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Friedrich von Wieser

THE LAW OF POWER
Das Gesetz der Macht, 1926

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When in the mid-twenties, having long made his mark as one of the founders of the Austrian school of economics, Wieser wrote his magnum opus, he cut a broad swath through the social sciences in historical perspective. His magnificent overview, his masterful grasp of the totality of man as a social animal in multiple power relationships, is reminiscent of the work of Schumpeter, the great Austrian of the next generation, whom Viner in his obituary called one of the last polymaths of the 20th century.

Although many world wars had been fought prior to the one witnessed by Wieser shortly before he went to work on "The Law of Power", probably none had been so designated by historiographers. But by the early 1920s the military clash of 1914-1918 had come to be viewed as geographically farther-reaching than any of its predecessors; hence reference to the World War in "The Law of Power" identifies what the next generation, experiencing the holocaust of 1939-1945, came to call World War I.

Wieser dispensed almost entirely with footnotes, i.e., he gave no references, as they are nowadays understood, to the work of others. He assumed that the reader is familiar with the writings of dozens of historians, sociologists, economists, and psychologists. Most of these probably still loomed large on the scientific firmament at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century, but for the post-World War II student of human affairs some names no longer have the ring of familiarity. What is more, in many cases it is virtually impossible to determine which ideas elaborated in "The Law of Power" originated with Wieser and which he may have drawn from the work of others. In some cases the author expresses these ideas with rare felicity, in other cases their presentation is rather turgid.

The author takes for granted a strong base in Latin. Certain terms or phrases of this foundation language of the educated person appear throughout the work, sometimes in quotes and sometimes italicized. Except for one Greek phrase, I have abstained from translating into English foreign language bits in order to give the reader some idea of how much graduates from advanced educational institutions half a century ago were supposed to be able to accommodate without translation props.

A related question is whether German words which have become accepted in the English language should be identified as such. I have followed the practice of underlining (and capitalizing) those which I understand to have become well entrenched, such as Weltanschauung, Realpolitik, Junker, etc.

A much more substantial problem is the fact, however, that a number of German terms used by Wieser often escape unambiguous rendition in English. This is partly because they are too general (e.g., are "Werkgemeinschaften" "work associations" or "task forces," or are "gesellschaftliche Werke" "collective works" or "collective deeds" or "collective accomplishments"?), and partly because we have largely discarded notions which smack of racial prejudice (e.g., we no longer talk of "edle Naturvolker" or "primitive peoples of superior blood," alias "high-born or

racially superior primitive peoples"). A slippery term of ancient standing is "Kultur"; thus, should "Kulturbegründung" be equated with "initiation of culture" or the "establishment of civilization"? (Somewhat arbitrarily, I have translated "Kulturvolker" into "culture peoples" rather than just "civilized tribes," or like phrases.)

I am not sure just what Wieser meant by "Massentechnik", which appears in many places,¹ hence have used the neutral word "mass technique," feeling strongly that the author meant something beyond "mass production techniques." Even more quizzical are passages such as the following² to which Wieser gave special emphasis: "Das Gesamtwerk der Zwangsgemeinschaften und Einheitsverbände hat immer die offene persönliche Führung zur Voraussetzung...." which I have, somewhat uneasily because I am nebulous about what Wieser was driving at, translated as follows: "The total accomplishments of the coercive and unit associations are always based on open personal leadership...."

Another "teaser" occurs in Wieser's discussion³ of the division of the power in state and society. It appeared least problematic to me to translate the title of the second section of that chapter, "Ordnungsmächte, Lebensmächte und Kulturmächte", as "Public Order Powers, Welfare Powers, and Culture Powers."

I am not sure what Wieser meant by the "Trieb zum Maximum", in the title of section 4 of the same chapter,¹ hence I have committed myself to a literal rendition, "Drive for the Maximum...⁵

In discussing the appropriate posture of the "dominant power" relative to the other powers, Wieser remarks: "Sie [i.e., the dominant power] wird darauf bestehen, dass keine andere Macht in ihre vorbehaltenen Zirkel storend eingreife, wird dabei aber doch das Stammgebiet der andern schonen müssen."⁶ In such cases of vagueness I have given vent to the translator's frustration by using quotation marks to identify dubious terms, as shown by the inner quotes: "It will insist that no other power intrude upon its 'reserved circles,' but at the same time it will have to keep its hands off the 'ancestral ground' of the others."

The word "Bußgertum" occurs, as expected, in diverse contexts; I have relied on intuition in rendering it now as "bourgeoisie," now as "middle class(es)."

Wieser makes many references to "Umsturz," occasionally in connection with events of World War I.⁷ But whether he meant a particular revolution or a more general upheaval, perhaps the entire reordering of values brought about by the outcome of that war, remains unclear.

Chapter VIII deals with "Die gesellschaftliche Willensbestimmung" and appeals to allude to the process of "social decision-making." Accordingly, in Section A of this chapter, Wieser distinguished between "personal and collective decision-making" (or "persönliche und gesellschaftliche Willensbestimmung").

I have vacillated between "leader of the mind" and "soul leader" in seeking an equivalent for "Seelenführer."

In searching for "the historic truth about self-determination of the people"⁸ Wieser observed: "In der Induktionsreihe der Geschichte zeugen die Jahrtausende für die Zwangsbestimmung, und nur Jahrzehnte...zeugen für die Selbstbestimmung." I hope to have captured the meaning of the first phrase of this sentence by looking for a "stages view of history."

As is well known, one of the most treacherous German words is "Sinn." Where I felt uncertain about the author's intended meaning,⁹ I have translated it as "sense" (rather than "meaning," "interpretation," "idea," "purpose").

At the beginning of the chapter'¹⁰ devoted to "The Law of Increasing Freedom and Equality", the author dealt with "Aggregationszuständen." I hope that "state of social relations" adequately covers Wieser's notion of "der gesellschaftliche Aggregationszustand", just as I hope that "work associations" ("task forces"?) comes close to his understanding of "Werkgemeinschaften."''

I assume that the "Kraft zur Freiheit, die dem englischen Volke eigen ist"¹² is captured by "the impulse to freedom," rather than "strength for freedom," which is particular to the English people."

I am not sure whether the title of section 1, "About the Theory of the Coincidences in History" — "Ueber die Lehre von den Gleichzeitigkeiten der Geschichte" — of chapter XV is appropriately chosen, because what the author in the text discussed is a "law of parallel historical development" — "Gesetz der geschichtlichen Gleichlaufigkeit" (my emphasis). I suspect, but cannot prove, an inadvertent equating of two different notions.

Wieser's distinction between "peoples" and "nations" remains opaque, and so does his idea of what happens when'¹³ "the peoples deepened into nations" — "Die Völker haben sich zu Nationen vertieft" or why'¹⁴ the Greeks and the Romans were "culture peoples" ("Kulturvolker") but not "culture nations" ("Kulturnationen").

I feel less than comfortable with the translation of "Die freien Engländer wurden ein weltgebietendes Herrenvolk"¹⁵ into "The free English became a world-commanding master race" because of the absence of a connotation of racial superiority of the English over the French or the Germans during the time of colonial rule.

Wieser's division of the work of society into "Sonderwerk" and "Gesamtwerk"¹⁶ I have incorporated into the conceptual pair "special undertakings" and "collective undertakings" (rather than "individual" and "social" undertakings) because in the former success essentially concerns the acting individual alone, whereas in the case of collective undertakings the general effect is at stake.

Along a different line, there are also instances of what I will call "blackout," i.e., where recourse to modern dictionaries has been of no avail. In the first of three different cases Wieser wrote: "Wie zu seiner Zeit der Grundherr die Bauern zu besitzlosen Landarbeitern abgestiftet hatte [my emphasis], so drückte jetzt der Fabriksherr...die selbständigen Gewerbsmeister in die Schicht der Lohnarbeiter hinunter." I have guessed at the mysterious word "abstiften" by using the English term "degrade," thus: "As in his time the lord had degraded the peasants to the status of landless workers, so the manufacturer..." In the second case the author talks of a "geringe Zahl übermächtiger und übermutiger Optimaten" [my emphasis], die "über eine Masse von verarmten Kolonen und Sklaven gebot," which I have glibly Anglicized into "a small number of too powerful and arrogant optimates....," thereby at least suggesting the idea of self-centered wealthy persons being solely concerned with optimizing their own welfare at the expense of their subjects. Finally, when Wieser condemns film makers for using movie theaters as means for disseminating slanderous war propaganda, he suggests that Dante would have been moved "die verleumderischen Veranstalter in eine der argsten Bulgen des Inferno zu verweisen." Iq Not being able to find out the meaning of "Bulgen", I have weakly generalized by referring to "one of the worst habitats [in both cases my emphasis] of the Inferno."

Before turning to a different, and final, matter I cannot suppress my delight qua economist over a passage in Wieser's discussion of "The Capitalist Enterprise" in chapter XVIII, where he aptly anticipates what much later came to be known as money illusion. For he wrote: "It may be that the men and women who followed the entrepreneur's call allowed themselves to be deceived by the figure of the money wage because they were unable to foresee the level of their necessary expenditures...."

I have never read a book which so abounds with references to "Gesetz des (der)..." or "law of..." Surely one may overdo this practice by using "law" when merely referring to some observed behavioral principle or tendency. Except for the "Law of Small Numbers" — "Gesetz der kleinen Zahl" — which occurs in chs. I, II, III, X, XIV, XV, and XVI, and which I have capitalized in accordance with accepted English usage, I have used lower case letters in giving the English version of these so-called laws. It may be of interest to the reader that, in the order of first occurrence, he will encounter the following "laws":

"Gesetz des gesellschaftlichen Wachstums," or "law of social growth" (Ch. II);

"Gesetz des Erfolges," or "law of success" (Chs. V, XII, XIII, and XIV, Section B);

"Glaubensgesetz," or "law of faith" (Ch. VII);

"Moralgesetz," "Sittengesetz," or "law of ethics" (Ch. VII);

"(inneres) Gesetz der geschichtlichen Bildung," or "(internal) law of historical formation" (Ch. IX);

"Gesetz der Massentechnik," or "law of mass technique" (Ch. X);

"Gesetz der abnehmenden Gewalt," or "law of decreasing (diminishing) force" (Chs. XII and XIII);

"Gesetz der Gewalt," or "law of force" (Chs. XII and XIII);

"Gesetz der höchsten Kraft," or "law of greatest (highest) strength" (Chs. XII and XIII);

"Gesetz des Parteiinteresses," or "law of party interests" (Ch. XII);

"(allgemeines) Lebensgesetz," or "(general) law of life" (Ch. XII);

"Gesetz der zunehmenden Freiheit und Gleichheit," or "law of increasing freedom and equality" (Ch. XIII);

"Gesetz der Gleichheit," or "law of equality" (Ch. XIII);

"(Friedens) gesetz der Freiheit," or "(peacetime) law of liberty" (Ch. XIII);

"Gesetz der geschichtlichen Wellenbewegung," or "law of historical wave motion" (Ch. XIV);

"Gesetz der geschichtlichen Gleichlaufigkeit," or "law of parallel historical development" (Ch. XV);

"Bevölkerungsgesetz," or "law of population" (Ch. XV);

"Gesetz der Erhaltung des Starksten," or "law of survival of the fittest" (Ch. XVII);

"Gesetz des Kreislaufes," or "law of circulation" (Ch. XIX, Section B).

I gratefully acknowledge the help of my colleague, Tom Iwand, in smoothing out some rough spots in the draft of the translation, and of Warren Samuels, the competent interpreter of the Wieser Weltanschauung, whose attention to detail yielded the discovery of those rough spots.

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FOOTNOTES

¹E.g., Chs. III, IV, VIII.

2Ch. in.

3ch. v.

4Ch. v.

is this the same as the "Trieb ins Grosse," or "Urge to Achieve Great Things"? See Ch. XV.

6Ch. v.

?E.g., Ch. VII.

8Ch. VIII, Section C.

in Section E of Ch. X.

10Ch. XII.

¹¹Ch. II.

12Ch. XIV.

13ch. xv.

14Ch. XVII.

15Ch. XVII.

16Ch. XVIII, Section A.

17Ch. XII.

18Ch. XIV.

19ch. XVIII, Section D.

INTRODUCTION

Warren J. Samuels

Friedrich von Wieser (1851-1926) was one of the unusual social scientists who, having formed, relatively early in life, inklings of a vision of a general model of society and perhaps of history, managed to marshal their energies and research to produce eventually, perhaps late in life, an opus articulating that vision. In Wieser's case, *Das Gesetz der Macht* was published only a few months before his death. For most thinkers, the road to the production of an elaborate statement of their grand view of society is diverted by much narrower and often much more technical work, if not also by the demands of teaching, administrative work, and possibly public service. Furthermore, in a world of increasingly specialized intellectual disciplines, it is manifestly difficult and readily perceived as unrealistically ambitious to generalize across, much less to master, several social sciences. Adam Smith came close in producing two-thirds of a trilogy focusing on the moral sentiments, self-interest and the market, and law (and fortunately we have several sets of student notes on his lectures in the unpublished area, jurisprudence). Karl Marx, of course, produced a system which, whatever its ambiguities and problems, stands among the world's great intellectual achievements. Of lesser historic significance, but not much if at all less an intellectual accomplishment, is the work of Max Weber, culminating in the integration of his thinking on polity, economy, and society,² as well as the *Treatise on General Sociology*³ of Vilfredo Pareto.

Wieser is well known for his technical studies as a leading member of the Austrian school of economics. He advanced and strengthened the Austrian theory of subjective, marginal utility. He developed the idea that cost involves lost utility, the notion of opportunity cost. He also developed the theory of imputation, which explains the valuation of factors of production in terms of their contribution to the utility status of final output, the value of inputs being derived from the utility of the final consumer goods which they help produce. In all these respects Wieser cemented the Austrian vision of utility as the central operating principle of the economy, and perforce of economic theory, active on both demand and supply sides of the market.

Wieser also had a career in public service. He was appointed to the Upper House of the Austrian legislature and also served as Minister of Commerce in the last two Cabinets of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Earlier in life he worked for seven years in the Ministry of Finance of Lower Austria.⁴

Throughout his adult life Wieser had what his student, Joseph Schumpeter, was to call a vision. Wieser's vision centered not on the static mechanics of individual utility but on society and history, on what may be called either historical sociology or sociological history.⁵ The principal elements of the vision were three: society undergoing evolution in form and structure, the role of leadership in all human activities, and

power as the fundamental category of social, political, and economic analysis. Common to all three is the notion of hierarchy. The model of the economy as a grand interplay of utility functions was to be ensconced in a larger model of power. If value depended upon marginal utility it also depended upon social stratification, that is, upon the social arrangements which helped form utility functions and, especially, which gave weights to the respective preferences of different individuals and groups. Value itself was largely eclipsed, as Wieser felt the need to concentrate on what we would now call the formation and operation of the institutions and mechanisms of social control and social change. Aspects of the whole and certain general principles of the central vision were presented in earlier writings, but Wieser's thought culminated in the remarkable work, *Das Gesetz der Macht*, which is here published for the first time in English translation.

Wieser is to be compared with Marx, Weber, and Pareto for his architectonic vision and grasp. As a theorist of social class Wieser is in the same league with them and with Robert Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Schumpeter. As an analyst who interpreted society, polity, and economy in terms reducible to the interactive categories of power, psychology, and knowledge — typically emphasizing the importance of power and psychology and how psychology and knowledge (belief system) are manipulated by and in the interest of power — Wieser is to be compared with Pareto, Schumpeter, Weber, Werner Sombart, and, more recently, John Kenneth Galbraith. His ideas also must be seen as having been influenced by the work of Marx, Weber, Pareto, Gustave Le Bon, Georges Sorel, Emile Durkheim, and Gabriel Tarde, among others. Although by the mid-1920s there had been considerable first-rate and influential intellectual activities in the fields in which he worked, involving the foregoing as well as other names, Wieser only rarely cited other writers and apparently relied principally on his own intellect rather than on close work in the existing literature. Nonetheless, Wieser's analysis very much reflects both the work of others and certain interests, ideas, and themes relatively common to the period of his adult life, especially among continental writers. To recognize that, however, is not to minimize his own accomplishments, which extended beyond synthesis. Wieser's analysis is quite original in a number of respects. Perhaps more important, he worked on truly fundamental problems of analysis and interpretation.

The place of *Das Gesetz der Macht* in Wieser's overall scheme of thought is suggested by noting the contents of his two other principal and previously translated works, *Natural Value*¹ and *Social Economics*.² In the earlier book Wieser presented the marginal utility theory of value, exchange value in relation to "natural value," the theory of imputation, the sacrifice-of-opportunity theory of cost, and a brief examination of public expenditures and taxation in the light of marginal utility theory. By "natural value" Wieser meant "that value which arises from the social relation between amount of goods and utility, or value as it would exist in the communist state... Natural value is one element in the formation of exchange value. It does not, however, enter simply and thoroughly into exchange value. On the one side, it is disturbed by human imperfection, by error, fraud, force, chance; and on the other, by the present order of society,

by the existence of private property, and by the differences between rich and poor, — as a consequence of which latter a second element mingles itself in the formation of exchange value, namely, purchasing power."³

Among other things, natural value would arise from individual subjective valuations of goods under the circumstance that each individual's preferences counted the same as all others'. In the real world, utilities — thus demand functions and exchange values based upon utilities — were stratified because of inequality in the distribution of wealth, that is, the differentiation of mankind into rich and poor.¹¹¹ In *Natural Value*, Wieser was principally interested in articulating the marginal utility theory of value. In isolating the domain of marginal utility he felt an obvious need to identify inequality as a key factor affecting the way in which subjective valuation operated in the real world. Some notion of economic power structure was necessary to the weighting of individuals' preferences. Wieser's focus on marginal utility, opportunity cost, and the process of imputation led him, perhaps ironically, to recognize stratification as an important factor from which he could abstract by creating the fiction of a communist society.¹¹

Power and utility¹² became the twin organizing principles of Wieser's *Social Economics*, a book described by Oskar Morgenstern in 1927 as "the greatest systematic treatise that has been written by an Austrian in which the principle of marginal utility is analyzed in all its ramifications."¹³ The first part of the book examines the abstract individual (but not the isolated Robinson Crusoe) independent of specific social arrangements and presents the fundamentals of marginal utility theory. The second part examines the individual within the specific institutional arrangements of the modern economy, inclusive of the state but without reference to specific state actions, particularly the constitution of the nominally private economy rooted in power, private property, and the law of property. The third part again examines briefly public expenditures and taxation in the light of marginal utility analysis, largely but not entirely independent of considerations of power and class. The final part amounts to a survey of topics in international economics, particularly international prices and balances of payments and trade, touching somewhat on the play of power in international economic relations.

Expectably, Wieser explores the universal operation of utility and opportunity cost in the valuation of consumer goods, capital goods, and other factors of production. Even when the abstract individual is the center of analytical attention, however, Wieser does not take the individual and his/her preferences and needs as given: These latter are socio-culturally conditioned.¹¹¹ Moreover, in the social economy, the individual operates within an institutional structure and social control (which may be so taken for granted as to appear "natural"). Society is divided into leaders and following masses. Social power is understood as, in part, class power. The role of law and of education is, in part, the reproduction of social structure. There is stratification of social* political, economic relations and therefore of utilities and values (prices). Power¹¹

signifies that marginal utilities and therefore prices are stratified. The market gives effect, in its allocation of resources, to hierarchical relations effectuated, reinforced, and altered through hierarchical institutions. These hierarchies are given direct market impact through private choice based on wealth and social position, with stratification operating through both demand and supply sides via the distribution of wealth, institutions, and noncompetitive (monopoloid) conditions. Realized economic welfare is a function of the actual stratified economy.

There are other themes in Social Economics which presage the discussion in *Das Gesetz der Macht*. Both the history and the operation of the capitalist economy are explicated in terms of power. Property as a form of power is critical to the historic success of the modern economy. So also are unions and the state as vehicles for working out new power relations balances of power, and welfare results. Leadership, perhaps especially anonymous leaders arising from the masses, is critical to all economic systems, socialism included. The individual is a social being who develops through "social education."¹⁵ Historical evolution is profoundly influenced by "success" and by the hold on the minds of the many of the successes of the few: "Success is the driving force that moves the masses to copy the example of the leaders."

In contrast with Natural Value, Social Economics includes explicitly normative discussions^{v/f} conjoined to positive description and interpretation which can stand independent from the normative views. Power exists and is subject to being checked by other power players. "Powerful persons are merely in a position, in building up the economic organization, to carry through their personal interests rather than the general interest. Thus they are able, at those points which they regard as critical, to replace the social mind by their OWN."¹⁶ Far from hypothesizing that pursuit of self-interest is consistent with realization of the social interest, Wieser argues that a truly social theory "will point the way to needed reform," especially furnishing "a sound theoretical basis for freedom and also for restrictions on freedom."¹⁹ This is part of the struggle for power in society, one dimension of which involves the conflict between the economic order erected by the bourgeois class and the "counter-reform of the economic order proposed" by the proletariat. Derivative from this conflict are the conflicts between the bourgeois and socialist thinkers and between their respective cases. Both classical and socialist economic theory have presented supporting cases for their visions of economic reality. Each has loopholes, deficiencies, and has gone to extremes; both have competed for control of public opinion. The socialist has pointed to the economic consequences of stratified power and the classical theorist to the consequences of freedom. In Wieser's view, "one must hold himself aloof from the excesses of the individualistic exposition, but the explanation must still run in terms of the individual," and "true freedom does not consist in total lack of control. It consists rather in a relation of the individual to society."²²

Private power is dependent upon the law, and the law is in part a creation of private power. Property is power; property is one of the forms taken by power. Property power is partly a

matter of formal law but also of unwritten law.²³ The state, consequently, is an "indispensable factor"^{2*1} in the social economy, and its operation and performance must be examined objectively. In part this is because the exercise of state power is derivative of leader-mass relationships. "The fate of society is dependent on the relationship of leadership and the masses," and "social power is most marked when these groups are legally superior and subordinate."^{2y} One problem is that in a hierarchical system "legal freedom of contract as matter of fact shrinks into an extremely limited freedom of choice."^{2y}

The crux of the normative issue lies, according to Wieser, in the questions: "Is private property an institution of economic endeavor or is it not, much more properly, to be called an institution of superior power? Or, to be more precise, is private property an institution subservient to the economic requirements of society, or is it merely the creature and tool of those who wield social-economic power?"^y Wieser's answer, which is quite complex and open-ended, indicates that he is not willing to take as given the specifics of the then-existing system of property, nor is he willing to reject private property. There is "great inequality between the rich and the poor." He argues that "goods should never be applied to lower needs, while higher needs call for satisfaction and could be covered accordingly. But the private constitution of economy permits the rich to satisfy their luxurious needs, while the poor are scarcely able to satisfy the needs of this existence."^{2°} Yet, he is not convinced that major change of the system will benefit the poor: "It may well be that a system of rules, which distributes very unequally the enormous gains to which it is instrumental, is after all more beneficial to the mass of the citizens than another, doling out its much smaller proceeds according to 'principles of right and reason.'" * The future of the specifics of the institution of property, then, is at the heart of the problem of the status of the existing order. "The extreme partisans [sic] of the prevailing order decline to recognize the evils of the existing disproportion of economic power... The opponents of the existing order look upon it as nothing more than a contrivance to serve the egoistic interest of those in power."³⁰ But "even the socialist state of the future will need leadership; will, by leadership, create power; and, as the outgrowth of power, there will again be despotism, under the pressure of circumstances, whenever the masses are not sufficiently strong to offer resistance to the prevailing leaders."³¹

One final point made by Wieser echoes Natural Value: He argues that the theoretical foundation for the capitalist system handed down by the classical economists, specifically "the theorem that private freedom guarantees the attainable maximum of social utility, is no longer regarded as sacred." He particularly stresses that the teachings of the classical doctrine "are valid only under conditions of a general equality of forces. Where this equality does not prevail, complete freedom can only result in disadvantages to the weak."³² In time, accordingly, the "state will feel it a duty to provide as far as may lie in its power the public means of protecting the life values of the laboring class."³³ To an economist the argument that traditional

microeconomics requires a general equality of power is striking and radical, whatever the implications for public policy.

Wieser did not in *Social Economics* provide a calculus for reform or for evaluating received arrangements. But, unlike so many others, for whom traditional doctrine is a rationalization of the regnant economic system whatever its constitution of private power (to use Wieser's term), Wieser was willing to confront ~~that doctrine~~ doctrine with the realities (as he perceived them) of power and thus treated the respective cases of defender and opponent of the existing order with understanding. Wieser was more interested in comprehending the power play at the heart of issues of reform and public policy than in providing a propaganda for one side or the other. He understood the dynamics of the actual historical evolution and operation of power. He understood the inevitable hierarchical tendencies in society. He was not taken in by ideological legitimations on either side. He was able to identify, in a relatively neutral manner, the critical analytical and policy issues.

Wieser, then, was able to integrate power and utility:

Price is a social institution, not simply because its magnitude is the result of a universal appraisal of value by society; it is so as the result of a social contest for the possession of the offered supply — a contest between individuals of varying appreciation and varying powers of demand. The maximum offer of the marginal stratum is decisive. Therefore price does not take its standard from the marginal utility as such, but from a stratified marginal utility.³⁴

This was in microeconomics. In what has come to be called macroeconomics: "The structure of the acquisitive community and the formation of income are always determined by the stratification of the people."³⁵ Whatever one thinks of the equality requirements, explanation of the working of economic reality necessitated, in Wieser's view, recourse to the analysis of utility, power, and stratification (inequality).

Turning now to *Das Gesetz der Macht*, as Professor Kuhn remarks in his Translator's Note, Wieser used "Gesetz" rather freely throughout the book. As I shall indicate below, several specific "laws" are very important to Wieser's arguments. The use of ~~Gesetz~~ in the title, which does literally translate "The Law of Power," does not signify a particular analytical or interpretive law. The "law of power" comprises an assertion of the primary importance of power in society, polity, and economy. Thus Wieser begins his Preface with this statement: "The people of the world stand under the principle of power." Power is the critical aspect of organized life, the important concept for analysis, and it is amenable to objective analysis, although hitherto largely neglected by social scientists and historians.³⁵ Law is thus used in the title in much the same way one may use the term "principle of utility" to indicate the reign (overriding importance) of the twin masters of pleasure and pain,

which is quite different from, for example Malthus's law of population or Say's Law.

Structurally, the book is divided into three major sections. The first outlines the principal factors comprising the general structure of power and society, especially the law of small numbers, power, leadership, leader-masses relations, the psychology of power, legal and nonlegal social control institutions, and aspects of collective decision-making. The second part presents the elements of Wieser's historical analysis of the reality (or, as he calls, it, the "work") of power, including the forms and transformation of historical power; the role of historical education; the laws of force, decreasing force, and increasing freedom and equality; the overriding law of small numbers; and the fundamental historical circulation of power. The third part, "The Ways of Power at the Present Time," focuses on liberalism; nationalism; the modern organs of power (classes, parties, press, economic organizations, and dictatorship); and the balance of power at the time; in each case he uses the concepts, the themes, and especially the laws developed earlier.

As the reader of the work will quickly observe, *Das Gesetz der Macht* encompasses both a model of interpretation of history and a holistic, albeit selective, treatment of society. Wieser's is a multi-millennial view, a particular interpretation of history which, while often focused on the century preceding the 1920s, identifies trends emerging during several thousand years of Western history as well as trend manifestations discernible within shorter periods. (That different interpretations can be given to history and to its ostensible manifestations is not of particular interest here to Wieser.) But taking account of this truly long view is indispensable to understanding the details of Wieser's historical analysis, particularly his most important specific laws.

As a theory of society as a whole, Wieser's analysis bridges, and to a limited extent integrates, several major social science themes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In a manner resembling the broad but nonetheless limited scope of Pareto's *Treatise on General Sociology*, Wieser's holistic analysis of society emphasizes power, power play, the psychology of power, and the role of belief systems; it does not directly include the workings of marginal utility in the market, which Wieser (as had Pareto) had discussed so effectively in his earlier works, although certain aspects of the evolving economic power structure found in *Social Economics* also are presented here.

If by political is meant having to do with matters of choice and power, then *Das Gesetz der Macht* is a work chiefly of both political economy and political sociology. Along with the works of such other writers as Marx, Pareto, Weber, and, to some extent, Schumpeter and Galbraith, this book integrates in terms of power the fields of economics, politics, and sociology. A leading member of the Austrian school of economics, which has come to emphasize doctrinally a stringent methodological individualism, thus also developed (here and in his earlier books, but most elaborately here) a sophisticated and thorough methodologically collectivist analysis. As political economy, Wieser analyzes the economy as a system of power, focusing in part on

the importance of class, the economic manifestations of leader-masses interaction, the specific power foundations of the economic system, and the importance of the interactions between nominally legal and economic processes. As political sociology, Wieser analyzes in terms of power and (what amounts to power) both legal and nonlegal social control as alternative paradigms, focusing throughout on a sociology of law, the internalization of legal and moral norms, the complexities of hierarchical relations, the social psychology of power, leader-masses interactions, and such specific topics as dictatorship, political parties, and the political (or party) press.

Wieser is, if anything, extraordinarily candid in matters of class, power, and hierarchy in general. Unlike Pareto, among others, Wieser evidences no anxiety as to possible adverse consequences of candor and demystification in social science for the status quo processes of social control and order.

Wieser was neither ideologue nor high priest. He presents no apologia for any dominant class, although he can be cited favorably by the ins and the outs and by the high and the low. He was a major contributor to a positive political economy and political sociology. He transcends (as much, perhaps, as a writer can) the popular legitimizing slogans and myths of law, politics, economics, and power. On the contrary, he identifies alternative idealized conceptions (for example, of the state). The phenomena of power, leader-masses interactions, and belief systems were something to be explored, mapped, and used to interpret history and society. Power and class were neither dirty names nor sensitive secrets. This does not mean that his discussions fail to reflect his time and location, for example, the insecurities of the nations and peoples of Central and South-eastern Europe (XVII), the prevalence of newspapers with party connections and editorial lines (XVIII.D), and his increasingly declassé status as the Empire passed into history. Nor does it mean that he never makes his own normative views known on various subjects, for example, that true democracy is freedom (V.6), that conflicts over rights are legitimate (VI.4), that complementary antagonists are necessary to produce a balanced way of life (VIII.A.3), that democracy requires a structure in which no single organization represses the others (VIII.C.3), that the masses' love of liberty is the counterbalance to the leaders' will to power necessary for a free society (XVIII.A.2), and so on.

Wieser also was sensitive and prescient regarding post-World War I developments in Europe, particularly centering around reparations, fascism, Bolshevism, the League of Nations, and the factors now known to have led to World War II (XVIII.F.5-7; XIX.A, B.2-4), although his portrayal of trade unions (for example, XVIII.B.5, E.3) and plutocracy (for example, XVIII.E.1,5; XVI.4) is more controversial.

Wieser's analysis of power centers on the Law of Small Numbers: rule, law-making, and ownership of the means of production — in short, all forms of decision-making are in the hands of a relative few. (Wieser thus goes far beyond Pareto's law of concentrated income distribution.) Accordingly, much of his discussion treats ubiquitous hierarchical institutions and relationships, often stressing the relations between leader(s) and

masses in all organizations, including the state. I shall return to the Law of Small Numbers below, but at this point I want to indicate not only that this law is one of several laws but also that Wieser's analysis of power is far more multifaceted and complex than can be summarized in a handful of laws.

Power exists, in Wieser's view, in a parallelogram of interdependencies, in a multiplicity of power relationships and power situations, not typically in situations in which one individual is under the control of another. Power is not entirely impersonal and anonymous but is largely so (III.3). Power generally operates unconsciously and inconspicuously (1.3). Power often exists as command over the human mind, belief systems which define reality and channel behavior (1.2; VI.5). Power is at the root of economic struggle and governs the operation of the economy (1.4). Force is historically important, for example, in regard to social order and historical education (1.7; XIII.1; XVIII.F.6; XIX.B.2-6). Force yields an aura of power (1.7), but, and much more important, it is transformed into power by the psychology of power (1.7; XVIII.B.4). The origin of power is in success (in re the roles of historical education, see below). Legal and nonlegal institutions of social control are social powers (V.2 and passim); power is social control (V.2; VI.1). Individuals and organizations seek self-preservation and exhibit a drive for, and the maintenance of, power (IV.7; V.4,7; VIII.A.3, C.2). Power play, power limiting power, and competition are ubiquitous (V.1,4,5,7; VIII.A.3, C.3; XII.4; XIII.5; XVIII.A.3, F.3; XIX.B.2). The powerful know how to provide effective legal protection for their interests (VI.2,9), as part of the contest for control of the state (XII.8; XI.1), including ubiquitous conflict over rights (VI.4,6). Decision-making is oriented more toward the attainment and retention of power than the achievement of substantive purpose (VIII.A.2; XIX.B.1). Social order is both a dependent and independent variable with regard to power (VIII.B.1; IX.5). Both entrenched and expanding powers engage in continual struggle (X.1,8,10), although relationships of conflict, alliance, and symbiosis are found among the historical powers (X.5). History is largely the adaptive transformation of power (X.10), for example as both leaders and masses mature from historical education. The transformation of power involves a historical circulation of power, comprising an expansion of the inner circle of the powerful (see below). Unions are organizations of opposition, not of leadership (XVIII.E.3). Capitalist enterprises are both leadership institutions and social powers, with power rivaling that of the state and often controlling governments (XVIII.A.3, E.1,4,7; II.4; III.3). Power is subject to selective perception: "We will always feel the powers that are useful to us to be beneficial aids for our affairs, to be powers of liberation, while perceiving those which hamper and crush us as powers of coercion — how could we react differently?" (II.3). — how reader will encounter such further points as: Balkanization means instability; the will to power lends courage, energy, and social dynamism; unused power atrophies; a nation either rules or is ruled; and the reality of power vis-a-vis mushy moralizing and idealism although, as we shall see, Wieser had a deep belief in the growing power of charity and peace, as products of historical education.

Two concepts employed in the foregoing discussion require amplification: "success" and "historical education." Wieser uses "success" to explain social decision-making and leadership selection. The origin of power is in success: Success attracts and permits survival, whereas failure repels (II.3* XV.2; XVIII.A.2). Force is transformed into power through the psychology of power: Successful leadership acquires (or produces) awe, confidence, and legitimacy (1.3). Success attracts following, or membership (II.2). Power is reinforced by success (II.4,6; XVII.1). Leadership selection is through success: The masses select in accordance with the test of success, from among the contending leaders (III.3,7; XIV.4). Success is thus a socializing vehicle, among other things a synchronization mechanism producing commonly held views (IV.1). Property, for example, is seen as sacred because of its consecration by success (VI.2). The social will is channeled by the gradual coordination of energy along successful paths (VIII.A.3). Capitalist leadership resides in its success in terms of production (XVI.3)* I shall have more to say about the interpretive and explanatory quality of the concept of "success," but it should be understood that Wieser intended to be taken quite literally: The course of history, so much a matter of trial and error and of contending parties, is profoundly influenced by both actual and perceived success. What succeeds, or what is perceived to have succeeded, survives. It constitutes the immediate turn on the path of history. Success is closely intertwined with the law of highest strength or supreme power: Success confirms and reinforces power, however problematic that power had been and remains. Of all the opportunities hitherto open to historical evolution, of all the prospective leaders, only the successful do in fact mark the actual course of history and leadership. Whatever and whoever fails falls by the wayside of history. Wieser seems to have understood this as a matter of both logic and experience. His participation in governance seems to have sensitized him to the psychology of power, including the role of the emotions which permit power to gain and retain its hold on the mind, functioning through actual or perceived success. That is, after all, the psychological dimension of political public relations in all societies.

The second concept is "historical education" (IX). History, to Wieser, has been a process of education. It comprises training in civic duties and in peaceful, cooperative activity (XII.1; XIX.B.5). Education exists in both school and life, the training of successive generations through formal and nonformal education (IX.6). The masses have learned from the experience of power (for example in military service, religion, limited cooperative ventures) to submit to a greater whole and to sense its successes as their own (IV.2). Through stern historical education the masses have been trained to participate in collective undertakings; moreover, through it leadership has been transformed from despotic to liberal leaders (VIII.A.2). Wieser thus notes the process of maturation of the masses in England, following the spread of the franchise, a process for which the way had been prepared by earlier maturation (XVIII.B.5). He notes that trade unions represent training in historical education (XVIII.B.5), union discipline constituting a form of moral self-education (XIX.A.2). He notes that the education of politicians requires them to be financially secure individuals engaged in a full-time vocation (XVIII.C.2; note the influence of Weber).

The absence of historical education, or of sufficient maturity, is the core of Wieser's theory of modern dictatorship, including fascism. These dictatorships are due to situations in which the masses, in his view, have power before their historical education (including what he calls their freedom organs (XIX.B.1)) has sufficiently advanced and they have adequately matured. They crave freedom and self-determination but lack the capacity for governance (XVIII.F.2-6; XIX.B.1). The function of law-and-order dictatorship is to abet the task of historical education (XVIII.F.6). Wieser is quite cold-blooded about this (and, of course, one is free to disagree with his interpretation). He is fully aware of the possibilities, indeed the ubiquity, of abuse of power (XVIII.D.4).

Whatever the means, one does learn from force (XII.5; XIII.1; XIX.B.1), i.e., the exercise of power has played or can play an educational role for all parties (IX; XVIII.A,B,F). Thus did Wieser see in prospective League of Nations' success in resolving small disputes the prospect of success in settling, short of war, larger conflicts, that is, a process of historical education. He also saw that this would require the transcendence of nationalism, for example, being able to admit national wrongs, that is, national reformation (XIX.B.2,4). The civilizing process is not something discussed frequently these days. With Wieser's multi-millennial perspective on European and world history, the process of historical, civilizing education became clearer.

Power is hierarchical: the Law of Small Numbers. The rival tendencies of hierarchy and equality together constitute the critical locus of tension in the operation and evolution of society (II.7). Thus Wieser contrasts Nietzsche's emphasis on the will to power of a true elite with his own: "The representative of the principle of power explained in this book is society in its tension between leader and masses" (Preface). Society and all organizations are hierarchical in structure. Stratification and leadership [itself hierarchical (III.4)] are ubiquitous (II.7; III). The practical problem is the relative rigidity of established stratified arrangements (XVI.1). Identification of class structure is difficult; although it is not a matter of economic division alone, it has been increasingly a matter of property versus unproperty, with ethnic, regional, religious, and dynastic factors still present but less important than formerly.

With regard to leaders and masses, Wieser makes a number of rather straightforward and, to him, fundamental points. The basic form of the constitution of society is found in the division between leader(s) and masses (III, XI). In it resides the fundamental division of power in society (III.1). The role of leadership, in its various forms (III.3) is to guide (III.2; XIV.1,3,4; XVIII.C.3) E.2). Among other things, the masses follow, either passively or actively, selecting between aspirants to (further) leadership on the basis of (perceived) success (III.6; IV.2,3; XI; XII.2). Because, in part, of ignorance and obfuscating belief systems, leader-masses interaction, considered as power play, is largely inconspicuous to the masses (1.3). Belief systems are used by leaders to control the masses (1.6). Success emanating from the work of the many will be credited to the few (1.7). Circumstances are important both in leader success

(III.8; IV.5) and in the transformation of leaders, who often are tamed and/or accommodate to new power realities (X.10; XII.2). Overall, leader-masses interaction is multifaceted and complex. Most critical for society, for its operation and its future, is the leadership selection process (III.5; VI.10). It undoubtedly was Wieser from whom Schumpeter learned "that the method by which a society chooses its leaders in what, for its particular structure, is the fundamental social function such as, for instance, was the function of the warrior in feudal society — is one of the most important things about a society, most important for its performance as well as for its fate."³⁷

Wieser's is clearly not a theory of power in the abstract. Although there is much theorizing and model-building in this book, his principal concern is the interpretation of history. Power, as the critical aspect of society, is the key to understanding the history of society, polity, and economy. Wieser's specific laws embody statements of general (and contradictory) tendencies with regard to power which he considered operative and observable throughout human history.

Historically, force is the first important law. Force is a mode of decision-making, of determining results (XIII.5). Force is paradoxically involved in the gradual transformation of predacious into social man (XII.1) through historical education. Force was more ubiquitous in the distant past but continues into the present as a viable and indeed necessary process of social decision-making, however much it is increasingly eclipsed by peace (XIX).

Second, there is the law of highest strength or of superior or supreme power or of success, terms which Wieser seems to use interchangeably. The crux of Wieser's argument — which, as with all these laws, is nowhere elaborately stated, his practice being to refer to general formulations of them — is that from contests between power players (for example, rival candidates for leadership power) emerge winners. These winners ipso facto represent highest strength, superior power, and success. Success so understood is to Wieser the principal adjustment mechanism in history (III.9; XII.5,7; XIII.5).

Third, there is the Law of Small Numbers, the law of most profound consequence and significance to Wieser, comprising the one theme (it encompasses, of course, the fact of leader-masses division) found throughout *Das Gesetz der Macht*. From the first paragraphs of the text Wieser stresses the historical fact of a rule, law-making, and ownership of the means of production by a few (1.1; X.7; XIV.1; in capitalism, XVI.4; XVIII.E.1,7; in socialism, XVIII.E.3). The universal and inevitable tendency is for power to concentrate, to stratify (I; II). The division between leaders and masses accordingly is fundamental in society and in all organizations: The technical requirements of mass action include the need for leadership (III.1; XI.1; XIV.1). Leadership guides (III.2). The masses develop their own (typically and importantly anonymous) leaders. Democracy involves leadership and the Law of Small Numbers no less than any other system (XIV.3).

Wieser argues, therefore, that there are two main trends of social growth. One is the tendency toward increasing stratification, toward greater hierarchy. The other is the trend toward the upward mobility of classes, particularly the rise of the masses (II.7). Although the law of continued hierarchic structure is never compromised, Wieser stresses that as between classes power has historically become more widely diffused. The lower strata become historically educated, increasingly sharing the rights of the upper strata, and the leaders they produce are coopted into the ruling ranks (II.6,7; III.5,9; X.10). Thus hierarchy continues, but in revised form and structure (XVI.1; XVII.3). The fourth law, therefore, is the law of upward mobility. A prime example was the new nineteenth-century economic system which both brought new strata into prominence and augmented the power of resistance of the masses (XVIII.A.3).

Closely related to, and not technically differentiated from the law of upward mobility, is a fifth, the law of increasing freedom and equality (XIII). Within the requirements of hierarchy, that is, of leadership and success (XIII.3-4), the masses (at any time those who are below the top strata of society) come to enjoy increasing rights and freedom in religious, political, and economic affairs (XIII.3). Legal equality is greater, and, again within continued hierarchic structures, there are wider opportunities for individual and class improvement (XVII.3). There is, therefore, a fundamental historical circulation of power. It is not solely, as it was with Pareto, a circulation of power among and within elite groups. It is a generally increasing expansion of the domain of effective power (XVII.3; XIX.B.1), a greater diffusion of power. Because of the needs of historical education, force and inequality are paradoxically necessary to achieve the historical circulation (diffusion) of power as well as unity and cultural heights (XIX.B.1). Whatever the necessary and/or actual vestiges of force and whatever the continued, necessary forms of hierarchy, in Wieser's view power has historically become more diffused, the freedom and promoting the equality of all persons.³³

The sixth and final principal law is that of decreasing force. It clearly is implicit in the argument supporting the laws of upward mobility and of increasing freedom and equality (although that is not to say that force has not been present in those movements). In Wieser's view, history manifests the gradual transformation of predacious into social man. Force has been a basic factor in this but, and this is critical, in time force has been increasingly replaced by law and morals; paradoxically, force permitted these to be generated by its success and by the experience of peace which (successful) force also produced (XII.1,3; XIII.1). It is only through the socialization of man that both decreasing force and increasing liberty have developed (XIII.5).

One possible generalization, or law, which Wieser specifically rejects is that of parallel historical development. He argues that there is no such law because there is no uniform historical pattern or periodization to be found in social growth (II.9; XV.1,4). Furthermore, the circulation of power cannot be categorized into world epochs (XV.6; although he did foresee the

hitherto subordinated nations throw off European dominance; see the discussion of imperialism, below).

Wieser's interpretation of history in terms of power centers on these laws regarding the evolution of force and the structure of power. His interpretation also is distinguished by a particular formulation of the notion of a circulation, actually an expansion or diffusion of the sphere, of power; by the role of success, through power and the psychology of power; and by the role of historical education. A number of other and somewhat subsidiary aspects may be noted. First, Wieser writes of the "task" of a people and how their success or failure to achieve its realization is critical to their history. For example, he points to the possibility of a conflict between a new historical task and the existing historical powers (IX.1; XII.9). (I shall have more to say about this below.)

Second, Wieser's overall analysis regarding force vis-a-vis peace is quite complex and nowhere fully stated. It clearly includes the following ideas: Successful force produces peace, which permits an increasing eclipse of force (XIII.3); and peace requires strength, which in turn requires force (XIX.B.6). Wieser may be perceived as glorifying force. He would respond that he was trying to be realistic and accurate in the light of history and a reasonable interpretation thereof. He would cite the generic situation in which warring nobles continue to devastate the countryside and slaughter the population until one wins and imposes what tends to be called "unification," which leads, in Wieser's view, to a situation of peace and of historical education consequent to a particular episode of success. Perhaps the rebuttal to Wieser is an argument on a different plane: He envisions success as its own justification and is unwilling to apply other evaluative criteria. His reply likely would focus on the realism and accuracy argument.

Third, he acknowledges the consequences of the early upper class acquisition of land for rural bondage and subserviency and, in turn, for the proletariat recruited from the peasantry (XIV.2).

Fourth, he identifies the then-modern crisis as consisting in part of the conflict between faith and science (VII.4; X.8; XIX.A).

Fifth, Wieser argues that whereas earlier governments (states and cities) reflected and served the upper strata of social structure, and while hierarchical structures and forces remain at work, the modern state, whatever its form, serves the entire people (XVII; XVIII.B.1).

Sixth, Wieser, as were so many of his contemporaries, was shaken by the numbing realities of what in 1926 could be called the World War (Preface; XIX). That war truly opened, he thought, the era of world history (XIX.A.1).

A central theme dear to Wieser was the growth of peace and charity. He perceived in history, as a companion to the law of decreasing force, a movement toward the more tender emotions, to peace, toward a community of love (II.9; V.7-8; VIII.A.1). Game has replaced war. Indeed, he thought war was no longer a regular

occupation if one takes the perspective of several millenia (XII.2,9). Politics has replaced armed aggression (XII.2), especially within nations. Man has progressed: The extermination of the male progeny of defeated enemies has been replaced by subjugation and work. While the latter may not be ideal, they are more humane conditions; what is more, in being manifestations of an ordered life (even if in empires produced by successful conquest), they permitted the work of the mind and the growth of sensitivity and humaneness to develop (XII.1). They have permitted the instruction of the intellect and the will, the control of passion, the growth of the peace powers (XIX.B.1). Warfare reinforces certain emotions; peace others. As the felt duty of peace has come increasingly to prevail, the great leaders increasingly have come to champion peace and love, at least in comparison with earlier times (XII.8). The civilized state has replaced its scaffolding, the warring state (XII.9). Charity, or fellow feeling, has grown apace with peace, as an ethical proclamation of human rights in a community increasingly marked by moral sentiment and action under the banner of love (XIII.1). Adam Smith's notion of sympathy, or benevolence, requires cultivation. Nietzsche's conception of love as weakness and decadence has been increasingly repudiated (XIII.2). The future is with the peace seekers, the peace powers, the first great historical power of love having been the Roman church, especially in its defense of the indigent and oppressed (XIII.2). This was part of Wieser's interpretation of history. It also was his dream: "I have no more ardent desire than this: that this book contribute something to filling the hearts with the confidence that it be mankind's lot to land in the haven of peace at long last." Although he chooses "sides with the peace party," he recognizes that warfare will continue, as part of the process of historical education: Those who lost their lives in the World War were the "heroic martyrs of the historical work of mankind" (Preface) -- again the paradox of winning force producing the transcendence of force, peace.

The reader of *Das Gesetz der Macht* will encounter still other concepts. Wieser stresses the idea of social vigor and strength, as contrasted with disintegration, as the basis of social growth (II.9; V.3,5; VII.3; XII.1). He occasionally refers to a racial basis of leadership strata and of leadership stock, in part in regard to its replenishment through absorption from below (III.5). In doing so, he may be reflecting a turn-of-the-century social science preoccupation with questions of race, including explications in terms of invidious, racist comparisons. Wieser's apparently most important statement on the matter (which may still leave one uneasy, in the light of later Nazi theory and practice) is that the historical circulation of power is more important than race theory (XV.5). At the same point he also predicts that the world supremacy of Europe will be followed by an equalizing rise of the hitherto dominated peoples (see the above discussion of categorization of world epochs).

In the light of both Wieser's earlier writings and the principal themes of this book, his treatment of the question of the economic power structure should offer no surprises. Class structure is an empiric fact, necessarily to be accepted (II.4). It is also increasingly an economic phenomenon (VI.2; XVIII.B.4). Market structure, behavior, and performance are governed by legal and nonlegal social control (II.4; VI.2). The position of the

capitalist, especially the finance capitalist, and of the capitalist firm, is predominant, encompassing a system of private governance (however much by anonymous leaders) and control of the official government (II.4; III.3,9; XII.5; XVI.1,4; VIII.A.1, D.4, E.4,5). Capitalism, after all, is a system of leadership, a phase or facet of the larger historical evolution of power and of leader-masses relationships. Capitalism is essentially a bourgeois power phenomenon, and power under capitalism has to be comprehended in that context. Individualism, according to Wieser, has been the ideology of a particular hierarchic system (IV.4; VIII.B.1; XIII.4; XIV.3; XVI.1,4; XVIII.E.1). The classical theorem equating private and social interest was seen as very limited once the play of power is recognized. Nonetheless, there has been the rise into social power of the industrial workers (II.7; XII.5). The relative positions of bourgeoisie, peasantry, and proletariat at that time are examined in some detail (for example, XVII.3). One difference between Social Economics and Das Gesetz der Macht is that in the former Wieser tended to think in terms of power interfering with the operation of the market, whereas here the market inevitably is based on and gives effect to power. Power and utility are truly joined.

Nor did Wieser hesitate to discuss the question of imperialism at various points in the book. Imperialism is an aspect of the modern nation-state system (XVII), along with jealousy (V.1) and the spirit of war (XVIII.D.4). The World War was admittedly an imperialist struggle (XVII.7). Not unexpectedly, he finds that it was due to great nations seeking the territorial redivision of the world (XII.9). Imperialism is but a facet of the international division of economic power in which the capital-rich countries dominate (with labor and capital interests therein converging vis-a-vis the weak nations) (XVIII.E.4; XIX.A.2). The European domination of the world economy and division of labor he perceived as being terminated by the World War (XIX.A.1). As have other interpreters of imperialism, Wieser perceived the interdependence of foreign and domestic power struggles, typically centering on economic conflicts (1.4-5). Imperialism and war were both very much a result of conflicting economic interests, however much disguised (XVIII.E.4; XIX.A.1). He also perceived the increasingly predominant position of financial capital: Finance capitalists control government economic policy. They are among the real rulers of the world (XVIII.E.4). More subtle than many others, however, he recognized that dividing up the world, whether by force or by peaceful agreement (at least among the dividing powers), has been the natural state of affairs (XII.9; XIX.A.2). His considerable prescience is evident in his discussion of the apparent imperial powers: Russia is one, expansionary in the long run, a Bolshevik imperialism. The English are born imperialists. The United States is an imperial power capable of world domination. Japan is an Asian power against Europe. (XVII.7) He also identifies the corporation, already a national leadership organ, as increasingly a world leadership organ, supported by national power (XVIII.E.4).

In addition, Wieser's methodological (as contrasted with normative) collectivism reaches not only questions of social power relations vis-a-vis individual utility, but also the nature of the individual economic actor as a thoroughly socialized individual: "Even into the sphere of private life social powers

intrude. Private life is not isolated life — it is social life... Not only is private life always embedded in social life, but in addition it is always more or less oriented to it... Just as do private rights, so all of private life is socially conditioned" (II.4. emphasis deleted). "Personal energy manifests itself mostly only in the degree of independence by which the general norms are adapted to the personal circumstances. Of the legal freedom of action there remains for the majority of people practically only a certain freedom of choice with respect to the modalities by which they fulfill the common norms" (IV.4; see also IV.6,7; VI.1,2; IX.3; XI.4; XII.2; XVII.A.1,2). These ideas coming from a leading Austrian-school economist may surprise many readers.

Pervading Das Gesetz der Macht also are elements of the intertwining themes of the psychology of power and the role, including the manipulation, of ideas and belief systems in the operation and evolution of society, polity, and economy.

Finally, the degree of Wieser's candor and depth of analysis is indicated by the two facets of what can be called his constitutional relativism. First, he argues that society's total constitution is the sum of all its public (including the de jure constitution) and private constitutions, including the idea that the political constitution is only one of several interlocking public constitutions (III.9). Second, he maintains that constitutional provisions and phrases have meaning only through the ways in which they are interpreted by the forces and powers that be (III.3; X.9), including the idea that law is a result of power structure (VI.3; XIV.6,7).

The discerning and critical reader of Das Gesetz der Macht likely will be uncomfortable not only with certain substantive themes but also with one characteristic of Wieser's analysis. The modern social scientist works largely with deterministic analyses: Generally speaking, phenomena are related to one another in a manner which yields a unique, determinate result. Wieser's analysis does not. However, although his is a nondeterministic analysis, his language often expresses indeterminacy in deterministic language, a possibility due to the fact that ex post determinate results have been produced. Indeed, his discussion often claims, or seems to claim, determinacy.

Wieser's analysis is nondeterministic for two reasons. First, notwithstanding the specifics of his theories of power and history, his overall discussion, insofar as it may be applied to any particular segment of reality or conjunction of events, constitutes not a theory but a model. It is a set of factors and forces in juxtaposition to one another, permitting now one to be dominant and then another; there is no formula for establishing for purposes of specific prediction the pattern of dominance or, especially, the precise situations when one and then the other will be dominant. Second, the core of Wieser's analysis deals with power, power play, and the psychology of power, and it is the essence of its reality that the results of power play are not readily (but that is not to say not at all) reducible to predictive models, for a heavy component of circumstantial factors enters into the determination of the results in each power situation.

For example, Wieser writes of the law of force having to yield in the long run to the law of liberty (XIII.5). He also writes that "there is no doubt that the national history of every people which preserves its physical and mental health will end everywhere with the victory of the powers of peace over force and that the intervention of force necessary to clear away obstacles in the way of the powers of peace will become increasingly rare and short" (XII.4). This type of argument covers every possibility: It attempts to explain why peace is present and why force is present (actually no mean feat, however limited). It qualifies both by making an assumption of "physical and mental health" which is nowhere precisely defined. Aside from the more substantive assertion that peace in the long run will succeed over force, with regard to particular situations the argument explains everything and nothing.

As I interpret the nature of Wieser's analytical design, however, it is not to predict each and every particular historical phenomenon but to present the array of forces or tendencies which makes history in the large explicable, particularly a history in which power, and therefore the vagaries of social decision-making and confrontations, predominates. When he writes, after the fact, of a certain historical situation, that "the collapse clearly showed that the old historical leaderships had no internal power over the masses. The military defeat deprived them of all authority. The masses not only denied them their following, but turned openly against them, and the preponderance of the masses sealed their fate" (XVIII.F.7), he is attempting to explain the course of that situation in terms of his analysis (just as marginal utility analysis attempts to explain actual demand phenomena, ex post, not to predict them). But that analysis in its handling of the contests of force, the psychology of power and the complexities of leader-masses relations — could have explained quite different results, for example, one in which the old historical leadership had managed to retain its internal power over the masses and in which the latter did not deny the former their following, perhaps even after military defeat.

Wieser's analysis attempts to provide understanding of the forces at work, not to predict ex ante. Accordingly, it makes points which are true ex post. Its explanations, while exposed to alternative explanations, tend to carry the ring of truth inasmuch as they relate to actual phenomena which seem more or less nearly to fit the overall analysis. (Much ostensible "verification" in modern social science involves the selective referencing of actual phenomena to suggest, or assert, the truth of a theory.)

Accordingly, there is not one law for Wieser but several. His analysis involves a dialectical process existing among the several laws which manifests (and requires the analysis to recognize) divergent possibilities all covered, and in a general way predictable, by the laws. It is a multidimensional, if-then model.

Wieser did not limit himself, however, to providing understanding of the forces at work. One reason for his deterministic language is that he went farther and argued how well his understanding of the forces at work do in fact explain the actual

historical phenomena. A model in which successful force produces peace, which permits the increasing eclipse of force (XII.3), and in which peace requires strength, which requires force (XIX.B.6), covers every possibility. Whatever the interpretive power of the model, it is clearly awkward to claim that it explains each and every predominance of peace and each and every use of force, at least in a manner that provides predictive power. I dwell on this because some modern readers will fault Wieser's analysis for not being determinate, and others for pretending to be determinate while not actually being so. Wieser's discussion leaves him open properly to the latter charge, but not to the former. His is an interpretive model, not a predictive theory, however much he may have been carried away with its seeming closure, and he should not be condemned for not accomplishing what, as I see it, he did not attempt to achieve.

One important concept in Wieser's analysis which is greatly affected by such considerations is "success." Actual and/or perceived success, as we have seen, is the principal mechanism of historical selection in his model. But the notion of success is relativist. Success governs the results of power play, but victorious power play produces success. The analysis is tautological. Wieser likely would respond that all analytical systems have fundamental tautologies and that success nonetheless is a critical concept, given reality. It constitutes the mechanism, as it were, of historical selection. The course of history is marked by a path of success vis-a-vis other paths which might have been. Success in this context signifies survival, not necessarily the fittest in any noncircumstantial sense. If anything, any nuance, properly is to be added to the fact of survival per se, it is that success permits certain possibilities for the future to remain viable (at least until later successes rule out still others). Successes point to the failures, to the what-might-have-beens. Success, in Wieser's analysis, has no independent positive or normative, ex ante, test. It is circumstantial, episodic, and without external or internal value basis independent of the fact of survival. It is the sequence of successes, however, which mark the course of history.

Thus Wieser argues that the welfare and culture powers (legal and nonlegal social-control institutions) produce "welfare" and "culture." But welfare and culture are known not by any independent test but only in terms specific to the victorious powers' conceptions of welfare and culture.³⁹ Welfare and culture are specific to power structure and success. With rival contenders for success, each with its own criteria of welfare and culture, the real historical problem is to determine which criterion is to dominate. To establish the successful criterion is to establish the criterion of the victorious power, and vice versa. When Wieser argues that the masses select, in accordance with the test of success, from among the leaders (III.7), he does not mean to establish an independent test of success. The selection process is the test. If success is psychologically based, how can it be produced contrary to what is psychologically dominant (VIII.B.5)? To Wieser, success is not a predictive category. It is relativist and circumstantial. His point is that whatever succeeds governs the future, in part by attracting a following and in part by ruling out alternative evolutionary paths.

Much the same thing must be said of Wieser's notion of a nation's historical "task." This is an ostensibly substantive term with relativist content which can be identified only ex post and then, perhaps, only in terms of the vision of task comprehensible under the aegis of the actual historical path. A different sequence of actual successes would have led to an understanding of a different notion of historical task. (This does not deny, of course, that individuals can project or identify subjective notions of task, ex ante.) Thus Wieser writes of a conflict between a new historical task and the existing historical powers (IX.1; XII.9). The new task will have historic significance only if the growing, emerging powers succeed vis-a-vis the entrenched powers. Otherwise, the task will have been aborted. A nation, accordingly, has at any time a spectrum of possible tasks. Power play determines which becomes operational. A notion of "the historical task" is thus a principal interpretive concept, but it can be used only ex post, retrospectively. Wieser may stress "awareness of the task to be done" (IX.1), but that can be understood objectively only ex post, for ex ante there are quite different awarenesses of the task to be done, quite different notions of what will constitute success. At best, one can discuss ex ante only the contest between these different pretenders to the throne.

At its most subtle level, Wieser's theory of power is precisely that power, power play, and leader-masses interaction operate to select from a spectrum of possibilities (of notions of welfare, culture, success, task, and so on) the one(s), which delineate the course of history. Operative within this process are Wieser's laws, which together amplify the fundamental point that "the whole social entity is governed by power" (Preface). Power governs welfare, culture, success, and task.

Utility analysis is Wieser's mode of handling the role of individual preferences, valuation, and choice, but power, in all its ramifications, governs both the formation of utility functions and the determination of whose preferences will count and in what socioeconomic system. Wieser is not unique in having formulated this integration, but he is the sole preeminent Austrian school economist to have done so. Austrian economics is much more heterogeneous because of that.

There has been an obvious tendency for economics to be understood and practiced only in terms of the "pure" economics of the market and accordingly to be preoccupied with deterministic techniques of analysis, to the exclusion of what may be called political economy, economic sociology, or sociology, that is, of topics involving power to any real depth. Such narrow understandings of scope and method severely limit economics. The work of Pareto and Schumpeter demonstrates the foolishness of such exclusivism. So also does the work of Wieser, for whom the analysis of the market and the pure logic of choice had to coexist with the analysis of power, class, historical evolution, and so on. To all three thinkers (as well as to others), the analysis of the operation of an economy requires attention, albeit not sole attention, to the organization and control forces making that economy what it is.

Wieser's (and others') work also has been adversely affected by the fact that many waiters have been interested not so much in

understanding the economy objectively but in articulating a case, the circumstantially best possible or most effective case, for a particular economic system or set of specific economic institutional arrangements. Wieser, the reader will learn, understood that effort and located it in the larger scheme of his analysis. That Wieser's analysis can be cited, for normative or propaganda purposes, in support of continued hierarchical arrangements, greater pluralization, or different hierarchical arrangements, or, for that matter, in support of recognizing the reality of power and class per se, has made his analysis, to this type of mind, less useful if not positively dangerous. That Wieser's type of work and substantive interests largely have been filtered out of economics is a pity. But each individual reader will have to determine the precise quality of the substantive analysis. At bottom, the argument of this book is that both marginal utility and power are important: Wieser insists that there are, in fact, two, not one, controlling principles at work in the economic system, that even marginal utility requires a system of order and a power structure for forming and weighting individual preferences.⁴⁰ We can all be grateful to Professor Kuhn for having undertaken and successfully produced so felicitous a translation and for thereby making this work available to a wider circle of readers. As the reader will soon learn, although there is much in this book that is dated if not alien to the modern mind, for example, Wieser's elitism, there also is much insight, indeed wisdom, for example, Wieser's mature and deep perceptions on social psychology, government and other facets of public choice, art, business, and, inter alia, the blending of methodologically individualist and methodologically collectivist aspects of economy and society.

FOOTNOTES

Springer, 1926.

²Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), three volumes.

Pareto, *A Treatise on General Sociology* (New York: Dover, 1963), two volumes. See Warren J. Samuels, *Pareto on Policy* (New York: Elsevier, 1974).

the obituaries by Henry Higgs, *Economica* 7 (June 1927): 150-154; Oskar Morgenstern, *American Economic Review* 17 (December 1927): 669-674; and Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Economic Journal* 37 (June 1927): 328-330. See also the articles on Wieser by Wilhelm Vleugels, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1937), vol. 15, pp. 419-420; and Friedrich A. von Hayek, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Free Press, 1968), vol. 16, pp. 549-550. More detailed discussions of Wieser's life and work are found in George J. Stigler, *Production and Distribution Theories* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 158-175; Henry William Spiegel, ed., *The Development of Economic Thought* (New York: Wiley, 1952), pp. 555-567 (by Friedrich A. von Hayek); T. W. Hutchison, *A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929* (London: Oxford, 1953), pp. 153-164; Richard S. Howey, *The Rise of the Marginal Utility School: 1870-1889* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1960), pp. 143-154; and Stephan B. Boehm, "The Later Work of Friedrich Freiherr von Wieser," a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the History of Economics Society, June 1981, East Lansing, Michigan. See also Hayek's "Friedrich Freiherr v. Wieser," *Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* 125 (1926): 513-530; and Eduard Spranger, "Friedrich Wieser, Das Gesetz der Macht," *idem* 125 (1926): 578-584.

¹'Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 330. Schumpeter's term for the field was economic sociology.

a sense of these developments, see Harry Elmer Barnes, *An Introduction to the History of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (Boston: Heath), vol. II; Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York: Harper & Row, 1928); Theo Suranyi-Unger, *Economics in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Norton, 1931); Emil Kauder, "Intellectual and Political Roots of the Older Austrian School," *Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie* 17 (December 1957) 411-425; and John Torrance, "The Emergence of Sociology in Austria, 1885-1935." *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 17 (1976) 185-219. See also William M. Johnston, *The Austrian Mind* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

²Natural Value, edited by William Smart (London: Macmillan, 1893; first published as *Per natiirliche Werth*, 1889).

⁸Social Economics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1927; first published as *Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Wirtschaft*, 1914).

⁹Natural value, pp. 60-62.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 58-60, 242, and *passim*.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹²Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., "Power and Utility: The Normative Economics of Friedrich von Wieser," *Review of Social Economy* 28 (September 1970) 179-196.

¹⁵Morgenstern, *op. cit.*, p. 671.

Economics, p. 25.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 163.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 165.

"Power."

¹⁸Social Economics, p. xvii.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. xvii, 9. Arguments much later in the twentieth century have focused on (1) the relevance of the status quo distribution of rights for the theorem equating self-interest and social welfare and (2) the probative value of any body of theory or technique for resolving conflicts among rights' claimants as to whose interest should be given protection through rights, that is, the structure of opportunity sets, freedom, coercion, and so on.

²⁹*Ibid.* p. xviii.

²¹*Ibid.* p- 154.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 155.

²⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 391-392.

²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 11, 410.

²⁵*Ibid.* p- 157.

²⁶*Ibid.* p- 162.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 389.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 397.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 398.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 406.

³¹*Ibid.* p- 408.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 410.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 429.

⁸¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.

³⁵*Ibid.* p- 317.

I, sections 1-4. Subsequent references will be in the text and to chapter (for example, I) or to chapter and sections (for example, 1.1-4).

³⁷Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Ten Great Economists* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), p* 217. The quotation is from an essay on Frank William Taussig. In his view that large corporate size has to be accepted, Schumpeter also may have been influenced by Wieser's view, which tended to equate effective power with social effectiveness and success.

³⁸Wieser's analysis can readily be interpreted, depending upon the perspective of the interpreter, as an apologia for hierarchy, for the use of force, and for egalitarianism. Wieser's understanding and objectivity in these matters may have been influenced by his perception and analysis of the recent history of his class in European governance. Wieser's analysis of history in terms of the laws summarized in the text, whether or not correct, suggests the utility of seeking the often-masked hierarchical element(s) in ideologies preaching individualism and freedom, and vice versa.

³⁹For example, whether the output of an industry is to be considered its physical product or the combination of physical-product and worker safety.

"Austrian School," p- 421.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

The people of the world stand under the principle of power. The whole social entity is governed by power, this being the highest value peoples aspire to and by which they are counted, weighed, and judged. But, contrary to what is usually assumed, it is not external power which determines everything, but fundamentally internal power is the core of the power phenomenon. As this core gradually matures over time, it bursts open the shell of external power under whose protection it grows to maturity. In the book which I hereby place before the public I was guided by the idea of showing how the stern principle of external power in the course of time is transformed into the more gentle commands of law and morality. This transformation occurs according to logical necessity, for the power which gives the people their law is itself governed by the principle of the evolution of that power. It was the second thought which in this book has guided my endeavors to develop the principle of the evolution of power; given the wealth of historical facts, this principle breaks down into a whole series of particular laws.

The title of the book might suggest that it bears a rather close relationship to Nietzsche's "Will to Power." This is not the case. The book is meant to be neither a detailed statement of Nietzsche's work nor a rejoinder to it, but has come into being quite independently from it. The representative of Nietzsche's will to power is the ambitious member of the master race, whereas the representative of the principle of power explained in this book is society in its tension between leader and masses. Therefore, the criteria under which the phenomenon of power is examined in this book are so different from Nietzsche's that the two conceptions hardly come close to one another. Only with respect to a few points, which certainly go to the heart of the matter*, they impinge upon each other, but in the main they ignore each other, and consequently in only very few passages of the book have I had occasion to turn against Nietzsche.

For the rest, as well, I have hardly had an opportunity to refer to other authors who address themselves to the subjects treated in this book. My work bears no significant relationships to most works in this area. The scope of the phenomenon of power and of the social phenomena surrounding it has been quite neglected scientifically so far, and he who wants to scrutinize it has to try in his own way how to get through. When I started out on my path I couldn't help finding out very quickly that I couldn't make headway on any of the tried approaches, and I would therefore mislead the reader if I were to give him literary references in the manner practiced by the German scholars. My source of knowledge was not the literature about power nor was it the other sociological literature. I have gathered the facts and ideas incorporated in this book in other ways, about which I want to give the reader the information which I owe him by telling him how this book has come into being.

My first close contact with the facts of power I owe to the study of history, to which I have been driven from my boyhood on by an unquenchable desire. I read historical works whatever I could get a hold of. Beginning with the school books, I then

immersed myself especially into the portrayals of national history. Later I sought to obtain a sweeping view of world connections by reading works on universal history, and I found my deepest satisfaction in the masterpieces which depict the history of the great world-dominating peoples such as the Romans and the English as well as the great historical peaks such as the Renaissance and the great catastrophes of the revolutions, especially the French Revolution.

Still more than through the study of distant times and peoples I obtained a grip of things through observing present-day political events. I was still a youngster when Austria obtained its "constitution," yet I was already impressionable enough to be able to share the exalted mood of the circle to which I belonged through my family. From then on I witnessed the whole transformation through which the liberal idea in Austria first vigorously blossomed out but subsequently decayed nationally and socially. I could not decide to take part in political life. I had to grow old to recognize as the reason for it that the narrowness of party matters did not appeal to me. As an attentive observer I was able to follow developments all the more impartially. I also paid close attention to political conditions outside Austria in which my interest was gradually aroused and the key to whose understanding I obtained from the experiences which I owed to close observation at home.

I was led by my own work from the historical and political foci of interest into the area of economics. I habilitated in this science, and as a teacher and writer I devoted to it a long and active life. Yet it wasn't the historical and political relationships of the economy which at first drew my attention, rather I was completely absorbed by its theoretical study. For I first had to gain clarity about the nature of economic events before I could decide to turn to their historical and political relationships. After having gained some order in my thoughts pertaining to economic theory I noticed that a further obstacle of thought separated me from the historical and political relationships of the economy. Economic action is social action, and in order to be able to see clearly in economic matters one must first have gained clarity about the general nature of social action. What the classical individualistic school taught about this could not satisfy me, and what the modern opponents of the classicists taught from the viewpoint of an organic view could no more do so. This led me to thinking through the social connections independently, and in doing so I for the first time encountered the topic of power. From now on I expanded my economic lectures and writings in the direction of social interpretation. When shortly before the World War I finished my Theory of Social Economy [published in translation as Social Economics - Ed.] I had reached the point where I could give it a minimal sort of social foundation. In addition, I took advantage of a series of special occasions for papers with a sociological content. My Prague Chancellor's Address of 1901 about "The Social Powers," the lectures about "Law and Power" I presented in the Salzburg University lectures series of 1909, an essay about Spencer's "Great-Man Theory" which I published in 1908 under the title "Arma virumque cano" on the occasion of the celebration of the founding of Vienna's "Schottengymnasium" these indicate the directions of my work. The growing intensity of the political battle in Austria motivated me to write a series of books and

articles about Austrian constitutional matters and the conditions in Bohemia.

Then all of a sudden the World War turned my thoughts in a new direction. I had long apprehended its outbreak, but still couldn't get myself to believe in it, as one cannot believe what one is unable to comprehend and now in its incomprehensible magnitude it had become a reality. In incomprehensible magnitude the culture peoples of Europe, although shaken to the very depths of their emotions, proceeded to act with unbroken determination. Since the inconceivability of war had become reality, there remained nothing to be done except doing one's utmost in order to stand one's ground. All the participating peoples did their utmost, miracles of strength and heroism were performed. I, too, endeavored to do justice to my patriotic duty. I had always taken the position of those who claimed that Austria would have to be created if history had not already created it, and now that its existence had become jeopardized, I contributed, with firmest conviction and according to my strength, my part to its survival. With this in mind, I expressed my views about Austria's relationship to the war in a few speeches. I found more ample opportunities in the Upper Chamber to which I was called and especially as a member of the government to which I belonged to the very end under Austria's last emperor.

The inconceivability of the World War was followed by the inconceivability of inner decay. Now the time for action was over, and the heart made itself heard. How could this all have happened? Had life not lost all of its meaning? Had the labors of historical work lasting for centuries and had the unprecedented sacrifices of war really been rendered completely in vain? These were the questions crying out for an answer. In a small book, Austria's End, and in several essays about the revolutions I attempted to give a first answer. In an article, "The Guilt for Peace," I formulated the accusation which I had to raise against the dictated peace. In addition, I conceived the plan for an extensive publication about the World War and the lapses of the conclusion of peace and was busily engaged in the preliminary studies for this. Out of these beginnings arose The Law of Power. My verdict about the World War shifted ever more the more my preparations led me to view it in the perspective of world history. Isn't the World War a piece of world history and must one not know its moving forces before he may dare talk about it? So I asked myself, and as I now inquired into the causes having brought about the World War, I was gradually and ever more deeply led back into the contexts of the centuries, and from these into the contexts of the millenia. In this pursuit the ideas reemerged which, even before the World War, I had devoted to the problems of society, but these now appeared to me in wondrously intensified outlines. From the dazzling flame of the war I had shared in experiencing, new light was reflected on the past, and I came to know the present as the mentor of history. Of the powers of the past we will never be able to comprehend those which have been overcome historically; e.g., we will never be able to comprehend the mind which has sunk an Egyptian royal tomb beneath the colossus of a pyramid. We no longer have a measure for the distance which elevated the Pharaoh over the thousands of slaves who had to drudge for him, but from the past those episodes, continuing to have their effect on the slice of history we presently experience, may well come alive. The fact

that the World War and upheaval reawakened in the peoples energies of which we no longer had a vivid idea has placed within the clear range of our understanding the long periods of the past when these same forces were at work. In this way I have learned to sympathize with the power movements which through the centuries and millenia of history have extended down to our time and of which it may well be said that they will extend beyond our time yet.

Thus the ideas had fallen into place to which I wanted to give expression in this book. The order in which I present them to the reader in no way reflects the sequence in which they occurred to me. In its various components the book developed in my mind simultaneously; its principal ideas suggested themselves to me without my initially becoming conscious of their interrelationships. I had an experience like that of the mountain hiker who before himself sees the peaks separated from each other above the flowing fog until the fog dissipates and he realizes that they are the crowning glory of a widespread massif. I have done what I could to establish the connecting foundations. In this, too, my goal was different from Nietzsche's, who with the rhapsodic buoyancy of the poet stays aloft in superhuman heights, completely immersed in gazing at the luminous figures which enrapture him, but mustering only sneering contempt for the darkness below. I was content only after I had gained the impression to be able to see the phenomenon of power cleanly as a whole and in its social setting down to its very depths. I believe to be able to assume that I have not neglected any of the essential-elements, though I must fear that I have not succeeded in joining together in fluent narrative the various parts which only little by little I could see as a unified whole. Some of them had long been completed and even published before I gained clarity about the work as a whole, e.g., the sections about leader and masses, about the psychology of power, about the historical work of force, about modern dictatorships. Their leading ideas have been incorporated in this book without change. On the other hand, I now have expressed myself differently about the social work of art than I did in an essay published in 1920, where I conceded a stronger effect to art as a unifying force for peace than I was able to accord to it in retrospect. Here and there, in spite of all the efforts expended, connecting transitions may still be missing. Yet I hope that this deficiency has the advantage of enabling the reader to see that it was not my plan to derive from initially fixed premises the conclusions at which I arrived, nor conversely to construct with hindsight the theoretical and historical support for preconceived conclusions. I haven't tried to prove or logically entwine anything, but only to render descriptively what after strenuous reflection I saw as a compact whole whose dimensions, to be sure, are so vast that only the most concentrated reflection reveals the underlying unity.

I must confess that with respect to one point I have obstinately stuck to a preconceived notion. I have written the book with a sense of unconditional acceptance of life. He who no longer believes in life should keep quiet on the sidelines or should consult a psychiatrist. It doesn't make sense for him with his doubts and despair to alarm the public which follows its life instinct and will ride roughshod over all those who would rob it of this instinct or diminish it. This does not imply that one should share the blind optimism with which the masses live

only for the day. He who has eyes to see also has the duty to see and to look out for the dangers which threaten the happiness of life. History tells of catastrophes which were worse yet than the World War*, and mankind would long have perished if over this it had lost the courage to face life. I seek my place and I seek readers for this book, among those who want to remain upright. I ask them to follow me as I pursue the currents which so far have guided the lifeboat of mankind through the pressings of history and in spite of the most dreadful losses and damages have still brought it closer to a lofty goal. It is far from me to assume that the catastrophe of the World War will not be followed by additional ones; on the contrary, I hold that we must prepare to meet new trials and tribulations, but I hold all the more that we must also be prepared to remain upright in our mind.

I have no more ardent desire than this: that this book contribute something to filling the hearts with the confidence that it be mankind's lot to land in the haven of peace at long last. But in doing so I must fear that I will tell neither of the two parties of peace and war just what they want to hear. As far as the cause is concerned, I choose sides with the peace party, but as far as the persons are concerned with whom I am inclined to go along, I find in the ranks of the peace party only few excellent men whom to follow I consider as an honor; the preponderant majority of the peace seekers are tired and feeble and will ruin the high cause of peace. Within the culture peoples the prime movers, except for those few excellent men, are to some extent still to be found in the ranks of the party of war, or they will again rally under the flag if the fatherland should call them. I can say with full conviction that on my part I do not view with hostility those resolute men who are driven into battle by their patriotic sentiment — I yield to their bravery and their spirit of sacrifice. I see in the millions who gave their lives in the World War heroic martyrs of the historical work of mankind. May the heroic spirit with which they met their death in order to discharge the duty imposed on them also inspire those who undertake to fight for the peace! I always had them in the forefront of my mind while working at this book. The latter is dedicated to their memory!

F. Wieser

Vienna, in January 1926

PART 1
GENERAL STRUCTURE OF POWER AND SOCIETY

I. External and Internal Power

1. The Law of Small Numbers as the Innermost Problem of Power

Until the eighteenth century almost all the peoples of modern Europe willingly submitted to the law given to them by a small number of aristocratic families or even by a princely autocrat. The one or the few reigned over the many the Law of Small Numbers was practically uncontested. It was not any different during Antiquity. In the Orient almost everywhere the Law of Small Numbers was heightened to despotism, and in the case of almost all peoples the enslaved masses obeyed the commands of their rulers. Although the Greeks and Romans were free during certain periods of their history, it is precisely through them that the Law of Small Numbers came to be fulfilled all the more inexorably in their spreading dominions. The small number of Romans imposed the law on a world.

The Law of Small Numbers is the strangest problem which history has given us to resolve. It shares the fate of all great problems in not having been viewed as a problem at all for a very long time. Through millenia people took it so much for granted to bow to the inescapable Law of Small Numbers that they completely failed to ask themselves how it could be that the small number held the upper hand over the multitude. When at long last the idea of popular sovereignty came into vogue, it was embraced with such abandon that the question of why it had not always been operative was overlooked in the first place. "The populace has slept, but now it is awake, and henceforth power will be wielded by the many" this was the formula presented by the orators of the day and accepted contentedly by public opinion.

Though originally proclaimed by middle-class thinkers, the idea of popular sovereignty gained greater importance for the proletarian thinkers since only they felt themselves to be the true representatives of the masses. Nevertheless it would be in vain to expect being enlightened by them about the meaning of the Law of Small Numbers, for they were of course particularly anxious to prevent the emergence of any doubts concerning whether the populace alone was called upon to wield power. The impressive investigations into power relationships they undertook were oriented to this aim. An example of such an investigation in the spirit of Realpolitik attuned to the present, was the speech "On Constitutional Matters" with which Lassalle launched his political agitation and which he might as well have entitled "On the Nature of Power." Another example, geared to the historical evolution of power, is Marx's doctrine of the materialistic conception of history. But neither the variety nor the brilliance of such writings must be permitted to make us oblivious of the fact that there remains in them an unexplained residual which relates to the very core of the problem of power.

At the beginning of his speech Lassalle calls the King of Prussia one of the real powers. He thereby touches on the

problem of Small Numbers, but he glosses over it without giving it any further thought. Instead, he dwells all the more closely upon the real power of the army. While referring to Prussians written constitution as "the sheet of paper," he designates the cannons as "those very important constitutional foundations," by which he means an essential piece of real power. He violently inveighs against democracy for having permitted in 1848 a futile and time-consuming debate over a constitution instead of getting hold of the cannons, which would have been easy to do. But was it really so easy in Prussia at that time to seize the cannons? One couldn't have done this without further ado, for one would first have had to cope with the gunners who at that time were favorably inclined toward the King. For the populace the opportunity to seize the cannons came only 70 years later, when after the collapse the Prussian King had ceased to be a real power. When the prince governs by arms the governs by dint of an internal power which he wields over the bearers of arms; and this internal power is the key to his external power position. Lassalle did not try at all to enlighten us about this key relationship. He thus did not explain to us the nature of power; he didn't even go so far as to pose the innermost problem of power.

Marx, too, in his materialistic conception of history did not make it this far. We will concur with his view that in the centuries following the settlement of the land, landed property was a decisive property, and we will also go along with his view that in the era of rapid industrial development ownership of capital became decisive. But we can't follow him any more in his contention that in the first-named period prince, nobility, and clergy had to be powerful because they controlled the real estate and that later entrepreneurs had to wield power because they owned the capital. He would first have had to make clear — which he did not try — how it could happen that the decisive ownership of land and capital was not always in the hands of the masses. What did secure to the small number the key position of power which enabled them to dispose of the vital property? This is what matters.

2. The Linguistic Concept of Power

Lassalle and Marx, just like the philosophers of the middle-class liberation movement in their own time, could not get close to the problem of power because they didn't have a clear concept of power. They all were under the spell of common usage, according to which the idea of external power prevails, especially how this is acquired through numerical superiority, arms or wealth. Yet they could have been better informed by usage, for when one goes to the ~~bottom~~ of the word "power", he finds enclosed in it the most profound meaning of the phenomenon of power, which includes internal power. The inestimable advantage which every social science has over the natural sciences is that for the former the correctly interpreted usage is the infallible guide to the very depth of a phenomenon. An observation of nature incorporated in the vernacular is a lay observation, outmoded by the progress of natural science. Therefore the methodically trained research scientist is well advised when he avoids brooding over the meanings of words in the vernacular over which the sun continues to rise and to set. Ernst Mach, the first-rate, method-oriented physicist, even wants to rule out the

concept of force. In regard to the inner experiences of human beings, the masses in their pronouncements are not lay persons; by virtue of having participated, they are chief witnesses. The strictest social scientist will have to let stand the concept of power. Not only that, but he will first have to exhaust its meaning before he can turn to the phenomenon of power, whose scope and content usage will reveal to him.

As is true for all original words referring to human relations, the world power also has an opalescent and confusing wealth of meanings. It is understandable that Max Weber calls the concept of power amorphous. How astonishingly much is being said about external and internal power, and of what a diversity of bearers is it being said! The bearers of external power are for the most part persons, either single or in groups, such as the prince, the noble families, the common people and their parties, and the nation. Internal power only rarely refers to a particular person, as, for example, when one ascribes power to the founder of a great religion or to the church. As a rule, internal power is viewed as impersonal and anonymous, as something in existence which can not be attributed to specific individuals. So it is with legal or ethical power, or with ideas, currents, and movements to which one ascribes power. We must not be puzzled by this impersonal mode of statement, for all these anonymous types of power always have their personal bearers. Could legal or ethical power endure without persons with legal and ethical sentiments? In order for ideas to have power, there must always be people in motion who are avidly devoted to them. However, with all these anonymous powers the number of those bearing them is too large to be sized up, and the share of power represented by any one of the many individuals is so small that he can not be viewed as a wielder of power. Therefore, in those instances where one has to deal with anonymous powers one abstracts from their personal bearers, referring instead to the inner forces effectuating power as its bearers. The same metonymy is also applied to the external powers, as, for example, in referring to the power of arms or wealth, neither of which has inherent power, of course, but which are merely power resources or tools through which their personal bearers exercise power. Finally, when linguistic usage allows the phrase that somebody or something is a power, as when the state is said to be a power, a great power, or a world power, such a phrase concerns only the form of the statement, leaving its substance unchanged. The state is a power because by its nature it has power.

For all power phenomena in linguistic usage Spinoza's construction holds true without exception and most exactly: he defines power as command over the human mind. Nature's forces become nature's powers when their effects, through terror or magic, fill our minds with fear or admiration. The power won by a friend over another, or by a lover over the loved one, works through the medium of the mind. By the same token, social power — the object of our investigation — means command over the minds of the members of society. In the case of internal power, this connection with the mind, with feeling and volition, is clear from the start: legal and ethical power; power of faith, of knowledge, of ideas and of intellectual movements of all kinds; and no differently the power of manners and customs — these are all founded on impressions affecting the mind. But is the same not also true for every development of external power?

In its most immediate meaning external power does not seem to purport anything other than command over the external means of power, over the masses, the arms, or the wealth. All these resources of power, however, are destined one way or another and in the final analysis to subjugate the people at whom they are aimed, or to make them somehow dependent, and thus to give control over minds. The masses are to be impressed by the overwhelming number of power resources; weapons are to give mind control by spreading fear and terror; wealth is to do it by its prospective enjoyment, and by exerting pressure on the competitor whose sales it threatens or on the worker who may be given or refused the means to work. Thus, external power is always command over external means of power with a view to control minds, or more aptly put: external power is command over the minds via the availability of external means of power. Therefore, external power is entirely of the same kind as internal power, from which it is distinguished only by the means it employs.

R. External and Internal Power Aggregates

Nor must we be puzzled by the firmness of emphasis given by linguistic usage to external power. When one talks of power without specifically qualifying it as internal power, he always means external power. External power is power pure and simple: superiority is superior external power; the wielder of power, the powerful, is he who disposes of external power; as a matter of fact, external power frequently is designated as nothing short of the decisive power, as in "might before right." Doesn't usage thereby unambiguously bear witness in favor of external power? Still, taking everything into consideration, we can't help recognizing that usage also admits of internal power — whenever the latter is referred to — as genuine power. When the poet invokes the power of conscience, the innermost power there is; he doesn't speak parabolically: Shakespeare presents to us Richard III in the reality of the desperation which overwhelms his mind. That usage assigns priority to external power is sufficiently explained by the fact that its means can be perceived by the senses, being most clearly evident to observation, and that the effects of its decisions, victories and defeats, are manifestly incontestable. The masses bow to them in mute resignation, and even the brave heart may be shaken by them. In contrast, internal power more often than not, especially in its almost imperceptible first stirrings, works only with soft blows and often wins its victories so gradually that they hardly enter into public consciousness. After all, the decisions made by external power which are registered by the senses are without exception supported by internal powers, although they may operate in the background and be removed from the observation of the masses, revealing themselves to the glance of the great leader or later to the retrospective eye of the scientific investigator. It has become a favorite custom today to say that the nimble politician knows how to accommodate the specific mentality of his opponent and to praise the statesman who can also sense the imponderables. At bottom, however, what always matters is the mentality and the imponderables, for what always counts is the effect on the mind which can not be gauged even when it is overwhelming. The final bearers of external powers are always some key internal powers which open up assured access to the possession of the former. The external power machinery of the state which a victorious

people erects on the backs of millions of new subjects, if it is to last presupposes among the victorious people a union of superior internal power which forms the hard core of the state. The broad, external aggregate of power of the subjected peoples, held together by fear and terror, presupposes the internal aggregate of power of a victor nation united by its ethnic feeling. The internal power binding together the victorious people is still quite raw, but it nevertheless exists. As soon as solidarity in the victor nation ceases to exist, the internal aggregate of power falls apart, and along with it the external power aggregate built upon it also breaks up.

The raw internal power with which victorious peoples begin their career in the course of time will become more refined in its use if these peoples have a talent for permanent rule. Battle experience tells them that they will add to and consolidate their victories if with unbroken soldier spirit they submit to the orders of the successful leaders. It may also tell the leading noble families that they will be advised to submit to the strong warrior prince who heaps victory upon victory. Ultimately chances are that an enlightened princely regime also penetrates the external power aggregate of the subjects with internal power and binds them together by turning the subjects into citizens. Thus originated the real power of the king in Prussia of which Lassalle speaks. Externally, vis-a-vis the foreign state, it was based on the fear of arms; internally, vis-a-vis the populace, on awe and confidence, as stated so fittingly in Bismarck's Thoughts and Recollections. The "Rocher de bronze" of which the Hohenzollern boasted was like the rock on which Christ built the church, an aggregate of internal power. It was less firm than the ecclesiastic structure, which still stands today. The power of the Prussian king vanished as soon as the populace no longer felt disposed to offer respect to and have confidence in the supreme commander who had failed during the World War.

4. The Task of Historiography

Historiography got started by narrating the victories and defeats of one's own people, and subsequently also of foreign peoples of whom there was knowledge, and in connection with that by telling about the rise and fall of the states and the kings, generals and statesmen, who had been the peoples' leaders in these events. History thus conceived is the history of the most striking of the external powers, namely, the war powers and state powers. Later more attention was also devoted to economic development as the importance of the economic forces for victory in war and the prosperity of the state gained recognition. To be sure, one did not advance far enough to be able to discern clearly the historical development of the economic powers and to connect it firmly with the history of the state. One subsequently also delved into the realm of the internal powers, being compelled to include in the exposition church power as an antagonist of state power. In the historic narrative, the participating masses remain in the background for the most part, all light being shed on the great leaders. The study and portrayal of their characters was a task which became a predilection for artistically inclined historiographers.

It has not been long yet since they began to tire of telling about ways, princely warriors, and commanders-in-chief, turning more and more to the evolution of civilization and culture, either by integrating it into the state history of external events or else by giving a separate account of it. May the author be permitted to express briefly his view that in spite of this change in emphasis, historiography still has not advanced to grasping its task fully. Precisely what is most important about the internal powers historiography has not told us yet. In lieu of the old military-political state history it would not, within its scope, be able to tell us more about internal power than what we otherwise get to read in historical works about the fine arts, religion, poetry, and science. Such historiography so far has not informed us at all about the extent to which the internal powers contribute to the building up of the social system. The social impact of science and art is not limited to their serving as ornaments of our life, they also strengthen life, and this is done even more by the internal powers of faith and morality. Whereas the external powers build up the external power aggregates, the internal powers are the key to building up the internal power aggregates, which provide the strongest single support for any society. Historiography must not view its task as completed until it has succeeded in telling us how the evolving social structure has gradually reached its present height through the interaction of external and internal powers.

At any rate, historiography does itself an injustice if it altogether decides to stop reporting on battles and victories, even when thereby civilized nations managed to fend off the devastating attacks of their barbaric adversaries. To describe the Persian Wars has not been only of parochial interest to the Greek narrator, for these wars marked one of the great turning points in the millennial struggle between the peoples of the west and the east. If a people destined for culture succeeds in maintaining its independence in a life-and-death struggle, such a success is of greater significance from a cultural-historical than a war-historical perspective. The victory against Attila in the Catalanian fields gave a short reprieve to the declining Roman culture and at least averted from it the worst of the destructive powers. The victory achieved by Charles Martell at Tours and Poitiers against the Arab invaders from Spain assured an independent future to the evolving culture of the Occident. Victory against the Turks outside the walls of Vienna was the turn for the later recovery of the lost southeastern Europe by the strengthened Occident. Alexander, Scipio, and Caesar had to secure through conquest the extended reach and long duration of the prevailing culture of Antiquity, without which the latter could not have become the base of modern culture. The Roman Empire built on the sword was the necessary prerequisite for the Roman church, which means for the crucial spread of Christianity.

The size of the sway exerted on the minds of men by the external powers can also be seen in the fact that the internal powers cannot help but make use of them as a last resort, as ultimum remedium. The internal powers are possessed by an expansionary drive no less strong than is true for the power drive of a conquering people or a war dynasty. Every passionate conviction is accompanied by an urge to communicate itself to others with a view to converting them: "Of what the heart is full, the mouth runneth over," as the saying goes. As soon as a driving

conviction bumps against another one which does not want to be converted, a battle of spirits breaks out, and if such a fight cannot be conducted with intellectual arms — for there are no arguments to conquer the conviction of the heart — the inflamed minds tend to fight it out with martial and other external instruments of power*. Ideas whose whole bent is toward profound peace eventually lead to murderous war if they encounter conflicting ideas. The apostles installed by Jesus Christ set out to proclaim with fiery tongues the glad tidings of external peace for mankind. Strengthened by the force of faith, the Christians defied the arms of their persecutors which could strike only their bodies, not also their souls. But this very indomitable drive had the inescapable consequence that one did not want to leave in peace others who persevered in unbelief or fell into superstition. He who opposes a doctrine embraced by others from the bottom of their heart makes them doubtful in their faith, which is man's most sacred possession, and such a person is therefore considered the most dangerous of all adversaries. This is why the fervor of the religious idea led to the atrocities of the Albigensian Wars and of the Inquisition. The Protestants were no less obstinate in their faith than the Catholic Church, and therefore after the Reformation the embittered antagonism between the old and the new churches, all proclaiming peace, was vented in the Thirty Years' War, viewed now as the world war of the 17th century. The modern taste for liberty likes to accuse the church for its proneness to violence. But has not the modern liberation movement, bent upon erecting the realm of reason, itself ended in the determination to use force? The residual of that realm of reason was the guillotine, the civil war, and the long series of external wars until the Napoleonic era into which nations were swept on account of the expansive force of the idea of liberty. The whole epoch of modern culture, because it is filled with new ideas, is also filled with ideological wars. If modern scientific thought had been perfected into a great Weltanschauung, capable of stirring the masses as well, it would inevitably have had to lead to ideological war. Ethical ideas have not yet become sufficiently detached from religious ideas so that they would independently intervene in human history. Instead, economic ideas continue to arouse the economic struggle which, even where it is waged only with economic resources, does not claim fewer victims than does fighting with arms. And how often, indeed, has the conflict of economic interests provoked the very battle of arms, and how dangerously is it still threatening future existence!

Yet the ultimum remedium of the external powers does not bring about a definitive decision in the realm of the internal powers: no idea can be shot down on the battlefield unless the persons and peoples who are its protagonists are being completely exterminated. The Thirty Years' War did not alter the proprietary status of the conflicting faiths. What the sword failed to accomplish, however, was wrought by the new idea of the enlightenment, which gravely impaired both religious parties by the defection of the believers. The realm of reason erected by the Enlightenment was removed by the dictatorship of Napoleon, whose Caesarean rule was defeated by the Holy Alliance. Stronger still than the armies of the Alliance was the democratic idea inherent in the educational movement. Amos Comenius, founder of the elementary school who during the Thirty Years' War was driven away from home and homeland, made more durable tracks in

history than did Wallenstein or Gustavus Adolphus. In the course of history the share contributed to the evolution of social structure by the internal powers keeps growing, and perhaps the day will come when the ultimum remedium of external power needs no longer to be resorted to because the internal powers, becalmed, have reached an equilibrium. Can historiography be complete if it neglects one or the other of the constructive powers?

5. External and Internal Powers During the World War

The World War, too, was not only a war of conflicting interests but at the same time a true war of ideas. It was fought not only for great practical advantages but also for dynamic ideas which lift human spirits and make people willing to sacrifice. The World War was kindled by the opposition of national ideas which had gained in tension as a result of the breathless advance of the national economies. National cultural power and economic power, both internal powers, borne in peace and oriented to peace, felt the urge to resolve their antagonisms through war, because all big and small civilized nations were utterly energized by them. Only as a war of ideas was it possible for the World War to assume its huge dimensions. No dynast could have demanded such boundless sacrifices of property and of lives from a civilized nation as was done by the nations themselves in their agitated frames of mind. Napoleon, too, was able to impose on the French the burdens of his wars only because he found the already existing armies of the Revolution which were still filled with the expansive drive of the idea of liberty and because he was able to intoxicate the French nation with the idea of world domination.

To all appearances, the Entente owed its victory only to its superiority in the external resources of power, to the numerical superiority of its fighters, arms, and other materiel, and especially of essential consumer goods. On closer inspection it can be seen that here, as always, ideas provided the support for the war devices and that the soundness of these ideas proved decisive in the end. Through the wooing force of nationalism the Entente was able to enlist for the war a number of nations which at first had kept aloof. In particular, the wooing power of the democratic idea evoked by the Entente enabled it to gain the decisive help of the United States whose masses could not have been stirred up by their capitalistic leaders in any other way.

Just as in the case of the Russians the socialistic idea undermined the front-line, this later also happened with the Central Powers. Additionally, the Austro-Hungarian nationality mix was demoralized by the subversive impact of nationalism. If the will to win the war had remained on the part of all population strata of the Central Powers as resolute to the end as it had been initially, they would perhaps have been able to fend off the numerical superiority, however great, to an extent sufficient to insist on a peace of self-preservation. However, the misery of war had become almost unbearable for the citizens of the Central Powers afflicted by the hunger blockade, and in momentous blindness the top leaders failed to draw from this fact, in good time the military and political consequences. It thus happened that the victory, which the Entente was unable to win on the war

front, was sealed by the demoralization of the people on the home front, which was followed by the debacle in the field and the complete inner collapse.

As in the case of all wars fought over ideas, so also in that of the World War the victory of arms, however overwhelming it may appear, will not bring the final decision. Already today, and in the victor nations as well, public opinion has become uncertain, and even there one suffers from the fact that the dictated peace is no real peace. Who knows whether even there it will finally be recognized that guilt for the peace, whose terms could have been assessed in plenty of time but which can not become a real peace after all, is far worse than the guilt for the war, which had been feared by all while nevertheless it took all by surprise.

Could it be that the civilized nations are no longer capable of an inner stirring which will bring the peace longed for by all? In India Gandhi with his idea of nonviolent national resistance has launched the hitherto — apart from the religious movements — most magnificent attempt at mobilizing internal power. He has achieved successes expected by nobody; he has united Hindus and Moslems; he evidenced admirable self-discipline in calling his movement to a halt when he feared that it was about to turn violent; and he wrought the miracle of exacting obedience from the masses when he told them to stop; and finally he was able to compel respect from the English government which had first treated him with disdain. It remains to be seen whether he will succeed in winning over the overwhelming majority of Indians to his idea and in holding them together till permanent victory. It remains to be seen whether nonviolent resistance, compatible with the Indian temperament, can also be wrested from the more adamant will of the European masses. Certainly, however, the impact already achieved by the Indian movement proves that inner movements of higher sublimeness, such as swept over the earth in the times of Buddha, Zoroaster, and Christ, can still become a reality today rather than merely being relegated to the memory of history buffs or to the dreams of visionaries.

6. Realpolitik and the Politics of Ideas

The great practitioners of Realpolitik who dominated world politics at the beginning and the end of the 19th century, Napoleon and Bismarck, both contemptuously rejected the ideologies of their time. However, nothing would be more absurd than holding the view that Napoleon triumphed only through his strong battalions and Bismarck only through blood and iron. While rejecting the ideologies, they clearly recognized the potent ideas of their time and utilized them for their policy-making. Every great Realpolitik is always also a politics of ideas, for it simultaneously works with arms and other means of external power as well as with the internal powers which govern mankind. No statesman could be called great who did not also assimilate for his own purposes the pregnant ideas of his time.

Ideologies emerged as book ideas, as mere brain ideas so to speak, such as are generated by the spirit of opposition rebelling against the pressure of the inherited powers, while still being alien to life because its conceptions are formed from

imagined ideals. The ideologies of the French Revolution were the fictions of man as a purely rational being rather than the live ideas of the real-world Frenchman, who couldn't quite strip away his historical environment. These construed ideas were rich enough to give firm support to the resistance against the antiquated historical powers and to instill in men the courage for new goals. However, they were still too little adapted to reality to permit their being transformed into permanent systems. After the first happy intoxication of revolutionary awakening the French nation was thrown into a tragic conflict: social thinking and social action would not join together. Level-headed persons kept to themselves because they could not make up their minds about what approaches to take, and leadership of destiny remained with the deluded who treasured above all the high-sounding word and who had to resort to the extremes of terror in order to make the imposed directions prevail which the minds of the masses were no longer willing to follow. Napoleon was the proper man not only through force to bring revolutionary excesses to an end, but at the same time to salvage the sound aspirations of the movement by practicing Realpolitik in bringing to fruition those wishes that were realizable. With unfailing self-assurance he recognized the vigorous yearnings of the French populace, he gave French administration its permanent system, he created the civil code — bearing his name as well as exuding his spirit — which clearly reflects the sense of justice of the French people. He gave to the French nation its unity and to the concept of nation its shape. **How aptly he understood the French character is demonstrated most vividly by the small book on the Legion of Honor founded by him, in which French society after all the storms of history still recognizes itself and to which it will cling as long as there are Frenchmen.** Many he won over those favoring the idea of regional sovereignty which he invigorated at the expense of the empire idea. That he could hold fast to his Italian conquest he owed to his understanding of the Italian **national idea**, to which he gave the first political expression. His undoing was the indomitable drive for power, making him not content with being the Caesar of France but pointing him to the unattainable goal of becoming the emperor of the world. Blinded by his good fortune, he stirred up the resistance of all the historical ideas of the old Europe until finally the strong battalions turned against him. They excelled in strength, not so much by sheer number — he had often enough overcome numerical superiority — but by the national spirit which fired them, while the French, exhausted by endless wars, turned away from them in their minds, and even his generals lost their faith in him.

Just as Napoleon rejected the ideology of the French Revolution, so Bismarck contemptuously rejected the democratic ideology of 1848, sensing correctly that the latter did not conform to the way of thinking of the masses of the Prussian people and of the German nation. But was he not just the same the consummator of the ideas of the Church of Paul? He found the suitable means, searched for in vain by the parliament of educated men, to carry through these ideas. He saw clearly that in order to accomplish the unification of Germany it was also necessary to resort to external resources of power which had to surround the forces of resistance embedded in history. He knew that these needed power resources were given to him by the traditions of the Prussian government and the Prussian people, and he also knew that the Prussian militiaman would loyally heed the call to arms issued by

the king. At the same time his clear-sightedness left him with no doubt that in order to achieve his goals, he had to spare the feelings of the vanquished South Germans and Austrians, since he was determined to end his own life if he did not succeed in persuading the king to enter into a just peace with Austria. He thereby managed that King Francis Joseph took a neutral stand in the French War, and later he attained the still greater success of securing for Germany through the Dual Alliance its historically appointed ally. His fatal mistake was his inability at the conclusion of the peace with France to resist the urging of the Prussian generals who craved a piece of the French national soil with a view to securing an initial military advantage in the next war, which by this very attitude they provoked.

This violation of the national idea had to be paid for dearly during the World War. In the age of the national idea, no great nation will renounce its unimpaired self-preservation. National self-assertion pushes the minds into aggregates of power which, thanks to the incessant working of molecular forces of attraction, give these minds unity time and again even though for a short or long time they may have been torn apart by the incursions of superior external power. Thanks to the persistence of their national feeling, the Italians and the Poles, notwithstanding all their defects, have triumphed over the big powers which were contemplating the sharing of their ancestral territories. Will not the drive for national self-preservation also confirm itself in the case of the German nation?

7. Force and Power

Every power has a force as its base. Conscious awareness of the effects of force stimulates feeling and volition: added to the effects which force has exerted so far according to its natural law, is its effect on the mind, on account of which power is attributed to the bearer of the force. It is one thing to perceive the natural effects of force; it is another to sense the dimensions of power exerted by it on the mind. The ballistics expert mathematically compares the elevation, velocity, and impact power of missiles or the range of cannons; only in battle does the effect on the mind come into play, which is what matters to the general. The engineer assesses the effect of water power according to the horse power equivalent produced by it, but only in the market, as evidenced by price, does the effect on the mind of demand come into play, which is what matters to the entrepreneur. Not only the external natural forces but also the personal forces used in the economy have to be judged by their external performance. The entrepreneur, rationally calculating, compares the output of the worker with that of the machine, and in the socialistic state of the future this is not something to be omitted either. The same is true for all personal forces of whatever kind which are put to action for a practical purpose. One must always examine the effect of these forces as means to an end, and only after they have so proved themselves comes the impression on the mind which surrounds them with the aura of power.

In the case of those inner forces which have an immediate impact on consciousness, as when reasoning is expected to bring insight or ethical force is expected to purify the will, the very act by which they come into play is already accompanied by

emotions, although here, too, force and power must, as a matter of principle, be distinguished clearly from each other. Here, too, force always has its technique. What is logic if not the technique of the intellect?

The sociologist who undertakes to demonstrate the ways of power must know the forces which in society are transformed into power. While he has to take them as a point of departure, he must not set himself the task of delineating the law according to which the forces act nor does he want to fall back on their origins and the law of their evolution. Such a farflung task would surpass his faculties, and the readers' absorptive capacity would also not be equal to it. He has to leave it to the engineers to point out the sequence in which human beings have utilized the forces of nature in their work, and to the philosophers and moralists to explain the gradual development of their moral and intellectual energies. He himself has enough to do trying to recognize the principle of power into which force is being transformed when its effects set the minds into motion. The Law of Small Numbers indicates that the effects of force emanating from the many will, as power, be credited to only a few. For example, the victorious general acquires his power not only through his own performance but always through that of his soldiers as well, just as the successful entrepreneur obtains his power partly through the performance of his workers. There is still a number of other laws which relate to the transformation of social forces into power. If it is to solve the problems posed by these laws, the theory of power must fulfill a task as difficult as it is important.

II. Of the Origin and Growth of Power and Power Associations

1. The Kinship Associations

State and society are often called extensions of the family, and the family is viewed as the nucleus of society. Thinking this idea through leads to the conclusion that the families, which stand side by side in state and society, are being held together by the same forces and powers as bind together the single family in itself. This is not the case, however. The family as such is tied together by the feeling of love emanating from consanguinity, whereas in state and society, aside from strong bonds of loyalty, no less strong sentiments of indifference and hostility are evident; the latter are not only tolerated, but at times are nurtured, encouraged, and demanded. Certainly, the family is not free from strife and hate: the bible begins its narrative of the human events following the expulsion from the paradise with the fratricide committed by Cain on Abel. But whereas fratricide within the family is viewed as an execrable crime, when committed during wars it is a duty enforced by state and society and is celebrated as an act of heroism. Even if all of humankind were of the ~~same~~ blood something still to be proved it would therefore not be permissible to trace the origin of social power to the blood instinct of the family. In state and society still other elements play an important part. State and society are not simple extensions of the family, the family is not the social cell. In an age of patriarchs one might be contented with such a view which reduces all power to the authority of the father of the family, venerated by the kinship group as its natural head. In an era of power struggles such as the present, one does not know what to make of this view any more, not to mention that it also fails to provide an understanding for the historical power struggles.

Still our explanation must take as a point of departure that temporally the family is the prerequisite for all large social associations. Historically it appeared first, preparing the ground in which the sprouts could take root whose growth led to the formation of society. In the beginnings of human existence there was no other force which could have created bonds among human beings than the instinctive force of blood which mutually attracts males and females during the years of sexual maturation, which unites parents with the children which spring from their union, and which still ties together children and children's children who are conscious of their common origin. In a period of development in which higher-level associations had not been formed yet, the kinship association had to assume certain common tasks outside the family circle which life's necessities imperiously demanded. It thereby evolved into a combat association and an economic association. In addition, customs, morality, and law experienced their first development in the kinship association. As is true for any other organ which is heavily used, the family under these circumstances was developed excessively, hypertrophically, so to speak. The bonds of consanguinity, stimulated most strongly by the necessities of joint action, became a uniting force far beyond the narrow circle of the family, and played a role in very remote kinship relations where later generations could no longer be aware of their existence. The horde, tribe, clan, etc. were aware of consanguinity stimulated among

cousins many times removed. It cannot be denied that thereby they became capable of forming work associations which penetrated deeply the functions later taken over by the newly formed higher-level associations. But when the latter had finally been established, they turned out to be so much more capable of performing the relevant functions that kinship associations had to yield to them. From here on the family regressed to its natural function and scope, just as a house which in troubled times had been fortified into a defensive castle was converted back into a simple dwelling place as soon as the state was in a position to guarantee public safety. In the well-developed state the family has become again the instrument for purely personal living which it had been in the beginning, in the service of marital community and thus procreation and of the education of children. The feeling of love of the family is now being reserved for the sphere of domestic life. In the public sphere it does not suffice and must make room for other sentiments, which in part are strictly oriented to defense and combat, but which — when oriented to the peace of the community — must broadly aim at the public weal.

Although the female heart is almost closed to the sentiments demanded by the public life, the love with which a mother envelops her children is not lost to the public interest. He who had the good fortune of an unblemished youth will be better able to resist the passionate temptations which as a man he encounters as a participant in public affairs. Just as the sunlight breaks through every rupture in the cloud cover, so the light of love which has warmed his heart since early childhood penetrates the dark and cold of the world where ever there is an opening for it. Peace and civilization would have progressed still more slowly — and maybe would not have advanced at all — if the sentiment of love derived from one's parental home had not been kept alive everywhere. To be sure, however, the social system makes such manifold demands that its development has to depend on still other, harsher elements.

2. The Work Associations (or Task Forces)

What causes prevent the kinship associations from expanding from within into large social groupings? Let us first state the fact before proceeding to the explanation. Given the pressures of propagation and augmentation, the resulting surpluses split off from time to time. They combine into independent associations in the process of searching, close by or at some distance, for hunting grounds, pastures, or arable lands. This is, in principle, the same process as is found with the bee population where swarms from time to time leave the parental hive, forming new populations under queens of their own. The instinctive attachment of the incremental population to the kinship association in which there is no longer room for them is very quickly overcome by the drive for self-reliance. Instrumental here is the decisive fact that the human race depends for its food requirements on much more ample space than do the bees whose swarms return quite near to where they flew out, getting their food in the same blossoms area. The wandering swarm of humans, once it has split off, has to venture quite far afield to find its subsistence base. It is well known that even those bee populations whose hives stand close together in the same house become estranged and hostile to each other. They differ from each other

by their smell and post guardian bees which fend off alien bees trying to sneak in and "curry favor" in order to steal honey. Human kinship associations grow still more estranged when they live far from each other and adapt to local conditions. Although there remains for the time being the tie of a common language and of many a custom, each association will continue to develop in its own way, and each will jealously guard its idiosyncrasies. Religious traditions exert their unifying influence for the relatively longest time. With the Greeks the peace of god dominated the big games dedicated to the gods, occasions which brought together the members of all tribes, which otherwise fought each other incessantly to the point where, under leadership of the principal city-states of Athens and Sparta, in the Peloponnesian War hostility grew and nearly degenerated into a war of extermination. While being intimately wedded internally by molecular forces of attraction, externally kinship associations are placed in hostile opposition to each other by molecular forces of repulsion.

Confronted with the instinct for self-preservation, by which each of the split-off kinship associations seeks to hold its own, the instinct of kinship association fails. The reproductive instinct results in ever more throngs of kin groups being sent out, but the more prolific it becomes, the more the original unity falls apart. But already within the kinship associations formations have occurred which tend to overcome the instinct of self-preservation of the kinship group and, submerging their antagonisms, to push ahead with, and complete, large-scale social development. Little by little within the kinship associations there arise cooperative groupings for warfare, economic activity, and other purposes, comprising no longer all the blood relatives and deriving their organizational structure no longer from the kinship order. A number of young people rally around the habitually victorious leader when he takes off for plunder or conquest. It is not a priority based on blood which gives him a position of preeminence, but he becomes army commander or duke thanks to success achieved with arms. The young people, joining his exodus, do not do so qua relatives but qua followers, and when he puts them under iron discipline, he legitimizes this act by the war objectives he seeks to attain. As success follows success, the wooing power of the task force becomes so great that, either peacefully or violently, it bridges the gap separating the old kinship groups from each other. From this point on the road is clear for the formation of society. The family, creation of the blood instinct, remains behind. Higher orders of collectivity rise above it which pure instinct cannot create any more because they presuppose concentrated, goal-oriented force — though being a raw kind of violence at first, it gradually becomes elevated to the heights of civilization and culture. Whereas in a kinship association the animal nature of man is preeminent, in the broad expanse of society he becomes a full person, though at first exhibiting all the marks of savageness. Animal states are mer'e kinship associations because animals are barred from socially rising above their blood ties. Only slight traces of this may perhaps be observed here or there, as for example in slave-keeping ant states.

But isn't it so that the blood instinct asserts in itself in human social ties even after societies have been fully developed? One is inclined to assume so for the nation state. Isn't

it the creation of national blood? Does not the community of blood give it its instinctive strength? One only has to pursue the origin of the nation states to convince himself that the opposite is true. Without exception they were creations of blood mixtures. All tribes of pure blood have disintegrated and joined others as soon as they entered into the big sweep of history. Of the Teutons we don't know at all if they ever formed a unit, and the Germans have only gradually coalesced into a unit, one which was never complete and from which big fragments have broken away in time. Almost all parts have mingled with blood of a different origin and different tongue. The present-day German people, viewed both as a people and a state, historically was the result of blood mixture, and the same is true for all big nations. They all are not mere creations of the blood instinct but higher-order work associations which have overcome the kinship association arrangements.

3. The Origin of Power in Success

The compelling force of the work association originates in the success attained by its actions. An important sentence! It explains why the work association endures and grows while the kinship association stands still and vanishes. The kinship association has the great advantage of having embodied in itself from the start a readiness for joint action, along with a national order of the family which always has its head. This is why chronologically it is the first to be called upon; without it history would have no beginning. But in view of the narrowness of the circle of persons to which it remains confined it cannot get beyond a relatively modest state of development, and consequently it would not, taken by itself, assure the continuance of history. To form a pure work association the masses are not ready to begin with because they do not know each other, and when they know each other they do not rally because they mistrust each other. This is why the first formations of work associations remain confined to the small circle comprised by the kinship association. But just as soon as visible success has been won, its magic force transforms the minds, and the more it grows and becomes consolidated, the larger the number of people it affects and the more firmly it commits sentiment and volition to its course. On the other hand, failure repels sentiment and volition. Through success and failure history acts as man's master of instruction, a master holding out the highest rewards and punishing with whips and scorpions. In the long run success attributable to united strength gains domination over the minds; guided by success, the masses in the end cannot help moving in emotional conformity at every step, like the drilled troops. In this manner power associations, and power, are created.

Successes come and go, and it thus appears that power is placed upon a tottering foundation if it truly originates in success. Isn't there indeed enough vacillating power, and must not the theory of power explain the latter's origin as well? It would be folly to assume that power is destroyed just as soon as success fails to come for a change. Only weak persons bow to fate without resistance; the strong and determined ones will defy it because they sense an inner strength to regain success, and therefore the world will be theirs in the end. The confidence in their strength is rewarded by the duration of their power. Up to

the World War, the Hohenzollern dynasty resisted all, even the most aggravating, storms of fate. Its firm control braved every misfortune and time and again secured success for itself, thereby gaining seemingly indestructible dominion over the minds. The World War fiasco was so devastating, so destructive of human lives, however, that the power collapsed all at once.

Is it possible as well to derive internal power, ethical power in particular, from success? Must not an upright person be loathe to "go by success" and thus to give homage to one ruler today and to another one tomorrow? That one gauges one's external strength by the degree of success achieved appears to be prudent and unobjectionable, for how else could it be reasonably assessed than by its effect? We will always feel the powers that are useful to us to be beneficial aids for our affairs, to be powers of liberation, while perceiving those which hamper and crush us as powers of coercion — how could we react differently? There is nothing immoral in this the sternest judge would have to approve. But might one take a different tack with the internal powers, might they be judged without paying heed to their successes? Why do we rate them as highly? Surely only because they promise the highest, most lasting, and most glad some successes! The person who "goes by success" makes himself contemptible by sacrificing his convictions to mere external success. The saying that power is conditioned on success takes away nothing of the grandeur and dignity of the internal powers; it's only a matter of interpreting this statement to the effect that it relates to genuine and lasting success. The validity of the internal powers is not diminished, let alone suspended, by also appraising them by their effects. On the contrary, the future is theirs because in the long run they prove to be the powers assuring the most comprehensive and reliable effects.

The compelling force of success binds people also in cases where the blood instinct failed, it also binds people of different blood. A work association with success on its side need not fear that its members will split off. Rather, it will continue drawing new members as long as it remains successful, and its growing numbers even may — though this need not always be the case, it is true for the most powerful forces — still further augment its strength to succeed. The 'Roman people was formed by the confluence of three different tribes whose history was preserved for a long time in certain traditions, especially in certain cultural institutions. Nevertheless, the witnessing strengths of success combined the blood of the three tribes to a unit inseparable in war and peace. By the joint accomplishments of its external victories and its internal development the Roman people became a historical unit.

The compelling force of success is being sensed by persons most distinctly in relation to the external powers of coercion which, as is of course well known, linguistic usage as well as common imagination regard as powers pure and simple. Indeed, however, the internal powers, too, derive their compelling force from success, and they give direction to human sentiment and volition no less imperiously than do the harshest external powers. They supplement the latter or turn against them but always their mutual relationship is conditioned by success.

4. Coercive Powers and Liberation Powers

The following survey presents in due brevity the main forms of coercive and liberation powers, and thereby also the principal forms of the communities or associations which are held together by one or the other of these powers.

Raw external force gives rise to the most severe of coercive associations, the forced associations of the type which barbaric victorious people brought into being as a consequence of their arms success. As long as their sentiments and volition have not been completely obliterated, the vanquished will try to rid themselves of despotism by uprisings or defections. Weak peoples under despotism will end up losing completely their capacity for self-determination, lapsing into the worst kind of dependence, including unadulterated servitude.

Even the state of a free people, as were the Romans is in itself a coercive association. Whether one likes it or not, one belongs to the state into which he is born, and one must do his duty in it. While this is true for every state, even the freest one, that people may legitimately call itself free which has no sovereign to look up to, but bows to the necessities of existence of its own free choice. Common distress calls upon a people completely surrounded by enemies to apply its joint forces to the preservation of independence. Every true Quirite (full citizen) felt an inner drive to go to battle for the state, and he also demanded the same from every other. When everyone expects from everyone else to perform the duties of a citizen, there arises out of mutual social pressure a coercive association. Through harmony of feelings among the members it is held together still more inviolably than the forced association shackles its subjects to the victors, more inviolably as well as more effectively because everybody marshals total determination with a view to serving the common cause. In the same way, the feeling of solidarity, wherever it is alive, through social pressure ties the companions to a firm association, broadened and reinforced by success. Even lukewarm and weak companions go along, notwithstanding the fact that they may sense as unpleasant and oppressive that they have to give up their personal comforts and to sacrifice for the common cause which they still don't have quite at heart. They are fellow-travelers who "go by success" while it can be had, but who will keep aloof and sooner or later will defect when success fails to come for a change. The ardent and determined companions, however, are not so easily deterred by failure, for they believe in their cause and stoutheartedly expect victory in the future. Where the bonds of companionship prove durable, the coercive association based on sentiment will assume, by and by, the refined form of a legal entity, receiving its rules through legal coercion. Where one encounters obstacles demanding a maximum of strength, social coercion coupled with despair escalate into terror, raging not only against the external enemy but even more recklessly against those own companions who show stubbornness or are being distrusted. As long as the states are fighting each other the sacrifices each state must demand from its citizens are so great that even in a free people's state coercion may become oppressive. The same is true for the classes at the height of the class struggle.

The community of faith, the ethical community, and every cultural community are held together by inner constraint, by moral obligation, by the pressure of conscience, of the love of truth, by the craving for beauty, and by any other strong inner urge. In these communities, too, fellow-travelers can always be found, whole groups of people who declare themselves for the spirit of the day, anxiously trying to display the attitude which is prescribed to the "full person" by his inner voice. While fellow-travelers find the success they are after in the general applause which the attitude they imitate is being accorded, for the genuine persons it lies in the inner satisfaction and the natural self-confidence which they attain. They cannot help obeying their conscience and render truth its honor. Perhaps they do so only after hard inner struggles, but after finally having overcome these obstacles, their nature becomes calm and firm. Undoubtedly the majority of even genuine persons are strongly influenced by the example of a great leader. Without his direction they could not find their way, but even so they follow him only because of an inner reaction and because of an appeal to a soul force whose commands they cannot escape any longer. Undoubtedly the majority of even genuine persons are encouraged in their course by the fact that they find themselves in the company of a great or overwhelming majority headed in the same direction. The masses always find their convictions strengthened by the perception that they are not alone but belong to a large community. In addition to their inner constraint and reinforcing it, people also sense a certain external (social) compulsion, which can be escaped less readily inasmuch as social judgment will strike hard those who err against the communal commands. In the case of the worst transgressions the offenders are ostracized, they are proscribed by the verdict of a social vehme,* just as is done by the state and the church. Nevertheless, the communities held together by inner forces are not coercive but free communities, for on the deepest level they are held together by an inner drive. They would never have arisen and would not be kept intact if they hadn't been awakened and kept alive by a call sounding from the innermost where no command other than that of one's own conviction counts. The duties demanded by these communities are joyfully accepted, by the genuine persons who constitute their strong core, as self-fulfillment, as decisions of their free will. For this kind of sentiment it does not matter at all whether the sensation of free will is only a flattering appearance which cancels the rigor of the law of causation, or whether moral constraint owes its irresistible force to the very circumstance that in it what is best in human nature has free reign.

There are various communities of interest, created and held together by the recognition of the practical usefulness of joining one's own strength — by itself almost insignificant — with that of others. The economic community is the most significant example. An individual magnifies his success extraordinarily when he finds the right spot for his work in an economy governed by the division of labor. The economy, such as it has developed

*The word comes from *vehmgericht*, roughly secret nonofficial court or tribunal.

on the basis of private property ownership, by its freer arrangements is clearly set off from the type of coercive community of which the state is the most striking example. The economy is not characterized by joint action, it does not proceed by central command, individuals are under the constraints of law and order only to the extent that they must stay within certain nontransgressible barriers. But within these limits they may move freely according to their discretion, they are free to make their decisions in accordance with their self-interest. The economy distinguishes itself from inner-directed communities — most vividly illustrated by the ethical community — by the fact that interest is guided by rational considerations, which do not have the rigor of inner convictions. It must be asked whether the economy, since it follows neither a social nor a specifically inner compulsion is indeed a true community rather than a loose association of individuals who meet, and part again, without any commitment. To be sure, in the case of the older economic orders, the village cooperative and the guild, the landlords and the town authorities, and the mercantilistic governments have, with anxious concern, issued the most diverse decrees, but later the classical writers prevailed with their own doctrines because all these coercive rules violated the true nature of the economy which was said to demand free mobility of individuals within the general bounds of law and morality. But as one looks more closely into classical teachings he recognizes that even where individuals enjoy legal and ethical liberty of action, they are subject to imperative social forces which are rooted in the competition of supply and demand. If one goes to the very bottom of things, he recognizes that it is not just competition which creates the social forces showing the economizing individual his path. In the vast expanse of the national economy every single person, even the strongest individual, would be lost if he had to depend entirely on himself. A strong individual favored by good fortune succeeds in rising to become a leader among the holders of power to whom he entrusted himself. A weaker or unfavorably situated individual, in order to break out of his inner emptiness, seeks the company of powers within the masses of society, and if he does not make the connection, he will fall prey to hostile powers who exploit his strength for their own purposes. Already when choosing an occupation serving as a starting point for his activity an individual is not the master of his decisions. In the main his path is determined by the force of his particular circumstances and of his environment, and again it is only the strongest and by fate most favored individuals who manage to assert themselves unaided. The masses follow tradition, which in numerous cases doesn't leave an individual any choice of his own and in others most severely limits their choice. The old law, not capable of individual distinctions yet, but everywhere naively reflecting the typical conditions, in the rigid caste system did as much as tie the son to the occupation of his father. Only modern law has opened up free occupational choice, though legal freedom doesn't mean, as it often does otherwise, real independence. The latter by and large will benefit only the relatively few; the masses continue in their effective restraint upon occupational choice. And in the exercise of his occupation the individual businessman is far from free to determine on his own the degree to which he will pursue his own advantage; rather he has to conform to the type which general competition, based on the technical and social experiences of the time and on the

energy of the people, has shaped. There are always only relatively few who do not have the stamina to measure up to the type, and their failures stand as a warning example for others. The big majority conform fairly closely to the type; their legally accorded freedom generally manifests itself in only very small deviations, above or below, which they permit themselves. Even personal egotism is usually circumscribed by society, and only very few are bold enough to pursue their personal advantage beyond the bounds of typical behavior.

Even into the sphere of private life social powers intrude. Private life is not isolated life — it is social life. It won't do to say of Robinson, as long as he is the sole inhabitant of his island, that he is the owner of private property. Not only is private life always embedded in social life, but in addition it is always more or less oriented to it, except that it is reserved to the beneficiary to determine the magnitude of the influence to be accorded to the social environment and, in particular, to ward off disturbing foreign incursions. My private rights permit me to dispose of my property at the exclusion of others, but they also give me the opportunity to enter into relations with others in my dispositions. I would be much the poorer if I didn't have this possibility. All monetary assets at my disposal would be without value, and even the bulk of real property values could no longer be fully exploited. Just as do private rights, so all of private life is socially conditioned, and even in the most personal sector of private life — domestic family life — the individual cannot set himself completely apart from social forces. The saying, "my house is my castle," is only intended to convey the idea that in his home everyone has control over access by strangers and that even the state has to protect, and to a certain extent respect itself, such domestic authority. After the same, every sensible person has a lively interest in making his domestic arrangements in conformance with the outstanding models set up by society, and he knows quite well that he will expose himself to societal reprimand if he decides to deviate notably from customary prescriptions and especially the prescriptions of his own class and stratum. With peoples of advanced civilization we encounter a surprising uniformity in all the details of domestic life: structure and operation are totally governed by certain rules and from morning to evening every hour fits into a firm timetable. While social rules already govern domestic life, they do so even more when individuals go out on the street and into public circulation even while minding only to their private affairs in the process. The clothes one wears when mixing with other people, the movements one may be permitted in doing so, the facial mien, the way one raises his voice and its volume — all these have to be exactly tailored to the social mores for fear of standing out and challenging the public. Although it may not seem so at first, this social command also emanates from success, for even a foolish fad may in its uniformity still yield a notable social success because the prescribed uniformity of behavior reduces frictions. While military troops or some other social organization designed to perform some overall task are geared to uniform action and while the community of interests of an economy is oriented to complementary action, individuals in their private activities are oriented in parallel order, so to speak, so private actions emerge as if they were socially directed and performed.

The drive toward social orientation even in one's private affairs is deeply embedded in human nature. There is hardly a social power which asserts itself more absolutely than the power of custom to which people submit almost without exception, not only the multitude of average persons but also people who usually stand aside; not only persons of refined culture but also the clumsy and arrogant ones; not only the stupid, but also the wise. One might almost start questioning whether the people accidentally jumbled together on the street, in the theater, and in the public means of transportation might not thereby lose their private personality and with the constant change of persons might coalesce to public bodies. Our language refers to the masses which are in such an intermediate state between private and social beings as the "Publikum" (public), a felicitous expression which is suggestive of "Oeffentlichkeit" (public) but does not bring out the connotation quite as emphatically as would "Oeffentlichkeit." Well, this public, while being subject to social forces, is at the same time a strong social power in its own right. For all public presentations — from those by poets, actors, and sculptors all the way to the supply by sellers — success is determined by the favor of the public, at least as far as proximate and external success is concerned which, however, quite often represents the decisive success where no higher values are involved.

About the specifics of the psychology of power — i.e., the psychic emotions which permit power to gain and keep a hold over the human mind — much more remains to be said, but it is preferable to leave these matters aside for the time being. As a first approach we were interested only in deriving the big manifestations of power from the common source of social success and in refuting the view, as widely held as it is erroneous, that there are no other compelling powers than the power of external force. Everybody who would understand the ways of power in the past and present must leave such a view behind. He who doesn't remains a bloody layman in social matters. He shares the myopia of anarchistic dreamers for whom the ideal of liberty is a state of complete lawlessness. They view it as a condition where individuals do not make any mutual contacts other than those created or dissolved by their contractual will, where therefore every service function of the state could be taken over by clubs, like those for sport or conviviality, which everybody is free to join or to leave. This would deprive society of all structural solidity; it would disintegrate into its personal atoms and be deprived of the firm ties needed for the achievement of its successes. However, care has been taken that it won't come to that, for the driving force generated by the success of the work associations will also create the necessary commitments of the mind with every people capable of work benefitting society as a whole. The weaker members are bound by coercive powers, but the strong ones find in liberation powers the necessary support. A healthy people will recognize soon that the defeat of the coercive powers weighing it down is only the first step toward freedom and that, if freedom is really to prevail, the second step, the growth of the liberation powers, must follow. The social commands emanating from these powers must elicit the same obedience as was previously done by the threat of external force. True liberty is not personal license but a painfully achieved social condition. Gottfried Keller, a true democrat at heart derided those of his Swiss compatriots who vaunted themselves to

be genuine republicans by the fact alone that they didn't have to obey a king. How much more cause for ridicule would he have found in the new republics being erected almost overnight in a whole group of European states but lacking the support of strong liberation powers!

Just as does the state, every work association requires supportive liberation powers in order to be truly free. Had the economy already become truly free by the mere institution of the liberal system and the removal of all traditional regulations? Isn't it rather so that capitalistic coercive powers have taken the place of state coercion wherever the class composed of small craftsmen, proletarians, and small farmers was too weak to be an inhibiting factor?

5. Primitive Peoples and Civilized Peoples

There is an almost incalculable profusion of coercive and liberation powers, of war and peace powers, of powers affecting public and powers affecting private life, which give a social-orientation to sentiment and volition of individuals in every developed society. In the tightly knit kinship associations with which history began, these powers are hardly in existence. The instinct of consanguinity had to take their place and to condition the minds for communal works. Nevertheless we must not underestimate the forces marshaled by human beings at the start of their historical achievements. This is especially true for those tribes which later evolve into racially superior peoples. In the blood of "high born" primitive peoples all aptitudes for cultural achievement were abundantly present in a seminal state. Although they, too, had primitive beginnings, it would be a gross error if one tried to apply to them the standards of those tribes which, neglected by nature, have remained primitive to this day. The immense magnitude of their achievements is portrayed only very inadequately in the Robinson Crusoe story which one is inclined to draw upon to illustrate the beginning of social life. What those primitive peoples had to do they had to get done without the aids which Robinson brought with him to his island. Robinson managed to get by so well on the island because he already embodied significant experiences of domestic education, and also because the cleverly calculating author allows him to leave his stranded ship and get on shore with just the amount of supplies and tools needed to scrape through. We had best imagine the ancestors of racially superior peoples as described by folk-tale, namely, as giants who dare the gods to fight them. The civilized peoples hardly stand above their ancestors, but rather below them, judged by their natural pent-up energy and their inner resources. The refined human being of modern civilization would no longer be capable of their achievements; he would be ignominiously defeated because his natural talents, notwithstanding all their development, have become badly stunted and have degenerated. If, on the other hand, it were possible to bring a wilding of superior blood lineage into a civilized country, he would develop his talents quickly and eagerly. The Vikings, who occupied the Normandy, were in no time able to occupy the top ranks of European knighthood in the arts of both war and Peace. What a civilized people is ahead in is the culture capital which it owes to the work of previous generations. Such Possession makes it rich even though it may have little strength

left for its augmentation. It has every reason to admire the vigor of both body and mind which its doughty ancestors marshaled to defy the savageness of life. It has no less reason to admire the mental powers enabling these people to find the paths leading from savagery to a civilized life. The founder of the worldwide Krupp enterprise has said that the most difficult task was gathering up the first one thousand dollars. Did not our ancestors also face the most difficult job in working up the "first thousand units of cultural accomplishments"? It made good sense to the ancients to attribute the invention of the plow to the gods, for in depth and efficacy it has not been bested by any one of the most brilliant inventions of which the present generation prides itself.

6. Formation of States and Initiation of Culture as Fundamental Social Achievements

Withal it required strenuous exertions through millenia to bring to fruition even the most promising talents of a people. The name "evolution," preferably applied to this process, can easily mislead, for we have before us not a single development, such as we perceive with a tree which, growing up under favorable conditions, puts on one annual ring after another. The development is also much more varied in forms than that of the butterfly into which the caterpillar via the pupa stage is being transformed. The progress of every people is always most strongly conditioned by the restraints which it encounters and which challenge its strength. Collective achievements are provided their strongest impetus by the need to overcome the obstacles faced from one stage to the next.

As long as living together is confined to the narrow circle of kinship associations, progress is confined to within narrow limits. Everybody is living the same monotonous life, and the division of labor is limited essentially to domestic matters because outside almost everybody is doing the same kind of thing. They all are hunters, fishermen, or herdsmen. Even the chieftain and his close leadership associates are placed only a little above the rest; at bottom they are all of the same crude nature. Gradations in rank mean practically no variations in style of life. The high born and the low born take the same meals at the same tables except that the first occupies the place of honor. For talents which transcend the traditional way of doing things there is hardly an opportunity to be used. It may be that the talents of a given blood are almost the same to begin with; in any case, given the general scarcity of things, there is a lack of means to advance them. One is engrossed in securing the tribal existence and the bare necessities of life. One does not get beyond that, however. Developmental forces, lacking a stimulus from the outside, remain dormant.

Nor is there fruitful intercourse with the groups which from time to time migrate away from the main tribe. Barter trade, the first means to unite alien tribes, still lacks the prerequisite of the division of labor, for the split-off groups continue doing pretty much the same thing as are done by the parent tribe. Neither here nor there exists the knowledge necessary to exploit the strange treasures of the earth. Lacking even more are the prerequisites for an exchange of ideas. All minds are equally

undeveloped, and in addition one is unable to scale the barrier which even short distances present. The environmental obstacles are still too difficult to cope with.

driving stimulus has its origin in the propensity to use force, inherent in man. Man in his historical origins was a violent being, and had to be in order to stand his ground in the struggle with an untamed nature. The drive to use force, suppressed within the kinship associations, finds its way to the tribe that has wandered off and has become alien, and especially to tribes of foreign blood. Occasions for fights are ever present, to be a stranger means ~~to be an enemy~~. This is true for civilized man, and why should it not also hold for uncivilized man! Given the general scarcity of things, interests clash hard. There is urgent necessity to defend emphatically the claims believed to be owned on hunting grounds and in fisheries pastures and cultivated lands cattle and other scarce things. Still much more important for peace of mind is to protect liberty and life, one's own and those of close kin, against continual threats. Woman is that objective of combat which does the most to stir up the passion of men. Carnal lust, mistrust, fear, and pugnacity are inexhaustible in arousing the fighting instinct. In an unending sequence of defense and attack, of victory and defeat, the strongest tribes eventually assert themselves, little by little subjugating their weaker neighbors. Great empires spring up and disappear. Finally, victors endowed with a maximum of external and internal strength succeed in establishing enduring reigns, fixed states are being set up, tribes and peoples grow up. Thanks to victory after victory, over the remnants of the old kinship associations extensive coercive associations have arisen. Now the talents which in the original narrowness of space lacked nourishment find a soil conducive to prolific development. The tension caused by a life-and-death struggle cannot help calling up the highest efforts, the triumph of victory bringing these to full fruition. The people grown powerful then becomes conscious of its pent-up wants; it reimburses itself from the possessions of the subjects and augments its wealth by having the latter work for it. The drive to augment the size of the population is no longer diverted abroad by internal destitution, and population growth implies greater national strength. Released from all servile chores, oriented solely to doing battle which elevates its sense of dominance, the victorious people inclines to and gains the leisure for more refined activities. The emerging victor-nation type of culture, which first takes pleasure in the display of outward splendor, soon turns to inner pursuits in the case of racially superior peoples. Mental desires awaken which stimulate the intellect. The darkness of a childlike superstition is being illuminated, the liberated mind begins to follow its inclination to search for interpretations of the accumulated ex- from narrow into wider perspectives is also the path from darkness to light; joined with the work leading to formation of states is the work involved in the establishment of civilization. In the historical beginnings all other collective accomplishments are greatly overshadowed by these two. They serve as the training ground for the great social forces which are transformed into the ruling powers of the <?ay- Warriors and priests, or, as they were called later, spiritual and secular greats, nobility and clergy, become the rulers in this epoch.

Each of the following epochs is distinguished by specific collective accomplishments, provoked and made possible by the need and the vigor of the times. Historiography in a grand style will delimit the recognized epochs according to the collective works characteristic of each. Every epoch gauges the greatness of its leaders by the success attained by the latter in promoting contemporary deeds. Talents which under different circumstances would have remained barren pour out all their riches when their hour has come. What social forces are available are being forced into serving the leaders of the time, ~~or~~ are avidly volunteered for such service. Uplifted by the social successes associated with their name, the new leaders join the ranks of the existing rulers, while the power of the formerly mighty pales ever more.

7. The Two Main Trends of Social Growth

Two trends may be noted within social growth. One is a tendency toward increasing stratification: society becomes ever more rich in hierarchical gradations, and the distances between the highest and lowest ranks become ever greater because the newly created material and spiritual values tend to accumulate with the rulers at first, while the lower strata have a smaller share in progress or may even be plundered and suppressed. The light of emerging culture first shines on the peaks of society, its depths remain in the dark for the time being, and for many peoples this will never change. Is there perhaps already a civilized nation today whose historically suppressed classes have again been lifted up to a level worthy of human beings? At any rate every robust people displays such a tendency. This is the second one of the perceived growth trends, namely, the trend toward upward mobility of classes, to use the name given it by an ingenious thinker in reference to modern conditions. Robust peoples are of such healthy disposition that the lower strata are capable of resisting the pressure from above, thus not completely succumbing to it but, however late and slowly, appropriating the newly created values, material and spiritual, of the upper classes as the lower strata become aware of these values. The judicious ruler is of course himself aware of his own interest in augmenting the vigor of the people to utilize it better; for the rest, the enlightened ruler always has a strong affinity for the populace. Although through long epochs of history the masses may have no share in public power, peace and the flourishing of arts and crafts at least provide an opportunity for them to further their private achievements through social interaction. Quietly and with unflagging effort peasant strength has been applied, wherever possible, to the clearing of forests and the cultivation of the soil, while industrious inhabitants of towns have filled and enriched these entities. In the present epoch, the face of the earth is being technically transformed by the alertness of industrial workers, both those in command and those in subordinate positions. All these quietly evolving and ascending collective forces have in due time been transformed into social power or they will do so, acting as a resistance first but eventually also sharing leadership roles. Thereby the foundation is laid for a new epoch of history.

8. The Economic Achievement of Society, the Error of the Materialistic Concept of History

Not until the present time has economic activity entered into the front ranks of collective achievements. For a very long time goods production remained a private matter* because it was spatially fixed. Distance was the most potent obstacle to the development of collective economic activity, not only because the goods produced didn't pay for the cost of laborious transports, but at least as much, if not more, because the productive factors were not sufficiently mobile. It was not possible to procure the manpower where it was needed, and the accumulation of savings was still too slender to make them available far and wide. The materialistic concept of history teaches that from the very beginning economic activity was the most general human concern and therefore always had to be a leading concern of society. This is a misunderstanding. What is most generally done is not per se also a collective accomplishment, at least not a collective deed in the decisive sense of a work association. What everybody does, must not also be done jointly. As long as neighbors cultivate their fields next to each other such cultivation of the soil remains a private matter. It receives its collective touch only by virtue of the fact that everybody learns from everybody else, but this parallel procedure is not enough to nullify its essentially private character. Moreover, the interlocking nature of the division of labor as it occurs when private business operations have evolved sufficiently far does not by itself deprive these of their essential nature — every producer and businessman remains independent, of course. Only the large-scale enterprise gives rise to genuine work associations. Perhaps the further development of the large enterprise will pave the way for an economy-wide work association, as demanded by socialists. That will be decided by success; for the time being one is not this far along anywhere. Nevertheless, nowadays economic activity is felt to be a joint endeavor inasmuch as it arouses a sense of solidarity of additional groups, and since economic activity leads to the accumulation of extraordinary riches, it is understandable if the economy begins to translate its strength into social power.

In one direction, economic interests from the very beginning have exercised momentous social influence: from the very start they were one of the roots of the social struggle. From the beginning there was a struggle for property ownership, and one of much graver consequences for the freedom of the worker. This was later, when personal freedom of workers was finally sanctioned by law in the civilized nations, replaced by the struggle for free access to jobs. Political battles turned, and still turn, largely around economic interests, and the same holds true for civil and external wars. Perhaps the World War would not have broken out if to the national fears and touchiness which are blamed for its outbreak there had not been added economic greediness and anxieties.

Certainly, economic interests are not the sole interests motivating combat. It will not do, as suggested by the materialistic conception of history, to characterize the battles surrounding the establishment of states as essentially economic in nature, and it is even less admissible to deduce the establishment of states as such from purely economic interests. To top it

off, in the establishment of cultural realms, economic criteria have no place whatsoever.

9. The Historic Growth Periods and the Personal Stages of Life

The succession of works undertaken by society, the succession of stages in stratification over which social accomplishments extend, stretches the process of historic growth over long periods of time. Every collective accomplishment requires and brings about in each of its stages a well-adjusted apparatus of power. Constructing such apparatuses of power will take its due time, particularly since it always must overcome the resistance of those organizations of power which had to be of service in the preceding accomplishment and in turn will strive to survive beyond its own contribution. If there are several collective works to be accomplished at the same time which will happen the more often the more ample the available forces have become -- the organizations of power will have to balance out each other, and in this they may succeed only after extended struggles. The long-lasting conflict between state and church, which filled the centuries from the Middle Ages into the Modern Era, originated in the clash of power organizations which within the orbit of the Romanic and Germanic peoples had been formed for the two goals of state formation and cultural development. Church and state had grown strong through successes, and both did their utmost to become the dominant power.

The talents of every people are limited, and in the long run therefore even the vital energies of even the most 'gifted and best-off' people may become exhausted. Then development will stand still, and since in the context of peoples stagnation means staying behind, the people remaining behind will perhaps fall prey to other, more alert peoples. China illustrates this. But standing still may also be due to causes other than the complete exhaustion of a people's vital strength; it may be grounded in the disproportion of internal power positions, as when an upper class which has grown too powerful holds down the as yet not fully developed forces of the lower classes, while itself no longer being capable of new progress because of exhaustion. Growth of social forces and stratification of social powers are two phenomena which must be rigorously distinguished. Usually one pays attention only to the first of these developments. It is more accessible to us because it has its analogy in the growth of personal strength. The second, however, deserves the attention of the social scientist in much higher degree, because in it originate the most peculiar and obscure social problems. The tree in a forest grows up differently than the isolated tree. The former is adversely affected by neighboring trees and perhaps will atrophy if it is too weak. It must strive heavenward lest it be deprived of air and light. While being prevented from forming a rich, expansive crown, it does enjoy more protection against the danger of windfall. Similarly, being fitted into the hierarchy of power (power struggle) of society sometimes promotes and sometimes retards the growth of particular social groups. The superposition of a higher power may protectively promote the growth of the lower social strata, but it may also arrest and destroy it. Any change in social stratification will therefore always have an impact on the growth of forces: it may increase

the pressure exerted on the layers below, but it may also liberate suppressed forces. The subjected farmers were so oppressively dominated that the old fount of peasant vitality, the historic source of the vigor of a people, stood in danger of drying out. The act of liberation of the farmers, initiated by the princely governments and consummated by the revolutions, has cleared again for the peasantry -- and thus to the nation -- the path of its natural development. The proletariat expects the same results from its own liberation.

Just as an individual power structure crumbles under the pressure of failure, or collapses when the forces fail which gave it initial impetus, or when it is defeated by a stronger power, so also the complete social disintegration may be rooted in the two facts of internal erosion of strength and superposition of a higher power. The exploitative dominating powers which sin against the great forces of the people must always lead to general decay. The social apex must tumble down when the supporting layers cave in. The proud master races which account for the history of old Asia have retrogressed in terms of population size, possessions, and culture to the levels achieved in early epochs and do no longer count in the making of history. It must be admitted that a goodly share of their strength was sapped by atrocious wars, but in all cases the superposition of power has contributed a great deal to the decline.

Decay of a people is not tantamount to its complete destruction yet. The complete downfall of a people is, at any rate, a rarity. Strictly speaking, this is made possible only by a war of extermination, and such a war in its full meaning consumes only the kind of people who, like the Goths in Italy and the Vandals in Africa, are only dispersed in a thin upper layer and who defend their dictatorial rule with barbarian valor down to the last man. Such exceptional cases apart, no people suffers bodily death. Nor should it be viewed as spiritual death when a people ends its separate existence by intermarrying with others. The fall of the Roman Empire did not entail the destruction of the whole Roman population, no more than the subjection of the Saxons in England by the Normans meant the ruin of the Saxons as a people. Although in either case the vanquished lost their identity as a people and ceased to be independent, having to suffer the superposition of a foreign power, just as the Saxons in England after fusion with the Normans remained a vital element of the English people, so did the population of the Roman Empire which, after fusing with the Germanic victors, was even able to force its own language upon them and in addition was able to salvage for the subsequent epoch a sizable remainder of its culture, which probably has been considerably underrated by the older branch of historiography. This transmission of language and culture, as it was imparted by the falling Roman Empire to the rising Empires of the Barbarians, had still much more substance than the cultural process of the Renaissance. The latter meant a mere transfer of ideas. The Humanists refined their Latin by immersing themselves into Cicero, and the sculptors and architects learned from the newly excavated Roman models. On the other hand, the downfall of the Roman Empire, however large the loss of human lives associated with it, left a body of inhabitants more numerous than that of the immigrant victors. This residual population was active as personal carriers of the old

cultural forces of society and by the superiority of their culture could exert influence even though they had lost their external position of power. Besides, by having the church and the papacy on their side, they even found access to the ruling powers of the time.

The view of historic growth presented here does not coincide with the traditional view. It is customary to derive the law of social growth from personal growth and thus to distinguish in society the same three stages of youth, manhood, and old age as is done in personal life. In doing so, one adheres to the same anthropomorphic concept of social life by which one otherwise, too, tries to approach an understanding of its complex structures under the simpler and more familiar image of the personal acts in life. Thus, for example, one conceives of the acts through which social activity is being determined as social acts of volition, which are assumed to occur entirely in the manner of personal acts of volition, with only this difference that they are executed by thousands or by millions of people instead of by a single individual. Indeed, the formation of social will - a subject that will be taken up in greater detail elsewhere - occurs in such a manner that the will of the majority of participants is either eliminated outright or else is being confined to such subordinate assistance as would never suffice to explain a personal act of volition. Similarly, much and perhaps most of personal growth does not pass over into social growth. Old age with its vanishing strength gradually withdraws from social activities. By and large, only manhood is socially active. All of the personal growth of youth remains socially inoperative; rather than advancing society, it only gets youth to the point where it can become socially involved. Growth of youth assumes importance for social growth only if in the new circumstances under which it matures it will become disposed to launch new movements. In the main however, youth first of all catches up with the preceding social development. Just as the human embryo, following the fundamental law of ontogenesis repeats the forms in which the evolution of the genus from the most simple living organism to man has taken place, so the youthful mind in its growth repeats the configurations which the human mind had to undergo historically. The boy first lives playfully, then he takes merciless pleasure in the wild cruelties of the Indian, later his mind turns to heroic adventures, and responding to certain stresses in his development he indulges the fervor of faith, then he chases after highfaluting ideals, until in a majority of cases the minds of the grown-ups at long last land soberly in the harbor of economic prudence. Social growth, however, is not at all the mirror image of personal growth, because even in manhood only a portion of the personal energies is called into the service of society, the remainder being reserved for private living.

The portion called upon to partake in social deeds is divided into two closely interwoven processes, namely, the development of energies through exercise and their transformation into social power. There is no analogy whatever for this second process in personal life, and even the first undergoes a strange shift in its social dimension because, as we know, it occurs by layers or stepwise, a process for which there is no analogy in personal growth either. No developing people grows uniformly in all of its strata. The top classes may already have become

effete while the middle and lower classes are still on the rise with unspent vigor or else are being prematurely restrained or they retrogress. A developing people will always show different ages for its different classes, inasmuch as the stages of personal life may be applicable at all to social conditions. One may think of a whole people as belonging to the same age group only with respect to the very first stages of development and perhaps also the ones of final perfection, if these should be attained at all. The periods of maturity of knighthood and of the middle classes are widely apart in the case of the peoples of the Occident, and maturity for the proletariat cannot even be envisaged as yet anywhere. Needless to say, thanks to the general social coherence every stage is always being influenced by the character of the others, and consequently a class having already come to a standstill may receive new impulses from another class which is forging ahead. Therefore the history of every people gives evidence of the phenomenon of recurring puberty, unknown in the sphere of personal growth, or - if we may believe Goethe - occurring only with exceptionally strong personages.

Just how did one come to equate the stages of growth of peoples with those of personal life? Surely, this was not done without some justification. Although a historical view reveals many similarities between peoples and the human personality, these nevertheless do not suffice to warrant a full transfer of the idea of growth to the evolution of peoples. Above all, the maturing of peoples is quite comparable to the maturing of persons even though it occurs over incomparably longer periods of time. Like every individual, every people is endowed with certain talents which little by little blossom and come to fruition until eventually they must be exhausted. Peoples whose talents predestine them to make history, but who haven't quite become a real part of it yet, undoubtedly create the impression of youthfulness which manifests itself with men and even spry old people through the refreshing feeling of restrained strength. In contrast we are aware of other peoples who lack every talent for making history and who early in their development show the marks of wilted old age. Similarly, there are cases of social decay where even young people show no signs of yearning and hope. However, not every people encounters such a decay. Just as a people which continues to renew itself in fresh generations does not suffer physical death, a strong people also does not sustain that lapse of strength which precedes death. To exhaust its strength means for a people nothing else but to develop its talents fully so that its development comes to a standstill. In order for social forces in the true sense to decay, quite special causes would have to be at work. Such a fate threatens especially the higher classes, who burn themselves out in the excessive strains of wars which they are called upon to fight or in mental exertions to which they devote themselves passionately, or who degenerate in wanton extravagances; the masses are threatened by this fate when they are held down in dire poverty and slavery. Where, however, below the stratum of the wilting elite the masses stay thoroughly healthy, their rise will lead the people into new manhood and even renewed youth. For most of the peoples of Antiquity we have only received, through the historiographer, a description of the conditions surrounding the elite which conveys the impression of decay as the end of a historical epoch. While it is true that the history of the upper classes by and

large codetermines that of the masses, it does not in any way give it its final shape. When the ruling class has become exhausted, the realms which were only held together by its strength will collapse and the masses will be drawn into the fall and subjected to endless suffering. Nevertheless, the vital-energy of the masses will enable them to bestow new growth and rich content to history in centuries to follow. Time and again we have to recall that the development of peoples occurs in stages, as far as its various strata are concerned. The historiographer will never measure up to his task if he attempts to portray the development of a people in analogy to personal development. He must with utmost attention follow the turns by which the ruling classes gain power, the masses are held down by the pressure of the strata above them, and occasionally the masses, after they have grown strong enough, in a breakthrough bring their collected strength to new fruition.

With the peoples of Antiquity, cultural developments may be viewed as an undivided whole inasmuch as its bearers constituted a single cultural stratum. The culture of the Athenians was manifested by a thin layer of full citizens resting on top of the half citizens and the unfree. In the case of modern peoples the cultured class nowhere is sharply set apart from the rest of the people in legal or real terms. It is therefore inadmissible to portray cultural history as well as the general history of modern peoples in the same unbroken swing as that of Antiquity. Its multififormity cannot be reduced to the simple outline of personal development. In order to enter into the feeling of fervor which comes out in German music and lyric poetry one must be able to understand the piety and the peace by which the home of a plain German citizen is distinguished from the superficial doings of the courts and of nobility. But in doing so one must not overlook the prehistory during which the prince and the knights were the energetic protagonists and models for the people. In this manner one period and class after another supplies the traits that mark the character of the people.

We on our part will definitely orient our investigations to the social viewpoint. We certainly cannot afford to overlook personal aspects, but we may include these only to the extent that they represent the necessary foundation of social relationships. We will therefore take them into account only when the personal forces are capable of exerting a social effect. We will not believe that the historical development can be fully comprehended from the strivings for personal growth, but we will always be alert also to include in our thinking the external circumstances which open up or block out the social paths to the unfolding forces of inner man. When for early times we see brute force as decisive, we must not explain its prevalence simply by the immaturity of youthful peoples, but we will deduce it above all from the harshness of the obstacles which have to be overcome at first. If for later times we witness the even more profuse unfolding of soft internal powers, then again we will not attribute these simply to the gain in maturity of the people or possibly to its exhaustion on account of old age, but we will take into account the immense help derived from the attainment of external peace and wealth for the expression of the long pent-up, more tender emotions and for the complete relaxation of the expectant minds. We always will also have to consider the after-effects which consolidated power entails. As long as such

entrenched power does not meet with new counterforces or does not experience a crumbling away or decay of its own strength it has an advantage permitting it to continue to hold its own. When strong new forces gain ascendancy, it will eventually have to yield to these, but nevertheless it may have served them as a first step, and such service comes plainly to the fore when the power is transformed from within to conform to the new circumstances. In both cases the new power is based on the successes of the old. Although the two trends may cross and get entangled, the eye of the social scientist will still discern the general line of development. His balanced judgment ascertains that the brute force making possible the creation of the state was a prerequisite for creating the popular setting for the liberation powers. Political passion never thinks further ahead or back, it sticks to the present, and perhaps it has to be so if the tasks of the present are to be accomplished. The progressive parties of the present raise the bold leaders of the struggle for freedom on the shield and turn derisively and irately against the rulers. They do it for good reasons when the hour of freedom has really arrived, but for equally good reasons at that time in the past when the task of creation of the state necessitated the use of brute force did the best men flock to the courts of the victorious princes with a view to serving them. In part they have probably done so for the sake of outward success, but the genuine ones among them did it out of conviction, endeavoring to contribute to the tasks and progress of the times. Perhaps one or another even had an eye for recognizing that further progress had to be the path to freedom. Unstinted recognition, however, is also due to those men who had nothing else in mind but to do their share of the work of the times, without giving any thought to the fact that such work later would change, and would have to change.

Healthy peoples have the strength to come to a good end through all the twists of development if only a kind fate accompanies their strength. Weak and ill-fated peoples break down, unable to muster the counterforce to overcome the predominance of the old powers or to stem the incursions of strong peoples.

10. The Utilitarian Principle in Society

These considerations make it evident that power, although it originates in social success and grows with it, nevertheless does not at once guarantee the greatest social utility. In social development the utilitarian principle -- the principle of the highest social good -- is being realized only under certain conditions which are so structured that they obtain only for peoples of greatest strength and tenacity and that even for these successful development can occur only in steps. Social success is every success within society, even one attained by a single group at the expense of the masses. The Law of Small Numbers is based on the social success of small groups, but the social success of small groups can be magnified to full-fledged social success if the new strength, which first was formed by the small group in its own interest, is removed from its control and placed at the disposal of society as a whole. First the prince unifies the people and uses them to his advantage. But as soon as the people, blessed by the law and order of the princely state, have recovered from the wounds inflicted on them by the struggle for

order, they will -- if they still have enough buoyancy -- get rid of the princely leader who has become troublesome and expensive and in the pursuit of development will turn to new tasks under new foremen. They will have to find out whether they will be better off with the new leader. Even for the most advanced peoples the golden age of peaceful general welfare still lies far in the future. The goal of highest social utility has not yet been reached anywhere, and there is grave doubt whether it is already possible today to discern the line of development leading to that goal.

III. Basic Form of the Constitution of Society:
Leader and Masses

1. Leadership as a Result of Mass Technique

Every social organization needs and has its constitution. Every state needed and had its constitution long before there were constitutions in the modern sense — amply deliberated, carefully phrased, and solemnly sworn to. Not only the state but also the church, the army, the economy, and every other free association of people down to the mere social clubs needs and has its constitution, whether* it be one of stated legal rules or merely a constitution in fact. The judicial system is the explicitly arranged classification of powers for an association of people. The actual constitution is the organization -- one of superordination, subordination, or equality — of social powers adhered to in fact, as based on the given distribution of social forces. At bottom the constitution of society represents the given state of forces and powers in the same way in which the human frame of mind is the state in which his mental forces are found. The more closely the legally described order approaches the actual order, the closer to life and hence the more effective will the legal constitution be. A constitution, however artfully put together, which in no way accords with real life is indeed, as Lassalle has said, only a piece of paper. England, which of all the European states has the constitution most closely reflective of real life, has also the most informal one.

All constitutions are merely variants of an ever recurring basic form. Their substance always concerns the division of power between leader and masses. In social life leaders and masses have their certain functions which, while they may become effective in widely differing degrees, must always be jointly active. If an association is to be able to act it must have both organs. Direct democracy in its most extreme form is not viable, for a big multitude can never exercise direct leadership, it is always in need of a special organ of representation. What cooperation between leader and masses means for social success is clearly understood today by the proletariat, which recognizes the value of organizing. What does it mean, to organize? Nothing but that a multitude arranges itself under leaders who enjoy its confidence. The leaders provide goal and plan for the movement, the masses give the latter its weight.

When a sociologist today talks about the phenomenon of the masses he usually takes as his point of departure the psychology of the masses, where the latter for the most part come off rather unfavorably. Scientific investigation in this connection tends to focus on the most spectacular, stormy, and most degenerate mass movements, and it also tends to stay within the political realm where the masses today are most conspicuous. We wish to take a more general point of departure for our investigation.

The necessity of leadership does not rest at all, or at least not in the first place, on the inadequacy of the average person who together with other average persons forms the masses. While a parliament brings together the men who in elections asserted themselves as leaders of the masses, those same

men, when assembled in parliament, are in turn in need of leadership. Not mass psychology but mass technique, above all, compels the supply of leadership. Even the most capable persons, if they happen to be assembled en masse, could not act unless leaders stood up on their behalf. The means of communication which are used by individuals to achieve integration and to find the path to joint action are not applicable to a great multitude. The contract is the suitable form of association between two persons or a similarly small number, but there can not be a contractual relationship between millions of persons. The thinkers who start with a social compact or treaty have failed to understand the nature of mass technique. They have fallen prey to that error which is at the root of all social thought namely, to treat man as a member of the multitude the same way in which he appears to us in his personal life. Not only does the individual receive different impulses from the environment of the masses, but he also has to use different means to relate to them than those he is used to in personal intercourse.

When two persons are inclined to enter into a contract, each has to consider his own intentions and then has to tell the other what he wants. In a people comprising millions a general exchange of conversation is altogether precluded, but even in an assembly of thousands or hundreds only it is out of the question for everybody to speak if the meeting is to come to an end. The big majority has to sit still — as already suggested by the word "Sitzung" — and remain silent while only the spokesmen talk. Listening may be quite conducive to renouncing independent reflection. One follows the speaker on the paths deemed promising by him in order to attain his desired objectives. But because one still does not want to act entirely without thought, a committee is chosen for deliberation, which under certain circumstances may deem it feasible to create a subcommittee, which in turn may shift the task of intensive deliberation to a set of reporters. A decision is finally arrived at in such a way that a reporter or an adversary makes a motion which is then approved or disapproved by subcommittee, committee, and assembly. Decisions which are binding on an entire people come about without a big majority of the people's representatives having to do anything more than say yes or no. How ill-considered and formless a private contract would be called if one party confined itself to the modest role which mass technique assigns to the majority representatives!

An especially informative insight into the technique of mass action is provided by the case of a political election, which is by no means as simple an act as the electors, and unfortunately also the lawmakers, happen to think. Even the word choice is completely misleading, for the elector does not elect. That is, he does not himself select, which after all is the most essential aspect of every election, but only gives his yes or no to the names of the candidates who have been selected by the leadership of the political parties. The elector chooses the party for which he wants to cast his vote. And where, as is often the case, the choice of party is predetermined from the start by his own interests, he does not elect at all but confines himself to declaring for his own party by casting his ballot. The President of the United States, who is supposed to be elected by the populace in order to give him as much authority as possible vis-à-vis Congress, in the true sense is still not chosen by the

people, and in terms of mass technique it can't be otherwise at all. The U.S. would never get done with electing its President if the many millions of individual voters selected their President in the same way a bridegroom selects his bride. The election proper, namely, the choosing from among a number of candidates, takes place in the conventions of the big parties — smaller parties have no say here at all — and here again the intimate circles of the most influential men who are in charge at the convention settle the issue. While the act taking place on official election day is a party vote pure and simple, it is as such nevertheless decisive because this determines the relative weight of the votes cast for the different parties. But this decisive act must be preceded by the selection of the candidate on whom the voters who declare themselves for the party have to concentrate their vote, and such a selection can be achieved only within the narrow circle of the leaders.

Just as it does for an election, mass technique for every social action of whatever nature demands a leader. Leadership does not have its origin — or at least not primarily — in the inertia or indifference of the masses, however much the latter may contribute in certain cases, but is inevitably preordained by the technique of mass communication. A congeries of armed and brave men will turn into a useful fighting force only after these people have subordinated themselves to a leader. The technique of combat absolutely demands the commanding person of the leader, just as the old-style assault party demanded the flag which was carried in front when a charge was mounted. In the same way, every type of social action demands leadership at the top.

2. The Nature of Leadership

Linguistic usage prefers to reserve the label "leader" for the great men of history. For theoretical purposes, however, we need a word for the position of leadership, however it may be filled. Of course this is not to say that theoretically it makes no difference how it is filled, but the label must be assigned to all persons who in a guiding capacity stand above the masses. Everyone who leads into good or evil must be regarded as a leader — even a destroying Attila or the due-date bill collector. Also we must not limit the label's use to military or political leaders, to princes, army commanders, statesmen or party heads, but it applies equally to religious leaders and leaders in the arts and sciences, in short to all who in any realm of social activity lead the way — even if perhaps only within a restricted realm — as teachers, masters, pioneers, protagonists, and foremen. The leader can exert influence not only by means of the strict order, the command or the instruction, but also via a proposal or offer finding approval with the masses, or via the judgment he renders, or a doctrine winning him pupils or disciples, or "his advice which is followed, or a successful model which is imitated, or via any other exemplary activity, though this may be [redacted] a premonition and aspiration. To be a leader in this theoretical sense means nothing but to be first in matters of ~~common concern~~. The social function of the leader is to walk in front of that of the mass is following. Hundreds or thousands or even millions cannot become part of a homogeneous movement other than when guided by the example of success evidenced in the person of the leader.

3. The Forms of Leadership

The highest form of leadership is the one where the leader is called upon by the paramount strength which he bestows upon his lofty undertakings. We will call it authoritarian leadership, and such a leader great leader we might possibly also call him the born leader. The great leader is the personal leader in the truest sense of the word: he does not trace his charge from anybody else, he is leader through and through on his own authority -- success has proved him to be the best, his title is one of purest historical selection. When a public call goes out to him he does not thereby receive his charge in the first place, but rather he is being recognized as proven best by his success, a person whom the rest follow willingly when he strides ahead. Once in a while the great leader asserts himself readily and by common, enthusiastic consent, as when, like the victorious commander-in-chief, he has conspicuous, breathtaking success on his side. In other cases he encounters passionate rejection because he demands introspection and a fresh start coming from the bottom of the human heart, and his teachings will perhaps win through only when he has given testimony for them by his own death. As the corpse of Cid Campeador was carried at the head of his followers in battle, so it may happen that the thought of the great spiritual leader will continue to guide the soul protectively and edifyingly into a distant future.

All in all, we only rarely encounter in the course of history the great leader who overwhelms the minds by the superhuman dimensions of his feat. Nevertheless, his figure lends itself best to opening our eyes for the essence of leadership, for his is the ideal case which demonstrates this essence most purely and distinctly. In his person we become most clearly aware of the function of taking the lead and of selection by success; in the other forms of leadership, which cover the huge majority of all real-world cases, the two elements are being more or less obscured.

This happens above all with despotic leadership, a leadership form which is most prominent in the beginnings of historic times. The victorious ruler who crushes and disposes his adversary is "the first" in the multitude. Though his superiority is evident his conduct may hardly be equaled with leading the way designed to generate a following. The despot does not want to advance the weal of his subjects, he would rather restrain them with a view to undermining their will to resist. In addition, the victory of brute force by which the despot acts on the minds of the subjects is such a crude form of selection that it hardly deserves such a distinguished label. Traces of true leadership may be perceived only when the despot rallies the masses in order to have them fight and work for himself. When despotic leadership thus turns into lordly leadership, the function of leading the way is performed more efficaciously; compliance with the commands imposed by the lord on his subjects is already genuine following. The despot who wants to hold his own as an organizing lord is no longer selected through mere force but at the same time must stand out through certain cultural traits. The peak of lordly leadership is the princely leadership, as exhibited by European noblemen from the Middle Ages until the age of enlightened absolutism. The princely leadership type retained of the compulsion associated with despotic leadership just enough to be

able to increase the emphasis of the internal authority which it had gained by the success of its foresighted leadership. This type of leadership through all of history has been one of the most effective.

In smaller social groupings, such as the guilds, from the very beginnings the leader is chosen by his fellows through election. In such a rather narrow circle of fellows who know each other this form is logical, of course. Needless to say, the right choice always implies selection of the most suitable person as well. The fellow called upon to serve through an election must already before have been enhanced by the criterion of success. To be sure, it can be hardly avoided that the outcome of the election will also be influenced by the interests and connections of the powerful members of the group. The degree of authority wielded by the chosen leader vis-a-vis the fellows who elected him will as a rule be much smaller than that of the despotic leader. The elected leader will not find it easy to prevail against the public opinion of his constituency. Normally he will be bound by this opinion, although at least in the details of execution he still has to lead the way, on pain of soon losing his authority. In large groups as well, and especially in a commonwealth, with increasing liberty the cooperative selection of the leader has become more and more usual. The choice of the people's representatives and deputies in a democracy is nothing but the cooperative choice of the leader on a large scale. Admittedly, the form of cooperative leadership cannot be carried over to a great people in such a pure form as one is inclined to think nowadays. In the absence of a proposal by a well-informed authority, the election from among a big multitude would always become splintered. For as we have already shown, an election is a social act, and as every other such act it requires the exercise of leadership. It is a gross error to think that election day is the day of judgment when a free populace, from the commanding heights of its sovereignty, pronounces its judgment about its leaders. The masses belonging to the parties always receive the slogans that guide them on election day from the leaders. The latter know very well that the outcome of the election depends a good deal on which leadership is in charge of the election, or as a characteristic expression goes -- has to "make" the election. To play this instrument of mass technique is not as simple as is assumed by the simple man in his credulity, which -- it must unfortunately be added -- normally also characterizes the educated man in matters political. The election instrument must be most highly refined if the votes drawn from the ballot box are really to designate the best from among the people. Not only must the instrument be highly perfected but, and this is far more important, so must be the players themselves, who have to handle it with expertise. In order that leadership succession through election really achieves its objective of selecting the best from among the people, it must already have been preceded by a historical selection of earlier leaders. In none of the young democracies has this prerequisite been met.

In the long run and under the appropriate circumstances, the personal-authoritarian as well as the cooperative leadership are transformed into historical leadership. Since the latter can be comprehended only in the context of the historic attainments of power, their portrayal will have to wait until later.

There is still another form of leadership, practically not noted at all by theory and yet of highest efficacy and next to indispensable for a thriving society. It is that form which asserts itself in a free society. Or should a free society be able to accomplish its mighty feats without leadership? Can one imagine that the growth of a free economy, the progress in the division of labor and of monetary transactions could come about without leadership? Or that the marvel of language, that art and science, that law and ethics, that even social mores could have developed without leadership? To be sure, within the realm of a free society it is never necessary to make collective decisions calling for united leadership at the top such as is necessary for decision-making in the army or civilian government. Leadership in the free society must be less formal and more relaxed, yet it must not be absent, because it is needed wherever the masses have to act as a collective body for which they would be positively unfit without leadership. It cannot be doubted that the tasks to be met in a free society require collective action. The innumerable individuals who meet in their habitual comings and goings must, in order to be able to meet, adhere to similar or to repeat an expression already used before — to parallel conduct. For the division of labor between agriculture and handicrafts, or between the various crafts, the individual economic units must act complementarily, and it is similar in art and science, in law and ethics. Such a parallel or complementary conduct is also called for by the need for understanding among the millions, and such understanding cannot come about without leadership. We find at work here a quite peculiar, "impersonal" type of leadership, on which to throw scientific light is much more difficult than is the case of purely personal leadership. The example of language, in whose construction both forms of leadership act jointly, perhaps provides the best opportunity for comparing their effect vis-a-vis each other.

Participating in the development of every culture language were great intellectual leaders, of powerful expression, masters whose words penetrated all the nooks and crannies of the populace. Dante's "Divine Comedy" has enriched the Italian literary language and Luther's translation of the bible has decisively influenced German as a written language. It is clear, however, that even the vigor of the linguistically most proficient poets and prophets has not formed the national languages all by itself. Their work, in turn, was based on a vernacular language, and even after they had done their work, the national languages continued to develop. In addition to the great prophets, before as well as after them, we also become aware of smaller and smallest prophets who played a leading role in language formation — the sober officialese has contributed its part as has business and life on the street. How often it is that the vocabulary is enriched by some kind of brilliant, witty, or earthy, but apt phrase, due to the momentary inspiration of a man on the street and gradually finding its way from the circle of a few nearby listeners into general usage! Such detail work in language formation goes on incessantly, without preservation of the names of those who play a leading role in this process. In addition to the great, well-known, and already mentioned leaders, whose names enter into the history books, changing leaders also participate, each one only with a very small contribution but collectively having an inestimable effect. In contrast to the figures of well-known leadership, we may call these leaders anonymous

because their names do not reach out into the broad public. Just as they do vis-a-vis the great leaders, the masses also follow these small, anonymous leaders, avidly gathering up the felicitous names and phrases coined by the latter and incorporating them into linguistic usage. The "popular song," whose author remains unknown, clearly explains to us how even an anonymous leader wins disciples in the populace for the task of language enrichment. The populace as such does not compose, it cannot create a song. Only the individual with suitable talent can do so, but some others who lack sufficient talent to deserve being called poets occasionally in a lucky hour may also hit the right note. Without their names becoming known or being preserved, their song is picked up by the pleased populace and, added to the vocabulary, is being preserved for posterity.

In just the same way do anonymous leaders have their share in the creation of money. Craving to do better for themselves in exchange transactions pursued for the sake of utility than is possible under the cumbersome form of barter, resourceful heads have searched for a more convenient means of exchange. When the mass of the populace was induced to imitate them because of the success they achieved in small-scale, individual transactions, by and by the smooth pieces of metallic coins were ground out which by mass use became generally accepted as means of exchange and subsequently were given technical and legal sanction by the state.

Of course, even anonymous leadership is fundamentally personal, save that the leadership individuals take turns. It is a changing and dispersed leadership, now one, then another, having a bright idea which becomes imitated. The anonymous leader, of course, does not create a big thing either, his contribution being limited to a single element, to an improvement here or there. It is therefore understandable that his person is being neglected. His work finds a broad following and is being selected, but the person as such is not being selected and remains in the dark.

In the sphere of private life anonymous leadership predominates. It fits well into the small-scale relationships found here, yet is enough to induce imitation of the kind of exemplary model which makes possible a parallel or complementary behavior in wider circles of the population. However, when in the private sector rather large social units come into play we find there, too, distinct personal leadership. Every economic enterprise calls for firm personal leadership, and in large-scale firms with hundreds or thousands of white- and blue-collar workers the person of the leader stands out in bold relief. The entrepreneur in a large enterprise must be a well rounded personality in order to gain his successes, and many such modern industrialists are counted in the front rank of social leaders. Not only does the fate of the many persons directly employed by their firms depend on their decisions, but by the impulses emanating from them they influence both the direction and speed of economic development as a whole, and perhaps of the country's political development as well — even worldwide effects emanate from them. Legally the leadership potential of the entrepreneur is limited to mere private effects. The persons with whom he has to deal — the suppliers, customers, and the salaried and wage employees — can only be bound by contracts in whose conclusion they confront him

with equal legal capacity. Legally he has no authority of command over them. Factually, however*, he joins in his person large and sometimes overwhelming power. In effect he has coercive power, not only vis-a-vis those persons with whom he enters into contracts but also those -- perhaps much more numerous but never met by him -- whom he displaces in the market or otherwise, directly or indirectly, harms in their economic circumstances. His power* is so great that, wherever he can wield it without restraints, it would permit him as a despotic leader to do violence to the economy as in the old times a well-armed knight and his horsemen could do from his fortified castle. Even with the restraints imposed upon them by government protection of workers and by unions, the large-scale capitalistic enterprises and especially the combines are in a position to exercise public power in the form of pursuing their private rights. The unusual strength of the personalities who are selected as leaders under the stimulus of extremely rigorous competition contributes more than a little to this. During the pauses of industrial development, which still occur from time to time in our otherwise restless present, one may gain the impression, though, that a captain of industry or magnate of finance, once they have acquired their wealth, are able to stifle competition from even the most talented persons by the weight of their own finances, being in a position to transfer through inheritance title to their sons and grandsons the status achieved by them through the avenue of personal selection. When, however, following such pauses the development of the national and the world economies resumes its breathless pace, the men of clever brains and strong nerves will again rise to the commanding heights through victory in the competitive struggle. An ample number of gigantic American enterprises existing today are owned by men who have risen from the ranks.

The forms of leadership described here do not do full justice to their wealth in the real world. We have described only models in their pure form, while in reality leadership forms are quite mixed. As the mental constitution of an individual cannot be completely traced back to the pure forms which scientific interpretation attempts to sketch, this is also true for the constitution of society. Nor are the articles of written constitutions a perfect fit for the world of reality; they, too, still contain all kinds of typical phrases which reveal their true value only through the ways in which they are interpreted by the forces and powers that be. The same democratic formula which means for England with its much better balance of forces, a strong power of government, in Germany after the revolution denoted inner strife, and in the Russia of the Bolsheviks the reign of terror.

4. The Hierarchy of Leadership

In order to be assured of success, leadership requires support of the supreme leader by subordinate helpers. In the army, the state, or the church there is need to establish a formal hierarchy of leadership in order to provide for effective leadership of the masses. The supreme leader is always keen on selecting his helpers himself especially his closest aides. The apostles could be instated with full authority by Christ only, and by the same token their disciples could only be appointed by them.

What the assistant means to the leader has been aptly expressed by one of the most successful economic leaders of the U.S., Carnegie, when he said that if he were given the choice of losing his capital or his coworkers, he would unhesitatingly opt for the loss of his capital, for he felt certain that he would be able to regain his capital if he could retain his coworker staff. Princely politics, sharply cognizant of its interest in maintaining power, has striven to fill as many positions as possible in the hierarchy of leadership -- not only in the state, but also in the church, the municipalities, and wherever else it could be done -- by princely appointment; where this did not quite work, as in the case of intellectual leadership, it strove to gain influence on leadership figures by the bestowal of honor and titles and by similar means. Democracy, on its part, strives to occupy the position of highest leadership, as well as those of lower rank through election, wherever feasible. The parties, which have such a great say in democracies, are assured of an augmentation of their power when electoral victory brings them not only representation in the legislature and the top executive positions, but directly or indirectly opens up for their relatives additional governmental offices. In addition, they attempt by dint of their strong organization to gain control over other social affairs as well.

The subordinate leaders form the layer of transition between the supreme leader and the masses. As viewed by the latter, they are part of the leadership group because they support the activities of the top leader. The latter, on the other hand, views them as belonging to the masses because they follow his directions. They are the first among the followers and promote the following by the masses through staying in closer touch with them than is possible for the distant top leader. Leaders in the lowest ranks embody much of the true feelings of the masses, to whom they stand as close as does, say the noncommissioned officer to the rank and file. The foremen in the factory are technically assistants of management, but their class identification often gives them a close tie with the work force whom they typically lead in the fight for economic betterment.

5. Leadership Strata (Leading People, Leadership Status, and Leadership Class)

Apart from the various leadership persons, we must also focus attention on the phenomenon of leadership strata as we encounter them in the guise of leading peoples, leadership status, and leadership class. The Romans were a leadership people, nobility and clergy have leadership status, and the group of the propertied and educated constitutes a leadership class. A cruel leadership people gaining ruling power through naked force will hardly be able to remain in power for long, and at best will not get beyond a barbarian rule to one conducive to development. On the other hand, the realm of a racially superior people will last and prosper unless it runs into some particular calamity. The leading peoples of superior stock have been the bearers of all great history. Leadership status groups and leadership classes in later epochs to a major extent descended from the stock of leadership peoples. Not only are the top leaders selected from the leadership strata but the latter have also enjoyed the power and often the right as well to staff all the other

governmental and social leadership positions to which attach far-reaching influence and advantage. Thus, for example, the class of the propertied and educated prior to the rise of the proletariat had a claim to the positions in government service, where rather important decisions reside, and also to the occupancy of the liberal professions and especially of the important leadership positions of the entrepreneur. Only the strongest and most fortunate members of the lower social strata may succeed in working their way up to the level of the elite and the positions reserved to it. The most capable minds of the unpropertied masses or of the subjugated peoples resent as a painful personal slight and at the same time as a public evil that the preferred positions calling for highly responsible leadership are not distributed in proportion to individual talents but are reserved for those born into the leadership strata. The latter thereby find the desired sinecures for their members, lacking in both knowledge and character. It all depends on the given circumstances, however, whether the personal injustice of the system will or will not be compensated by the service to society which the leading class as a whole renders by virtue of its superior talent, historical selection, and received education.

To a certain and sometimes very high degree the strong race and class also protects and elevates the weak individual, while conversely the weak race and class also weighs down the strong individual. As long as the Oulrites as a people were up to the mark, in Rome the uncouth barbarian, however well he may have been endowed by nature, was unfit for any office, and in a modern state the uneducated person even fails to meet the formal requirements that go with a given office. Also it always depends on how much the leading class is itself anxious to maintain personal selection. Such a class always can really stay at the top only as long as it insists on placing its strong individuals in front, and success couldn't have lifted it to its majestic height in the first place if it hadn't been blessed with a wealth of strong individuals. If it is smart, the leading class will want to admit to its ranks the special talents who strive upwards from below. The church has done so in its propitious periods, enlightened princely governments have done likewise, even the nobility itself has done so occasionally, and the educated class replenishes itself automatically from the talents which succeed in rising up from below. As soon as the leadership stratum loses its superiority based on its talents and experience, while still wanting to maintain its social position by referring to its inherited and well established rights, conditions are favorable for an eventual rise of the lower classes. But when these lack the strength for such a movement, it will mean the end for this sort of a people because leader and masses have equally failed.

6. The Following by the Masses

As to the masses, matters seem to be more simple, yet even here the alert observer encounters a greater variety of forms than he is at first inclined to assume. In the most simple of cases following stops at mere imitation: the model of the anonymous leader is being emulated by his environment and subsequently by a wider circle as well. However, the achievements of a great leader are too stupendous to be imitated by the common man, and the latter doesn't even try. Following Christ isn't meant to be

imitation of Christ; following contents itself with obeying those commandments which the founder of the religion deemed to be appropriate, considering the weakness of the human flesh. The commonplace person who affects the gestures of the illustrious man makes a fool of himself. Even merely complying with the commands addressed to the masses exceeds the strength of a great many people. On the bottom of every society is found the dregs of a dead mass, constituting the refuse of history. Next to the dregs is that stratum of the masses which remains almost entirely passive, being suited to blind following only and, strictly speaking, following its close surroundings rather than the leader with whose lofty heights it can't be in touch at all. It constitutes the ballast for the movements of society and presents a special danger because it reinforces every movement to the point of absurdity and always tends to tip over. Only the reflective, searching type of following is true following. It is by far not as widespread as is assumed by the impetuous democrat who fancies that the whole people share his zeal, an error which is mainly responsible for the many setbacks of the democratic movement. The highest degree of following is active following, which demands of the masses a certain independence of conduct and the capacity to adapt to the given circumstances. Determination and unflagging effort are required in order to train even a qualified man for active following. The trained and tested soldier of the kind represented by Caesar's veterans or Napoleon's old guard renders a distinguished performance when he obeys the order of the leader. His active following in physical terms alone is already an unusual feat, but it is so also in spiritual and moral terms. To jump up from the cover of the trench and to follow the leader into the fire of the enemy is an act of will which requires a complete man. If the masses accomplish it, this is only because, and to the extent in which, they are in touch with each other, convinced that such conduct is demanded by everybody from every one else and that nobody must stay behind who values not being put to shame in front of his comrades. Every truly active following by the masses must be borne by spiritual and moral forces — how else could a sense for law and ethics, true culture, and a strong sense of liberty endure with the populace!

7. The Functions of Leader and Masses

We have identified the social function of the leader as walking in front, that of the masses as following. This general finding stands in need of some specification.

Sociology, such as it has developed to the present, has only given an entirely inadequate account of the functions performed by leader and masses in society — after all, the phenomena of leader and masses have not by far been sufficiently grasped. One may say that all in all they have been understood only in their most striking manifestations and not in their substance. The tenets of mass psychology deal in the main with the criminal and pathological masses agitated by revolutionary ideas and having for the first time become conscious of their power, but not being sure yet how to wield it. These mental conditions of the masses, partly nothing less than morbid but in any case not normal, are being analyzed quite capably by the science of mass psychology, but this does not teach us anything about the function of the healthy segments of the masses. As to the leaders, usually only

the most eminent figures are being given attention. Carlyle talks about heroes, Emerson of the representative men, Nietzsche of the superman, Spencer of the great man. More so than the other social thinkers who have focused on the relationship between leader and masses, Nietzsche and Spencer began their investigations with a bias — amounting to pleadings rather than inquiries, in Nietzsche's case in praise of superman, in Spencer's for preservation of liberty for the masses. While Nietzsche exaggeratingly idealizes the figure of superman, Spencer notwithstanding all his reservations views the populace as in a state of advanced maturity. In reality both leader and masses are for the most part endowed with much more modest strength than is taken for granted by Nietzsche and Spencer; their accomplishments are therefore much more limited. Nietzsche and Spencer stopped short at that idealizing portrayal which is an indispensable aid for research in the humanities because it points the way to the complex and more-difficult-to-interpret figures of the real world, but they didn't themselves take this additional step. Linking up with their presentation, we will try to do so.

Nietzsche sees in the great man the incorporation of life in — the true sense. The masses governed by herd instinct are merely the stuff from which the great man shapes his works. He needs the masses as his antithesis, his threat, his state of war, without which he cannot maintain his high position and observe the necessary distance. Spencer, however, teaches us that the "great-man theory" is at best partially true. This means limiting its application to earlier societies bent upon destroying or subjugating each other, in which case the capable leader is said to be correctly viewed as all-important, although even here the number and the qualities of his entourage must not be lost sight of. But he further teaches us that as soon as war ceases being the job of the whole male population, there appear — without urging, without the thought of a king or lawgiver — new institutions, new deeds, new ideas, views, and customs, whose evolution cannot be understood even if one were to read himself blind over the biographies of all great rulers. He teaches us that society must form the great man before the latter can reshape society, such that all those changes which he has directly originated have their main causes in the generations from which he descends. This means that in no way could Aristotle have as parents a father or mother with facial angles of 50 degrees or a Beethoven have descended from a tribe of cannibals who prepare for a feast of human flesh by engaging in some kind of rhythmic howling; that Shakespeare could not have written his dramas without the fullness of life surrounding him in England, without the language which hundreds of generations had developed and enriched through use; that the strategic genius of Moltke could not have triumphed in the absence of a nation of 40 million placing at his disposal men of burly shape, strong character, obedient nature, and capable of carrying out orders intelligently. Spencer thus teaches us that an explanation of social phenomena which dwells on the great man has no more rationality than would somebody who dwells on the effusive effects of a trace of gunpowder without mentioning the ignited charge, the bomb, the cannon, and that quite enormous range of devices by which the charge, bomb, cannon, as well as the grain of powder, have been produced.

Spencer is undoubtedly correct in depicting a genius as dependent also on historic antecedents and the collaboration of his people and his time. He overlooks, however, that in order to remedy the plight of the times which keeps society under tension something new must be created which at first stands out so peculiarly against what went before that it does not appear as its historic sequel but as its neutralization. This new element, originating in the mysterious darkness of a great soul, could originate only there. Convinced though we may be that the strength pervading the great soul also has its origins in previous states of society, we are still not able to say how it emerged from its causes. Here there is something really new for our human eye, not merely an old force which is changed into new forms according to rules which we might be able somehow to anticipate, let alone to master. Time and again, from the unlimited space of the mind the spark of genius was bound to light up, ignited by the titanic power of a Prometheus, to point the way for further evolution by the light of a new thought, the touch of a new perception, the courage for new deeds. Viewed in this manner, the constructive work of history breaks up into a series of advances each of which is presumed to be based on the accomplishment of a great leader. Without the great men there would be no development; they are the driving forces for humanity's growth; without them the people would not be the people nor would the world be the world.

In one cardinal point Spencer is evidently quite wrong. The personality of the leader is all important not only in the first brutal and destructive battles, but remains so always; what is more its importance grows along with the tasks of culture. Rather could the devastating battles of the primeval hordes and tribes have come to their aimless end without the all-important leader than that the tasks of a scientific age, of an age with ethical standards, could have been accomplished without an outstanding leader. The tunnel leading from the darkness of uncultured life to the light was excavated where the rock stratum was softest and offered the least resistance, in the struggle of violence against weakness. Only in progressing further does the courage grow for tackling ever harder rocks, and increasingly difficult therefore must become the task of the leader who overcomes resistances with the diamond auger of the mind. Filled with the natural science spirit of his time, Spencer took up above all those social themes which could be more easily analyzed by natural science methods the movements of the masses who seem to follow an unchanging law of progress. He believed he could not find a law describing the paths of the genius, and consequently it mattered to him to belittle the big man as much as possible and to eliminate him from the context of history, wherever feasible. Therefore he left almost nothing of the image of the great man, Napoleon appearing to him as hardly more than a robber-chief.

Indispensable as is the performance of the leader in front the achievements of society, no less so is the following by the masses. If the leader is viewed as the sower casting out the seed the masses may be viewed as the ground which absorbs it. In rocky places it withers but in rich arable soil it brings forth fruit a thousandfold. The strength of the leader alone cannot give society its law, but it is his mission to issue the Gail to follow him. In doing so, he first attracts his

leadership staff. Stirred up by the secondary leaders, the most alert group of the masses answers the call of the leader by active following. By and by the others will go along until eventually the group of blind followers starts moving and even the dead mass falls in line. The generality of such following bestows upon the social command its compelling character, which we have been able to recognize so distinctly in the case of the general acceptance of money. By either denying or granting them their following, the masses in the final analysis themselves decide the fate of the leaders. It is the masses who pronounce the judgment of world history over the leaders. By the test of success, the masses select some from among the leaders. While the simple man on the street certainly cannot explain in words the concept of leadership, and while he is even less able to judge leaders in words, he still contributes to the verdict over them by arranging his acts in accord with this concept, to the extent appropriate to his circumstances. It is stupidity to try to deny to the masses the function of assessing the performance of the leader. For a humanity which has proved capable of recognizing with awe the superhuman figure of Christ there is no human dimension which it should not be prepared to judge. One only must always recall that to the masses belong the apostles and disciples and the whole leadership hierarchy. Anything which ultimately fails the test of evaluation by the masses is against human nature or transcends human strength.

What the masses mean to the leaders can be most easily seen by the behavior of the leaders themselves. Many of them orient themselves from the very beginning to the attitude of the multitude and only seek for the ways and means to satisfy the popular currents. Even the strong minds which first go their own way, by indignantly turning away from people who cling to the habitual, turn back to the masses as soon as they believe to have found their proper course, avidly craving for followers, who then are taken by the leaders as confirmation for having achieved the desired success. The leader demands that the path found by him become the common path; therein, of course, also lies the social service by which he advances the common interest. But how many leaders never tire of clamouring for public recognition! How many of them debase themselves downright by yearning for empty approbation and mistake it for true recognition! How often in such cases superman becomes human, all too human! Even those leaders who scorn the insipid ovation couched in words are being consumed by that nobler ambition which can hardly wait for being perpetuated by the deeds of the multitude. Only the truly great minds are above such weakness. Their thinking is entirely absorbed by their works, and they are so sure of their way that they find equilibrium in themselves.

The decline of the leadership class of a people is a grave social misfortune. It takes new strong impulses to elevate new leadership groups during a new period of history. Not every people has had the strength to rise to a middle-class culture yet after having passed through periods of courtly and clerical-knightly culture. But for a new social class to be able to rise, the masses must have remained sound in their deepest nature. In these depths of human nature the spring of a people's vitality flows. The masses are the fountain of youth, the energy reserve for its future. Once peasant strength has been sapped, the people has forever finished playing its historical role.

What is being said here about the masses applies only to the healthy elements of the populace, being of the same stock as the leaders and having remained racially pure in the course of history. The pride of the leaders tends to regard even this group as inferior. In reality this is not true at all because this group, absorbed by its daily toil and lagging from a historical perspective, has not yet fully developed its value system; for this very reason, however, its energy is not spent as yet. As soon as its time has come, the healthy masses of the people will elevate new strata to leadership positions, and these will take the place of the exhausted historical leaders. On the other hand, however, the democratic mind which takes at full value those elements of the masses of inferior or deteriorated racial mixture goes astray. This group, which has given the word "masses" a contemptible ring, does not take any positive part in the history of the populace; rather, it is completely dysfunctional, an impediment and a danger — it is the rabble and the chaos.

Every strong people is confident that at the right time the right leader will be born to it. The religions teach, and the devout members of the populace believe, that God's finger will elevate the great leader, if need be. Scientific historiography, too, has for a long time concurred with this view. Spencer still had to argue with a renowned English historian of his time who wrote history with this slant. The modern scientific spirit rejects, along with all other miracles, also this one. It is rather inclined, as we saw in Spencer's case, to disavow the great men, thereby to preserve the logical consistency of historical development. In the most recent history of religion there is no reluctance to express doubt whether the greatest religious leaders — a Zoroaster, Buddha, or Christ — have ever lived. One attempts to deduce their doctrines from the way of thinking of their times. Yet what would be gained by this? Though Christ be denied, there are still his words, expressed in imposing simplicity, as only a peerless mind could formulate them, and even if one wanted to forget about Christ's words, there is still Paul left who cannot be disowned. Alexander the Great and Caesar, too, historical criticism has to let stand in any case, and doing this raises the question of what would have been the course of world history if Alexander's vigor had been exhausted sooner and if the conspirators' dagger or a Gallic sword had carried off Caesar earlier. Isn't the great man in history, admitting his existence as one has to, a mere accident which invalidates the logical consistency of development? To answer this question one must find the right attitude. We, too, must not pass it by.

8. The Great Man

For one, let it be said that the great man by no means is always irreplaceable; by no means is he always the one and only who will never return. How often has it not been that great ideas, as soon as they were embedded in the trend of the times, were stated simultaneously by several thinkers! The mathematical discoveries of Leibnitz and Newton are a well-known example. We can take for granted that even if Columbus had died prematurely America would not have remained undiscovered. It cannot be doubted that from among the bold seafarers, who after his death further pursued his discovery, there would also have been found

the man who in his place could have translated into action the idea of Copernicus. Wherever we see a series of great researchers at work who sequentially build up a science, we can be sure that the later ones, continuing the work of their predecessors, would themselves have performed that work if only it had not already been performed.

This first thought leads to a second. It is in the nature of every strong people that it is endowed with great men, as in the case of every mountain range there are still the peaks rising above the crest. There has never been a people whose members were equally, or nearly equally, endowed by nature. The observed character of the populace is the average of widely dispersed aptitudes. The degree of dispersion varies between different people. The Romans were more uniformly endowed than the Greeks, and in Mommsen's judgment, until Caesar they had no statesman and even no commander-in-chief of the stature of a true genius, but this lack was compensated by the proficiency of their masses. In Rome, year after year one could count in all probability on finding the two consuls who knew how to lead the legions according to the traditional rules of the art of war, and throughout the centuries the legions displayed the same victorious strength. For that matter, every people has a greater amount of leadership talent in those lines in which its masses are quite gifted. Is it amazing if this people is given the right leader at the right time in those undertakings in which, above all, it tries to make a go? The general tension during the time of search cannot help arousing persons with particularly sensitive leadership talents. They are being urged and uplifted by a sizable number of less talented but equally ambitious companions. Their inner concentration as well as the external application of their strengths are being intensified to the maximum possible by the passionate zeal with which their leadership performance is expected and received. Their appearance on the scene and their work are no chance occurrence. They are the logical reflection of their environment, on which they manage to bestow a higher personal expression, however.

To be sure, it is not possible to interpret completely in this manner the historical feat of Alexander or Caesar, or Shakespeare's "Hamlet" and Goethe's "Faust," not to mention at all the greatest of all soul leaders, the prophets. There remains an inexplicable personal residual - no doubt about that. But this inexplicable residual is by no means identical with the totality of the great leadership figures. It concerns only that part of their stature which towers above that of the leader next in line who would have taken on their domestic or foreign worldly works if these hadn't already been performed. If Caesar had not existed, Pompeius the Great or one of his vigorous sons or one of the other Romans striving for control would have performed the tasks which had to be done historically in order to make fit for monarchic rule a state which in light of its geographic extension and the heterogeneity of its constituent parts could not have survived any longer with its old urban-cooperative constitution. Perhaps somebody else than Caesar would not have brought to the work the same bold design, and perhaps it would have required several starts before Caesarean will would have made its way to domination, but nevertheless it would have struggled through, because it had to. Given such figures as Marcus Antonius, Augustus, and Tiberius, we can see that the generations

of Rome in those days were not lacking in ruler types. Clearly, even the very great leader is to a large extent the exponent of his people and of his time. In any case, however, from the time he begins to shape history, further developments are rigorously consistent. The people maintains intact as much of his personal achievements as it is able to in the long run, given its own nature and characteristics.

By the example of Bismarck and the German people the relationship between the great man and the masses becomes vividly clear. Without Bismarck's political genius the German Empire perhaps would not have been established so soon and on such strong foundation. He depicted himself merely as the helmsman who without the backing of the national current would have accomplished nothing, and the strength of this national current was so great and gaining so rapidly that sooner or later another helmsman would have been found who would have led the people to the envisaged empire, though perhaps less skillfully. Compared with Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Italians, the political immaturity of the Germans with respect to head and limbs, leader and masses, is so great that the inexplicable personal residual in Bismarck's case is considerably greater than it is for the great political leaders of those other nations. In Prussia, the German state of strongest political organization, Bismarck was the first since Frederick the Great who was again capable of conducting world politics. He knew his people too well not to be filled with grave concern as to whether the realm set up by him would be durable. His saying, "I have lifted the German people into the saddle, it must figure out itself how to ride," sounds like a premonition of impending collapse. It would have taken a second Bismarck to prevent the World War or to prepare for it politically in such a way as to make military victory a foregone conclusion. This second Bismarck did not exist. The historic accident of Germany availing itself of a statesman qualified for world leadership did not occur twice within such a short span of time. At the beginning of the War, the Entente, too, availed itself of intermediate-rate statesmen only, but their political training — especially in England, Europe's historically most mature state — was so superior to that of Germany and the Central Powers that victory could have been snatched away from it only through a top military performance by the Central Powers. While capable of such during certain phases of the War, they could not sustain it in the long run. The German people lost, and had to lose the World War of the 20th century for the same reason they lost the Thirty Years' War of the 17th century. That war, having started as a religious civil war within Germany, became, through meddling of first the Danes then the Swedes, and at last the French, not to mention also the Magyars, more and more an external war. It kept going on and on even after the emperor had made peace with the majority of the Protestant estates. In this external war emperor and realm succumbed to the statecraft of Oxenstierna and Richelieu who after Wallenstein's fall did not confront a leader who would have been a match. Then, as now, the German people came, or have come, to grave harm as a most logical consequence of their political immaturity. Of Bismarck's legacy the German people has retained as much as it was able to sustain permanently according to the historically determined proportion of its strength. Will history's logical consistency again hold good in that it will rise anew on the

basis of enhanced inner resources with respect to which it has never been wanting in great leaders?

For the rest, aren't the origins of the inner strength of a people equally mysterious as is the "inexplicable personal residual" which we touched upon? As in the case of the superhuman leader, we again cannot for the masses of a people grasp the law which determines their rise from the depths of being as well as the target of their strength. We have to be content if we succeed in demonstrating the logical consistency of historical evolution, once leader and masses with their respective strengths have appeared on the scene.

9. Fundamentals of the Development of the Constitutional System

A people's constitutional system, too, is logically determined as soon as the forces — based on natural aptitude as well as historical training — are given which are marshalled by both leaders and masses in undertaking the historical tasks prescribed for them by the times. Always these forces arrange themselves according to the law of supreme power or of success.

At all times society has been directed to undertake two types of work. One type, the collective works, requires that the "unified masses" join together to pursue the common endeavor under undivided leadership. The other type, the special or private works, at first glance appears to have as its subject the individuals qua individuals, but on closer inspection we also see participation by the masses, "dispersed masses," under anonymous leadership setting their own rules for parallel or complementary action. The subject of collective endeavors are the masses united under designated leaders and governed by uniform powers, whereas the subject of private endeavors are the dispersed masses under anonymous leadership and governed by anonymous powers. Not only the public system but the private one as well has its constitution or, more accurately put, its constitutions since, here — as there, special constitutions demanded by the specific tasks of the various spheres apply to all the constituent spheres of social action. The political constitution is only one of several interlocking public constitutions and, just so, the economic constitution is only one of several interlocking private constitutions. Society's total constitution is only the result of the meshing of all public and private constitutional matters. The lawyer looking at the political constitution as a self-contained fact is never able to understand it thoroughly. Its balance, its focal point, are always determined by society's total constitution. Political rights and duties are the manifestation of forces and obstacles which have their support in the religious and the other public constitutions, and also in the economic as well as the other private constitutions.

How leaders and masses share power is not determined by the personality of the supreme leader alone. It always depends much on the contemporary tasks which devolve upon the leader and allow him sometimes more, sometimes less influence, but it depends quite especially on the composition of the leadership strata and the strata representing the masses of the people, as well as the tension existing between these two.

SH All the private tasks depend for their execution primarily upon individuals. The successful evolution of such endeavors therefore depends upon the universal proficiency of the masses. — In the main, leadership does not go beyond the anonymous type. „ Since anonymous leaders emerge from the masses in continual succession, they are most intimately connected with the masses, and the indispensable prerequisite for their proficiency is the all-around proficiency of the masses. The anonymous leaders are bound to receive their impulses from their own private undertakings which they conduct as do all the others, except that in moments of inspiration they hit upon one method or another for making their previous practices more successful here or there. Under their steady leadership, followed by the masses as a whole, general conditions are bound to improve greatly in the long run, although imperceptibly in the short. By and by a new terrain can be consolidated which lends itself to the preparation for radical change. Within the rural domestic household crafts developed, and within the craft guilds the ground was laid for the development of the large-scale enterprise. To be sure, more sweeping changes require open leadership, but the latter can still operate within the private sector, as demonstrated by the great entrepreneurs who are grounded in the private sector although they may — reach across into the public sector as well.

Every religious community, every ethical community, and — every other community held together by internal bonds need as a firm foundation widespread mass participation under anonymous leadership. If thoroughgoing change is to occur, great authoritative leaders must rise above this ground. The total accomplishments of the coercive and unit associations are always based on open personal leadership, with leading individuals emerging from the leadership strata in the process.

In periods when states are founded and culture begins, the open, personal type of leadership assumes its most rigorous forms. Leadership by coercion and domination is called upon, supreme authoritarian leaders rise, a ruling stratum of warriors and priests is formed above the masses. It depends on the natural aptitudes and the historical training of the ruling classes and probably on external circumstances as well whether they will preserve for themselves their cooperative constitution or in turn will submit to princes and princely families under whose leadership they may yet better be able to meet their collective interests. The Roman peasants in their battles with the neighbors, motivated originally by defense rather than offense, were able to make do with the leadership of the patrician families, who in turn neither needed nor tolerated a king. After having fended off Hannibal's attack, under the impression of the battle of annihilation at Cannae, which seemed to raise the threat of the destruction of the state, the Roman kings envisaged the higher goal of extending their world supremacy until it had become fully consolidated. From this point on, service by the leaders, which had been rendered according to old tradition, could no longer suffice for the changeable tasks of world politics. Strong personal leaders were needed, of the caliber of a Scipio, a Marius, a Sulla, a Pompeius, to weather the dangerous crises of the state which had to be faced in succession until ruling power went to Julius Caesar as the strongest leader and hence passed on to the Julian dynasty, and thence to further dynasts and dynasties. During the entire period of battles surrounding the founding of

the state the military constitution was the frame for the state constitution. This is true not only for the despotism of the barbarian victor, but equally for the Roman state in its prosperous times and ditto for the heyday of the Germanic-Roman states. A last characteristic symptom of this is found at present in the fact that even the monarch of the civilized European states wears the military uniform, thought to be that garment which most faithfully designates his position.

Under the pressure of the military constitution the old peasant vigor of all the softer peoples gradually disappears, and even that of the tougher ones threatens to fade. On the other hand, in the more secure system of states new forces rise up: after the force of a purified faith, the economic force of the middle classes and the force of the educated classes, and in alliance with them, peasant strength rallies and recovers anew. In the capitalist economy the strength of the worker proletariat then concentrates and becomes organized. At first the new strata make themselves felt only as agents of effective resistance to the old powers. Later on the ~~strongest among them rise them-~~ selves into the ranks of the elite, and in the end the proletarian class advances its claim to leadership and, if it cannot be helped, to dictatorship. After the church authorities had to come to terms with the power vested in modern education and culture, princes and nobility also had to yield to the democratizing trend of the times as it was brought into the constitutional system by the intellectual and economic achievements of the middle class and the proletariat. They either have to accommodate themselves, or else they will be removed by revolutionary force. The constitution of combat with its monarchic-feudal apex is changed into the democracy of the middle class and the proletariat which given its capitalistic and cooperative aims fits into the frame of the economic constitution.

Through the centuries and millenia of human history down to the present the antagonisms of personal leaders, leadership strata, and masses have had a fundamental imprint on the structure of social life. Always the attainments of the times assign to the players their characteristic roles, which they fill in the measure of their strength, the latter in turn being based on their endowments and historical education.

IV. Psychology of Power

1. The Mass Mind

In its greatest intensifications social power has an element of the superhuman and not infrequently even something inhuman. It is therefore understandable that many of the historiographers, political scientists, philosophers of law, economists, and sociologists who had to deal with phenomena of power have sought its origin in some sort of objective elements outside the sphere of personal being. He who does this, however, commits a twofold error: he confines himself to the realm of external power, using external means; and, in addition, he confuses the phenomena of power with the means of power. The possibility of using external means of power in ways which militate against human sentiment lies in the nature of the means of power, whereas decisions concerning the particular uses to which these means are put originate, in the final analysis in the character of the ruler. In the case of the internal powers there cannot be any doubt that they have their origin in the human mind.

For philosophers of the Stendhal or Nietzsche variety, who perceive the masses as governed by the herd instinct only, it was reasonable to trace the superhuman quality of power back to a superman, and in the process they may have viewed it as a sign of special greatness if the latter as a monster overstepped the realm of the human. Such an interpretation, however, apparently won't do for the great majority of cases, for supermen and monsters of the kind represented by Caesar Borgia are exceptional men. By the way, Caesar Borgia certainly did not have the stature which Stendhal would have us believe. He was a true son of his time, one of the many and perhaps the most unscrupulous among the Condottieri who given the Italian circumstances of that time, were faced with the temptation and had the resources to erect a princely throne for themselves. What he wrought he did with the help of the historical powers such as the contemporary Italian soil generated. He was by no means the sole perpetrator of his deeds and misdeeds; the historical environment provided him with the aims, means, accomplices, and so to speak the challenge for committing them. Only the exceptionally great religious leaders, solitary peaks in history, activate forces truly their own, but even their achievements would amount to little without the masses because the latter must first identify with these achievements before they can become truly real.

Even of those philosophers who recognized that the masses had their personal share in the experience of power, many could not bring themselves to tracing it all the way back to single persons, to individuals. Individuals seem too weak to bear the superhuman, superpersonal quality of power which at times is intensified to an anti-individual quality. This readily explains why one inclines to postulate the masses, the people as a whole, as the collective subject of power. Doing this implies that one cannot help using the concept of a mass mind, a people's mind. There is great temptation to use such resounding words. Every orator or writer with imagination and linguistic command can count on being effective if he knows the right place to use them. Oswald Spengler, who wants to bring out the overwhelming quality of the ideas of culture, will avail himself of poetic

liberty and refer to the mind of the populace from which flow such ideas. Romain Rolland will refer to the mass mind when he wants to bring out the pressure exerted upon even the nobler spirits by the commonly held ideas. He who uses such language and remains aware of the figurative meaning of such phrases attains a strong and permissible effect. But what an aberration it is to turn poetic liberty into serious theory and -- as it has happened not only unconsciously but in full consciousness -- to view the mass or popular mind, instead of as a harmony of individual minds, as a special entity in itself which has its own life over and above the minds of individuals! And what an even grosser aberration to construe -- as has also happened -- a body to accompany this mind floating on some lofty heights! When confronted with such aberrations one must firmly emphasize that the habitat of the mind is in individuals and remains there even in conjunction with all collective relationships. In truth there is no popular mind and no popular will. One may go further and assert that, strictly speaking there is no public opinion as such, no general legal conception held jointly by the people, no ethical sentiment of the masses as such. All these phrases which suggest themselves automatically, and which are as misleading as they are typical, are only meant to say that the minds, wills, opinions, convictions, sentiments are pointing in the same direction, if not for all citizens at least for a decisive majority, or perhaps only for a minority which, however, has control over the minds of the others.

How individuals of a multitude become synchronized has become plain in our investigation concerning the origin and the growth of power. It is success which leads individuals to keep in step with one another. It is thus also clear that the single individual, being pointed in the same direction as the many, feels being under the spell of a higher power, stronger than he is; he can't easily grasp that he himself takes part in its formation. Even if he should at first hold this view he will later reject it under the overwhelming pressure of the environment. Thus arises the feeling expressed by Mephistopheles in the crush of the "Walpurgisnacht" in these words: "You believe to shove, and you are shoved." But by whom else is the individual being shoved than by the others who are pushing along with him, but every one of whom likewise feels being pushed from the outside? It is the mind of the many tuned to the same pitch which starts a multitude of human beings into motion. In every multitude, elements which are individually different and incompatible with the movement of the whole are being held down and ground off. To this extent the movement is supra-individual and even anti-individual, but this does not make it impersonal. The force activating it can have no other origin than the persons who are joined together in a collective. Every true and strong social power must have been experienced in common in the minds of the participating individuals. The state does not function without the upright character of the citizens who lend weight to its decisions; nor the army without the bravery of the warriors and the active pressure generated by their number; nor the church without the devoutness of the believers; nor the law without the convictions of those with rights and those with duties. In order to be operative, ideas must be alive in the brains of the leading classes of the time, and the social movements or currents must go through their hearts.

Whatever we may observe in terms of supra-individual or even anti-individual effects of social power, scientific thinking must be traced back to its personal origin, or scientific thinking will have failed in its task.

2. The Psychology of Power of the Masses

Vis-a-vis the firmly established external power, the experience of power by the masses is a passive one only. Perhaps the strongest individuals will feel impulses to resist, or will actually resist when they are expressly challenged or the occasion appears particularly propitious. The majority of the weak, however, sinks into dull resignation. In the long run the herd instinct breaks through, everyone submits to the status quo, and the masses as a whole give in to the same sentiment of subordination.

Internal power arouses in the masses the urge for ready emulation. In this connection the individual obeys not only his own instinct, but his behavior is also determined by the contact he has with the attitude of his environment and that of the masses in their entirety. The experience of power is intensified by the fact that the individual submitting to power thereby enhances the effective weight of internal power in society: he joins the ranks of the social rulers, albeit with a minimal share of power.

The power experience of the masses is greatly augmented in substance in those frequent instances where external and internal power operate jointly. The soldier's experience of power represents an especially illuminating example of this.

The miracle occurs in every good military unit that the peaceful mama's boy who loathes combat and the spilling of blood is transformed into a trained warrior who faces the arms of the enemy with calm deliberation and rushes towards them with resolute courage. To effect this transformation, fear of the sanctions of military discipline is not enough; fear, the passive experience of power, merely generates dull obedience. The transformation is not brought about even when the recruit, gripped by "battle stage-fright," under the irresistible spell of his environment is swept along in the assault; such is only the herd experience of power, which can turn quite readily into panic. The transformation begins when the soldier understands the purpose of discipline without which there cannot be any lasting success. As soon as the fighting forces have been even sufficiently trained, not only the superior but every single soldier demands of every other one that he do his duty without any reservation; by the same token, every single soldier is governed by the idea that all the others expect him to do likewise. A brave heart responds to this expectation with a mighty surge of the sense of honor, and even the fainthearted cannot evade the dictate of honor. Now the order of a superior who is trusted by the rank and file will meet with ready mental acceptance, for no man could bear the thought of lagging behind the others when worse comes to worst. The transformation is complete when military honor is enhanced by soldierly pride enjoying the triumph of victory. In the success of victory the soldier experiences the exaltation of Matchless strength which reasserts itself through all the

terrors. Such a flush of strength he has never before come close to, and from such heights he looks down upon the Philistines with contempt. This experience of strength is at the same time an experience of power because it has an overwhelming emotional impact on the individual. Just as everyone who was a participant had a share in the mustered strength, he also has a share in power, having been elevated by it and brought under its spell. Military honor and soldierly pride converge to a soldier-like stance, which implies soldierly duty. The thousands or millions filled with this spirit through the medium of their will transform the leader's order into their own action and thereby combine into a unit from which emanate very strong effects.

In all cases in which individual will as experienced by the masses is woven into the social fabric of power, the mental process occurs in the same sequence: first recognition of the necessity of going together, then the mutual demand for and expectation of going together — all this based on instinctual drives — next the arousal of a sense of being honor-bound to meet this expectation, on the part of both the strong and the weak comrades, then the perception of success and the pride of the experience of strength which is enjoyed as an experience of power and reinforces the drive, finally being sublimated into a sense of social duty. The more internalized the experience, the more binding the sense of duty. The honor and pride experienced by robbers — likewise manifestations of man's social nature — do not go beyond the sentiments of the duty of comradeship; citizenship honor and pride and public spirit appeal to the conscience; law and ethics are deeply rooted in conscience, though honor and pride are also present; the honor garb of integrity shall remain immaculate, and the upright man shall be permitted to feel the pride of having performed a difficult duty without being thought of as a Pharisee. Only the resolute scoundrel and villain is defiant enough to rebel as one against all. The masses of the people are softer, they yield to the pressure of the common will. They do not only yield to it passively but follow this will actively and enjoy the experience of power which the victory of right over wrong entails, and the formation of their inner stature follows the general rule. Although there is probably nobody who never violates the prohibition of his conscience in the face of temptation, the experience of internal power flowing from victory over temptation, which in the great majority of cases will repeat itself, will appeal to the conscience and strengthen it time and again. To be sure, the number of people who do not require any outside assistance in order to remain inwardly upright is none too great. The far-reaching decline of law and morality after the World War and revolution has shown with appalling clearness how little moral fortitude many individuals possessed who heretofore were honorable in every respect. The shaken authority of courts, police, and church; the rise in temptations caused by distress; and the bad example of success enjoyed by unscrupulous persons who rose to the top in defiance of law and morality have deflected many weaker souls from the path of devotion to duty or made them derelict in their pursuit. It is comforting to observe that while the world resounds with the noise of the lawbreakers the quiet ones around continue to heed their conscience without fail. They understand one another without having to say much, they unswervingly preserve the image of society as it should be and continue to translate it into deeds through the medium of their will. The warmth

of their experience of internal power keeps alive the germs of a better future.

The experience of power associated with faith is the most spiritual of all. In the souls armed with strong faith, honor and pride carry little weight; as the apostle says, their glory is the testimony of their conscience in innocence and humility of heart. They stand ready to maintain their faith against the might of the entire world, martyrdom is the most sublime form of power experience for them, and through it they gladly give testimony for a transcendent power with which they feel inwardly at one. Their experience of power is yet more pure and rich by far than that of the soldier on the field of honor.

To submit to a greater whole and thereby at the same time to sense its successes as one's own experience of power — this for the masses is the content of the psychology of power as manifested in thousands of forms.

3. The Teachings of the Psychology of Power of the Masses

The problem of the psychology of power such as we have just encountered it is somewhat related to the tenets of psychology of the masses as developed by Tarde, Sighele, Le Bon, and others. As one pursues the actions of the masses and traces them to their psychic impulses, as done by the writers of this orientation, one cannot help encountering the phenomenon of power under whose spell the masses act. In the analyses of psychology of the masses, as done with perspicacity and acumen, one finds all sorts of things which cast light on the phenomenon of power. However, the teachings are not designed for a genuine analysis of this phenomenon, and in addition one needs to be clear about the fact that the concept of the masses in these teachings is not interpreted in the way we do, namely, as the opposite of the leader. Considered as masses in that view is any multitude, any rather large number of people who in a given case are affected by the same mental impressions. The leaders are included here, at least all the lower-ranked anonymous leaders who are not even further distinguished, but also nearly all the higher-ranked leaders, with the sole exception of the exceptionally great who clearly stand out against the masses.

The theory of the psychology of the masses first described the mass psychoses and thence in the main the power experience of the masses of our time, when they have just gained control but don't feel quite sure of their ground yet. Le Bon's much-read book about the psychology of the masses gives a brilliant and vivid introduction into the ideas of this body of thought. The critical look of the skeptic mercilessly reveals the weaknesses of democracy. The value of the new teachings lies in this very inexorable urge for truth, for empirical earnestness. Hence its effectiveness and the applicability to it of the saying, 'Blessed are those who do not utter empty words, for they will be understood.' The new theory signifies honest reflection on the democratic cliché, but at the same time it also connotes, in its scientific thought about social action, the turn from words to facts. It will admit only experience, seeking it at the source. It recognizes as the source of social action an insight which did not exist before in all its clarity the

psyche of individuals who are joined together in the masses and who as members of the multitude now behave quite differently than would each individual acting alone. Even in the most turbulent scenes of the life of the masses it recognizes no other actors than the individuals themselves, but under the impact of public excitement there come into play with these individuals motives for action which in private life are hardly, or not at all, conspicuous. The same individual who in private life endeavors to bridle his urges may give in to them without restraint when as a member of the masses he has gained an awareness of public power. The most level-headed persons, once as a constituent part of the masses they have become exposed to especially strong appeals, may reveal propensities of which they had not ever before been conscious, pathological and perhaps even perverse ones which, under the impact of mass suggestion, spread contagiously and are discharged in criminal and other mass psychoses. In further pursuit of its ideas, the theory of mass psychology claims that as members of the masses individuals are more excitable than the instinctive urges become prominent while intellectual demands recede. Even the refined man, distancing himself in his personal circle from everything crude or shallow, is said to go along with the masses when he is caught up with a motley crowd in the public, equally gullible as the rest and equally inclined to vacillate from one extreme to the other.

These tenets Le Bon and his followers have empirically corroborated by a whole series of choice and well-presented examples, but nevertheless we must not be content with them. Apart from the fact that the theory of mass psychology leaves private life entirely aside — a point to which we will return — even within the realm of public life it clings almost exclusively to the exceptionally striking phenomena of mass existence, though these are in a minority and make no difference in the regular course of things. The masses which it observes are the pathologically excited or otherwise agitated or disturbed elements, while it pays no attention at all to the calm masses being firmly embedded in the hands of their leaders. It deals particularly with the weak and unsteadily led masses as we so often confront them in a revolutionary period and especially on the occasion of decisive turns of fate. Le Bon's mass psychology is at bottom the psychology of modern democratic crowds, flushed with a sense of power but not quite having learned yet how to use it. These people indeed are guided more by instinct than by reason and understanding, more by suggestion than by resolute will. One goes hardly astray in declaring that the modern theory describes power as a herd experience, that it describes the mass sentiment which in an excited crowd spreads with uncanny infectiousness, overreaches itself, and then again begins to have doubts about itself. The period of revolutions, broad though it is, nevertheless is only a rupture in the very long run of historical development, preceded by extended periods of a relatively quiet and in any case more steady development and perhaps to be followed again by such. In these other periods of development the power experience of the masses, now grown sure of their successes, rises above the mere herd experience, because during these centuries and millenia the masses are dominated by stern and harsh, perhaps brutal, but all the same successful and thus firm leaders. The new teachings don't tell us anything about the psychology of these times, and therefore the theory may be said to have made only a promising start by describing the spectacular phenomena of

the revolutionary present. It has staked out its field of observation too narrowly. We have to extend it so as to cover the whole sweep of history; we have to expand modern mass psychology into a full-fledged psychology of power which would describe, above all, the healthy power experience of masses not debilitated by psychoses, unsteadiness, and fluctuations.

The firmly led and becalmed masses are not flexible, but conservative. Le Bon occasionally admits that in their character the masses are really conservative. If he, like other teachers of mass psychology, views the flexibility and continuous vacillation of the masses as their decisive characteristic, the reason rests partly in the fact that the subjects for observations were in the main the Gallic people of whom Caesar already observed that they are "novarum rerum cupidi." Above all, the explanation must be sought in the fact that the masses were observed during the period of revolutions when, without firm leadership, they yielded without resistance to the moods of changing circumstances. In ordinary times the masses perform their difficult life tasks with unflagging industry year after year, and they remain so firmly fixed on their range of vision that they become sober, narrow-minded, and intolerant. Conservative in all matters, they are especially so in their attachment to traditional types of leadership. Persevering and loyal this is their truest nature.

What the theory of mass psychology says about the licentiousness of the individual in the masses is true, moreover, only for the masses lacking in firm leadership. The calm masses are under the influence of traditional powers which bind all of their members. These powers fail as soon as the masses have begun to waver, and the personal urges, previously reined in by them, can now break free. But can they break free completely? No, this they cannot do, for as long as the masses act as such, they are a unit imposing the law on its members, and when agitated, they impose the sternest law possible. Le Bon makes very fitting remarks about how during the great revolution the masses, when committing the most grievous acts of licentiousness, were guided by a sense of having to perform a public duty. He relates that in the case of the September murders the mob felt called upon to act as judge, and in awareness of this feeling diligent care was taken lest somebody misappropriate the belongings of the executed victims. Licentiousness off one's own bat is not permitted by an individual member of the masses, but all the worse is an outbreak of licentiousness by the masses as a whole. The rabble which usurps the office of the judge because no judge is present who could act as such assumes of his duties only that most terrible one of retribution; for the rest it indulges the wanton lusts of an extravagant experience of power. Leadership, necessary to maintain unity, falls to the wildest day-dreamers, and the human herd instinct becomes subservient to the basest animal instinct of human nature, even in the case of persons who otherwise might have been judged good-natured. "Chasms deeper than hell yawn in the mind of man," as the poem goes.

There is a need to add several clarifying comments to what the theory of mass psychology affirms about the attribute of credulity. Credulous, in the sense that they are amused by everything offered to them, the masses are only when they want to be amused while not otherwise pursuing a distinct interest.

Where they do the latter, the masses believe only what they want to believe because it suits such interests as they may have. To be sure, in this case they are ready to believe the most improbable things if in them they can find a motive for the attitude suggested by their interests. What the masses cannot believe because it hinders the pursuit of their interests, this either leaves the masses completely cold or is vehemently rejected in case it should be urged on them. In this respect the calmest and most conservative masses do not differ from the most unstable ones. This sort of gullibility is a desired means of auto-suggestion by which one goes mad about his moods. Just as does each individual, the masses also need to believe in themselves, they need the legend of their own excellence and triumph as they need the legend of the enemy's depravity and hatefulness. Otherwise they would be incapable of that heroic exertion of all their strength demanded by the struggle for power. In the struggle for existence no people incapable of such exertion would be able to hold its own. There is no folk-history which would not have something to tell about the ultimate devotion of the citizens which they brought to bear on the great crises of the state. The strongest peoples, the ones striving most passionately to stay on top, aim most vehemently at nourishing with avid faith those motivations needed to keep their passions aroused. As soon as necessary, the experienced judges of the life of the masses, such as able leaders are bound to have in their midst, immediately go about supplying to the populace what the latter hungers to believe, and they know very well that they won't have to be choosy in the fare to be delivered. The coarser it is, the more effective it will be. The English populace, being the one among the peoples of Europe which is given most say in the shaping of governmental decisions, is most strongly exposed to the propaganda of its leaders. Only after what is supposed to happen has actually happened the God Aeolus recalls the storms, and the waves ebb away again. Now the time has come for the sensible men to make themselves heard again, ones who did not get a hearing during the general tumult, who may have begun to become doubtful about themselves or who had been unceremoniously shoved aside. Exposed to their rebuke and their exhortations, an upright people begins to see the error of its ways, and even starts to make better what can still be improved, provided, though, that — remaining conservative even here — not too much of the fruits of victory has to be surrendered. And when the turn has come for the next fight, the popular mind with equal credulity again practices the same passionate abandon and does not hesitate, should it be called upon to turn against yesterday's friend, to invert his just recently vaunted assets to as many ominous vices. That's part and parcel of the tenacity of the strong people who wants to assert itself in the world.

The assertion, too, that in the life of the masses the instinctive elements stand out calls for clarifying qualification. Only those elements of instinct come to the fore which may become part of a strong joint force, and they are raised to the level of consciousness. On the other hand, instincts which are in the nature of human carnal desires remain confined to personal life where, to be sure, inasmuch as they are of general importance in personal life, they will exert far-reaching effects. Hunger and love always retain their widespread effects in the social mechanism, but as factors of social power they are overshadowed by other driving forces which forge the big masses into

unions. Likewise the assertion that intellectual elements are submerged in the masses is not confirmed in the healthy life of society; in fact, the masses are lifted up by the leader whose ideas they join in thinking through. It is precisely the success of joining forces in society which gives a special impetus to the intellectual elements in human life. Education is a social accomplishment going on, now in steady and calm work, now in a rushing current. The latter happens when new ideas, after long gestation, suddenly capture the minds where through the experience of power they become dominant and their new plan is happily being felt. Now the idea acquires an instinctive element, something of a force, beyond the individual, generated by the social vigor with which the minds push each other ahead. More so than for the truth-seeking individual thinker, the new idea for society in its excited state of mind is animated by a desire; it is a delusion full of captivating splendor, full of excessive expectations.

4. The Individualism of Private Life

The theory of mass psychology is also mistaken in its presupposition that the phenomenon of the masses cannot be found in private life, that here the individual stands "for himself." There is no such thing as an "individual for himself;" it would not be viable. Even in the privacy of his home and the seclusion of his work every person is exposed to the influence of social powers — of anonymous powers, as we called them; even here one wants to measure up to the judgment of others whose eyes, as one is well aware, follow a person everywhere. Likewise here one also wants to learn from the successes of the others, eagerly perceived even when one goes about his business at some distance from each other. The essential characteristic of the life of the masses, that one acts in harmony with each other, is found in private circles as much as in public life, there is only a difference in degree. In private life one is not so tightly pressed against the others so that one can move with some more independence. In public life one is physically so close to each other that, to use Mephisto's words, one must shove and is being shoved.

This has to do with the fact that in private life everybody has to provide for himself, has to perform his special task, whereas in public life one has to arrange the joint affairs, to perform a joint task. As we know, however, the special achievements of private life are not isolated, but in their own way are likewise the achievements of society. Not only is the individual in his special tasks held within the confines of the powers of law and morality, leaving him only a certain space within which to move freely, but within this space, too, he is not entirely free. There are probably few households which completely flout the social model; most of them accommodate themselves closely to it and anxiously avoid evoking the criticism of the others. Personal energy manifests itself mostly only in the degree of independence by which the general norms are adapted to the personal circumstances. Of the legal freedom of action there remains for the majority of people practically only a certain freedom of choice with respect to the modalities by which they fulfill the common norms. Rather than strictly separating one

individual from the rest, egotism in the case of the great majority of people moves them to provide for themselves in such a way as do most of the others, as "one" provides for himself. For the great multitude of people in their private affairs the "psychology of one" [as in: one does, or one does not, Tr.] applies, if I may repeat an expression already used on another occasion. The average person strives to behave in everything, if possible, as one behaves. The ego feeling, by which a person recognizes himself in his innermost as being distinct from the others, in the case of all the weaker persons — which is the great majority — is being influenced by unnoted but compelling social powers, thus being given a direction which is no longer purely personal. Consciousness has untold points through which social influences can penetrate it and which guide it, to its very depths, into the socially well-worn tracks. The ego feeling of the socially educated individual is not satisfied unless it finds itself at one with society in all principal respects. In instances of full social education, egotism emanates from the individual and ends in society. Turned into social egotism, it will demand for itself just only as much as one may, and should, ask for himself according to social tradition.

This proposition holds not only where one clearly feels bound by social considerations but especially where one believes to have to rely entirely on himself. Where the mass man, the average person, feels entirely in his element, he is least an "individual for himself" and all the more the product of his environment and his time which have formed him. Individualism of the average persons — this is really a misnomer, for practically nothing individual, nothing really personal, has remained with these people. Home and school have ground down what was original and special and have, without their being truly aware of it, through superior pressure -- met at most by the resistance of a headstrong child — compelled complete submission. Having become legally independent, they continue rendering the sacrifice of independently reached decision-making. Anxiously, in every situation they act as one generally acts under like circumstances. They always need the prop of the general example to enable them to make up their minds about what may be the most advantageous, most economical, most efficient, and most clever course of action. The masses of average persons are synchronized members of society, who may without hesitation be given their own private-sector law, without running the risk of society being torn into atoms, as claimed by the enemies of individualism. The modest experience of power which they enjoy under their circumstances suffices to keep them within the traditional order. The classical doctrine of individualism would never have been challenged if it had confined itself to postulating freedom of motion for the masses of ordinary human beings who were never capable of abusing it socially. To be sure, it would never have been contrived if it hadn't had to ask for something more.

In private economic life, individualism in the true sense only asserted itself in the leading entrepreneurs. The precipitate development of production techniques and the market mechanism for clear-sighted and strong-willed men opened up possibilities of gain of which they have availed themselves with determination and often recklessly. They have not only acted as free individuals but in an individualistic manner, aimed at their own well-being and the enjoyment of their own will. Even the latter

1 is true in the fullest sense only for the strongest of these entrepreneurs, i.e. for those who are leading the multitude of entrepreneurs. All the others, however self-reliant an appearance they may give themselves externally, still derive their strength for the most part from contemporary currents, which have aroused a great many others of their kind with whom they walk their joint course. As Marx has noted correctly, the entrepreneur is the creature of his time: he must aspire as his own companions do, otherwise they will disregard him and push him back. Who as entrepreneur dares to tread new paths must have entrepreneurial energy above the average and must fight it out with his companions.

Entrepreneurs like to interpret their business motivation which is nothing but the psychology of power — by saying that they are active not so much for their own sake but that of the general interest. They like to depict themselves as organs of society, as public benefactors. They vaunt themselves of the extent to which they multiply social energies, create new output, and provide new jobs for many people. Although they need not be accused of hypocrisy, it is hardly wrong to assume that most of these men without the incentive provided by the experience of personal power would hardly have become so susceptible to social affairs, although it must be conceded that the urge to exercise their strength on the vast expanse of society exerted on them a charm of its own. It is, at any rate, the lure of the personal experience of power which turns them indifferent to the imposition of coercion on their collaborators and competitors and the associated large sacrifice demanded of them.

5. The Psychology of Power of the Leaders

Like the economic leaders, all leaders in public life must stand out above the average and thus have some special individual quality, though this does not always mean that they must be individualists as well. By no means do the leaders always aspire to exploiting their power for their own personal gain. By no means small is the number of those whose egotism benefits other groups in society, their party, their class, or the state, and the great religious leaders give of themselves unstintingly for the public weal. When the leader seeks to utilize power for his own benefit, he must be sure not to do so in such a crude fashion as to gain for himself an economic advantage. To satisfy personal ambition is a motivation which almost always plays a role and not rarely supplants all other motivations. With lust for power it will often be hard to tell whether it pushes the strong man ahead because he feels more qualified for social accomplishments than all the rest around him, or because he can't bear the thought of letting somebody else take a more preeminent position. In any case, the urge to give free rein to his strength can be hardly suppressed by the strong leader. Nevertheless, only few leaders are so upright that, following Nietzsche's word, they may be called free spirits; most leaders who want to exercise power are the same time under the spell of historical currents of power. Only the most exquisite leadership types devote their energies to the powerless beginnings of new historical movements, not to say to the troubled and downtrodden. The typical leader goes along with the manifestation of power, whether historically consolidated or only emerging, because power alone can give him

the heady experience of leadership, as craved by his soul. This is a typical feature of the psychology of power inhabiting the majority of leaders.

His leadership function — to walk ahead and induce the masses to follow him — the typical leader performs by indicating the ways and means conducive to attainment of the goals suggested by the drives and aspirations of the people. The typical leader is a servant in the pursuit of the historic objectives of the masses.

Able to rise above the horizon of the masses with relatively greatest independence will be the strong and dominating leader who is sure of his power and will not let resistance intimidate him. A Bismarck, as counselor of a king in an unimpeachable position, could force the recalcitrant citizenry to do their military duty when he saw a need for blood and iron as power resources needed to forge the national state. After victory he had enough personal stature to dare contradicting the king and the army commanders themselves when they wanted to impose on the enemy peace terms which he deemed detrimental. Finally, after having recognized that the German people was saturated, he could apply all his masterly skills to maintaining its peaceful allegiance to the empire, notwithstanding conflicting sentiments of war. To be sure, in a dynastic realm the outcome may also be different, for even though the strong dynasties are historically selected, this is not true for every single one of their representatives and not for all their advisers. The democratic system has the advantage that all its leaders must be screened through a certain process of selection, although this process is nowhere of such a nature, nor could it ever be so arranged, as to guarantee that at all times only the cream of the crop from among the people will be elevated to leadership. The democratic leaders, in order to rise to the top and stay there, have for the most part to yield to the moods of the masses. They have to go with the currents of the time and therefore move to where these are strongest avoiding the more quiet waters.

The very great leaders excepted, it may be said of leaders in general that they aid and abet the aspirations of the masses instead of mitigating them. The great religious leaders always draw from the whole of human nature. They awaken new forces, but at the same time also attempt to restore mental equilibrium. Other leaders, however, the leaders of ways and means, may be divided into two groups which, though they may differ in many other respects, have the common effect of disturbing the equilibrium. One group is endowed with a kind of general leadership talent. They are flexible enough to turn in every direction as need or interest demand; above all, they are gifted in speech and writing; they are the loudest callers in battle; they have the apt word for everything; they coin the daily slogans suitable for rapid circulation and, in passing from mouth to mouth, for pre-tending agreement of views. The masses applaud them today, but tomorrow they may be ridiculed. In any case, they are needed, being the indispensable players on the stage of public affairs. The other group, by far more effective and valuable, consists of men who are especially gifted in some particular way and who in the many domains of life initiate progress. While they are the foremen for the masses, so to speak, each of them necessarily must also be viewed as limited in his own particular way. In

their specialty they are far superior to the common man, but the latter, being of more balanced disposition, is in overall terms more than a match for them. They suffer from hypertrophy of certain organs, and notwithstanding all their education, they often only manage to become a virtuoso of their instrument. Both groups manage to maintain their authority and power by means of the success achieved by the masses under their leadership. But it is not always the right kind of success, it is not always success in the objective — which is easily lost sight of — but often merely success in the means. A military leader who is nothing beyond being an able leader — and most of them are only just that -- knows how to win victory on the battlefield, but he does not know how to exploit it for peace, and the populace is deprived of the most valuable fruits of victory unless a kind fate bestows upon it by way of compensation the able statesman-like leader.

The narrowness of the leader becomes all the more dangerous for the masses as with it goes an intensified sense of honor. Leadership honor is ambition, craving for honor. The leader needs this enhanced feeling because his function calls for increased effort and enjoins on him increased sacrifices and dangers. Since the toll of officers on the battlefield is always greater than that of the rank and file, the leader needs as a compensation the prospect of gaining a larger measure of honor. He who conspicuously strides ahead will be given honor before all others; he will be decorated with the victor's laurel although clearly the masses contribute to the victory. What a temptation it is to increase the sacrifices of the masses in order to intensify the leadership experience of honor! The greater temptation consists in elevating the power of the leader to the power of the ruler. The lust for power is yet a much greater threat for the masses than is mere leadership ambition. In its greatest overdoing that lust craves power for its own sake. Every victory is to give birth to a new victory, while the prospects for peace, the very objective of victory, become ever more remote. Domineering takes pleasure in the sacrifices which the masses must render to those striving for the summit of power. The power experience of a Napoleon is heightened when, following victory, he rides across the battlefield and sees it covered by the bodies of the dead and the wounded. Napoleon was not only a stupendous master of warfare, but his highly gifted imperial nature, one of history's most impressive, permitted him to grasp and to master the most manifold and demanding tasks. Yet his lust for power was so consuming that all the energies which he was able to muster were to be subordinated to the one goal, world domination, which he thought he would be able to win by the sword. The psychology of power of the Jacobinian terrorist rulers, who before him had led the masses stirred up by the revolution, is less transparent than Napoleon's. With them lust for power and sense of duty, both raised to a peak, were indistinguishably coupled. They were the ardent servants of a fanatic belief for whose demands they were willing to sacrifice themselves; only their successors feigned a sense of duty which they did not possess any more. In contrast to Napoleon, they were — the one Danton excepted — narrow-minded individuals without the capacity to channel the immense and newly unleashed popular energies still unconscious of their potential. But the very fact that they confined themselves to the new idea of popular sovereignty enabled them to exercise leadership as to the ways and means

until the historic resistance against this idea was broken. iney were even more afflicted by the fever of the general revolution-ary psychosis than the masses themselves, and while they enjoyed the thrills of an unbridled experience of power more avidly yet than all the others did, they had to expect from one day to the next to be delivered of the frightening power which they wielded. Kronos devouring his own children — this was the way to characterize the French revolution, and a more apt comparison could hardly have been chosen. The drive for power did not let up until it ended in self-destruction.

Sharing the experience of power of the great leaders are always the privileged persons of their immediate environment. Beyond that are included the groups of the more notable fighters and helpers needed for their success, also the subordinate leaders dispersed across the masses as well as the camp-followers; a mixed group starting with the great dignitaries of the state and church and the potentates of capital through nobility and clergy, officers and functionaries, all the way to the lowliest men of confidence, Pretorians and Janizaries, little business people and lackeys, not to forget the best and the worst representatives of the female sex. They all assist the leader in maintaining his power, which is their power. One must understand this in order to appreciate the fact that the one prince or else a very small number of privileged persons give the law to the millions. In addition, however, one must not overlook — something which the democratic sentiment of today is no longer able to grasp — that the successful dynastic leader could in a very genuine sense become popular. To the democratic sentiment of today the dynastic sentiment of bygone days appears downright as the expression of base submissiveness. While there was never a lack of this and one merely has to glance over to Asia or Africa in order to collect evidence for it, one must also be able to put oneself into the shoes of the citizen loyally devoted to his prince, depicting the latter as the leader in joint victories and triumphs, obliged to him by the ennobling virile sentiment of loyalty. Even when a weak and degenerate son followed his able father on the throne upright citizens could continue in their devotion, which now served an institution called for by the time, sanctioned by tradition, and for the time being not replaceable by any other order. The populace first had to go through a power experience of its own before it was ready to escape the historic dynastic leadership. Or else it had to encounter the bitter experience that all the sacrifices of devotion rendered to the princely will had been in vain and came to an end in the experience of disaster and impotence.

The lordly will responds to the masses looking upon the ruler with fear or awe, depending upon personality and historical situation, with cruelty, harshness, insolence, condescension and benevolence, or with a sense of duty steeped in princely nobility. The joint experience of power bestows upon the companions a sense of unity so that they will assist each other in the defense or improvement of their shared position. On the side of the lords, that experience leads them to stick to the same line in rejection or in leniency, and on the other side of the masses it instills the same sense of faithful service or of obstinate refusal. As this is true for the relationship between the governing and the governed, it also applies with appropriate adjustments to all circumstances where leader and masses go together

and in the process become aware of their mutual dependence as well as of the discrepancy of their interests.

6. The Sacrificium Voluntatis in the Power Experience

The picture of Kronos devouring his own children illustrates in the stark case of the Jacobinian terrorist rulers the supra-individual and anti-individual aspects of the drive for power. Something supra-individual and perhaps anti-individual, however, is found in every instance of belonging to an association of power and is, therefore, though sometimes only in very small degree, an essential element of the psychology of power. Just as a person who crowds together with others in order to remove through joint pressure a physical obstruction must renounce the unimpeded use of his limbs, so in a social group, whether one belongs to the masses or stands out as a leader, he must partly sacrifice his own personality — perhaps even a sacrifice in terms of great exertion and dangers, at the very least a sacrifice of independence of his will. In favorable circumstances one is compensated for this sacrificium voluntatis by becoming part and parcel of a strong collective force which wins greater successes, and since in a prospering society the favorable case is common, in most of such instances the sacrifice will not have been rendered in vain.

In private life the sacrificium voluntatis is reflected in the inconvenience and the burden of social obligations such as are owed to relatives, neighbors, co-workers, and the social class. It is being felt in especially grievous manner in the expenditures necessarily associated with one's rank which must be defrayed by the members of moderate means as well. One feels with particular acuteness the renunciation of pet propensities which must be sacrificed to the need for making a living.

In the sphere of full public life, when the masses are being compressed very tightly, the necessity of going together harmoniously is imperative. It is not enough for each to arrange himself behind the other with wide spaces between them, but one must form closed units. Success categorically demands collective action, and therefore even the most independent mind subjects itself to the collective will. Individuals do not want to stay apart from each other, but spontaneously arrange themselves in rank and file, all of them rendering consciously the strongly felt sacrifice of their own will. Honor, pride, duty overwhelm the individuals, so they joyously sacrifice themselves for the general experience of power, which each of them shares in sensing; joyously though not painlessly, for it is not possible without pains to wrench from the instinct of self-preservation a Maximum of renunciation. The individual in the masses does not cease feeling qua individual when he bows to the strong power of the general public; he only stops feeling individualistically in the sense of his personal advantage. Every person becomes the active agent of the collective will which he translates into Purposeful actions by means of his will, for whose sake he parts with his possessions, incurs great effort and extreme danger, and does not hesitate — if this has to be — to renounce his self-Preservation and sacrifice his own life. The instinct of self-Preservation consciously submits to the social drive for power, the individual will acting in the guise of supra-individual

demands. In doing its utmost, more than any external compulsion could wrest from it this will becomes anti-individualistic to the point of self-destruction.

The sense of honor rooted in leadership imposes on the leaders in still greater degree the sacrificium voluntatis. They, above all, are duty-bound to shoulder devoted work, and in the face of danger they must be the first to give themselves to the common cause.

7. The Personal Instinct of Self-Preservation and the Drive to Maintain Power

This insight gives us the key for understanding not only the behavior of the individual in the public arena but also of the whole community itself. By virtue of the fact that each individual is committed in his will to act in harmony with the others the whole collective body is tied together, but this very solidarity gives it added impetus and staying power. This insight is very ancient, older than all scientific sociology. For a long time it has been incorporated in the allegory of the rods which, supple when taken by themselves, become inflexible and firm when tied together in a sheaf. But it is grasped in its full meaning only when one considers that the bond, once it exists, cannot be undone so easily. A social group, once it has been formed into a unit by the sacrificium voluntatis of its members, cannot easily be jolted by the sacrifices which it demands of them. Once success has induced leader and masses to go together, failure will not automatically induce separation in spite of the losses caused by it.

The pertinacity of a people can last to the very end. Precisely the strongest peoples have often and for a long time -- some of them forever -- worn themselves out over the sacrifices which they took upon themselves in order to complete their historic course. The strong people is still more inflexible than the strong man: the latter, after all, finds resolving to turn back at least somewhat easier once he has recognized that the sacrifices demanded by the battle will bleed him to death. While the individual is bound only by this personal passion, the thousands or millions making up a people are also bound by the mutual pressure exerted by one upon another, they are bound by the general sacrificium voluntatis. Their attitudes are adapted to the historic condition in which they rose to power, and they do not possess the inner equilibrium which would enable them to get used to a new attitude easily. The technique of the masses works slowly and at times fails entirely. To the very end one cannot get oneself to stop relying on the power which hitherto has always brought success, which was strengthened by success, and from which one can no longer extricate himself even when failure plainly flies into the face of it.

We have thus penetrated to the innermost mystery of the psychology of power. Personal strength, by aligning itself with the strength of a multitude of like-minded individuals, is being enhanced way beyond its inherent potential. Alongside it, there is a strengthening of the feeling of power, though at the same time strength in no small degree is being deprived of its personal roots. In personal life the instinct of self-preservation

always keeps a healthy individual upright, notwithstanding all the errors to which he may otherwise be prey. In society this unerring quality of instinct is lost as soon as a person's instinct of self-preservation, along with the sacrifice of his own will, is totally subordinated to the collective drive for power. As the many unite their wills and sacrifice their independence, they experience a diminution of control over their will. This imparts to power not only a supra-individual and anti-individual, but under certain conditions also an anti-social character which, in complete reversal of the law of success, may lead all the way to social self-annihilation.

We will have to pursue this thought in detail later on.

1. The Competition of the Powers

in every nation there are always numerous one might almost say innumerable associations alongside each other, everywhere uniting leaders and the masses for joint action, and in each of these associations success weaves the bond of power which gives them internal coherence. Most conspicuous are the large aggregates of power comprising the totality of the citizens: the state association, the other local associations of collectives, the church association, the national association, and in addition those which are the carriers of particularly sweeping power, such as the military association. But then there is still left the varied number of all the organizations serving the most heterogeneous special interests, from the top-notch intellectual all the way to the purely material and sociable ones. Bound to attract the observer's attention least are those associations of a free society which, being anonymously governed and acting through anonymous powers, lack a firm organization: "anonymous associations," as we may well call them. Every association has its special constitution which through success is adapted to the actions which are called for and which accordingly divides the competences between leader and masses. Thus there emerge leadership associations, where supremacy lies with the leaders, and mass associations, where it is found with the masses. Included among the leadership associations are, in addition to the older models of violence, the authoritarian and manorial ones; among the mass associations are the cooperative-democratic and the anonymous ones. Both kinds are rarely found in pure form; usually one encounters the most variegated transitional and mixed forms.

Everybody always belongs simultaneously to a large series of associations and thus to a large series of social powers. To touch upon only the most important relationships, every individual who has become independent has in his capacity of citizen of the nation, member of a province, or citizen of a town or village to meet many responsibilities, among which the duties connected with compulsory military service alone already oblige him strictly. Other responsibilities he must meet as national citizen, as member of his church, class, social group, and particular occupation. Since the social powers bind him in his personal life as well, he must obey, both as a producer and a consumer, the laws of the market; as a member of the male or female sex the code of male or female honor; and, abstracting from everything else, as a human being vis-a-vis other human beings he must heed the general ethical powers. Within the realm of the social powers polytheism obtains; many big and small gods rule side by side, and every one of us must bend his knees in front of numerous altars.

Just as the priests and believers of a church association do, in every other kind of association leader and masses endeavor to enhance its power as much as possible. Also acting upon the leaders, in addition to their zeal for the job, is their personal ambition, for they see their own power growing with that of the association. Even the masses always contain a sizable number of persons who do not want to vanish completely in the darkness of

the DIR crowd and who aspire to rise some distance above their companions. Anonymous leadership offers even modestly talented persons favorable opportunities of this kind, and another opportunity offers itself through service in leadership staffs which the principal leaders must recruit wherever comprehensive social tasks must be performed. If one takes into purview all the leadership staffs of society, a comprehensive gamut of hierarchical levels of power and rank unfolds itself, around which fights are fueled by ambition, the drive for power, and the desire to dominate. Between the associations themselves even more fiery battles for power and rank break out than do between members of a given association. One pokes fun at the importance and rigor given by a small town to classifying its inhabitants by rank. But in doing so, it only follows the same deep instincts of human nature which at the beginnings of history through the barriers of cast placed rigid fetters on the social status of millions and which led to many bloody clashes between classes and peoples. The ruler trying to take into account everybody in the state who wields power has to institute for this purpose a special service in order to measure rank by royal court. This for many is the noblest of life's goals because they take such rank as a symptom, as an authoritative recognition of their total power position in society. While arbitration of the fight for external rank already requires unceasing efforts, the fight for power itself continues incessantly. Only the developed nation has brought matters to the point where this struggle between citizens is, as a rule, carried out with peaceful means, though from time to time it may even here still conjure up civil war and revolution. Between states themselves the jealousy of power has never ceased to provoke wars, and in it must of course be found the ultimate cause of the World War.

2. Public Order Powers. Welfare Powers.* and Culture Powers.

There are associations, and thus powers, which are established in the first place to further the interests of the rulers and in the course of development serve the general interest to guarantee a smooth pattern of living together. We will call them public order associations and public order powers, respectively. Aside from them there are the still much more numerous associations and powers through which it is possible to obtain direct life goods or life values. Included here are the faith power, the education power, the economic power, and the ethical power. We will designate such powers as welfare powers.* Embodied in every welfare power, however, are elements of public order power, because welfare power needs and provides for in its constitution the suitable delimitation of competences of leaders and masses. As seen most clearly by the example of the church, the special order of these competences may under favorable circumstances even be elevated to general social recognition, in which case the welfare power becomes a public order power as well. Conversely, we can see that every public order power in turn creates its own life values, thereby acting as a welfare power. Thus the two types of power, which we must differentiate by their

A literal translation of "Lebensm'achte" ("life powers") would be meaningless at best and misleading at worst. -- (Tr.)

ultimate objectives, interlock again as far as their concomitant effects are concerned. We will see this more clearly as we now proceed to the description of the various principal cases which belong to both types.

The first public order power which emerges from history is the arms power. From times immemorial human beings have banded together to carry arms in order to defend themselves against subjection by a hostile power, subordination under foreign rule, and if possible to gain through victory ascendancy for themselves. The subjugated party stands in danger of losing the most highly valued of life's goods to the victorious one: liberty, honor, all kinds of possessions, wife and child, and even one's own life. The victor, on the other hand, expects to enrich himself by the goods and the values of the enemy. This explains why the means of power, through which one ~~has to~~ determine the victory, became supreme life desiderata in their own right. The weapon as well as the other requisites of battle, and no less the personal feats and virtues of war, acquire high and highest general esteem. We have to confront them with the original or direct life values — those sought for their own sake and which fill life — and view them as indirect or derived life values. They are indispensable to guarantee the possession of those other goods needed for the enjoyment of life's ultimate objectives. In them one anticipates life's aims, and therefore every nation always includes them in its wealth estimates.

The law power is a public order power of predominantly internal force. It safeguards the possession and utilization of life goods and life values — for one by incorporating the citizens' sense of justice into firm rules, but also by protecting legally established possessions against trespasses by third persons. The public order power of law, too, through the legal institutions and the work done by judges and other legal experts, creates new indirect life values, which are considered everywhere as characteristic of a high civilization.

Finally, a third important public order power is the political power of a community. Every community must complement the arms power by a civilian power. The mutual relationships between all the organs of sovereignty and of administration must be regulated, they must be brought into a hierarchical system. In that, the political order merges into the legal system, creating public law. But, in addition, its tasks also include seeing to it that all the duties of the sovereign and the administration are properly performed. Statecraft is the art of the successful use of political power. In the admiration accorded to the great statesman is contained a recognition of his accomplishments as national life goals. They are part and parcel of the great values of civilization.

The loftiest welfare powers — faith power, education power, and ethical power — become culture powers to the extent that they manage to ennoble the forces of life. Purified faith power, refined ethical power, improved education power are culture powers of the first order. The faith power of Christianity in the age of ecclesiastical predominance developed into a public order power of such strength that it could dare doing battle with the secular power and for a long time remain victorious. The weaponless church overcame and survived the Roman Empire and

subsequently defeated its victors — one of the strangest historical processes providing much food for thought and opportunity to learn.

Every genuine public order power contributes to the accomplishments of civilization, which complement those of culture by securing civilian peace with its vast possibilities of communication and mutual understanding. Only in the pacified interior of the states created through war was safe ground won for cultural tasks. If the Jewish people, after having lost their state and having become dispersed across the nations, was still able to become a major economic power, this was possible only by other nations having taken upon themselves the exertions and the battles necessitated by the maintenance of state security. The consummate political public order power must be an authority over a compact territory which can become active everywhere within its realm without a loss of strength.

3- The Power Endowments of the Nations

A people can become great only if it is talented for all crucial public order powers and culture powers and in its historical development has advanced them all. In this connection there cannot be any doubt, however, that certain peoples are better endowed for and strive to attain the first kind of powers, others for the second kind. Sparta was a paramount military and political public order power, but perhaps was also, among all historically outstanding public order powers, the one which was least effective as a culture power. Athens was so outstanding as a public order power that it could vie with Sparta for hegemony, and in addition it was so lavishly endowed as a culture power that with the values created by it it could fill the history of Antiquity and could bring Rome, the world victor, to acknowledge the superiority of Greek culture, which for the most part it merely took over. About the Greek people as a whole it may perhaps be said that the world never has seen the like of it nor will see such ever again; modern culture still lives off the Greek spirit. The Romans were a public order power without peer and equally strong in military, law formation, and political respects; their historical legacy, too, continues to exert its effect down to the present.

In the course of millenia still other universal empires have been founded through arms power and political power. Most have disappeared without leaving any traces of their one-time grandeur other than vestiges of the impressive architectural monuments in which their rulers wanted to immortalize the image of their power. If one recalls all the past lordly splendor, automatically the view suggests itself that fighting power fades away and that only culture power lasts. For the types of Attila and Tamerlane this is true, indeed, as their victories have wrought destruction; but it is not true for the victories of the Roman people. In spite of all excesses in particular instances, the Romans were by and large a true public order power for the entire Mediterranean basin, although they did not manage either to unite all the subjected peoples into a well rounded ethnic group or to maintain their realm forever against the assaults of the barbarians. The accomplishments of the civilization created by them ¹⁵¹¹ not perish with their realm. The Roman highways had been

built to such perfection that even unattended they could serve the migrating peoples and armies for a thousand years. Dilapidation of roads, where they had existed in the first place, began after they had finally fallen into disrepair for lack of even elementary care. The Latin language sent its rich offshoots into the Romanic languages, and beyond that remained through a millenium or longer the language of education for Central and Western Europe. The medieval as well as modern legal science acquired its basics from Roman law, to find in it the firm foundation for the structure of its own legal system. The idea of the Roman Empire came to life again in the Franconian and German Empires. In the most far-reaching sense, however, the Catholic church became the heir of both the culture power and the political power of Ancient Rome. The city of Rome, which the first time around had become the world capital through its arms, could do so a second time because it added to the faith power of the church the ruling tradition of an entire epoch.

The English people very closely resembles the Roman people as far as the pursuit of world domination is concerned. It likewise combines the aptitude for arms power, as well as legal and political power, and is thus capable of playing a superior role in the rivalry of the public order powers. The fact that in the Continental wars in which it has taken part it has for quite a while now begun to fight with "alien swords" and tends to hold back its own national arms power until the seriousness of the contest demands recourse to it as well, is no testimony against its military prowess. It is a testimony for its political aptitude, which it shows precisely by knowing how to use, to the greatest extent possible, the fighting power of allies and subjugated peoples. Should it not be added as an essential characteristic of the Roman-English type that both peoples are lacking in the fullness of artistic endowment such as other great civilized nations possess? In the case of the English people it is especially striking that it is wanting in creative talent for the art of music in which modern artistic perception finds its most unique and profound expression. It is probably no accident that we don't see the musically most talented peoples come off victorious in the decisive battles for supremacy. Isn't the reason for it that they are all too much introverted to be able to turn their strength outward, as would be necessary if they were to assert themselves as the dominant public order power?

In the case of the German people the elements of power are peculiarly mixed. The contrast between North German and South German character is grounded in the contrast between public order power and culture power. The fight for supremacy between Prussia and Austria, like the fight between Sparta and Athens, was decided in favor of the specific public order power. By its victory over France Prussia-Germany appeared to be on the way to becoming the hegemonic power of Continental Europe. During the World War England and Prussia competed as the leading public order powers of the two opposing camps. It is a verdict of world historic significance that England emerged from the War as Europe's victorious public order power. If only the originally applied arms power had mattered, Prussia-Germany would have won the victory for the Central Powers thanks to its superior military training. By virtue of its clear political superiority, however, which in addition to its economic power also brought to it the superior arms power of its allies, England was able to

no means assured of world hegemony, the reason is that the Entente could not consummate the fight against the mighty foe under England's leadership, but had to invoke the help of a third party, a tertius gaudens, the U.S. of North America, which with its saved strength stepped into action after the two adversaries had become exhausted. In his nature the Anglo-American in many respects displays in greater measure those characteristics which appear to make England qualified for being the leading public order power. For all that he is still considerably further removed from art and not fully interested even in science where the English mind clearly excels. Besides, the U.S. on its own soil, thanks to its ample natural resources, is assured of highest economic power. Whether, given all this, the U.S. is qualified to assume world leadership will, however, not be decided until after it will leave its historic isolation permanently behind and will under similar circumstances attending the use of arms and as a culture power have proved itself.

But let us leave aside for now the major world relationships and stay again within the bounds of national history.

The Ruling Powers and the Drive for the Maximum, the Dominant Power

Among the numerous or countless powers of every nation the weaker ones like to lean upon other powers. They need protection and find it in a symbiosis particularly with the strong ruling powers, to which in turn they bring additional strength. The strong powers, growing conscious of their strength, want to become independent and engage in battle the other powers which they encounter. Far from simply offering resistance, they try to get control over their adversary, if this is somehow possible. They defeat the weak one and go all out in order to win victory over the strong one as well. All the great public order powers and all general culture powers jealous of their self-assertion want to be considered as ruling powers, not restrained in any of their expressions, able to command only. Every power which feels called upon to be the dominating one has in itself the drive for the maximum. The strong power knows of no self-restraint. It gives us the proof for the correctness of Goethe's dictum that a god can only be balanced by another god, that it is absurd to expect that a force will restrain itself, rather it can only be held in check by another force. For this reason the public order power wants to be an exclusive territorial power, tolerating within its borders no foreign meddling and seeking to further extend its borders. For the same reason the faith power in its core is intolerantly aiming at general recognition, and the same would be true of knowledge power if only it were sufficiently strong for this purpose. The drive for the maximum does not permit the aspiring ruling power to rest until it has subordinated all powers within reach, until it has become omnipotent. Unless its inner resources crumble away, it can be arrested only through external resistance. Therefore, as between ruling powers which collide, fighting will at first always decide the outcome, and only after competition with each other without a decisive success for either side is one ready for peaceful accommodation, which in the end may turn into symbiosis. Old powers are most likely to band together when they are threatened by aspiring new

ones, against which none would feel strong enough any more to fight by itself.

The coalition of the ruling powers must not be imagined as one of full harmony, let alone total merger. As long as each is confronted by its own specific social task, it must maintain the special constitution appropriate to that specific mission. On the other hand, it will not quite do for each one to insist on complete independence, for in this case even with the best intentions repeated frictions would be unavoidable; always one of the powers must of course maintain a certain pre-eminence. We may call this privileged power the dominant power. But it is not simply placed above the others, it is only pre-eminent, the first among many powers with partial autonomy, not the apex of a comprehensive hierarchy within which it would be able to act as final arbiter for every decision. The sentence, "Caesar non supra grammaticos," holds true for the whole range of social tasks. As is true for languages, every social undertaking forms its own rules from within. The dominant power will have to yield to the other powers' — provided that they are tolerated at all — autonomy within their jurisdiction and will claim for itself only the privilege of regulating the border areas where it collides with the others. It will insist that no other power intrude upon its "reserved circles," but at the same time it will have to keep its hands off the "ancestral ground" of the others. In addition, it enjoys the inherent advantage that newly emerging powers will at first, and to the extent feasible, collect around it. It thereby enjoys over all the other powers the advantage of potential growth.

From the beginning the state through its arms power was qualified for occupying the dominant position. Its sway expanded the more the better it succeeded in building up, in addition to the arms power, legal and political power as well. Grown to cultural stature, the state was finally able to add to its superiority further by learning how to attract certain cultural powers or to nurture them within itself. Ecclesiastical predominance, too, in its heyday did not rest on faith power alone. The church was at the same time the principal administrator of legal power, political power, and culture power of the time, which were supported by the faith power. The example of the church makes it evident that it would be wrong to view dominant power as unrestricted predominance, as all-encompassing superposition. Like the church, the state as dominant power was and is not omnipotent, notwithstanding all the efforts to make it so. In the state there never was, not even in times of most oppressivetyranny, an onnipotent despot. Louis XIV emerged from his battles with the "Fronde" as absolute king, but by no means had he thereby become an autocrat over everybody and everything. Victory over the "Fronde" assured the royalty of exclusive control over arms power, guaranteeing it supreme legal and political power as well. In addition, it transformed the feudal lords into courtiers, to whom it mattered more to secure royal favor through court services than to enjoy in their manors the exercise of their feudal prerogatives. Satisfied with these successes the

'Name of the political movement of the French high nobility against the absolute monarchy. - (Tr.)

kingship permitted the continuation of a sizable complex of feudal privileges which survived until the Revolution. It stands to reason that the church also remained a strong power. Moreover, culture powers of most diverse origin were flourishing, and at all times a few competences of the public order power had still been reserved for the local corporations. Hence substantial sections of national life were beyond encroachment by the most absolute of all kings who, more rightfully than any of his predecessors, could say of himself that he was the state.

5. Supportive Powers (The Fundamental Civil Rights)

The autonomous public order powers and the welfare and culture powers at work in addition to the dominant power, aside from the special function performed within their domain, render a general service to society, namely, offering resistance to the encroachment of the dominant power. During the time of ecclesiastical supremacy it was primarily the state, and during the time of state supremacy primarily the church, which were called upon to perform this service, which is of highest importance for the social constitution as a whole. As the pressure exerted by the substructure of the supporting wall if the building is to remain intact, so the pressing dominant power demands correspondingly strong counterpowers and supporting powers if the social body is to remain healthy and vigorous. The counterpowers are the autonomous ruling powers, while the supporting powers include especially the anonymous powers of a free society. The citizens must have been made into upright persons by their moral sensibilities and sense of justice, by their education and economic strength, in order to be able to defend the realm of their home and their income, their personal and private life, against the dominant state power or church power. The constitutional civil rights, having been an inventory piece of every constitution since the memorable Declaration of Human Rights, must be covered by supporting anonymous powers, or else their constitutional proclamation remains an empty word. Never has ethical power become the dominant power, nor could it grow to play such a role: it is too inward-oriented to permit the kind of organization demanded by the dominant power. Still the politician errs, because it is the strongest of all supporting powers. Lodged in the human conscience, it urgently and warningly orients all personal actions to the goal of performance of one's social duty. Through it, above all, the individual matures into a social being; through it, above all, society is therefore held together.

All the supporting powers which are peculiar to the masses of a people we combine in the notion of national character. Creature of natural endowment and historical education, it is a fact to which every constitution of rights has to conform. On its supportive capacity depends the degree in which the social achievements of a people may be crowned by organized and dominant Powers. It is the lasting foundation of national history.

6. The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers.

The contrast between the dominant and ruling powers on the one hand, and the supporting powers on the other, gives the theory of the separation of state powers its deeper meaning. This doctrine was aimed at the absolute prince who united in his person the legislative, judicial, and executive powers. The separation of these supreme powers was meant to protect the freedom of the people from the danger of being crushed by the overwhelming princely power. If, then, a prince declared his willingness to share his legislative power with the parliament, there had to be behind the parliament a real power if this declaration was in fact to be carried out. The mere stipulation of the separation of powers in a constitutional document would not do the job vis-à-vis a prince who had the dominant power at his disposal. Such real powers were present, indeed, where the dominant princely power was confronted with strong, supporting people powers. In the century of the Enlightenment the citizens had at their disposal in the form of education power and economic power a wealth of such supporting powers, and the postulate of the separation of powers, which a century earlier would have remained an empty word, now made good sense in view of the actual distribution of powers. In a democracy -- at least where it is deserving of its name -- such special guarantees of the protection of freedom as are called for in the absolute state are no longer required, for true democracy is freedom. As far as that goes, the theory of the separation of state powers has lost its former meaning. Nevertheless, even in the most perfect democracy it will retain all of its importance if we extend its scope from the state powers, for which it was first formulated, to the social powers. Democracy, too, is expected to preserve the natural barriers of state power as marked by the historic successes of the state and to abstain from encroachments upon the autonomous social powers which developed through success alongside the state within the realms of public order power and culture power. Under the shelter of freedom the dominant state power must less than ever become the all-controlling supreme power, rather it now must all the more readily tolerate alongside itself all the other powers which emerge from its social undertakings. Only if these powers offer resistance to the overzealous democratic craving for omnipotence can the social equilibrium be assured.

7. The Social Equilibrium

Separation of powers is multiplication of powers, and as such is the apt expression for the variety of desires combined in human nature. For each of these desires, which a substantial number of individuals share, it provides social assistance. Certainly, there may arise new conflicts between the separated powers, rousing a very painful response in the conscience of those at the mercy of these conflicts. Which of the great and small gods, in front of whose altars one has traditionally bent his knees, shall be served when these gods themselves start fighting? How grave inner conflicts has the fight between state and church caused those anxious to remain loyal to their faiths as well as their fatherland! In what inner conflicts has the fight for world power entangled all those who want to keep their faith with the idea of national entity as well as humanity!

The fight between social powers is more obstinate and acute than the fight of personal passions in the heart of an individual. Although the stirred-up passions rage against one another in the heart of individuals as well as a sane person is fundamentally at one with himself and sooner or later will find his inner balance. Society is not such a closed unit. It is governed by separate powers which do not readily tend to balance out. Only the weaker ones yield to a symbiosis, whereas the stronger ones one-sidedly follow their urge to preserve power which inheres in them because of the *sacrificium voluntatis* and the unyieldingness of mass technique. In the strongest ones among these powers an expansionary force is active which strives for the maximum. Each of them has a tendency to be dominant and submit the others to itself in order to rise to omnipotence in the end. Leadership ambition coupled with deluded narrow-mindedness is what, above all, generates this drive. In every association of power those always stand out who would go farthest in achieving the association goals, and in unsettled times the loudest spokesmen are most readily listened to by the multitude and appear to be most qualified for leadership. Only when their extravagant actions have again the balancing forces of nature, with those taking the lead who can bring the contending powers into accord. The equilibrium of social powers is the upshot of hard struggle. The more vigorous the calm supporting powers, the sooner that equilibrium will be found and the more durable it will be.

Of all social powers it is the innermost ones which strive most fervently for peaceful harmony. A pure faith which has extricated itself from the outward delusion of superstition ties together in worldwide religions millions of persons -- the worse, to be sure, when the persuasions of the world religions clash. An ethical belief capable of forcing its way to the bottom of sympathy would have to unite all feeling human beings into an indestructible alliance -- but, surely, the innermost powers are the last to make it to the top in human history! First there are the external powers, and among these the most uncouth are ahead. The innermost powers must be the last ones because they are the most sheltered ones. The minds of men must first be delivered of the plight of human existence before they become receptive for the tender vibrations of the soul. These powers bring peace, but they need peace in the first place to grow up from their germs.

For the time being the ruling powers in nation and state, but especially in the world, confront each other sharply divided, and equilibrium between them is still far from finally being reached.

8. -the Concept of Society

Given the fact of the separation of powers, we have to be fully aware that none of the concepts of society has its complete counterpart in the world of reality, whether we talk about human society, or European society, or civic society, or even only heated society. Everywhere deep and jagged rifts pervade the quality of living together. The notion of society as a community and as demanded by pure ethics, is truly alive in only a few souls; especially for the world at large this idea is almost

totally useless. Aside from [redacted] enthusiasts, world citizens have always existed only on paper, and today they hardly exist any longer on paper. Nobody thinks of the United States of the World, and to most the United States of Europe sounds like an unattainable postulate. Even the world religions, taking human society as their point of departure, haven't been able to carry through this idea. In truth none of them has become a world religion because no one has succeeded in uniting the hearts of men in the world as a whole, and not a few of them were ready to fight off the others in battle. As the continents, so the associations in which mankind grew up in historic separation, down to the present, have been sundered by seas of alienation and mistrust, or even hate. As a rule such separation has been bridged only by the lust for plunder of the conqueror, the audacity of the adventuresome discoverer, or the business acumen of the profit-greedy merchant. All these people pursue only their personal interest, and next to these there remains to be mentioned only the religious zeal of the missionary who is to serve the idea of humanity even though in reality he is often only out to expand the reach of his own church. In real terms, there is almost nothing left of the concept of human society aside from the external coexistence of tribes and peoples which touch each other across the earth and are exposed to mutual pressure. Without their being held together by an inner bond, they are pressed by the needs of living together to search for an equilibrium condition, which is usually found only in battle and whose center of gravity is for the most part determined by force.

If one wishes to understand the living together of human beings, one will nevertheless not be able to dispense with a concept of society which for the time being abstracts from all frictions and disturbances of living together. The sociologist needs to use the method of abstraction (idealization) as much as does the physicist, otherwise he could not develop the formal laws of life. If, for example, one wishes to understand the law of the relationship between leader and masses, he must first view it free from all frictions and disturbances, for which purpose he needs the idealized concept of society. This is done to great advantage as one is then placed in a position of also gaining clarity concerning the effects emanating from the frictions and disturbances of reality. The same is true for all laws of living together. We will develop these laws with the help of a formal notion of society which does not have a pure factual counterpart.

VI. Legal Power and Legal Form

1. The Power of Custom. the Drive for Knowledge and Beauty. and of the Moral Sense

The dominion of law first covered only the narrow circle of the blood associations. Here it supplemented through firm rules the uniting feeling of love where the latter began to become shaky. Today the rule of law governs the state and its people with respect to a large part of its social relations, and even in the relationships of peoples to one another there are traces of the formation of international law. In order to understand how the rule of law has spread so far and what expectation exists that eventually it will cover the totality of human relations, one has to realize how it originated in the first place. One has to be aware of not only how the rule of law differs from that of external coercion, but also in which respects it differs from the more closely related dimensions of customs, of the drive for truth and beauty as well as of ethics. To put it very succinctly for now: external coercion rests on a "you must", custom on "one must", truth and beauty on "I must", but law on "I shall" in conjunction with "I may." The "I shall" and "I may" also apply within the realm of ethics, therefore law and ethics are most closely related. But although they are closely related, a penetrating inquiry still shows that even they are separate in origin and nature and hence in their effects as well.

Law is one of the broad foundations of social order, and one has to understand it completely in order to comprehend the structure of society. We therefore will use extreme care to separate clearly the drive for law in its roots from the most closely related other drives. We will reserve for later a discussion of external coercion with its "you must."

Custom is very closely connected with law, as far as the urgency of its commands is concerned. The rules of manners and customs for not few people are really the most urgent social commands, the most proximate to which they seek to conform. Burning shame rises in the heart of the vain woman — and no less for that matter, in the heart of the vain man — as soon as they can tell by the scoffing of the surrounding company that they have somehow infringed on one of the many rules dictated by good form. For high society the observance of etiquette has the special function of marking social rank, and he who lays claim to be included in a certain rank must be sure to master its form. As in the case of law, manners and customs also have a judge who observes and avenges the committed offenses. For every social class there is the vehmic court of its members in which women have long had voting representation and which has the far-reaching authority to pass the most severe sentence, namely, exclusion from the respective social class. Nevertheless, customs and manners lack the deep inner impulse which characterizes law. However religiously the dictates of fashion may be adhered to — representing the most superficial expressions of customs, to be sure the big majority still do not participate from

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conviction but only because all others do likewise, and one does not want to be conspicuous; at the same time, however, one is prepared to conduct oneself in the opposite manner as soon as fashion changes. Of course, there are always people as well who are so addicted to fashion that they regard the monstrosities of every season as most genuine confessions of human nature, but these are people who surely have no idea at all of what human nature and true confession are. Customs and manners obtain their hold on the mind through the generality of their observance, their validity resting on the social constraints of "one must." For all that, it is not the pure herd instinct, however, which operates in them: if I talk as "one" talks, if I act as "one" acts, I don't behave purely as a thoughtless fellow traveler, but I want to avoid giving offense, if I can help it. Besides, in a great many cases I bow to an understanding which I feel is implicit in the general observance even though I may perhaps not be quite able to fathom it. At any rate, the fact of a general custom is in itself already a notable social success in which the individual person has to acquiesce. The "one must" of society is the expression of the sacrificium voluntatis, of the sacrifice of independence, which the members of society render in the conviction that the collective exudes a power which no individual acting alone could even remotely attain. The social constraint of "one must" is the counterpart of the experience of power which one enjoys by virtue of being a member of society. Belonging to high society, above all, enhances the social weight which one carries, and consequently those wishing to be included in it are willing to submit to the stronger imperative of "one must," thereby trying to set themselves off from the vulgar world.

In recognizing the true and the beautiful the "one must" does not apply; rather, a certain "I must" becomes operative here, that "here I stand, I cannot help it" which Luther spoke at the Diet in Worms. Not everybody can hold this sentiment so purely and firmly as a leader of Luther's stature did. The masses need for this purpose the leader who walks in front and in addition even the going along of the surrounding crowd, but this striding ahead by the leader and this going together with the others have always only the value of an aid, however indispensable it may be, for the personal act of recognizing and sensing, because the individual on his own could never have gained the insight or experienced the sensation. But in order to really possess such insight and feeling, one must have acquired them in the end through personal experience. Those who have not gone through the experience of scientific understanding or artistic perception do not really know and really enjoy, but only think they do, and hence their opinions are knocked down by the next change in the general atmosphere. They are fellow travelers obeying the "one must." Such hangers-on are found in all movements, even the most genuine ones, and their number is often confusingly large. But could a movement be genuine if not the core of its adherents were motivated by a burning drive for knowledge and true perception?

The "I must" of striving for truth and beauty provides the transition to the "I shall" of law and ethics. Here as there the same inner urge operates, being given the same social aids from leader and fellow travelers. The peculiar characteristic of the legal and ethical "shall" is that it addresses itself to the human will. The scholar and the artist do not tell themselves

1 that they ought to gain knowledge and perception, they acquire it as by intuition or contemplation, though at times they have to strive passionately for clear intuition. On the other hand, by obeying the legal and ethical "shall" one performs a duty of the will. Often this is being discharged joyfully, without giving in to compulsion: a mother does not force herself when caring for her child, but her devoted love is rooted in the blood instinct; likewise, at the sight of foreign suffering sympathy is stirred up automatically in the sensitive heart and man gains knowledge through compassion. Although in all these cases it is not necessary that the will be called upon, very often one must first have suppressed egotistical desires in order to be able to live up to the duties prescribed by law and ethics. In either case the legal and ethical "shall" are clearly distinguished from the egotistical "shall," which is marked out by external aspirations. The young man wanting to forge ahead sets goals for himself which transcend the ordinary and perhaps also his own strength. The "I shall" by which he whips himself up is derived from a whetted appetite for success: one would not blame him for being less ambitious, and perhaps he must even be taken to task for attempting too much. The root of the "shall" governing law and ethics goes deeper, it is embedded in the conscience. One is not looking for external success but for inner fulfillment. He who does not conform to the precepts of law and ethics exposes himself to social condemnation and, what is worse, to the vexing rebukes of his own conscience. The mental response to infractions of customs and manners is a touch of shame; errors of cognition and artistic perception lead the self-examining mind to the accusation of inadequacy; to offenses against legal and ethical duties it responds with the typical sense of remorse.

The ethical "shall" has deeper roots still than does the legal one. The latter may be satisfied by this or that individual who performs his legal duty perfunctorily, without inner commitment, and many a man may be regarded as impeccably righteous who does not have a trace of social justice. An ethical act, however, to be worthy of the name, must always be performed with a deeply committed heart. He who performs it only for the sake of appearances is a plain hypocrite who cannot claim any merit for this act. A pure ethical sense will accuse and condemn even those evil impulses of the soul which do not evolve into deeds at all, and among these especially those which were deterred by external restraints only. It is possible that ethical judgment will condemn more severely the evil design of a wicked heart whose execution was frustrated by mere accident than the improper act originating in a warm heart gone astray. It isn't that the act as such wouldn't also have to be assessed by ethical criteria! The hardened villain who, while the act is in progress, persists in his evil design without pity and does not rest until the mischief has been consummated will pass less well before the tribunal of conscience than the one who was not strong enough to see it through.

Because of the inner origin of an ethical duty it is taken for granted that one does not have to wait until he is reminded to fulfill his duty. The weak person who can't help himself must be helped; the child is looked after by its mother while, and specially because, it is not conscious of all of its needs; the rich person must give to the poor out of his abundance; and the healthy person has to provide for the sufferer, the experienced

one for the ignorant, without these duties having their counterpart in a claim by the other person who could demand his due. The pure heart senses the common bond of humanity and its value so strongly that as a result the will does not sense a sacrifice, but rather an urge to submit to the general scheme of things. "To give is more blissful than to take" — this saying expresses the ethical ground rule. It is hardly admissible to enumerate one by one the duties stemming from this basic sentiment. The great ethics teacher spurns prescribing a code of ethics, he bases everything on this one command: "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Self-respect and equal respect for others is the sum total of all ethical teaching. It may be appropriate, though, to spell out just a few great commands while in all other matters conscience must decide in each individual case how to apply to it the basic command of love.

2. The Purpose in Law and the Sense of Justice

Law does not have the same deep inner origin which ethics has. Law is meant for the world of action, and external relationships are therefore placed in the foreground. Law regulates the reciprocal behavior of persons wherever their actions may touch, whether they have to proceed jointly or whether their paths cross, yet the purely technical aspects of their behavior are left out of consideration in the process. Just as it is not the task of law to provide for the technical aspects of the material apparatus which is used in transactions, so it is not its task either to provide for the technical aspects of the personal apparatus which is required, for example, for military troops or for any operating entity whatever. The legal order comes about only when human beings — in contrast to materials and tools — are guided by their will according to their interests. It then becomes necessary to delimit the sphere of action for every single participant or for every single group of participants in order to eliminate frictions and fights as far as possible. With this intent the legal order stipulates the authorized actions. Within the realm of freedom of action accorded to the individual or to the group, the legal system declares: "Here it is up to you to act according to your interest, you may." One is permitted to use his property as he sees fit provided that thereby he does not encroach upon another sphere of action which the lawgiver has earmarked to serve the interests of other persons or of the general public. Within the sphere of freedom of action one may enter into agreements with other persons and dispose of the claims arising out of these agreements. The legal duty only comes in second place; it is the shadow cast by the legal claim. The "I may" of the claimant necessarily calls for "I must, not" for all outsiders, which may be even reinforced to "I must, not." No other person may encroach upon the sphere of my rights, and if someone does so all the same, he misappropriates my rights and has to make compensation for the damage he thereby has caused me. In numerous cases the claim of the entitled is directed against a specific person or a specified group of persons from whom he may demand performance. Here his claim is matched by a positive obligation to perform, a "you must" which makes the obligated person responsible not only for performance but for any damage arising from delay in rendering his legal duty.

The fact that law always refers to external behavior opens up to external coercion, from which the depths of ethical behavior are barred, the whole realm of law. It must always be ascertainable whether the conceded scope for freedom of action has been respected or violated, whether the assumed obligation has been met, and thus the possibility of coercion is opened up. Even where full performance cannot be enforced either because the obligated person resolutely refuses to perform the act intended for him or because fulfillment has been made impossible through lapse of time or for other external reasons, it is usually possible within the economic realm to make a monetary estimate of the extent of the damage and to attach a monetary value to the indemnity which it is possible to sue for inasmuch as funds for reimbursement are available. Thereby it is possible for rights within the economic realm to be pursued to the end in value terms even where direct coercion is impossible, and it is of course well known that the economic realm, where performance is clearly determinable, provides the main substance of law. Conditions are less favorable in the area of penal law and within it especially in respect of the protection of personal rights. Once the personal protected interest whose endangerment was to be punishable has been destroyed, not even the most extreme coercion can restore it, nor can it provide a replacement. This creates a substantial difficulty for both the teacher and the lawgiver when they are to determine the size of the award of punishment. At any rate it is clear that the threat of punishment, even if in the given case it has not been enough to prevent the evil, can still have the beneficial effect of nipping in the bud other attempts at creating mischief. It is equally obvious that once the evil has happened in spite of the threat of punishment, one must mete out such punishment lest there be doubt about the seriousness of intent.

The state, as well as society, makes full use of the opportunity to guarantee the fulfillment of legal obligations through coercion. With this aim the state supplements the "you shall" of the legal duty by the "you must" of legal coercion by establishing courts and by adding to the substantive law rules about jurisdiction. Society intervenes to a very large extent through the "one must" of social coercion. Obviously unlawful behavior angers the majority of persons who become aware of it and provokes counter-measures. The social position of the person who has committed a wrong which is felt by society to be such is compromised. He has to fear unpleasant judgments and encounters, and in the extreme case social ostracism, which is painful enough when it means exclusion from the circle of one's companions but which may go so far as to bar him from society as a whole.

There are enough people who are sufficiently righteous — but no more — to accept the "you must" of the state and the "one must" of society. Law in the form of coercion delimits law as they see it. Of such a kind is Nora's husband, Dr. Helmer, as sketched by Ibsen. He is beside himself on account of Nora's behavior because she is threatened by conviction and public opprobrium, but as soon as he learns that the threat is gone for her, the case is disposed of, as far as he is concerned. Whether the legal rule which his wife has violated is good or bad, whether her offense is ethically excusable, he is completely unconcerned about. Ibsen's satirical portrayal of Dr. Helmer hits all the harder because Dr. Helmer himself is a lawyer.

Perhaps the lawyer more so than other professionals is inclined to lose sight of the content in stressing the form.

We for our part must not gloss over the question which Dr. Helmer forgets to pose. We must not fancy to understand the law as long as we do not know from where the legal rules derive their content. It must be a content of special worth if state and society agree that the rules deserve to be backed by enforcement power.

It is indeed so. The rules formulated by a healthy body of law have their deep inner motivation. They receive their content from the meaning, from the purpose of the actions which they have to regulate. The origin of law in practicality may be clearly recognized in the phenomenon of common law with which law began. We see how law based on usage flourishes, with usage supported by the success of purposive action. The fact that the interests of the powerful confer special stress upon the purposes which they pursue must not be viewed as providing an objection against this idea; it just so happens that the powerful are the first to determine success in society, and they know before everyone else does how to provide effective legal protection for their personal aims.

The origin of law in practicality and success is most clearly evident in the case of property law or business law. Business law must, if it is to last, always have passed the test of social success. The townsman and the farmer view private property as sacred precisely because from times immemorial it had been consecrated by success. Should one day, things change in such a fashion that the technique and organization of enterprises are no longer compatible with private property, then socialism could claim success. Its institutions would assert themselves as they have been tested by experience, and in the course of time they would come to be viewed as sacred, just as was the case for private property before the spread of the large enterprise. As in business law, so in all areas of law the experience of the most expert counselors will, even though subject to various fluctuations and disputes, ascertain the forms which give the most apt expression to the purpose of life, as understood in every epoch by every people. For public law cannot be developed without political wisdom, administrative law is clearly oriented to practical purposes, and the rules of proof in adjective law — whether formulated clumsily or elegantly — are always to serve the one purpose: finding the truth. Penal law is probably that area of law whose origins are most distant from reason, as it was created in response to angry outbursts of the urge for retribution which was hardly aware of its objective. But hasn't penal law in the course of its evolution also been shaped according to the requirements of practicality, or could it be that legal science has wasted its efforts in inquiring into the purposes of punishment and in graduating the sentences accordingly?

The rule of law aiming at purposive results is a rule of reason. In this connection it is obvious that legal wisdom cannot be equated with wisdom in each particular case. A solid legal system demands firm general rules of law which must be based on firm general rules of wisdom. If law is to be as reliable as it purports to be, it cannot differ as between persons or as between today and tomorrow. The typical permanent connection

between action and its result must shape its content: as many types of phenomena, so many different rules of law. In addition to the general civil law, special law will apply to the merchant, the miner, employees or other groups; they all need their specific rules because they live in their own typical circumstances. The powerful in a nation, too, may succeed in representing their case as deserving of special treatment, but within a newly defined type it is imperative that the same rules apply without respect of persons. There is a modern trend of thinking which views legal theory as a mere theory of the forms of law, and it has developed this idea in a fruitful and ingenious manner. But when it goes so far as to designate the purpose to be achieved as something lying outside the law, it is nevertheless mistaken. The purpose is the procreative element in law, and it belongs as closely to the legal structure as the system belongs to its shell; substance of law and its shell could not grow unless the expanding force of something alive were enclosed in them.

The highest social rule of reason is not per se a rule of law. The enlightened egotist as such is not yet a man of law, for even though he were willing to pass up momentary advantage if such renunciation promised him a greater future advantage, he will still callously evade his duty in all instances where he believes to be able to outwit the sagacity of the law. Sagacity speaks to the intellect, law must satisfy the sense of justice. The righteous person sees behind the various legal rules of reason the persons for whose benefit the rules were enacted, and he feels a moral obligation to accord such persons the same legal respect as he demands for himself. Self-respect and respect for the other person — aren't these also the foundation of ethics, though? If this is so, then the sense of justice is that ethical sentiment which refers to the content of law, the rule of law being the ethically perceived rule of reason. This does not imply that one must always be clearly aware of the ethical content of the rules of law when they are being applied. One has hardly a reason for doing so as long as the rules are strictly observed; it is enough to apply them as rules of reason, or even merely to follow usage. Also, taken by itself the individual rule of law may not reveal any ethical content at all — think, for example, of external rules of procedures. Such content adheres to the rule only by virtue of the fact that ethical perception is characteristic of the legal system to which the rule belongs. The ethical perception of the law, however, will always be vividly summoned when a person is tempted to break the prescribed rule. When confronted with the injunction, "Thou shall not kill," and with all other injunctions backed up by criminal law punishment, one feels distinctly that in these cases breaking the law is moral crime. But even in cases of mere civil wrongdoing — as when one denies a person the payment owed to him, or one demands improper things from him, or one hides the evidence for truth — everybody with a sense of justice is told by his conscience that he has violated an ethical duty by yielding to the temptation to pursue his personal interest. Conversely, if one marshals the strength to perform an arduous legal duty he is uplifted by the realization of having won a moral victory.

In the majority of cases the ethically perceived rule of law its demands falls more or less short of the measure postulated by the great ethical command of charity. Not even within

families is this standard always quite met, although for the most part the love of parents for their children, and later the love given the parents by their children in thankful restitution, provide what ethics demands over and above the narrow rule of law. Those families in which the instinct of consanguinity is fully alive share the available goods to the end in the manner of poetic justice. There always are numerous persons as well who outside the circle of their relatives give as much as they can of their possessions to the physically or spiritually indigent, without being legally forced to do so. The churches at all times have been intermediaries for works of compassion, in monasteries countless individuals have spontaneously given the vow of poverty, and in still many other ways the sharp edges of the legal system have been ground off by the soothing order of love. Nevertheless, the experience of all times and all nations has shown the durability of legal systems in which ethics holds in only a restricted form, which for all that may yet be obstructed by the slags of force preceding the rule of law in the early evolution of mankind. The feeling of love which ties together the majority of the people with one another is not strong enough to soften the strict legal system into a harmonious ethical order. In its fanciful beginnings the idea of socialism brought forth all manner of attempts to organize society like one large family. These undertakings have failed without exception. As the rule of law is otherwise adapted to typical conditions, it is also with respect to the degree of legal respect which it expects the people to extend to it, being adjusted to the typically prevailing degree of charity. Could it also last if erected on a different foundation?

3. About the Inequality in Law

As we look back today on times long past, their legal systems appear to us as immoral. We can no longer turn our mind back to the setting of restricted ethics which was common to everybody at that time who as lord had command over slaves. To deprive a fellow human being of liberty we rate as a crime against nature. Later centuries, in turn, will not be able either to view our legal system as ethical any longer. The rank inequality of legal rights with which our sentiments can put up will probably be perceived as a gross suppression of the poor. Nevertheless, in a time to which slavery had been handed down by history and which could not imagine a situation without slavery, the lord could not have felt, and did not have to feel, his right to hold slaves to be unethical, just as today we do not perceive the inequality of rights as unethical unless it is very bad or has been created or augmented by the use of brute force. The view of coming generations means nothing as far as the ethical perceptions of a given age are concerned, for the latter finds its yardstick for comparisons in the views held by the immediately preceding generations. A body of law which is more lenient than the one by which the ancestors lived may be viewed by the sons as ethically acceptable. For the rest, the ruling law can always claim for itself the strong argumentative force of experience; it exists and therefore can be, it has been confirmed as possible by the reality of its being and by this alone is already stronger than any purely contrived system which would first have to pass the test of experience. The rules of reason of the law are too firmly grounded on success to disintegrate readily in the

face of the precept of charity, which in its full content of course transcends the average strength of man and means a target to shoot for rather than a direct command. There is yet another reason why it is wrong to say that personal inequality is fundamentally at odds with the nature of law; law receives its character not only from the persons it joins together but also from the things it must regulate. It may, and indeed often does, happen that collective success is best achieved when individuals joined together for action establish a hierarchical order of unequal rights, graduated according to the shares contributed by them to the accomplishment of the social tasks to be realized. In this case the sense of justice readily accepts the inequality of right and rank. It is positively wrong always to attribute the inequalities which are so numerous in the body of law to superior force and external coercion; rather they are quite often the logical creation of strength systematically organized.

4. The Fight for (the Observance of) Rights

When it is perceived ethically, the rule of reason gains the heightened stature of an ethical power. Only the "you shall" of the conscience enhances the worth of the rule of reason to the level which justifies summoning the political "you must" and the social "one must" for its enforcement. Even the "I may," by which legal wisdom defines the various spheres of will, in every legal system in which right in its full meaning has not been disfigured by force is elevated to "I shall." The old saying that nobody is hurt when somebody else uses his right doesn't tell enough; not only that I do not act unethically when I act within my permitted sphere, but society even expects that I make full use of my legal rights for the sphere of these rights is measured by the typical experience of what can be accomplished, and no claimant is supposed to fall short of such accomplishment. Since the "I may" does not really refer to the things to which I am entitled but to the persons who must respect my rights, I do not act unethically vis-a-vis them either by insisting that they fulfill their duties. Within the framework of a nonviolent law I even act ethically if I do not yield any of my rights which I have to claim if I am to meet society's expectation of success. In this sense the fight for one's rights is permissible and within proper limits even required. The ethical perception, reflected in a conscience-dictated duty to heed the rights of others, at the same time gives me a claim to defend my own rights, and I fight a worthy battle if I try to stop an adversary who usurps my rights. The fight for one's rights only loses its legitimacy when continued against an adversary who without his fault is no longer capable of performing. Such a fight cannot be approved by an ethically perceptive person, just as ethical perception can no longer approve abstention from the exercise of a right, or the accumulation of such a right in a person to such a degree that it no longer permits being put to socially valuable use.

Owing to the fact that the rule of law is never derived from a single occurrence but always from the typical general conditions, the fight for legal rights, waged at first only between two individual persons, obtains higher social significance. The way they conduct is at the same time waged in the interest of the companions, the party, the class. The public, therefore,

waits in suspense to see whose side the national court and the social judgment will take. As the excitement grows, the companions, parties, and classes enter themselves into the fight about rights, which only thereby becomes a full-fledged ethical war, with a significant general interest rising above the individual interest. Who would doubt that the freedom fight of the suppressed is an ethical fight! And isn't it so that the defenders of the existing powers also have to look after an important legal idea? As the populace fights a worthy battle when it defends its inalienable rights, so does the prince who observes the historic duties of his high calling.

5. internal and External Power of Law

The internal power of law is stronger than the external one. Law receives its external power by the "you must" of the state and the "one must" of society. State coercion is indispensable when it is necessary to crush the will opposing the legal system, but the state's means of coercion will suffice only as long as the resisting citizens are merely in a minority. Against a pronounced majority, unless it were abjectly submissive, the state could not prevail. Even against a strong minority it has to work with the instruments of martial law which cannot be used for the duration, and where the state does not have social pressure and the force of conscience on its side, it will not assert itself fully at all. As long as social pressure from the circles of the military, nobility and the students demand the duel, the duel will prevail although the state punishes its practice as a crime. Just as little has the state succeeded in keeping the bold Alpine people from poaching, which in their own circle yields them praise rather than disgrace. Social pressure, on its part, is very effective where things are so plain that every resistance to its "one must" is immediately noted and brings on a balancing counter-effect. On a bridge with much traffic pedestrians and drivers of vehicles will in the main automatically keep to that side which usage prescribes they do; the inexperienced or recalcitrant are more or less bluntly shown the right way by those who meet on the bridge, and the police can afford to limit its strength to one or a few men because it has nothing to do but to take drastic steps in an emergency. Where things are not so plain, social pressure must, in addition, be supported by the ethical sense of justice. The sacrificium voluntatis must be rendered in the conscience itself, and the will in its very core must adjust itself to the ethical power in which it wants to have a part. If all citizens were filled with the sense of justice, no force whatever would be necessary altogether in order to uphold the legal system. Travelers who know the old interior China which has not yet been changed in its character by communication with Europeans tell us that in those areas courts and administrative authorities are being much less drawn upon than in any country of European civilization. The thousand-year-old, stagnating Chinese civilization has developed so many firm habits of living and has given so much external and internal direction to the people as would not be possible in the more agitated life of Europe, where state coercion, social pressure, and moral constraint must work together in order to guarantee the workability of the legal system. Where moral force is weaker, the regime of law is also imperfect because thereby social pressure is weakened as well and because the state by

itself is of course much too weak. It is not the state's better trained police force which makes for greater security on the open roads than in centuries past, it is the more civilized and peaceful disposition of the citizens. Why is the regime in matters of taxation so much less perfect than it is in private law although the penalties provided by the state for violation of tax laws are much higher than those applying to private wrongdoing? The answer cannot be in doubt: the tax provisions are not interpreted by the majority of citizens with the same sensitive understanding as the provisions of private law, tax morality being of course much lower than the morals governing private legal relationships. The church in its awareness of human behavior therefore prudently refrains from condemning offenses against tax morality according to the same standard applied to offenses against the moral code in private life. The average citizen deems permissible vis-a-vis the state, in spite of all its power, what he considers illicit vis-a-vis the most homely fellow-citizen. With the companion, the business correspondent the client one deals continuously, they are personally known, one has an appreciation for the experience of power which a frictionless cooperation with them brings, one wants to be esteemed by them in order to be assured of their concessions. For all these reasons one feels so close to them that one not only depends on them for purely rational considerations but every person of not downright indelicate manners is automatically motivated to offer them legal respect and doesn't wait until he is forced to meet his due obligations to them. The state, on the other hand, is an abstract entity, not vivid to the common imagination and not speaking to human sentiment, an abstract entity alien to common knowledge and all the more removed from the conscience. Only through the passionate excitement of people's sentiments, as brought on perhaps by a popular war, do the masses awaken to their duty vis-a-vis the state; then certainly they are prepared for the greatest (volitional) sacrifices because at the same time they become conscious of the experience of power which the continued viable existence of the state means to it.

Public law has the peculiar characteristic that wherever the opposing interests of large groups collide, the internal power of the law is of no avail. Every group fancies to have the law on its side and denies legitimacy to the opposite party. This is the gate through which force is called into public life; because internal power is missing, external power must do its job, and because the gods do not speak, the demons of the underworld are loosed. Hence the fights between the parties, the classes, the churches, and above all the nations. Whereas within a particular state force must be applied for the most part only to a small, defiant minority which refuse to obey the law, as between nations denying each other legal respect force must become the instrument to be used at a moment's notice.

6. About the Necessity for a General Belief in Law

If the power of law is recognized as a fundamentally ethical, internal power having its roots in the conscience of the individual, it is thereby not in the least denied the character of a social power. Even in their innermost endeavors humans look for support in the form of social confirmation. As the yearning for knowledge and for beauty need this support, so do also the

religious and ethical yearning; in each case tasks have to be met which transcend the unaided strength of the individual. Truth is not being falsified when I find it in association with others, but is thereby elucidated and strengthened. People are so much alike that they do not begin to deny their nature when they follow the best who are striving ahead and in doing so lean on one another. When in association with others under the same circumstances I discover the same law, I need not disavow my sense of justice; on the contrary, I will have satisfied it better than if I had gone my way alone. A generally held belief in law is its strongest test.

But is there any kind of law which would fully pass this test? Are there really legal persuasions so generally held that only a small minority not responsive to a sense of justice keeps aloof? Do the majority of people really know the law according to which they live? Every individual member of the masses knows it only for his own limited sphere, and when he uses it he does so by applying it in its traditional forms, but without possessing the degree of understanding we must insist on to justify using the term "persuasion." While the masses may understand the essence and purpose of private law, which touches upon their most immediate interest, do they not lack any kind of judgment in public affairs of which it is so hard to obtain a general view? Indeed, the expression "belief in law" says more than may be said of the individuals who make up the masses. The general belief in law does not come about in such a way that all individuals in the multitude become fully persuaded; it comes about, as does every social decision in general: by the leaders walking in front and the masses following. After all, even in legal matters one must not expect more of the masses than what corresponds to their nature; that is, in legal matters, too, it is incumbent upon the masses only to confirm through appropriate following the policy of the leaders. The social finding of law requires the leadership by those sensing and shaping the law and fighting for it. When in legal matters we see the masses actively imitating the behavior of the leaders, they contribute their due share to the formation of the belief in law. They will prove their active involvement in ruling law by the degree of resistance they offer when they are expected to live according to a different law which is repugnant to their sentiments. Where, however, we see the masses accept with dull indifference the decisions announced by those who just happen to dominate the rostrum of public life, to speak of social belief in law would be out of the question. The masses will thus not champion a body of law which has so originated, and such law will therefore not pass the decisive test.

7. The Importance of Legal Form

As an internal power law is also in need of the corresponding external form since it is called upon to regulate the external behavior of human beings. To a certain extent it is in need of coercive power, because otherwise one could not cope with the opposing minority. But even in the ideal case of general and complete obedience to law, where no external coercion is required at all, complete legal power demands the legal form. Even the mind willing to comply with the law still needs the trained judge who applies the general legal rule to the particular case which may be in doubt. The judge, in turn, in order to protect his

decision against the charge of arbitrariness, needs the statute which spells out the general rule of law. The modern school of free adjudication, which would give the judge full power to use discretion in accordance with the nature of the case, presupposes judges of the stature of the great Roman jurists who had in them the spirit of the lawgiver. Judges, being on average what they are must be placed on the firm foundation of the law.

The lawgiver's task is among the most significant and most difficult leadership tasks in society. Social judgment has always placed the great lawmaker in the forefront of leaders. His importance is not diminished by the fact that the legal norms which he has to formulate must be prepared by the nature and life of the people, for in any other field as well the great leader is always prepared by the spirit of the people. The special task of the lawgiver to derive firm rules from the worldly wisdom accumulated through experience requires a penetrating knowledge of life, which must be paired with the highest acumen and the most finely attuned sense of justice, as reflected in an artistic linguistic instinct. Nor is the importance of the lawgiver reduced by the fact that he needs jurisprudence as an aid. Only by the scope and significance which jurisprudence has won with all strong peoples can we fully appreciate the significance of the legal form. The latter finds its outward expression in the solemnity surrounding the announcement of the law as well as the functioning of the court.

As does the scholarly jurist, the lawgiver and the judge also like to cultivate the legal form for its own sake. The reception of Roman civil law provided by the jurists during the epoch of Humanism and the Renaissance demonstrates the attraction exerted at that time on the juridic spirit by the legal form. Taking part in the reception of English constitutional law during the period of the revolutions were not only the yearnings of the masses for freedom but also the sense for good form of the jurists. In both cases the result was a well-formed body of law which nevertheless could not help being perceived as artificial because it lacked an organic connection with the natural soil of the law, the creative sense of justice of the people. Such artificial law is still only halfway law and will mature into full law only after its form has been adapted to the content which the native sense of justice demands. One must have learned from the pattern of the foreign law how to pour one's own legal aspirations into the mould suitable for their contents.

Just as the legal profession when it is in rapid movement undertakes too much as a leader, there are other times when it stands still and becomes derelict in its duty to point the way in legal matters. These are the times of rigid, arid juridic law when jurisprudence and jurisdiction stick by the letter and wither. A strong people will then seek to create its legal configurations in the informal way which was once peculiar to the common law.

Mastery of legal form yields its greatest advantage by guaranteeing untroubled evolution of the law, permitting in wise foresight to transfer old law into new before it has turned from good sense to nonsense, from blessing to curse.

Even a quite healthy people only after having fully matured attains the happy blend of legal justice and legal form, and thereby full internal power of law, while its adolescence and decline are filled with fights for external power. Even to a mature people it may happen once in a while that, the peaceful sequence of bodies of law is interrupted by the conflict of tormenting forces, but internal peace is likely to be restored relatively quickly and the wounds of battle will justly heal.

8. Legal Form and Rule by Force

The road to the power of law historically has led to a large extent through the power of coercion. The despot will always feel the urge to be legitimated and exalted. After having knocked the lawful king off the throne, he wants to take the latter's seat and be adorned by his crown. He does not want to content himself with the rule by force which he commands but he wants to have behind him the whole formal legal apparatus, otherwise he doesn't believe to possess complete dominion over the minds. Therefore he neglects no detail of legal form. He has himself proclaimed by law as ruler, he installs judges and orders them to punish those who refuse to acknowledge him as a ruler. But does he thereby really acquire the power over the hearts which his lawful predecessor held? By no means. His law doesn't oblige the conscience of his subjects, and the sentences of his judges are viewed by the people as unjust coercion. The outward legal form used by him is nothing but continued rule by force; following the armed war against the hostile army, he now conducts the war with chains and gallows against the various adversaries who no longer dare to do battle in the field. He apprehends them when they refuse to render to him in public the homage he demands, and he pursues them into their very homes if he suspects that there they will conspire against him. The law proclaimed by him is no legal precept but merely a coercive measure; the judge appointed by him is not a judge but a readjuster. Just as the dragoons of Louis XIV could not convert the pious hearts of the Huguenots, no more can coercion by the usurper stifle the feeling of loyalty toward the legitimate king.

The despots of modern times are as avidly after the legal form as were those of past centuries and millenia. In the new states, which after the World War were established on the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, rule by force is unhesitatingly passed off for legal form, and everybody is a traitor who struggles against the new despotism. There no ethnic minority, however large, may claim for itself the original national right of self-determination which had been so solemnly proclaimed by the victors themselves. Is the dictate breaking this original right to be able to create law? The dictator, of course, needs this very legal support so urgently that he cannot escape the self-deception to the effect that he be able to transform force into law merely by calling it law. Was perhaps William the Norman also recognized by the Saxons in their hearts as the legitimate king because he defeated and slayed the Saxon king Harold on the bloody field of Hastings? One royal successor after the other had to act as a despot until finally the Normans and the Saxons had formed a sisterly union of English people and along with their common language became linked by a common sense

of justice. True power of law is an internal power, it is a following from the heart which no longer requires coercion or else only against a minority of lawless minds. True power of law is active power, and the king acknowledged as legitimate finds willing souls to do his bidding. But for the despot no hand will bestir itself unless forced to, and when his rule of force has ended he is a helpless beggar pursued by hate.

Of the historically established tyrannies only those acquired the full power of law which changed so drastically that they won, through the blessings of civilization and culture the minds of the masses which at first they dominated by the terror of arms. On the long road to be traveled until the forced following of the masses was transformed into a following giving spontaneous legal recognition, the minds of the masses had to live through a variegated series of transitional sentiments until the rule by force came to be mentally accepted entirely as rule by law. The modern mind, which takes the state of freedom for granted, is no longer quite able to imagine these public sentiments, because to that mind it appears as impossible that a state of slavery was not always perceived as unbearable coercion. But should this really have been the case through all the millenia when a large, and often the major, portion of the population lived by the laws of slavery? The lords to whom the slaves had been awarded as property have through these long epochs regarded their lordly privileges as affording complete control, not any different from property right in material goods which they owned. As to the unfree, we must assume that they, too, had to become resigned to their lot — which as rule they had no prospect whatever to change — to a degree that they still could get some enjoyment out of life. For the milder cases of bondage, as it was borne by the rural vassals, this was certainly true. Ordinarily, unless the rough arm of the lord or his representative just happened to interfere, the peasant could enjoy his physical vigor, attributable to the work he did, and in the main also the fruits of his labor almost as much as the freeman of those times who by the prevailing circumstances was as a matter of fact almost as firmly tied to the soil as was the bonded servant as a matter of law. But the masses of the unfree, too, who were under a harsher regime still had to resign themselves to their fate, if only in dull submission. The members of such tribes whose instincts did not contain the yearning for freedom perhaps felt better off in their dependence on a lord who provided for them to a certain degree than they would have felt if left to their own resources. Did not all those sentiments include a certain recognition of the rights of the lord? We must assume this to have been true at least during those long periods when the minds of the affairs, without acts of resistance except for a few isolated personal eruptions. Where, however, slave uprisings broke out or peasant revolts of the English or French kind in the 14th century or of the German kind of peasant wars, we surely have clear proof that the sense of justice of the oppressed did not yield, and we must assume that its resistance could not be broken even when the uprising was put down with cruel force. In the end, the mind of the European peoples still considered all forms of bondage, even its milder variants, as incompatible with their disposition and did away with them.

The sentiments of today's proletariat, legally free but to a large extent weighted down by dire poverty, are closely attuned to the sentiments of the unfree of times past. They are also approached by the sentiments of ethnic minorities who feel short-changed in their claims to self-determination. These minorities had put up with the lack of self-determination as long as they were not sufficiently advanced to create their own cultural values, but once they have caught up in this respect, they perceive the absence of self-determination as nearly unbearable coercion. Most painfully suffering under foreign sovereignty are those peoples which earlier had enjoyed national freedom and a culture of their own, but in the wake of fatal wars have lost their independence. The democratic movement of the 19th century imparted new strengths to, and revived the demands from, a fair number of such peoples who along with their political independence also appeared to have already lost completely their cultural independence.

Time and again new developing law is added to the old familiar law. At first it presents itself as an external custom, without being pervaded as yet by the sentiment of an inner imperative, characteristic of law. Perhaps the zeal to follow is very active here, but it has not hardened yet into firm duty. The combative, adventuresome young people who under the command of a famous leader embark upon an expedition into foreign lands are willing to submit to the harsh discipline which he maintains, leading more by his spirit-stirring will and his mighty arm than by carefully weighed directives. The instructions given to his followers and obeyed by his eager people are emerging martial law. Out of such directions, after they have been selected and confirmed by success, have emerged the laws of war which received recognition in the European armies. If the expedition leads to the establishment of states and the laws of war are surrounded by and supplemented with laws of peace, this body of law receives the consecration of people's law or full law. If, on the other hand, the expedition does not proceed beyond the dimensions of a raid, its law becomes the law of a small group of individuals who like robbers live outside the universal law. Robber law can never become genuine law, though within its sphere it may hold its own through fear and terror or may to the mind of a Karl Moor even appear as pure law. Not only is it unlikely that in a group of lawless persons healthy moral drives will be found that are necessary in order to elevate the companionable spirit to a persevering sense of duty for the group, but robber law necessarily places itself at variance with the entire legal system of a people. It can therefore not be true law, for true law must be internally consistent as part of a general system which combines all the individual rules into a coherent whole.

9- About the Art and the Development of the Formation of Law

The first legal forms were rigid-typical and may be compared with the rigid-typical configurations of the earliest art. Only little by little does the lawgiver learn how to express the diverse legal configurations of life. In this regard the Roman legislator was preceded by the Roman judge who was especially qualified for the task of moulding the law because he was at the same time the scientifically trained authority on the law.

Even with peoples of very rich legal talent the art of shaping the legal forms for the most part lags behind the development of the content of law. Like any other art, this one, too, takes its due time, of course. To the powerful in the country what matters, above all, is to obtain the sanction of legal form for their personal power, and therefore they at first formulate a body of law for themselves only, alongside which the law of the populace grows wild, so to speak. For all that, the powerful in the country know quite well, however, that they must couple with their own formal law a far-reaching tolerance for the uncontrolled growth of the law of the populace.

In the historic beginnings the law was tailored quite one-sidedly to the person of the ruler, but all the same surrounded by the exuberant growth of the actual powers to whom the ruler had to give full scope. In the beautiful book by Erman-Ranke about Egypt this state of affairs has been most aptly portrayed in the chapter which describes the king and his court. We wish to quote the pertinent passage verbatim. It reads as follows

The idea of the state, which through the legacy of the Greeks and the Romans has become second nature with us, was as foreign to the peoples of the Old Orient as it still is today for most Orientals. In the Orient the notion prevailed, and often still prevails today, that the entire state machinery works for the ruler's sake only; that taxes are paid to fill his treasure-house; that war is waged for his glory; and that for his honor the big monuments are built. All the land and all goods are his property, and even when he lets others have a share in it, this is, strictly speaking, only in the nature of a loan which he can call at any time. The subjects, too, are his property, and he can do with their lives as he pleases.

Of course, this is only the official view. In reality, here, too, things look quite different, and the king, seemingly governing everything like a god, mostly has only little independence. Next to him are, of course, the old counselors who already served his father and who are used to being obeyed absolutely by the army of scribes and clerks, and also next to him stand the generals with their blindly obedient soldiers and the priests with their untrammelled power over the lower classes. Settled in the various states, however, are very affluent noble families who stand closer to the population of their native place than does the ruler living in the remote capital. With none of these mighty ones must the king fall out. He must spare the sensibility of the ministers, must open up innocuous channels for the ambition of the generals, must guard closely against his functionaries approaching the nobility too closely, and above all must get along well with the clergy. Only if he can measure up to all these demands, while knowing at the same time how to balance off each of these factors against one another, does he have a chance for a long and blessed government.

What has been said here for Old Egypt is true for every time and every nation where the effective powers of law have not yet been fully articulated in legal form. In this sense we must correctly interpret the much quoted phrase, "and the king is absolute if he does as we wish," which has been attributed to the absolute if he does as we wish," which has been attributed to the conservative Junker class. It is not merely the witticism for which the words are usually taken, but the accurate expression of an apt observation. The Junker admits that the royal law is the only formal law and shall remain so. He does not demand the explicit recognition of the rights that go with his class alongside the absolute rights of the king which he himself wishes to uphold in all their strength in order to take refuge behind them against the subjects. He is content to obtain the factual toleration of the exercise of his power interests, and this the king on his part is glad to yield because he in turn needs the following of the Junkers, being too weak alone to prevail against the whole body of the populace.

10. About the Formation of Modern Constitutional Law in—Particular

Modern Constitutional law has the peculiarity that its forms very often do not try to give an immediate replica of life, but are determined by the ideas one forms of public life. This statement also applies to the economic aspects of constitutional law, whose orientation is almost more closely determined by the ideas about individualism and socialism than by the actual success of these ideas. Private life is more narrowly circumscribed and more predictable, and its configurations lend themselves more readily to being given legal expression. In contrast, the eye of the observer is hardly able to survey public life in its vast expanse and impetuous momentum. Instead of imitating the realities of public life, constitutional law readily adheres to the workable ideas according to which greed for power combined with idealizing thinking wish to see the state structured. Thus the first royal law was a replica of the notion of an ideal monarchy, and the rights of the king were allotted in the way the perfect prince needed them to do his best. Weak successors didn't quite know what to do with the superfluity of their rights, or else — the more frequent case — they abused them in the wantonness of power. So it could happen that the weak prince was dominated either by the creatures of his whims, his favorites and mistresses, or else by the vigorous persons of his environment who served him as indispensable aides. He only had the name and the outward honors of power while those others enjoyed it to the full. Precisely such cases illustrate the significance of legal form. For the all-powerful male or female favorites always had to stay in the background, not being covered by the legal form which was accepted by the people. What happened had to happen in the name of the king, and the masses on the outside didn't quite find out at all in whose head its fates were decided; only the insiders of the court knew this and took advantage of it. Even such energetic and statesmanlike ministers as Richelieu and Mazarin could not step into the limelight. Their power would have ended quickly if they had not limited themselves to assisting in its exercise but had also demanded being outwardly recognized for its possession. In order to overthrow the Merovingians, the Carolingian majordomos had to excel for a long time as

the factual chiefs of the state until they finally could successfully assert their claim to the royal title. Isn't this preponderance of legal form of great significance? It assures the peaceful operation of the law, while actual strength still has the necessary play. To be sure, a kingdom which all too long has lacked a strong representative must in the end crumble away and collapse. The history of the Merovingians presents an example. In a tragic way Louis XVI paid for the mistakes of his predecessors.

Economic liberalism, too, emanated from the idealizing notions which opposition against the tutelage of mercantilistic governments had called forth. One gloried in exaggerating assumptions about the individual being destined for liberty and about the socially beneficial effects of competition. The legal forms instituted by Mercantilism were for the most part perceived as forms of coercion, and their abolition was demanded: in the main the economy should remain free from encroachments by the state. In appropriate places economic liberty has, indeed, yielded great and greatest successes, but there were enough places where it was misplaced, and in these places strong powers of coercion gained the upper hand. Capitalistic power, which was itself enhanced by the growth of large-scale economic structures, could become excessive as soon as the state gave it free play, but the weaker strata of the population were severely oppressed and thrown back inasmuch as they did not find the remedy of self-help. Then came the proletarian thinkers with their idealizing notions of the state in the economy and demanded as legal form an extreme form of economic coercion. What a confusion has thereby been injected into the modern legal system! There was the danger that the power of law would lose its direct relationship to success from which it is said to have originated. Instead of success represented by facts, what was supposed to matter was the success which the idea achieved in the minds of men. Much mischief has thereby already been visited upon the peoples, and worse still seems to loom ahead. Level-headed thinking has been put to a severe test.

The democratic movement of our time in naive faith accepts the democratic form of the constitution as idealizingly as had been the case earlier for its absolutistic form. As the latter presupposed the ideal king, the former takes for granted the ideal populace. One believes to have found in universal suffrage the infallible form of law by which the best from among the people are promoted to leadership. However, the selection of the test is not as simple a matter as it seems. Only in the older historically tried democracies does the maturity of the people meet the necessary prerequisite for good elections, whereas the young democracies are not so far along. We will have more to say about this later.

1. The Communion of Faith

The culture powers enrich life with internal values which are more enchanting for the receptive spirit than the most magnificent external treasures. Their importance, however, doesn't rest merely on the fact that they adorn and crown life, but they also have binding force of the highest order. To be sure, human beings must first be brought together by the firm pressure of force, and they must be educated by public order powers until they become receptive to the binding force of culture powers; but once these have become operative, they turn out to be the superior powers. They can be shared with other people without losing any substance; nay, they are even enhanced by joint possession, and thus peace, rather than conflict, emanates from them. Besides, they are constant in their nature: whereas the universal empires in which the world's great religions originated have long since collapsed, the latter have endured.

Among all great religions, Christianity has proved to be the greatest binding force. It managed what no other one did: through its power to bind and to absolve it rose above secular dominion. The sway of the church provides us with the most impressive example of the power which faith may attain in human minds. The historiographers have long neglected the study of this power, but it deserves at least as much attention as the history of arms power.

The belief in one single god, almighty creator of heaven and earth, unites the souls who devote themselves to him with fervor into an unswerving communion. One god, one church! The devout mind cannot think it any other way, and therefore the Christian church from its very beginning perceived itself as the community of believers, and already in the first confession of its faith labeled itself catholic or general church. To it really applies what the Bolsheviks claim for themselves, namely, that their message went out "to all." As did the apostles and disciples, missionaries today still march out into the world in order to spread the message of salvation. In the times of yearning for faith, as it filled mankind at the end of Antiquity, this message was received wholeheartedly by the majority of people, by the strong minds no less than by the poor ones. The strong minds didn't just pretend to believe, they did believe they led the others to belief. The poor in mind, however raw their belief may have been, didn't merely act like it, but they followed with their soul, which found its comfort in belief. Since the almighty God is also the everlastingly wise and good God, along with faith the love of God is planted into the soul. Since God has created man according to his own image, the love of God also demands charity, which is the highest ethical law, containing all the other precepts. The community of the believers is therefore not just that, but at the same time it is an ethical community of life.

The connection with life on earth had certainly less importance for the beginnings of Christianity because, like Buddhism, it sought comfort in renunciation of this world. But more and more the church adapted itself to the vitality of the fresh

peoples of the Occident by showing how to unite the notion of this world with that of the hereafter. The Roman church also became the leader of the faithful in the world of the here and now, and particularly it became the leader of a spiritual culture. As later the Protestant visionaries in their iconoclastic urge cleaned the churches, so the Oriental church, in a still farther-reaching sweep, had attempted to purify the world of the slags of antique culture, and the Roman church in this respect followed it to some extent; splendid treasures of antique culture were destroyed at that time. But as soon as the church had given to life in this world its due, it became the creator of new learning. Coping with the mysterious metaphysical problem which afflicted the mind of the believer served to sharpen scholastic thought whose ponderousness was compensated by its honesty and science. It was not arrogance when theology called itself the mistress of the serving sciences; it truly acted as a guidepost for them. The religious feeling found its triumphant expression in great art. In the venerable dark of the vaulted church religious art symbolized the devotion of faith. In the towering height of the churches this art symbolized the god-seeking zeal of faith. The hundreds of cathedrals reaching heavenwards, as found in town after town, are testimony to the ever-present energy of faith, and the transfiguring pictures with which they are adorned testify to its profusion. If it were permissible to measure the strength of life awareness of an epoch by its artistic creations, the present would appear to us as poor in vital consciousness as compared to the era of the predominance of the church.

If one adds what the church has done for economic development as an administrator in matters of education, law nursing, and in still other ways, one obtains the impression of a comprehensive culture power such as there never was before and hasn't been since. The church wanted to be leader for everybody and for everything as well. No external power, whatever weapons it may have had at its disposal, could be a match for the internal power of the church, even abstracting from the wealth accumulating under its control. Vis-h-vis the universal power of the church, every external power could make itself felt only as a partial power. While every prince gave commands only within his territory, for the ecclesiastical power state borders were nonexistent. Rule by arms changed in incessant battles and provided insufficient protection against the dangers threatening life and property from every side. What the state was unable to give, the church did: by pointing to the poetical justice in the life to come, it opened up the prospect for the definitive victory of the good, and it gave to the faithful, notwithstanding all the evils surrounding him, a feeling of self-assurance in life, with the unshakable goal of eternal bliss for the pious.

The hierarchy of church leadership provided the firm scaffolding for the public order on earth. For joint practice and teaching as demanded by the common faith, every village was provided with a church and a pastor. The parsons were united under the bishops, and the bishops under the pope, and thus an incomparable world organization was created which eclipsed every political organization. Therefore the church was eventually, though not without a hard struggle, to assert itself as the dominant power of the time. It outgrew the states, it demarcated

the boundaries between its power and that of the state, and it was so strong that even within the political sphere it managed to preserve its interests in the most emphatic manner.

After the power of the Roman church through a millenium had been renewed time and again — notwithstanding the worst external and internal disruptions afflicting it now and then — it was finally curtailed through the gradual development of the entity of the state. The state monopolized large functional areas after it had managed to establish internal order and the independent education of laymen, having sprung up alongside church education, provided it with secular functionaries in lieu of spiritual counselors. In addition to its losses to state administration, the church also had to abandon to social self-government large functional areas previously entrusted to its care. This giving of ground in state and society is closely related to the religious split caused by the Reformation. Since then the communion of believers has been torn asunder, and none of the separate communities of the faithful could have the aura previously possessed by the communion of all believers. Adding them all up yielded arithmetically the same number of members, but the influence resulting from the sum of the parts was far less than had previously been the influence of the undivided whole. The Catholic church had been superior to the states, but now the state had an edge on the churches existing within its territory. The state made the best of its superiority by laying claim to determining the creed of its subjects. Religion became a political matter: political wisdom was not inclined to tolerate an alien power within its boundaries. Through the command, "cuius regio eius religio," the sovereign managed to augment his secular sovereignty over the subjects by the religious sovereignty over the believers. The Protestant chief of state had a particularly favorable position as head of the national church, but the Catholic chief as well couldn't help feeling stronger when he permitted the Catholic church to operate as state church, which in return assisted him with its power.

Only after a protracted development was political freedom crowned with religious freedom. In a number of countries the state church maintained its preferred position vis-a-vis other religious societies, but in purely democratic countries religion was proclaimed to be a private matter.

Overfatigue at the end of the long-drawn-out religious wars contributed in no small degree to the victory of tolerance, but contributory in still larger degree was the doubt which was fomented by the development of modern science. Whereas the upsurge of the state deprived the church only of areas which lay beyond faith, and whereas the schism won over to Protestantism the peoples and nations which the Catholic church lost, religious doubt in the very area of faith has estranged millions of souls from all churches, the new Protestant ones as well as the old Catholic one. Modern science through observation of nature learned to master its proven empirical method, ridding itself of the scholastic way which had become barren. After the humanities had also come to orient themselves by the modern spirit, scientific perception ceased serving theology. The maid gave notice to the mistress of termination of obedience, nay, it threw down the gauntlet to her. With a clear eye the scientific spirit revealed the childish superstition which was hidden away in

faith, and, confronted with penetrating scientific judgment, the notion of miracle — "faith's dearest child" — vanished. Although the modern thinkers at first only aimed at the purification of faith, a much farther-reaching effect took place unintentionally. Scientific understanding and faith make demands on human nature which in the highest sense can be met simultaneously only by individuals of the most rugged mental constitution. He who is habituated to the bright light of reasoning very quickly loses the capacity to see still in the mystic darkness of faith. In addition, with the coarser mass of humanity the yearning for faith is weakened by the lively interest devoted to material values in the face of phenomenal economic development. Thus faith has ceased being the predominant power over the minds of men. To a large extent the class-conscious proletariat has been lost to the churches. The faith-keeping peasantry clings more to their forms than their teachings. While within the educated class the number of the faithful is still somewhat larger in Protestant countries, there are only a few in the Catholic church who know how to reconcile knowledge and faith.

Nevertheless, the social power of the Christian churches even today must not be assessed too lightly. The statistical number of those who profess their religions in all civilized countries is still almost tantamount to the sum of the population. To be sure, this number, like many others derived from the field of statistics, must not be taken at its face value. The statistician in this case, as in others, has to depend upon some external, tangible characteristic as found in official church membership; he is unable to find out something about the internal experience of faith. All the same it must be admitted that even the fact of external religious profession has its inner meaning. As long as individuals, though having turned indifferent in the matter of faith, are nevertheless unable to decide to discontinue church membership, they thereby make known that belonging to the church still is of value to them. One will not go wrong in assuming that it is not only the value of a convention which keeps them within the ranks of the church but also a residue of conviction. They can no longer really believe, but perhaps without confessing it to themselves, they would still like to believe, if only they could, and as long as they harbor such a feeling they find it impossible to proceed to a formal declaration of unbelief, which is a leap into vacant space. Those who no longer believe, however large their number, do not have anything which could unite them mutually and which they could pit against the church organization. Against this, Christianity has the testimony of nearly two millenia on its side, and even today has so many convicted adherents that only the most determined mind can ignore this weighty fact.

For people who simply confine themselves to the state there is almost nothing left for heart and imagination. Whenever human hearts are stirred up most deeply, as with birth, marriage, and death, a spiritual speaker is usually heard, and when a state representative speaks, his dry manner misses the solemn mood of the occasion. Truly, the organization of faith power of all existing organizations is the one best versed in human insight. Even in its most simple manifestations, the effect still exerted on the minds of the masses by the institution of the church — the Catholic church with its chapels, offices, hierarchies, ceremonies, pomp, and grandeur — is fascinating. Even in

countries where doubt has settled in most deeply, the power exerted by faith not only on the believers but also on the half-believers (but still used to believing or wanting to believe), the superstitious, and even quite a few doubters is impressive. Even now faith binds large groups of persons together in communities which exert power on the conscience of their members. There are people with very strong religious needs who separate themselves from the churches and seek god for themselves, but the number of these independent spirits can only be small.

When the state declares religion to be a private matter, this can only mean that it withdraws from religion the special protection granted to it before, but this cannot diminish the hold which religion has on the hearts. This dominion is still evident everywhere. Nowhere so far has religion become a private matter in the sense that it be a purely personal matter of individuals, not further noticeable in public affairs. Therefore, even such a state, having conceded religious freedom and equality, will give much more recognition to the religious sphere than to the purely private sphere of individuals. Everywhere today religion is a public power by virtue of the multitude of people which it keeps under its spell as well as the authoritative air by which it exerts this spell; even the most powerful state would think twice before disparaging it. Just as even after its loss of power in secular matters the papacy is considered by state authorities as equal and inviolable under international law, so every church building and even more the whole church paraphernalia are looked upon by the public, inasmuch as it is still capable of reverence, as untouchable and supra-personal.

2. The Power of Knowledge

The lofty goal scientific thinking strove after was a firmly grounded Weltanschauung which was supposed to replace the unprovable Weltanschauung of faith. One soon had the opportunity to recognize, however, that it was in no way possible to convert the great masses to a scientific Weltanschauung, which was bound to exceed their mental capacity. To be sure to have the populace on one's side, one had to let it have its church. At this point, the one communion of the faithful which had existed hitherto was renounced into the two camps of the believers and of the knowledgeable. In the long run it became apparent, however, that the dominion of the new Weltanschauung couldn't be rejoiced in even by the camp of the knowledgeable. The announcement of the end of the world, as taught by natural science, frightened the timid souls, while the turn to materialism, which seemed to gain the upper hand, repelled the sensitive. Only a few minds were staunch enough to heed Spinoza's high-minded direction of renouncing the demands of the heart and letting it go at cognition as such. But the very urge for knowledge was eventually struck in its core when one had to bend to the view "that we cannot really know anything." Stern criticism definitely put the human mind in its place, following the final conclusion of scientific wisdom, "Ignoramus, ignorabimus." The human mind, so one modestly had to admit, is not capable of penetrating the essence of phenomena, and it never will be. When confronted with the ultimate issues agitating the heart, the power of the mind comes to nothing. Even with extreme exertion it remains as unable to

illuminate these issues as the strongest source of light generated by human effort is unable to penetrate the darkness of the universe. Though enriched by thousands upon thousands of insights, which not only yield immeasurable benefits but also elevate the mind and in aesthetic terms provide purest enjoyment, mankind has still become impoverished by science inasmuch as it has lost a sense for the faith-supported meaning of life, which remained scientifically inaccessible.

Having failed to reach its ultimate goals, science has nevertheless become a power factor of the first order. Science has created the modern type of education, knowledge education, which has become one of the pervasive social powers, bearing out the saying that knowledge is power. At the present time scientific technique revolutionizes the state and society. Knowledge education is nowadays the most important weapon in the life struggle, more important than property, though the latter has the one advantage of providing the less gifted with the means to acquire an education and, for that matter, to stand his ground without a particular education. However, in the end property will rise even in the absence of property and will eventually acquire property. The customary division of society into a propertied and a propertyless class was done by choosing the designations — as language likes to do — according to striking external characteristics. Given its full designation, the propertied class should at the same time be called educated, and the propertyless class should be designated as uneducated. Numerous men always belong to the propertied class — and these represent the strongest in their class — who have risen from dire poverty exclusively by the force of their mind and who come to earn high incomes and even accumulate large assets. The middle classes owe their advancement to the fact that they have become the principal representatives of knowledge education. Because knowledge is power, the middle-class revolution was victorious and liberalism has had its heyday. For the proletariat, too, knowledge became power, however restricted the scope of learning to which it gained access. The proletariat would never have gained its present share of social power if it had not been directed by leaders from the educated class and acquired at least an elementary education. Without mandatory grade school the proletariat would not have acquired its press and could not have organized itself.

The structure of knowledge power is distinguished from that of faith power in essential respects. The communion of faith must be a great deal more intimate than the community of the educated, for faith is simple but knowledge has many dimensions. At the same time the simple content of faith remains so much in the dark that the god-seeking believers require a broad consensus lest they be diverted by doubts, whereas knowledge, unless it cares to address itself to ultimate issues, can grow to be fully secure. The knowledgeable person will refute the ignorant and the erring by the strength of his evidence. For the believer, the existence of the heterodox or of the unbeliever is a source of annoyance, filling him with hate and inducing him to fight. Faith incorporates an indomitable yearning for unity, while knowledge is built up from many points of departure — jllizing experience and reflection — through slow growth and tenal expansion. Only subsequently does the desire make itself

felt to bring organizational unity into the multifarious knowledge. The constitution of faith from the beginning demands centralization, but the realm of knowledge is set up as a republic of scholars, an unfettered union of independent minds.

In the realm of knowledge, should the greatest minds not also wield the greatest power? A quick review tells us that they do not, or at least not in the sense that they exert direct control over the masses. The general, comprehensive ideas which the greatest minds, leading the way, conceive are of such an abstract nature that they cannot be directly absorbed by the masses. There is a need for intermediary minds who provide the connections by usefully applying the general ideas to the particular domains of knowledge. All truly path-breaking ideas require a number of intermediaries and a prolonged education until the masses have been made ready to follow suit. Especially where knowledge is applied to activities where it has to be combined with external resources, the scientific teacher is being eclipsed in the eyes of the masses by those leaders who have to bring his work to final full fruition. Aristotle could be Alexander's teacher, but he couldn't himself be Alexander, and Aristotle's teachings had their most widespread currency only after the Greek era was long past and the Roman church educated the minds in its schools according to his basic ideas. Kant and Darwin have strongly influenced human thinking, but the multitude does not know these men, it only knows their latest disciples. Even Rousseau and Marx, who were concerned about the rights of the masses, attained influence on the masses only through their active successors. Rousseau did not live to see the triumph of democracy, nor Marx that of the proletariat. Only Robespierre, through the formula of popular sovereignty, held sway over France, as today mediocre proletarian demagogues influence the masses by using the great expressions which Marx had formulated. Volta and Ampere are the ancestors of the electricity industry. Today their names are used by every electrician, but they themselves benefitted in no way from the returns and the social power which were the fruits of their ideas. They had to content themselves with disseminating these ideas among the physicists of their time. Production techniques first had to be refined through further technological progress and practical experience to enable the practical application of their ideas. Also, the capital funds needed for plant and equipment expenditures had to be raised first, and the organizing entrepreneurs had first to obtain their training and get started on their careers. The crucial gain and the most extensive command over the masses is reaped by him who is in the advantageous position of bringing to practical perfection what others, and greater minds, had prepared intellectually.

Knowledge never completely and deeply penetrates the masses, and therefore the power which follows in its wake does not penetrate all the way either. The time and the cost of acquiring an education are more than the masses can afford; only the most strongly talented overcome these obstacles. The multitude must be satisfied with elementary education and the power to resist implicit in it. So long as the masses live in economic circumstances which absorb their strength in working for their daily bread, the splitting of society into the two classes of the educated and the uneducated will be the necessary consequence. In addition, one must reckon with the selfishness of the educated

class which derives its advantage in economic and social power from the fact that it retains its monopoly on education. Granted that knowledge does not lose intellectual content by being communicated to others, the approval it meets with tends to secure it more firmly. Though it is given to people to take pleasure in teaching others, the urge of the knowledgeable to teach is still considerably weaker than the urge of the believer to convert, and the former is readily inhibited by the egotistical reflection that by diffusing knowledge one forgoes a power advantage. In the circles of the haves it is often deplored that the lowest strata of the population were not left in their traditional state of ignorance, and one hears it said that knowledge only leads the masses astray, turning them into a danger to society. The true reason, not openly admitted, for the lament is that one expects to be better able to cope with the lesser power to resist on the part of the uneducated masses. To a certain extent, haughtiness joins the power of knowledge: One is proud of his superior education and craves the continued enjoyment of this sentiment. Not a small part of the demands concerning education is explained by this. The European knows quite well concerning the Chinese educational set-up that it was intended to constitute a rampart in order to keep the masses away. In all honesty the European must admit that his own educational institutions are not devoid of the same desire. The common man can easily sense the egotism and the arrogance inducing the educated to place himself above him, and he responds with a defiant hate which on his part in turn tends to widen the already existing hiatus between the two classes. Shakespeare, a supreme judge of human nature, also observed this trait and brought it out. The scene in "Henry VI" where the revolting mob led by John Cade slays the teacher because he can teach, and slays Lord Say because he even knows Latin, is a true-to-life portrayal.

Knowledge power — let us clearly realize this — is not underpinned by ethics in the same way as is faith power. Whereas the law of faith implies the law of ethics, knowledge per se is amoral, except that qua Weltanschauung it may aspire to the summit of faith. Man does not acquire a higher ethical stature by augmenting his knowledge about nature and himself. The superiority of knowledge which distinguishes the educated person does not make him kinder than he is by nature; if anything it makes him haughty and cool. That a Comenius and a Pestalozzi had it within themselves to teach the children of the populace was not caused by an urge to display knowledge, but by their loving-kindness which inspired them to search for ways in which they would be most effective in bringing to the unlearned the benefits of instruction.

There remains to be mentioned a final characteristic which structurally separates faith power and knowledge power. Whereas organization, knowledge power breaks up into the multitude of its disciplines. Each of the two classes, the educated as well as the uneducated, is held together by its characteristic class spirit, but without being organized into a firm association with a finely graded leadership hierarchy as is true for the churches. It is anonymous powers which cement the classes inter-ahy. While the proletarians at least managed to set up a comprehensive political organization and workers in the trades an

economic bargaining association, the educated class everywhere lacks political concentration.

3- The Social Work of Art

The statement, "art is power," cannot be compared with the statement, "knowledge is power," as an equivalent. Whereas the historic eras of arms power and faith power were followed by an age of knowledge power, it is not possible to speak of a historic epoch of art power. Even during the great epochs of art Phidias and Praxiteles, Raffael and Michelangelo, Shakespeare and Cervantes, Bach, Beethoven, and Mozart did not rule over the peoples, however mightily they influenced their souls, nor is art the determining factor for the superiority of the educated classes. Knowledge, by increasing man's understanding, augments human command over nature and — though not to a very high degree — over himself as well. The same is not true for art, for it does not expand the scope of man's dominion. No lesser man than Goethe declared that "the Muse knows how to accompany, but it doesn't know how to direct." This puts most aptly what can be said about the social achievement of art. It accompanies life by emphasizing its emotional values to the extent that they are accessible to the power of imagination. The benefit it brings to us consists in making these values entirely our own and by its enrapturing breath enhancing our receptivity for them. All art is renaissance, is rebirth of life, is intensified unfolding of life forms from the soul, which becomes aware of itself and of the world of phenomena. Art power is derived from the welfare powers which it reproduces in an escorting fashion, but because art unfolds them on a higher plane, its own power radiates beyond them and warms the most central part of the soul. For the poet to whom a god gave the gift to express his own suffering pain turns into elation: "Happiness and unhappiness become a melody."

Imagination captures the emotional values of life by following up the life forms which surround us in nature or which have been created by human beings themselves. Art does not merely reproduce the beautiful, it does not confine itself to the pleasing or even only the accommodating. Rather it strives to capture everything oriented to feelings which can be governed by the power of imagination, from the sacred and sublime through the dramatic to the tragically touching and even to the horrible, if only it portrays humans as nature compels them to act, placed into an overpowering surrounding world with all its malice, baseness, stupidity, and foolishness pressing in on them.

Every era sees in the human being different life forms and, through the medium of human feelings, sees different ones also in nature because every era accomplishes different social tasks and evokes different feelings. The development of art is the echo of the progress of history. At the time of great accumulations of the power and fights for power, (power) art was reflected in the massive structures of the pyramids and the other majestic royal buildings. In poetry, (power) art manifested itself in heroic epical poems. In the era of faith religious art grew up with its temples, mosques, and domes, with its god figures, madonnas, Jesus child figures, and its sacred transfigurations. The comfortable middle class in the Netherlands took pleasure in an art of coarse intimacy. In "Werther's Suffering" and in "Wilhelm

Meister" Goethe reduced to writing moods which he shared with his time. The Age of Revolution, during which in the wake of the impetuous urge for liberty the historic powers of the state disintegrated, subsequently in the guise of the taunting accusations of an Ibsen, Strindberg, and their followers turned against the conventional emotional values of society in order to renew its conventional types from the depths of the soul. However, in the process it was all too often content to turn rigid behavior patterns into vulgar exuberance. Today's art researcher knows that in writing art history he must include contemporary history and ethnic history.

We are thereby excused from the duty to discuss in detail the relationships between art and social achievements, though the art of music deserves to be gone into separately. We must not omit this if only it is the only modern art which matches in magnificence of attainment the arts of Antiquity and of the Renaissance. In addition, however, we must clarify the special relationship between it and the life forms. Music also takes as its point of departure certain life forms, but its work has the special feature of giving expression to the enjoyment of life the more perfectly, the more it rises above the individual forms of life. Music takes over the rhythmical nature of the step and the dance, or the hunting or battle calls, as well as the jubilating or painful outburst which joy and suffering involuntarily wrest from the human breast. All this elevates it to the level of art, as it does the sounds of nature reflected in the movement in the forest and the magic of fire. It reaches its peak only when it surmounts the individual life forms and gives its most profound expression to feeling. As Schiller said in his well known verse, "But the soul only utters Polyhymnia." That music was the last of the arts to reach adulthood is explained by the fact that it is the most spiritual of all arts. All our internal forces are released and can grow only when the external ones have performed their historic task so that the most profound parts of our being are no longer burdened with the external pressures of life which inhibited them before. Just as Goethe's "Werther" could fully give himself up to the painful enjoyment of his sensitiveness because combat was no longer the daily chore of the man, so the time for full enjoyment of great music only came when people had reached a stage where they could afford to listen undisturbed to the profound utterances of their soul. Because the religious sentiment was the first to struggle through, great music began with religious music. The less hampered the souls became, the richer the musical expression.

The artist, although he does not direct life but only accompanies it, will nevertheless walk in the very front ranks with the leaders if he is a great artist. How often he is the herald of new movements in life, his renown winning adherents to them! Perhaps before the philosopher, the poet is in touch with the new sentiments of the masses, and among the philosophers those will lead who are kindred souls to the poet with respect to excitability of feeling and power of imagination. But the poet or the artist could never be effective at all if he proceeded all by himself; he has to have on his side the leading thinkers and Practitioners. The latter may well be able to do their work without him and actually have often done so. In these cases art proclaimed its glory subsequently and saw its task in keeping alive its power of imagination for events of the past. New tasks

always can be set for art only through new life works, which develop in new life forms. Were human beings not given a growth potential in life, art along with life would come to a standstill.

Art by its ability to enhance human feeling — which is essential for art — is more closely related to faith than is science with its cool detachment and orientation to order. High-level art immerses itself into its subject with a fervor approaching that of the believer. Scientific criticism, which kills faith, does not touch art, and therefore one often hears it said that for modern man art replaces faith. Does art not spiritually remove him completely from, and reconcile him with the world, as faith does for the faithful? Among the listeners being edified by "Parsifal" many may experience the kind of feeling affecting the pious person praying in church. But is the strength to face life brought home by the theatergoers of the same kind as the one the faithful takes with him from church? The believer is told by his faith that in the world beyond there is a judge who equalizes the injustices of life on earth and that he is above all harm of life if he uses his strength according to the will of the supreme judge. For the rest he knows that he is not alone in his faith but that many go with him and that the community of the church shields him. The deeply religious person takes the feeling of strength conveyed to him by the community of believers as a guarantee of eternal life, and thereby life on this earth also becomes secure because it opens the gate to the hereafter. The bliss of faith is therefore sensed to be real. For example, the stage consecration ceremony in Parsifal can give to the most devoted listener the blissful assurance of faith only on condition that it is for him not a mere play but the artistically exalting expression of reality. In the miracle of the Holy Grail he must experience the miracle of the Holy Communion — he must be a true believer. If it were not so, the high artistic enjoyment to which he devoted himself would be only like a passing beautiful dream, to be followed by the disenchantment of the cruel world of reality. Under the impact of Bach's passions and cantatas, the believer will more intensely identify with his faith, but not even the most sublime art could turn an unbeliever into a believer; at most it could for a short time simulate the felicity of faith. He who identifies art with faith does not know what faith means. Grillparzer has said of religion that it is the poetry of the unpoetical. Conversely, one might say of poetry, as well as of art in general, that it is the religion of the irreligious.

Does art, like faith, perform its task for the people as a whole, or does it perform it, like knowledge, essentially for the educated only? Today many strata of the population are altogether alienated from art, and the educated guard their art treasures with anxious care lest they be destroyed by the barbarous assault from the mob. While the aesthete demands art for art's sake, Tolstoi at an advanced age rejected the art of the educated, allowing only art for the populace. Certainly Tolstoi was wrong for the gruffness with which he disapproved of the art of the educated. The life of the educated demanded, and still demands, as does all life, an accompanying artistic expression, and life was and still is so multifarious as to put artists to many different tasks. With all that it must be admitted, however, that the art of the educated is in danger today of becoming

overrefined, and Tolstoi could point out many manifestations which would like to be taken as art but are not so any more. The overrefined art of the educated can nevertheless find the return to nature — whose mirror it is supposed to be — with the help of the masses are not yet so degraded that they have forfeited any kind of art. Hasn't German poetry renewed itself by the voices of the peoples which Herder collected? It is the merit of the populace to have saved for the future the song which the poet sang in times of healthy vitality of the people, after the deformed mind of the educated hand long lost sight of it. In the soil of the people it kept its roots fresh and, after its time had come again, it was nurtured to new growth. All art, if it is to remain vital, must be deeply rooted in the populace in whose life forms it finds its models.

4. The Crisis of our Culture

In the battle between faith and knowledge an armistice has occurred for the time being. The leaders of the two sides are not involved in the occasional collisions, as exemplified by Tennessee's "monkey trial" in which the relationship between evolutionary and religious doctrine was debated by public prosecutors and attorneys in front of an audience of petty bourgeois and farmers. It was an isolated skirmish fought by irregulars while the big parties are biding their time. The scientist party broke off the battle in a tactical position in which it felt assured of victory. It believed to have shown that all belief remains superstition and that the human mind would have no desire to return to the mystery of faith once it had lifted itself up to the light of scientific reasoning. It was believed that the age of faith to which people had first surrendered had been overcome by the age of knowledge once and for all. Nor did one falter when the attempt failed to support a scientific Weltanschauung with the power of a new faith. In turning away with indifference from all metaphysical concerns, one found satisfaction in the treatment of concrete scientific problems, which after all is not minor work but draws on mental strength of the highest order. The churches on their part lifted the prohibitions by means of which they had tried to restrain scientific work. Not only did they remove the barriers to scientific work but, in order to refute the blame of being uncultured which compromised them vis-a-vis scientifically trained minds, they themselves sought to appropriate the results of scientific progress, and ultimately took the further step of participating in scientific work, in order to be able to interpret its results in a way compatible with faith.

At the time of the great ascent of science it had appeared as if the Christian churches maintained themselves by the sheer might of convention while having completely lost their hold on the minds. At the end, however, it yet appeared to be possible again that they held their ground with respect to a vital innermost point vis-a-vis which scientific reasoning appears to be helpless. Many hearts turn back again to faith with yearning expectation, and the boldest ones among the minds hungry for faith are highly optimistic today that a purified faith will succeed in awakening in people's hearts the affirmation of life remanded by the soul of man and which science cannot provide.

They hope for a complete purification of faith in the sense that it leaves to knowledge its rightful domain and withdraws to the innermost realm which is inaccessible to knowledge and must remain the province of faith. However, since the prophet who by his message of salvation could reconcile faith and knowledge, hasn't come along yet, the battle between faith and knowledge, with losses on both sides, has been suspended for the time being and the throne of spiritual world dominion has remained unoccupied.

The ecclesiastical culture was undivided and its autocracy was not challenged by any alien principle of culture. In real life there were plenty of hostile forces, and the passions too untamed to yield without resistance to the precepts of culture. Nevertheless, the existence of the church and its culture injected a conciliatory attitude into the fierceness of life. As the individual after a life of sin found refuge and atonement in the sanctuary of a monastery, society had the comforting feeling of possessing in the form of the church an institution of salvation with the power of giving absolution to people for everything done wrong. While the scoundrel yielded all the more frivolously to the temptations of passion, the church was still able to strengthen the vacillating and to use its concentrated power in the fight against evil. The contrast between modern culture and church culture fundamentally derives from the fact that this concentrated conciliatory homogeneity has been lost. What modern culture may have gained in freedom, it may have lost in clarity. It is this confusion of culture which we sense to be its present-day crisis.

Science has been least afflicted by this. For it freedom has indeed resulted in wealth, as far as nothing more than its particular work is concerned. By being able to decide about its most appropriate method, it finds all paths open which lead to understanding. Immense are its accomplishments! And it may thereby harbor the expectation that one day all the collected insights may be organized into one unified whole, given that it has shied no effort to organize what today can already be set in order. For the time being it does not yet have to gain clarity about the final destination where all insights are merged. Its time is fully occupied with present tasks, and the rest may be reserved for the future.

Morality is in a sorrier state. It may not refer to the future but must do justice to the present. The ethical law of the Christian peoples, like all great ethical laws so far, had been anchored in faith. Even today the teacher of religion in school and in the pulpit is assigned as an official duty the teaching of ethics. But can ethical doctrine suffice in the long run if it is based on a belief from which such large groups in society have defected? Social ethics must rest on a foundation which is common to all members of society. Science is unable to erect this foundation. Not even the most devoted scientific efforts can implant the ethical impulses because either man has been endowed with them at the outset, or else they are not present at all. The modern ethical movement has set itself the task of detaching the law of ethics from the law of faith and to develop it independently, but so far it has managed to win over only a small group. All things considered, ethical matters today are governed by a convention which originated with ecclesiastical

rules. For the rest ethics is given over to life's unrestrained movements, which in turn are stimulated by the forces acting in modern society and to which the widely differing leaders assign very different goals — a highly confused state of affairs which penal legislation can mitigate only with respect to the most striking dangers and, by the way, with hardly adequate means. Additionally, in the view of sensible and concerned men, the ethical foundations of culture have been severely shaken by the brutal advance of the striving for affluence which, it is said, has been promoted by miraculous economic development and was the real culprit for the catastrophes of the World War and the Revolution. One even hears the assertion that the Western world of Europe and America is hopelessly bogged down in selfishness and that salvation for the world can come only from the unspoiled East.

Art, the faithful companion in life, distinctly reflects the crisis of our culture. If one were permitted to take the achievements of architecture as the expression of the constructive force of mankind, the verdict about the culture of our time would be disgraceful. Its dull mind is incapable of approaching the greatness of ecclesiastical art in which the peoples of the Middle Ages were vying with each other, or of merely reproducing the well-rounded arrangement of the picturesque middle-class sections of the town of earlier times or of the cozy village. But today's poetry, too, lacks the pure, idealistic trait which has characterized the great poetry of all times. Although it must not be overlooked that in present-day poetry a strong and justified urge for truth seeks fulfillment, this urge is strangely commingled with many other urges with repulsive and vacuous overtones. In art, as in life, the aspirations of the time are chaotically at cross purposes. The crisis will only be overcome, health only be restored, when culture has again become a unified whole. Couldn't the cultural world perhaps be on the way to such a goal? In particular, couldn't the confusion of our morality be a sign that the cultural world is about to seek its accommodation to the expanded social relationships of the present time? Questions of this kind we will only try to answer after having given a sufficient account of the historical development.

At this time we want to state only that for every people taken separately there is a point of concentration given by the fact that all its cultural forces are combined into its national culture. Certainly, this alone does not suffice to overcome the general crisis. National culture cannot be the apex of all culture, for this would mean going without the culture of mankind. Moreover, in the national cultures the conflicts between faith and knowledge and the other confusing antagonisms of modern culture are of course far from being resolved. The staying power of national cultures is rooted in the egotism of national consciousness, which becomes pridefully aware of the widespread cultural attainments — something that can be pointed to by every nation to which the various culture powers, much as they may be at odds with one another, subordinate themselves for the common purpose. However little national cultures in their present form may do to provide ultimate gratification of the human striving for culture, it is still necessary for social thought to dwell upon them. They exert profound influence on the ways of power at present time, and it will be necessary therefore to return to in the last part of this book.

A. Individual and Collective Decision-Making in General

1. The Meaning of "the others" in Society

When a gang of boys has played a nasty trick and is called to account for it, as a rule "nobody has done it," everybody shifting the blame to "the others." This is not just a lame excuse, as one usually thinks, but hits the nail on its head. Here is one of the cases for which the statement holds true, or almost holds true, that children speak the truth. Surely each of the boys had a share in the trick, but the individual share is usually quite small compared to that of the rest, and therefore "the others" decide the issue. Only rarely is there a commanding leader who towers as much above the group, however large it may be, that he can fully have his way. Hitler is said to have been such a commanding leader in school, and later he wanted to be so again in German political life, but his strength turned out not to be great enough after all. In national political life the commanding leaders are considerably rarer still than in school, and the German people has had none since Bismarck. In contrast to the commanding leader, the average leader is partly shaped by "the others" as well. We clearly recognize by the example of the gang trick how this happens. The ringleaders, if they are merely ordinary leaders, perhaps would not have hit upon the mean idea in the first place unless they had wanted to assume an air of importance in front of "the others." Nor would they have dared to go through with the plan if they had not perceived the opportunity to send "the others" into the fire. Perhaps at the moment when they made their rash proposal it didn't yet occur to them at all that it could be carried out, for they did not know — what a great many adults don't know either — that an idea is already half the deed once it has been proposed decisively. In case it has been proposed boldly enough, only the few discerning individuals in the audience will be independent enough to call into doubt whether the design can really be carried out. The multitude will keep emerging doubts for themselves and may well best each other in optimistic statements which in the end do no longer permit any backtracking and turn the rashly made proposition into a serious matter. So it may happen that what nobody really wants to do will be done by the whole group because "the others" want it done.

As in the case of the boys' trick, the immediate moral support for every social action is provided by the attractiveness of proceeding jointly, of going together with "others." Not only does the crowd give in to this lure when following the leader, but the leader himself — excepting the truly great leaders of the mind — senses it when he expects the masses to follow him, and the masses in turn sense it not only vis-a-vis the leader whom they follow, but every individual also senses it vis-a-vis the "others," who — his feelings tell him — will follow along with him and expect his co-following. It could never happen that an individual soldier jumps up from the protective trench into the murderous fire of the enemy if he did not know that, his leader was ahead of him and, in addition, had the feeling that "others" will go with him. Storming smack into enemy fire is a

personal decision impossible for a single man to make for himself; only social decision-making, where "the others" decide the issue, can bring about the event.

Like storming into enemy fire, the decision to wage war cannot be made from the viewpoint of a single citizen; only the social decision by the totality of an aroused people can bring about the event. What is inconceivable from a personal viewpoint can become socially inescapable. Though perhaps hardly noticeable in the individual case, there is something personally inexplicable, not to say irrational, in every act, of social decision-making; that element can turn into a meaningful event only by the fact of acting collectively.

Even in the case of the great commanding leaders of the mind the existence of "the others" comes into play. Here however, it happens in a very special way which does not impair the commanding height of the great leader but rather makes it more impressive yet. When the great leader acts from his heart and soul, he acts not only from a personal inclination but at the same time on behalf of a collective entity because his heart is stretched to encompass the general. A Michelangelo or Beethoven who satisfies himself thereby also fulfills the highest artistic urge of the national spirit. A prophet seeking a statement of faith which is to satisfy his inmost yearning thereby also meets the yearning of mankind in search of God. When the masses follow the great leader, social determination in the purest sense has been achieved, containing no irrational residue. But this determination, too, has something personally inexplicable, for it reaches a height which the minds of the masses as such cannot reach and which becomes accessible to them only because their capacity to feel has been raised much above normal by the example of the great leader and by the collective act.

The great leader of the mind by perceiving himself at the same time also perceives all the others, whereas leaders of stature and especially the masses need the others in order to perceive themselves. The activities of others happening clearly in front of their eyes rouse their own personality, their actions become goal-oriented, their strength grows. In the togetherness of human beings feeling acts upon feeling, in mutual interaction stimuli are aroused, in the exchange of opinions conceptions are formed and strengthened, and in the end the wills are directed into common channels. Thus arises social decision-making as the determination of wills of a great number of persons which is carried out in a setting of mutual contacts.

This doesn't exhaust, however, the totality of social decision-making. The notion of "the other" has a double meaning for our sentiments. To the lonely person, feeling helpless and weak, it means the joyfully welcomed friend whom to join one has a hearty desire. To the person, however, who is already associated with others, who feels strong by this association, and who has become sure of himself, "the other" is a different, kind of person, a stranger who looks out for himself, whom one turns away from with mistrust because one fears he might diminish one's own personality. Observation, therefore, shows us not only the going together but also the going against one another of human beings. It shows us that they are ready to stick together with their own kind, but when they are discouraged by mistrust and

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fear, they part into hostile groups who are against each other in defense or offense. That force plays such a role in history can be explained by this. One believes it necessary to defend oneself in battle against the other whom one mistrusts and fears. A fight beginning with defense unexpectedly turns into offense, and vis-a-vis the vanquished, who is not taken as of the same kind but viewed as a stranger to be looked down on or despised, the victor is not deterred by sympathy from proceeding to absolute annihilation. If the enemy's life is spared, this is done only in order to exploit him pitilessly.

Therefore, from the beginning social decision-making through fight and coercion is part of social decision-making; in fact it is by far the predominant kind of decision-making at the beginnings of social life. Human beings at first feel like belonging to one another only when they are in small circles; the masses are strangers to each other and hostile. If they are to be merged into larger social units, this can occur only through combat and victory. The growth of society into large aggregates sprouts from the bitter root of coercion.

Following Aristotle's well known saying, we view man as a social being. A good point, except one must understand it correctly. Human beings are called to being social. Without social interaction they could not become full persons, and they need mutual support in order to awaken their energies and to put them to good use. However, as soon as through mutual help they have somewhat succeeded in mobilizing their inherent strength, they feel that they have met their social calling for once, and in hostile spirit begin to refuse contact with others who stand outside their original associations. People's native drive to associate with others is in its original tendency not yet strong enough to make them willing to become completely engrossed with each other. Even on today's cultural level the idea of an all-embracing human society is only a beautiful dream to which reality does not correspond. Even on today's level people are not yet united into a great community of peace, but, they are separated into battle-ready societies, and even within each society there is still a residue of coercion which threatens to erupt into domestic war. The great multitude of "the others" are still not viewed as brothers and fellow human beings. Much is achieved if they are allowed to move about freely and have their way, but hcxw often they are seen as adversaries and enemies!

2. Power and Purpose

Linguistic usage permits us to consider the social collectives as units, whether they be joined together tightly or loosely. The state is regarded as a unit, so are the people and the church, or the profession, the class, the party, or society as a whole, the public, or simply a multitude of persons which has come together in some place — the series of collective names could be continued on and on. By personifying social units, usage also permits to formulate everything relating to their actions as if it concerned only a single person: one speaks of the will of the state, the spirit of a people, the progress of society, of public opinion, of the general conception of the law, of national sentiment — the series of these personifying phrases could also be prolonged much further. Correctly understood, all

these expressions are welcome devices to summarize with impressive brevity a result which comes about when thousands and millions of persons joined in social groupings meet with respect to their feelings, views, judgments, and decisions. The danger of misunderstandings is not negligible, however. The personifying form of statement suggests the supposition that social actions, although occurring in extraordinarily enlarged circumstances, still run off like personal actions in all essential respects. When one talks of public opinion the presumption is obvious that it is to be understood as the unanimous confession of all minds, whereas often a large number of citizens, perhaps the majority, has no part in it and many, perhaps most, of those who profess it, do so only with their lips, and perhaps only a few articulate orators or journalists urge it upon the public. When one talks of national spirit, the presumption suggests itself that it is to be understood as the uniform property of the nation as a whole, whereas it may be representative of only a thin stratum which covers up the masses vegetating apathetically. When one talks of the will of a people one suspects that it is to be understood as the exact sum of the wills of the thousands or millions constituting the people and that it absorbs all of these wills as fully as a stream combines the water of all of its tributaries. But such is not the case as a rule. When the so-called popular will is formed, the wills of thousands and millions of individuals not only unite and intensify but also rub one another and intersect, inhibit and smother each other, shift and warp, as a rule causing immense losses of energy and far-reaching adulterations, or missing, of goals.

The ideologues to whose views must be attributed the misunderstandings which confuse the modern constitutional system have imputed to the sovereign citizens the full impact of the will. For them popular will was magnified individual will, still more clearly and firmly goal-oriented than the latter and far superior to it in weight and majesty. An error of fateful consequences! Whereas the old-time constitutions, when one did not try to form a distinct idea about the state, were adjusted to the given conditions and thus of course also to the given power relationships like a glove fitting the hand, modern constitutions are tailored to such a dimension that the immature peoples are not capable of filling up the constitutions which they make for themselves or have their political^v untrained leaders prepare for them. The constitutions do not fit them and therefore aggravate or distort their decision-making. The doctors who attempt to cure the constitutions when the latter fail to render the expected services rto not know as a rule where the evil is located. If one wants to see clearly he must resolve to go to the bottom of things and to observe closely, from the beginning and in all its important Particulars, the process of social decision-making.

To a certain degree we have already prepared ourselves for this task in advance. As we go about it, everything we have learned about the relationship between leader and the masses, about psychology of power, and the distribution of social powers will stand us in good stead. As we summarize the results of these discussions, we still wish to connect them with an idea just developed, namely, that in social decision-making "the others" decide the issue. Whether individuals go together in touch with each other or whether they confront each other in

battle and exert force, social decision-making is always endangered to a certain degree. The intervention of "the others" makes it unavoidable that the clear relationship between end and means, which gives personal decision-making its certainty, becomes clouded.

Personal will, too, is not downright purposive. Not only that quite often, misdirected by error or passion, it misses its target, but the means are already in existence and in motion before targets are set. Such targets may still be sought out, or perhaps may not even be sought for the time being as the means are sufficient onto themselves. Only as the will matures are means and ends hitched together by dint of reasoning or practice. In the case of a mature man means and purposes are sensibly entwined, the will being simultaneously energy-determined and purposive.

In the life of peoples the effective energies are distributed among a confusingly large number of persons, while differing greatly in magnitude and direction. We must not be surprised that usually they are far less concentrated and controlled than in the life of an individual. Mature men we encounter everywhere, but mature peoples history has revealed only too instances. Means and ends are therefore incompatible only too often in the life of peoples, the social will being generally still more determined by energy than by purpose. Since in society energy operates on the minds in the form of power, we will understand why social decisions are power-oriented rather than purpose-oriented. Certainly, power is built upon success which is implicit in purpose, which leads to the conclusion that power and purpose aim more closely at each other, after all. Power-determined will therefore must always to some extent also be purposive but only when power has fully matured will it be wholly determined by purpose.

In the case of forced social decision-making an incongruity between power and purpose may be clearly perceived. Social decision-making by coercion is geared to the purposes of the despot, the subjected masses not being allowed to pursue their own aims. The despot controls them and makes them serve his personal purposes in proportion to his power. Inasmuch as he exploits them for himself, their actions cease to be personally purpose-oriented and become power-determined.

In the case of peaceful cooperation, the life aims of all companions must count equally, as a general principle. When the aims of individuals clash, the will of the minority must yield to that of the majority. While here, too, subjection is demanded, it will be granted readily. The minority gives in willingly because it recognizes and wishes to enjoy the enhanced power effects which it partakes of by subordinating itself to a greater whole. The decision of the minority is power-determined, but it does not for this reason cease being purposive: a lesser aim is sacrificed to the higher aim of power.

The sacrificium voluntatis brought by the assenting minority is the most clear-cut but by no means the only sacrifice of will which a peaceful society demands. Social harmony incessantly and in all respects demands the mutual adjustments of wills of individuals which would have to diverge if everybody gave

vent to his desires. Without this adaptation of will the majority itself, to which the minority yields would not be integrated, and without it the minority would not come to an agreement either. The adjustment does indeed not always occur as a result of clear reflection and resolution; for the most part one automatically yields to the stimuli received from the environment. Nietzsche, who cannot desist from sneering at the masses, and many others since his time speak of a human herd instinct. The characterization fits the cases of panic and others of a similar kind where the masses allow themselves to be carried away purely by the animal instinct of going together. This remains active even though one no longer has any strength left to think clearly. If people in going together were guided merely by the herd instinct social actions would be purposive only and precisely to the extent that the purpose of the genus manifests itself in instinct. To pass off the following by the masses only as a manifestation of the herd instinct is to grossly misjudge their social function. The able man has good reasons for going along with the others, and he is well aware of them, though often only by intuition. By their active following, whether arrived at by clear reasoning or being more grounded in feelings, the masses endorse the leader, giving him testimony that his action is purposive. By making an impression on the minds of the others, the act of following by the able men has a power-determining effect on these others.

With respect to the so-called fellow travelers so often found with social movements, it may be conceded that in a number of cases they follow a kind of herd instinct. The common man very easily yields to the pressure of power. He is disinclined to expose himself to the blame, ridicule, and disapprobation which he suspects will come to him from "the others" when he confronts them. In order not to attract attention, he goes along with general movements even when he does not feel personally affected by their cause and cannot expect for himself any benefits from them. However, there are also fellow travelers for better reasons. In every election the big parties become heir to fellow travelers from the camps of weaker parties or from camps still lacking in organization by party. Such fellow travelers thereby sacrifice their personal aims to a certain, and sometimes major, extent to the purposes of the party which they join. They have to tolerate that the party which they helped come to power does many things which they don't approve of, but unless they have been completely mistaken, they nevertheless win through in more respects than they would be able to if they withdrew entirely into their shell. They follow that power which happens to be closest to them, after all. Their will is power-determined because it thereby becomes somewhat purposive.

Above the fellow travelers are those — and they are also numerous — who while being too weak to offer open resistance to power, nevertheless cannot resolve to obey it either, but instead simply let power have its way. If one is left to his own resources it takes courage, which very few marshal, to set oneself against a general movement even if he is emotionally very opposed to it. Only after making common cause with several others of like mind does reluctance balloon into resistance. Up to that point one stands idly aside and lets happen what can't be helped. Because social will is power-determined, all those must

renounce social expression of their will who are not in a position to add power to their aims.

If it were possible in the case of powers which allege to be supported by the general will always to deduct all the fellow travelers and those who can't get a hearing, as well as those who stand aside because of inertia and irresolution, it would not rarely be found that the number of strong-willed, purpose-oriented activists is much smaller than the number of the rest who resign themselves to power.

The strong-willed, purpose-oriented participants must also make some sacrifice of their will. In social life with mutual contacts there occurs a process of grinding off unique personal characteristics. This process will be hardly noticed in detail, but in the end the whole picture may have changed. The idiosyncratic corners and edges of the individuals are polished off or even broken off; one becomes more uniform. Even if one has to put up with certain inconveniences, one adapts to the collective personality, as it were, because, all things considered, one feels in the end better in doing so than in living entirely according to one's own taste. One takes on the character of the neighborhood, compatriots, social stratum, class, and nation because presumably one thus gets along best with the others and in the end may have become enhanced in his own personality. The uniform purpose is the general purpose, which thereby becomes the power purpose. Only after one's own type has become crystalized and one then encounters the different type of an alien environment, does one refuse to make further adjustments because he now senses the alien element to be inconsistent with his own personality. The resolution of this inconsistency by getting groups into contact which hitherto were separated amplifies the realm of power with frictionless orientation to purpose.

What has just been said is true not only of the masses but of the leaders as well. The very process of mutual sympathetic understanding itself demands its leaders. Merely maintaining good manners calls for the example set by strong men, while the introduction of new customs and the bridging of traditional antagonisms requires leaders of particular strength.

In many cases the personal sacrifice rendered for the common cause will be greater than the advantage one can expect from acquiescing in the given power. In these cases decisions serving personal aims give ground to power decisions. The citizen in voluntary devotion sacrifices his own blood to the defense of his fatherland; he ignores his instinct of self-preservation and gives up his life because patriotic loyalty demands this of him. In order to maintain the power of his state he is willing to sacrifice himself, as he is aware that the state could not hold its own against the martial enemy if it did not dare losing the lives of a certain number of its citizens in the process. Similarly, workers who are filled with the cooperative spirit subject themselves to the policies of the union even though they severely damage their personal interests. Better workers subject themselves to a wage system suitable to the average worker but prejudicing them; the well-off worker with no personal axe to grind subjects himself to the strike decision even though he voted against it; and even non-unionized workers subject themselves to the power of a sense of solidarity and do not dare

breaking the strike, however much their proximate interest should call for this. In all such cases the social decision, although not arrived at by external coercion, will still cease being determined by personal aims because it is power-determined.

Like the masses, but even more so the leader must be willing to lay down his life for the common cause. In battle he must be the first to stake his life. He couldn't be the leader in the pursuit of power if he were not setting an example in devotion, which is a constructive element of power.

The social will needs the reinforcement of power in order to attain its full potential and thus its goals. In the absence of power it would not be able to overcome the inertia and irresolution which nestle everywhere in society. It would lose too much momentum in running into the edges and corners of a personal nature, it wouldn't even be able to pull along the willing ones and wouldn't goad on the leaders ahead in the way necessary in order to activate maximal strength. In addition, of course, it must also overcome the resistance of the unwilling who have only their own interests at heart and ignore the social system. Will not reinforced by power is too weak for its social tasks, it is powerless to achieve the personal aims assigned to it. The power purpose has priority over the various personal purposes which it is to promote. Of course, it must not be confined to itself; indeed, it must not neglect to promote the personal aims for whose sake it exists in the first place. But if it can't be helped, one or another of these aims must be unhesitatingly sacrificed to it in order that it may win through at least in major respects.

To be sure, the social will, being weighted with power, loses the greater flexibility of the personal will. It is sluggish, and this may have, as will now be shown, the bad consequence that it will miss the social aim as well. How often one finds that the means cheated for the sake of an end will dominate the end! This also holds true for power as a means. The power purpose aligns itself as an independent aim among the purposes it is called upon to serve, nay, it places itself above them.

3. The Instinct of Self-Preservation of Power, and the Social Inversion and Self-Destruction of Power

With no people, not even the most advanced one, do we find that the social powers are entirely harmoniously adjusted to the social purposes. Given the weight of the strongly developed Powers, those purposes must suffer for whose protection there exist only weaker powers. Even if all dominant powers had been extinguished, power and purpose would still remain far from being perfectly balanced against one another. Social action is by no means fundamentally balanced according to a uniform plan, as when an able and experienced man formulates his life goals in such a way as to allocate his resources to his purposes in harmony with their relative importance. Until now, social decision-making has never and nowhere achieved the degree of unity found in the realm of personal decisions. Never and nowhere has it therefore been devoted to the maximization of social welfare in the way personal decisions have shaped personal survival and growth. Social action, of course, does not occur at all in response to clear

deliberation, but has developed from the gradual coordination of energy and success. It has not been devised from the top in accordance with a governing principle of highest social utility, but has grown from the bottom in accordance with the experiences incurred with respect to the various partial forces. The social power is not a homogeneous entity which could be assigned to the various purposes, but is always a profusion of partial forces in motion side by side, grappling with each other and at best striving to balance each other, but without being able to do so completely. Coordination is too slow a process. The formation of each partial power is being restrained by the fact that feelings first need the experience of success in order to secure to the burgeoning power dominion over the minds. Just as the various powers gain strength only little by little, they crumble away only gradually. The first failure does not suffice at once to remove them or perhaps even only to diminish them; perhaps, on the contrary, it provokes redoubled efforts. Failures must repeat themselves and be lasting in order to break the spell which existing powers exert over the minds. Every power, once it exists, has a tendency to perpetuate itself. Individuals subject to it always have to face the possibility that "the others" are still under the spell of power, and since they do not want to be put on their own, they also remain under the spell. Among the minds resigned to the given power there first has to develop a mutual understanding that the others also do no longer want to have any part of it. We only begin to understand the drive for power completely when we recognize that power's self-preservation drive belongs to its very nature. Every partial power has in itself this drive: it wants to continue in operation even when it is no longer quite able to serve its purposes. The social will remains power-determined even when it shouldn't be quite oriented to social purposes any longer, and in the end it may take a struggle to overwhelm a will which has become useless or harmful.

It cannot be overwhelmed unless new powers which are better adapted to the social aims gain the upper hand; however, given the resistance of the old powers, this cannot be accomplished so quickly. The buoyancy of the new forces must be so great that in overcoming the old powers they can convert themselves into power. There must be an equilibrium between the drive of forces to unfold and the drive of powers to preserve themselves. Occasionally, old powers are so deeply entrenched historically that it is altogether impossible to shake them up, even when they have become incapable of producing new results. Exhausted peoples therefore stagnate in their development, being no longer able to get beyond the bounds of the old powers. Only the vital peoples succeed time and again in developing power drives which operate in the direction of greater and greatest social welfare. On the other hand, this exposes precisely the strong peoples and also the strong parties to the grave danger that in the attempt to preserve power they bleed themselves to death, for they do their utmost to maintain their traditional power — which so far had always brought them success — and in the end they may pay for their power-obsession with self-annihilation. In such a case the law of success is inverted, and the power-oriented will battles against the highest purpose: social self-preservation.

As it does in the masses, but more strongly yet, the drive to maintain power operates in the leader as well. Rare are the

great leaders who have a balanced view of and think about, the totality of national aims. The epochs of their activity are the heydays of history during which militating endeavors balance out, supplementing each other and cross-fertilizing. As a rule the leader's mind is more narrowly focused than that of the individual citizen. The former is wholly addicted to his purpose, being trained for it, devoting his whole self to it, forgetting or postponing everything else. Thus it happens that so often the leader is only soldier, only politician, only philosopher, or only artist. Therefore the leader, given the superiority he possesses in his special area, may become a social danger. Completely devoted to his cause, using in its pursuit all the power he can muster, he threatens to rupture the unity of the social body, which in any case is only loosely joined together. To provide balance it is necessary that there are other leaders who become his complementary antagonists, and ultimately the common sense of the able citizen and of the same masses is called upon to select from among the leaders struggling for power in such a way as to assure the pursuit of a balanced line of life.

B. Public Opinion

1. In General

Among the social powers, public opinion occupies a peculiar place. It formulates the law for those powers which immediately govern social action. It receives the content of the law from the powers of action where these prove fully successful, and in this case it provides conservative reinforcement for the existing powers by gathering the basic ideas of human experience into firm statements which become society's common property. Where, on the other hand, the powers of action are at variance with public sentiment, it formulates new ideas designed to dissolve the existing order and to prepare for a new one.

Not all persons participating in social action always have a part in the formation of public opinion. It is obvious that those with an opportunity to form public opinion thereby obtain a great advantage over the others, who are not able to give public expression to the rationale of their actions. The creators of public opinion become the carriers of their peculiar power. Where the powers of action serve their personal interests, while damaging those of the rest of society, they will interpret public opinion as approving and strengthening the existing order. On the other hand, where their personal interest requires it, they will twist public opinion in a direction contrary to the existing order. As long as male thinking shapes the social ideas, this will reinforce male supremacy. The advancement of women can be kept by the degree to which they succeed in winning over the public to adapting itself to female modes of thinking and feeling.

That party which forms public opinion will be able to exert an influence on social decision-making which goes far beyond its own resources of power. The French Revolution would not have been victorious if it had not had public opinion on its side. France had previously had plenty of peasant revolts and mob purest, but it had been relatively easy for the kings to put them down with their military might. But now the king mobilized his

soldiers in vain, as their files dissolved in the face of the higher power of public opinion, which favored the masses. In the period of liberalism the educated class benefitted from the fact that in those days it dictated public opinion. It contrived the new ideas, it had a monopoly in literature and journalism for the dissemination of these ideas, although while representing its own interests it also was, in a broader sense, the spokesman for all of the remaining people. A good deal of its predominance in public opinion was lost with the independent emergence of the proletariat. Fundamentally this couldn't be otherwise, yet it must be pointed out that the middle class by the ways in which it exercised its predominance also helped the proletariat to acquire its intellectual arms. The liberal doctrine was pushed too far by its zealous protagonists, proving more than was necessary and useful for the middle class interests. The proletarian thinkers, wide awake, detected this excess and used it for the benefit of their class. The doctrine of the liberal economists to the effect that economic value rests on labor provided the proletarian economists with the support for the doctrine of the exploitation of workers and of surplus value. Similarly, the idea of popular sovereignty, evoked by the middle-class pioneers of progress against the princely power, was twisted by the proletarian thinkers in favor of the great masses for whom they spoke. Wasn't it thereby strongly suggested to them to claim that it is these masses which make up the people? The liberal placing the populace in the forefront had hardly an argument left against universal suffrage which threatened his political power. The liberal idea had gained an edge on the liberal interest.

This has something to do with the fact that nowadays the educated class doesn't want public opinion to carry as much weight any more as it formerly allowed to it. The intellectual now mistrusts public opinion and carps at it wherever he does not dominate it any more, and thus especially in political life. Given an educated public, one may no longer appeal to public opinion without further ado, but must first have made clear to readers or listeners that one has good reasons for doing so. But it is not enough to do this in each individual case. He who would be honest about thought concerning social affairs must on general principles gain clarity first about the importance of public opinion, which is no simple matter at all. In public opinion healthy and depraved instincts are thoroughly mixed. The way it is formed exposes it to the danger of adulteration, and this is especially true for political public opinion as it is formed in times of mass movements.

2. Healthy Public Opinion

Healthy public opinion emerges first where the close personal interests of those who form society are involved. In the affairs of the family or the economy, based on the experiences in life that opinion will always make itself felt which is appropriate to the given talents and circumstances. Viewed from the lofty level of advanced development, this opinion may be dubbed crude and detrimental by later generations, but in the case of a healthy people it will be healthy nevertheless, because it allows for vitality and development. The most able as anonymous leaders will set an example for the others who will imitate it, and it

will thus be proved by its general success. Thus tested, the opinion on which a consensus is formed attains power over the minds. Since family life, like economic life, touches everybody without exception, public opinion which becomes the basis for general action is the general opinion. Not everybody can articulate it — perhaps only very few can do this — but everybody is devoted to its tenor. Thus arise general legal convictions of binding force which are resisted at most by a malevolent minority. In the proportion in which social life becomes more complex, the areas in which pervasive public views are formed expand. Authoritarian leaders appear and lift the spirits by proclaiming a purified faith, preaching a higher standard of ethics, or leave their mark as scientific investigators and thinkers as poets, or as artists. New and more refined forces are awakened in society, progress is made in the mastery of means of public welfare and especially in elevating aims in life. As the multitude tests through its actions the directions of the leaders, in addition to the welfare powers the culture powers grow to maturity; they also rest on the commanding force of public opinion. Here as there, public opinion is the opinion tested in the crucible of success and governs social action. It is the opinion confirmed by social action and raised to the level of persuasion.

Every clever prince reckons with public opinion which discloses its identity in the welfare powers and culture powers, and even the despot, by indulgently letting it have its way, knows how to make himself well liked by the populace. The small number wouldn't be capable of imposing the law upon a vigorous populace unless their will to power stopped short of the power embodied in the widely held views about life and culture. Machiavelli in his "Principe" establishes the rule for the prince to respect the customs and the material interests of the citizens. Often the state has used its most drastic means of force in setting itself against religious movements in their beginnings if they threatened to reduce its own power. But as soon as it recognized that it would not be able to break the hold which these movements had over the minds, the state made peace with them and joined them. In the end every government which measured up to its tasks felt it to be its duty to accept public opinion which actively manifested itself in the life and culture powers as legally binding and through legislative acts to assign to it a clearly defined role. Civil and penal codes were enacted, the state provided the church with its own law, and when the Protestant denominations set themselves apart from the Catholic mother church, the Catholic states finally saw fit to let them have their rights, after having become convinced through hard battles that they were no longer for the dominion of the religious creeds.

.The Public Opinion of Say-So

At last public opinion also conquered the state itself. It was out of the question that the advancing Enlightenment, seeking to explore and improve everything, would bypass the state into whose domain the most important general interests had been placed. Wealth and education of the middle classes had grown apace so they didn't need, nor want, to tolerate any longer the tutelage of the old powers which judged matters from their narrow horizons of times past and above all were anxious to maintain

their influence. The distress suffered by the peasant and later the proletarian strata of the population incited them, too, to fighting the old powers. The battle-cry, "bread and the constitution," under which the Parisian suburbs rose up during one of the phases of the French Revolution, is characteristic of the entire modern mass movement. The masses demanded a new political order to protect their pressing life interests. Much as the pressure of mass poverty may everywhere have contributed to the new political order it still was not anywhere in itself decisive. In the final analysis the middle-class revolution was victorious because it had public opinion on its side. The progress of the proletarian movement is in keeping with the growing recognition which the democratic idea has won in public opinion.

Since then, in middle-class circles public opinion has turned against public opinion, so to speak. Whereas the grandfathers and occasionally the fathers in their youth were inspired by Schiller's Marquis Posa — whose words to King Philipp, "Give us freedom of thought," touched their heart-strings — their sons read Le Bon's castigating paper about the psychology of the masses and amuse themselves by his assertion that even intelligent people turn into fools when they are massed together. The more resolute among the young people call for the strong hand to restore order, the soft-hearted dreamers yearn for a return to the ideal of Romanticism. But what good can it do to daydream of past conditions which are gone once and for all! The world today lives under the banner of the masses. To ride through the countryside in a stagecoach may be more idyllic, but in times of mass transportation one must use the railroad. The masses have their share in political life and therefore must also obtain their share in political thinking. Every sensible person realizes that in the process they commit grave mistakes from which the entire public life suffers. One has left behind the politically naive belief according to which the instinct of the masses, as soon as it is freed from external force, leads by itself to correct decisions. But it is equally wrong to declare that this instinct always goes astray. One must know how to separate the genuine from the spurious. Here theory can contribute its share by showing in the first place where today's political misconceptions of the masses have their origin.

If we watch closely, we find the formation of public opinion in our time affected by an element of misguidance which is present whenever the masses are left to themselves without firm guidance, but which nowhere else becomes so lastingly effective. We encounter this element with particular force in the development of rumors, which by the way need not to be looked upon as expressions of public opinion. It has always been known that the masses are inclined to give credence to the most monstrous rumors. Because of its utterly senseless effects a Roman author in a much quoted passage depicted "Fama" as a frightening monster — misshapen, gigantic, and deprived of vision. In the absence of the level-headed man with the authority to deflate a rumor, the latter may begin as a result of the fact that within the realm of the credible nothing appears to be too far-fetched. Where are the sources which nourish the rumor? According to a well known story, in a seaside resort in whose neighborhood sharks had been seen a few visitors took the liberty of spreading the news that in the resort itself sharks had shown up. This was

done in order to show off in front of "the others" when the latter stopped coming to bathe and the jokers would be the only ones with the courage to swim out into the seas. However, the enjoyment of their triumph was short-lived, for with the passage of time the news about the shark danger came to be told in such certain and threateningly embroidered terms that the originators of the rumor began to believe it themselves and also preferred to stay on the firm land. So many others had seen the terrible beasts, or they were able to tell of still others who certainly had seen them. In such ways rumors get started and grow. They are generated by the attempt to assume an air of importance in front of "the others," through news that must be exaggerated in order to create a sensation, being further blown up as they spread. Notwithstanding a high degree of incredibility, news becomes a certitude through the authority attributed to the pronouncements of "the others," once they have come from the mouths of a considerable number of people.

It is similar with opinions passing through the multitude. The strongest argument in the public for the correctness of a view is always the reference to the many "others" who have already stated it. The public let stand only those views which can be readily accepted by "the others." Truths in need of closer examination or presupposing special knowledge are not quite suitable for circulation. This is why the masses continue to believe the truths spread yesterday even when circumstances have changed considerably, whereas today's novel truths are the secret of the few independent thinkers. Likewise the public prefers to let pass what meets general wishes or needs or widespread sentimentalities or other superficial emotions. One does not like to believe in the sternness of reality unless it just happens that a catastrophe has frightened the hearts, in which case one likes to indulge in the crassest exaggerations. It is in the nature of this opinion formed in the process of circulation that it refuses to have anything to do with superior knowledge, which is what individuals gain through deliberation and experiences and to what they gear their actions. This hidden better knowledge, as Goethe calls it, everyone has to keep for himself; it doesn't get through the minds of the masses. The opinion of the multitude prefers to attach itself to the mere word which can circulate without further ado, rather than to a meaning which requires the careful documentation of facts in order to be understood. This explains the dominance of the cliché in public of the empty ringing phrase, of words to which no well-reasoned course of action could be joined, while giving rise to extravagant images and expectations, however. The public orator who knows his public also knows very well that it won't tire of the cliché and that he can't frequently enough serve it the slogans of the day which it feels to be important and whose importance it takes pride to assess. The general applause which the slogans evoke restrains the remarks of those who know better for themselves because they have been led to believe that, in any case, they couldn't prevail against the collective opinion of the others, so ultimately they begin to have their own doubts. In all areas of social life one encounters conventional views which are repeated by the masses while no judicious person believes them, and one even runs into conventional lies with which everybody must identify who cares to have access to society. In all such cases public opinion must be defined as that opinion which is being expressed in public. It is the opinion with which one

is successful as a public speaker while contributing nothing to the success of social action, or possibly even jeopardizing it. Perhaps that this opinion is not taken seriously in the realm of action — this would be the best case — but often it is so powerful that it inhibits or misdirects action, so that the able person first has to prove himself successful by fighting a winning battle against it.

4. Public Opinion in a Democracy

Since the democratic movement began to mobilize the masses for political life, this variety of public opinion has spread in the political arena more than in any other areas of social life. Not that the political opinion of the democratic masses be their own untenable creation! To help form public opinion, the masses always need and find their leaders, and things were no different in the case of the democratic movement. The political opinion of the democratic multitude is the result of continued, insistent efforts by great leaders. One would commit the greatest injustice in judging the minds of the inventors of the modern ideas about state and society if one were to accuse them of having simply shaped their ideas with a view to giving them widest possible circulation. They were guided by the deepest convictions, believing that in state and society matters must not remain the way they had been shaped historically, but that they must be reconstructed from the bottom up. Their contribution was the genuine and great work of leaders. What courage and what breadth of mind were indeed needed to break loose from the views hallowed by firm tradition and, notwithstanding an all-powerful government, to combat them and replace them with unheard-of new ideas! What these men have done in state and society as critics and thought-provokers will have everlasting aftereffects. Of course, they have often erred, and erred grievously at times, in their formative ideas. They undertook to rebuild state and society conceptually, and this was more than they could handle. Every idea about public affairs always needs to be tested by success, but the innovators were not in a position to verify their ideas continually and in detail. Their case also illustrated the relevance of the saying that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. They had to complete their systems in their minds — leave it to posterity to try them out. They therefore shared the fate of all ideologues: they pursued their ideas to the extremes of possible conceptual inferences without appreciating the obstacles created by the refractory facts of reality. In their view all evils from which the masses suffer should be terminated by getting rid of the historic powers to whom the masses were subject. They failed to recognize that these powers also had to perform their social functions and that the masses, merely by struggling free from the dominating powers, didn't acquire the ability to fulfill these tasks better, or to fulfill them at all. For all that, the first great leaders had no intention whatever to flatter the masses as demagogues do — anything but that. Rather they made the highest demands on the masses whose strength they couldn't help overrating greatly. It didn't occur to them to adapt themselves to the stunted capacity of absorption of the Philistines or of the lowest social classes. As one reads Rousseau's "Contrat Social" or Marx's "Das Kapital," one is astonished to see that these books which make the highest demands on the reader, could find their way into the masses at

all. The first 100 pages of "Capital" approach the most difficult of what has been written in economics. One must from the beginning have sided with the proletariat to be able to follow the bold leaps necessary to develop here the foundations of the theory of surplus value. An unprejudiced reader will have to stop time and again lest he get hopelessly mixed up in the tangle of errors which confused Marx and which he hid before himself with all the artifices of delivery. The ardent middle-class reader has read Rousseau, the fervent proletarian has read Marx, the way the believer reads the bible. One has been edified by the high-sounding words for the very reason that they could not be fully comprehended. There remains the difference, though, that the bible points to a mystical sphere, removed from demonstrability by rigorous proof, whereas statements about society and economy condemn themselves when they can no longer be clearly understood. Nevertheless, the democratic movement has brought to them hosts of partisans because they were written with the interests of the masses at heart. They won over the enthusiastic minds who hoped under their guidance to be able to obtain an understanding of social connections, but they also won over a great number of the remaining persons who were already satisfied with the professed aim even though they could not understand it. Without being structured to make them fit for circulation, the words nevertheless, through the force of circumstances, did get into circulation, generating that misunderstood public opinion which clings to the word. The great slogans of liberty, popular sovereignty, full labor value, exploitation, and surplus value, however seriously they were meant by their originators, have all been debased and become catch words in public opinion, used by demagogues for sure effect. How many decisions to strike may indeed have been sealed when these slogans were thrown out in a meeting, whereupon the unanimous applause triggered by them cut off any further consideration and silenced the secret better judgment of individuals! If workers who had joined the applause asked themselves on their way home why they had done so, they quite often must not have been able to give an answer. They were, after all, tripped by the stumbling block of "the others," which even earnest theorists find it most difficult to lay bare. As is true for social decision-making, public opinion, too, for the masses is not the fruit of clear deliberation, rather it is jointly felt. Personal opinion is being subordinated, if perhaps only reluctantly, to the sentiment one has concerning the opinion of the others. To eradicate errors of public opinion requires the argument of failure, the only one to which the misled masses will bow.

Political public opinion at the present time contains a whole series of doctrines which are taught by well-intentioned leaders for the benefit of the masses and are eagerly absorbed by them before having passed the test of success, while not having been conclusively refuted by failure either. Inasmuch as this is the case, these doctrines are part of that confusing species of Public opinion which one declares himself for in public but which cannot become the basis for successful social action. The confusion of public affairs existing in so many countries today rests to a large extent on the fact that when states were set up this public opinion, which went by the word but missed its meaning, was used as a guideline.

It is said that in public opinion the most extravagant ideas will always win out. This statement cannot apply to healthy public opinion, for in it those ideas will win which garner the greatest success, which can hardly be the most extravagant, but will be ones which have been well thought out and strike the middle ground. The statement applies to that public opinion derived from words. The overloud word will drown out the less loud. That the statement could be made and was greeted by applause proves how much today that kind of public opinion counts which is based on words. This sentence embodies an experience peculiar to the time of a helter-skelter mass movement and which had to become particularly prominent during the tempest of revolutions. As soon as the ideologies of our time have been tested thoroughly by the facts of experience, the radical swings will die away.

4. The Share of Leader and Multitude in the Formation of Public Opinion

The restoration to health of political public opinion must originate with the leaders. Reflection, more than any other component of social decision-making, is the business of the leader. While wants are registered automatically in the mind, and while under the pressure of deprivation and passion the arms of the many will easily join for the advance into action, the business of reflection calls for composure, of which a multitude of heads is never capable. To be sure, the leader, too, will frequently go astray in his deliberations, and his follies will be fateful for society, but eventually the right leader will arrive at the right conclusion, something the masses as such never manage. not to say that the masses should not have any share whatever in social deliberation; they, too, may in their own way contribute to enlightened understanding. It devolves upon them, in response to the pressure of their own needs, to direct thinking to the general welfare and by their probing actions to corroborate the judgment of the leader. The masses must carry enough weight to indicate the focal point around which prospective decisions oscillate, and the leader must have the clarity of vision to recognize that focal point, as well as the unbending determination not to be deflected from it. The purification of public opinion is the task of realist-political leaders who correctly assess the strength of the masses and resolutely safeguard leadership authority. The seasoned leader will seek to arrange things in such a way that the crucial deliberations take place in closed session and that decisions are so expertly prepared for by the few that the masses have little choice but to endorse them. The able democratic leader also claims for himself the choice of tactics; he demands that the masses place their trust in his ability to choose the appropriate means for the attainment of the objectives pursued. The demagogic leader makes the best of things by using in public the customary slogans which, when he is alone with his equals, he smilingly disregards, as did the augurs at all times, bearing in mind the needs for action. The genuine leader will act differently. He will not shrink from resolutely opposing public opinion if he deems it harmful to the public weal. In this connection, however, he will perceive healthy public opinion and use it as the firmest possible pillar of his actions. Thus Bismarck fought his way through the military conflict with the help of the

Prussian House of Representatives, because he deemed a policy of blood and iron necessary to achieve the great national goal of a German Empire. At the same time, notwithstanding a hostile public opinion, he reckoned with full assurance that the Prussian militiaman would heed the king's call to arms.

The magic means at the disposal of the strong leader to prevail against public opinion is success. Heaping one success upon the other, he will finally accomplish the political education of the populace. If in the process he curtails the rights of the masses where these rights exceeded their competence, he will placate them by his sure touch in meeting their true needs, which remained unsatisfied and perhaps were not even recognized as long as the wrong leaders and their foolish views were listened to. Again, to shove the masses off the political stage on which they have gained a foothold everywhere is something the great leader will not try. Rather he will work incessantly at educating them for the role which devolves upon them in their own and in the general interest.

C. Self-Determination of the People

1. The Idealizing Democratic View

Public opinion in young democracies takes it for granted that all contemporary European peoples, and perhaps also all others who are cultured or have acquired some degree of culture, are capable of self-determination and thus have the aptitude to direct their destiny ably, of their own will, and without a superimposed power. It is in the nature of self-determination that it must encounter no barriers other than those resulting from the necessities of mass technique. It is of course out of the question for a people to arrive at their decisions in grassroots assemblies in which their whole incalculable number would participate — this error of direct democracy has now been recognized. While in quite special cases direct decisions by the people may be admissible, as a rule decision-making requires a body of peoples' representatives and deputies. It is true that these persons cannot be bound by imperative mandates — an act of direct democracy which must be ruled out. But it is believed that by means of an election the representatives and deputies can still be subjected to the will of the people, who are said to control them and, depending on their performance, can elect them to office or drop them. It is further believed that, since the people is composed of all its citizens, all citizens must be permitted to vote in order to express the popular will correctly. By declaring all members of a people of both sexes who are of age and sound mind and have not forfeited their civic rights equally eligible to vote, it is said that the unfailing path of self-determination of the people has been found.

To an ardent democrat, self-determination is the natural condition of a people. In his view, in the periods of lack of freedom which preceded democratization the nature of a people had been violated, and he views the proclamation of self-determination, like the proclamation of human rights, as a return to nature. By purifying the concept of the state from the improper admixtures of force, the idealizing democrat views the state as an association of upright persons for the purpose of

meeting the particular functions of a state. Could, he continues to reason, a form of organization be appropriate to the state other than that which fits the association in general? He suggests that one only has to take into consideration the fact that the number of members of the state is incomparably greater than that of members in an ordinary association and that the general assemblies of citizens are too unwieldy to make them suitable, like other general assemblies, to conduct deliberations and pass resolutions. Whereas the members of associations can be granted certain privileges of direct democracy at the general meeting, citizens of the state, it is argued, would essentially have to be limited to the exercise of the franchise. But, it is concluded, this restriction, dictated by the necessities of mass techniques, does not infringe the character of the state as an association.

2. Self-Determination in the Club and in the Corporation

So goes the idealizing democratic view of the state. It has nothing to do with the state in the real world. The real-world state is not a creation of the free contractual will as is the club, but it is a historic creation of the will to power. The tasks of the club are so closely delimited that they are susceptible to deliberation and resolution: it is a single purpose, or in the extreme a series of closely related particular purposes, for which one associates. The resources which must be procured are also within the horizon of the members, and the latter, because they are united by their common tasks, feel indeed like companions, nothing between them being of an adversary nature. It is not necessary to accord to the board of directors far-reaching competences, and the lust for power is not given free play; there is scarcely room for ambition, at most there is room for a harmless sort of vanity. The state on the other hand, has a historic origin one has no idea where and when it expands, this as a rule occurs by the use of force. Only in very rare cases does one become a state citizen of his own accord; one is born a citizen or becomes one through forced annexation. When a worker transfers the name of a buddy from his union to the state which he wants to conquer, he falsifies the name. Until very recently states endured to which a great number of reluctant citizens belonged. It was not long ago at all that Sweden and Norway separated, only recently the Austro-Hungarian monarchy collapsed, and the Irish even contemplate disassociating themselves from free England. State purposes may occasionally be scientifically defined, while practically many possibilities must always be kept open and the leaders be granted broad authority. Power is always called upon. Mere statement of purposes does not suffice, resort must be had to drastic measures backed by power. This is already true for the internal affairs of the state, even when citizens are united by public spirit, and is much more necessary in foreign relations, where the idea of social cooperation has not taken hold yet and aspirations may wildly diverge. What temptations indeed lurk for ambition and power greed, not only for the leaders but for the populace itself!

Only a very strong people can be sure to walk upright on the path of self-determination. The masses do not even find it in the much simpler relations of social cooperation, as exemplified by club affairs. There are always only a few members who know

the by-laws or have even read them. In elections the influence of a small clique is decisive in most cases, and often enough the board of directors must take care that elections are held at all, as it also often must see to it that a quorum is present at the meetings. May it be assumed that people who are not quite mature enough for the club will be so for the state? In no case can the loose form of a club suffice for the state. Nature has made the lion stronger than the house fly, and so the organs of the state, if they are to perform ably in the service of power, must also be equipped with a stronger skeleton, blessed with more ample blood flow, and provided with more nerves than the organs of a club. The old democracies which didn't set up their constitutions according to an ideological recipe but received them by the prescription of history, do not content themselves therefore with the pure democratic form either. England still has its king and its upper house, and above all has its historic party constitution with the firm footings of its dynamic leaders.

The corporation is an association for gain, and yet the simple constitution of a club could not endure even for it because in it the drive for power is already too much stimulated and therefore its shell must be more firmly built. In order to raise the large sums of money needed by such a corporate enterprise, numerous participants must be enlisted people who merely supply funds without being able to work for it or having any business know-how at all. Vis-a-vis these members, who are more numerous than the multitude of small shareholders, the founders and the board of directors occupy eminent positions of leadership with power and predominance which provide ample opportunities for exploitation. The audacious founder doesn't fear shareholder control, and need not fear it if he addresses himself to the inexperienced circles of the general public whose greed for profit he manages to bait. His leadership meets with confidence on the part of the followers as long as they see that "the others" follow as well, and those follow as long as share prices go up. Their market price is the only criterion to which one pays attention. Although one may have to admit that this price is unreasonably high and that the enterprise is altogether unsound, he keeps buying as long as the bull market feeds the expectation that buyers can be found in turn to whom one can sell shares at a profit. This goes on until one day the boom collapses and the doubters are shown up to be correct, after it has become too late. Those shareholders who cannot protect themselves the state must aid by curtailing the power of founder and board of directors in some ways and substituting its own power for it. Only when the public has become mature for the corporation can it be safely left to its own devices in the form of a free association.

The Historic Truth About Self-Determination of the People

As between peoples, the gaps in personal strength are incomparably greater than they are between founder and public, and where self-determination has not yet been achieved, the opportunities for predominance and temptations for its abuse are incomparably more numerous than in the field of share ownership. Perhaps things were different with the first tribes in history, perhaps individuals at that time were more equable and thereby protected against superior strength. If this really had

been the case, this early state has long been buried by history. During the struggles which united tribes into peoples equality and liberty disappeared. The history of peoples in a real sense begins with coercion and coercive rule, with superimposition and subjection. The ascent to freedom which mature peoples in their prime finally accomplish is ~~not~~ return to nature; the self-determination of a mature people is a stage of development attained late and with great difficulty. One must not imagine force, under whose yoke peoples were held so long, as being merely exogenous; the personality of peoples themselves has also had something to do with its spread. One may perhaps say even of peoples who were defeated by a foreign conqueror that they were too weak for independence; certainly, however, this is true where the superior powers rose within the state itself. When the Romans were subordinated to the Patricians and the Germans to the prince and nobility, these peoples, notwithstanding all their raw strength, were still unable to solve in free self-determination the problems posed by their times. The times called for war, and the war strengthened the rulers. In a stages view of history, the millenia testify for rule by coercion, and only decades — summing scarcely to centuries even for the strongest peoples — testify for self-determination. One must not date the history of peoples to begin only in 1789 or 1848, let alone in 1917 and 1918. Everything that happened within a people before the years during which it finally turned to freedom was an outgrowth of its personality or was at least co-determined by its personality. The period of force and violence is part of its developmental history, and one can no more think of it as not having occurred than one can imagine the developmental history of the earth without the ice-age. Not only have indelible traces of the stages of development remained in the stratification of peoples as they did in the stratification of the earth, but only a tracing through of development' can give us insight into its unfolding nature. What geologist could hope to understand the structure of the earth without following its evolution? By the same token, no statesman can understand his people if he does not understand its history, which reveals to him its strengths and its weaknesses.

The mere fact that a people has shaken off the yoke of the old powers must not in itself be taken as furnishing conclusive proof that it has matured to full manhood. After the Spaniards had driven the Moorish conquerors out of the country, they were brought under the scarcely milder yoke of their kings. After the Russians had become free from the Czarist regime, they became slaves to the much harsher Bolshevism. The fact, too, that a people through its representatives has declared itself for democracy does not in itself guarantee to it true self-determination. The economic freedom proclaimed by liberalism has benefitted the robber promoter against the inexperienced public, the usurious creditor against the helpless debtor, the exploitative entrepreneur against the powerless worker, and the state had to intervene first in order to protect the economically weak against the economically strong. In the same way, where political freedom proclaims democracy prematurely, it cannot help benefitting the strong individuals among a people against the weak ones, where in addition there is no higher adjusting authority which could protect the weak. In a people which has not yet grown ripe for self-determination while having already adopted its form the superior powers germinating from a people's grass

roots will shoot up unimpeded. They will, heedless of the fact that the letter of the law is against them, expand as powers wild until eventually, after having gained full strength, they will top it off by adorning themselves with the crown of legality. Perhaps the superior powers will fight and mutually weaken each other to the point of impotence. Between the Scylla of power and the Charybdis of powerlessness, a people on the way to maturity will steer its most prudent course if it entrusts itself to a helmsman who is armed with success. In the difficult epochs of history, this was done by the predecessors of those peoples which by now have grown ripe for self-determination, and they thereby have more effectively helped their descendants to attain majority than if they themselves had prematurely declared their majority.

From the fact that so far a comprehensive view of historical stages argues strongly against self-determination the conservative mind draws the conclusion that self-determination is at variance with the nature of a people. In choosing this interpretation it commits an error no less grave than does the democratic mind which disregards historical experience. The historical sequence of stages is one of developmental stages. The fact that in spite of its long duration the development process so far has led to only a few states of true maturity proves nothing more than that historical development proceeds only at a very slow pace until the maturation process of a people has been completed. Good things take their time. The development of the millions cannot be a simple thing, given that the first act consisted of the subjugation of the masses by a ruling minority and the masses then have to regain their strength and human dignity.

When has political maturation reached the degree necessary for a people's self-determination? The prospects for self-determination would be in a bad way if for its achievement it were necessary for the grooves of history to be completely evened out and for the populace to have evolved into a true association of upright and intimately united companions, as imagined by an idealizing concept of democracy. Even the English people, having self-determination and vigorously practicing it, have not advanced that far. It is never possible to smooth out completely those unevennesses which distinguish social from personal decision-making, though they must and can be overcome to the extent necessary for a people to feel as a 'unit. Self-determination of a people presupposes first of all that its members feel as an entity and through mutual attraction are cemented together into a firm aggregate, without any need for a superior power to press them together for its own sake. There will always be horizontal and vertical differences in education, property, and influence, yet they must not be permitted to rupture the cohesiveness but must be brought into such an equilibrium that no force hinders any other, rather that one helps another. There can't be any question of self-determination of a people as long as the parties recklessly persist in asserting their self-determination, which boils down to self-denial of the people. With respect to all its forces a people must be so well organized that nowhere the predominance of organized groups represses the other groups. The organization of the state must be the completion of a pervasive social organization.

The Issue of Social Guilt

1. Legal and Sociological View of Social Guilt

By way of an appendix we still want to discuss with utmost brevity the question of social (collective) guilt.

Can the social will become guilty? In terms of prevailing linguistic usage the question must unhesitatingly be answered in the affirmative. One talks about the guilt of the parties, peoples, states, governments, and the masses, accusing them all for their evil intentions or for their negligence as one accuses an individual malefactor. However, it is not permissible to go so far in personifying the social will. Given the way this will is arrived at, the notion of guilt does not apply to it.

An individual becomes guilty when and because he defiantly pits his personal will against the higher general rule or he fails to obey such rule. Undoubtedly, it is possible in this sense for a multitude of persons to become guilty: a gang of thieves or robbers or a military unit neglecting its duty, or any assembly of people which disturbs the public order, destroys property, or otherwise commits subversive acts. For offenses by a rather large number of persons, a new criterion enters the picture, however. One makes a distinction between degrees of their wrongdoing, one views the leaders as the most guilty, or possibly even as the only ones guilty. One therefore metes out more lenient punishment to the masses, or one even permits them to go scot-free. Perhaps one decides on such leniency only because one cannot punish the whole big group. The commander of a military unit which has not held its ground vis-a-vis the enemy orders only every tenth soldier executed or to run the gauntlet because he simply cannot let them all suffer bodily punishment for their delicts. But isn't there another motive involved? Isn't it so that one does not want to punish so many because this is viewed as incongruous? We here encounter a motive which sheds light on the question of social guilt. The individual in a crowd is somewhat or perhaps even wholly excused by being, after all, only one among the many, against whom he cannot prevail. Under suitable leaders and placed in a more propitious environment, the same soldiers who have just failed will do their full duty.

From here we find the transition to the cases in reference to which one talks of social guilt. In using this expression, it is taken for granted that those who violate the general rule feel they belong to a special social unit. They join together in a new rule which is directed against the present rule. The proletarian movement confronts the middle-class conception of law with its class-conscious conception. It was no different for the movements by the debtors, the slaves, or the peasants against their hard-hearted creditors or lords, for the movement by the sectarians against the only saving church, with the movement of the freedom enthusiasts against the princely state. The ruling powers alleged to see in each of the respective movements a grave wrong, a culpable breach of prevailing law. From the point of

view of the oppressed, their revolt was a protest of human feeling against brutal insolence, against cruel enslavement against pernicious mental duress. The zealous innovators feel like the true society, like the representatives of mankind. When they are they venerate their martyrs as the victims of a great idea and, when the new idea finally wins out, elevate them to heroic status, permitting their deeds to inspire them.

The jurist, who must formulate law in terms of the existing powers, makes allowances for such convictions by no longer ranking the revolutionary deeds among the common crimes, as was done during the most barbarous times, but dealing with them separately as political offenses. As such he exempts them from the degrading punishment applied to common crimes; perhaps he accords to them less onerous forms of detention, and perhaps he also assesses milder penalties. At least he will be so inclined when the misdeeds have been directed only against the political constitution, all the while perhaps applying a sterner measuring rod when, penetrating more deeply, they are intended to upset the whole social order.

Differently the sociologist. He is not bound by the existing law. He recognizes in the parties wrestling with each other the representatives of two systems whose eventual outcome will determine what history's selective judgment will be. In all great popular movements something is at work which deserves to be respected in itself as sheer strength and which lies beyond good and bad true and false just as is true for the great motions in nature. "Streams do not err, they go," as aptly put in an illustration by the old Giboyer — in Augier's play "A Pelican" — to his son when he begins to summarize the political wisdom acquired during his long life. It is not as if the sociologist would not have to count the power of law among the great social powers; rather he knows that what one party does to the other on account of atonement for having broken the law is in the first place a mere use of its power resources to safeguard its own interest, and it will be shown only subsequently whether this also includes the true social interest. Perhaps, and this may well be the rule, each of the two parties has the law on its side to some degree and is in the wrong with everything going beyond that and the new purified law can only emerge from the balancing of the two systems vying with each other for supremacy. Every tyrant can determine the external form of law, as illustrated by Gessler's hat, while the internal power of law arises only from the contact between consciences.

As to the relations between peoples, there altogether does not exist any clear, supreme law as yet. What we call international law is at most nascent law or is an ethical demand born from refined human perception for which no supreme judge has been installed yet and which becomes largely invalidated by state emergency legislation. Often a great number of citizens, perhaps even a majority, does not partake in the so-called will of the People. The unfree people are not being asked at all, and many perhaps most — of even the free people are swept along, without a will of their own, or they keep quiet in the background. Of course, all these people must be absolved from guilt, and this is true even for those who quite openly go along, because they, too, lack the capacity to make their own decisions, which is, of course, a precondition of guilt. In a strong popular movement

everybody does what "the others" do. He can't help it, acting as he does in response to the irresistible pressure of a sweeping general current and probably with a feeling of elation over faithful sacrifice for the fatherland. But if it is not possible to attach the guilt label to any one of the millions making up a people how could guilt be attached to this people as a whole, consisting as it does only of its citizens? It is, or appears to be, different with the guilt of the leaders. But aren't the leaders of the great movements in turn excused by the irresistible current of the masses? They become guilty only if they themselves have with evil design abetted these masses. Is the Russian Czar responsible for the World War? He decreed the general mobilization which had to lead to the declaration of war as a necessary consequence — but was this decree truly an act of his free will, or was it not wrested from him by the paramount force of circumstances? Incidentally, as far as war is concerned, where is the rule of law against which a declaration of war sins? To every people the just war is permissible. But because, according to international law as it existed till the World War, every people had to use its own discretion as to whether its war was just, every people has so far considered every war as permissible. Never has a people conducted a war for which it could not adduce the most persuasive reasons.

2. The Criterion of Social Endangerment and Security

If one wants to make a people responsible for its wars, he cannot do so by using the criterion of guilt, but must resort to the criterion of endangerment. A bellicose and easily excitable people is no doubt a danger to its neighbors and perhaps to the whole world. The neighbors and the world are entitled to do everything in order to provide sufficient safeguards against such a people. Against the Cimbri and the Teutons one has to be on his guard. To be sure, what is gained by saying this against the people for whom contemporary Germans are nothing but Cimbri and Teutons? Shifting the issue from the question of social guilt to that of a social threat will only be welcomed by these people. From the viewpoint of endangerment and protection they will ask for the use of yet greater coercion against the people of the Cimbri and Teutons than they will from the viewpoint of guilt and punishment. A level-headed mind, however, knows better where the danger of war is hidden for modern nations. Among the European nations there are no longer any Cimbri and Teutons, they are all zealously devoted to their works of peace, except that each observes with anxious mistrust the aspirations of the other nations which surround it, firmly resolved to maintain its independence by all means. As soon as the clarion call to save the fatherland has come from those manning the watchtowers of the national bastions, in every proud nation all citizens will rise like one man and at once are overwhelmed by the tremendous impulse of joint action which sweeps them up irresistibly. Now the word is, "it must be," now there is no holding back any more; who does not go along is a coward and traitor. To avoid another world war, it is necessary to erect those safeguards — and to do this for all civilized nations -- which are to protect them against the surprises of their mistrust and against the sudden flushes of national combat fever.

IX. Social Institutions, Historical Formations Historical Education

1. Strength and Task

"Faust" in its first version, the so-called Original Faust, was written by the 26-year-old Goethe within the brief span from October 1774 to early in 1775 and then again in another burst of energy in the late summer and the fall of 1775. During these short weeks of highest creative insight young Goethe experienced the intensification of strength making it possible for him to give poetic expression to the Faustian urge which had seized his soul and to create the figures of Faust and Gretchen, Mephisto and Wagner, of which Brandes has said that they are not inferior to the most famous figures of world poetry. With this first Faustian problem. He had to become a mature man before coming sufficiently to grips with it to be able to write the Prologue in Heaven, which in the wager proposed by Mephisto to God develops the plan of the work. Over long pauses, the scenes of the first part fell into their proper places, but only when he had become an old man, as Goethe wrote in his diary, did "Faust" become for him the main object to which he devoted his daily strength. Now he put himself to the task of completing the work. If he had posed this task at the beginning, "Faust" could never have become the "Faust" we know. "Faust" could become what it is only because at the outset there was the energy which pressed for an outlet, without being bound by a task. The task suggested its strength. In the second part only those passages fully reach the heights of the first part which were not written down in fulfillment of a poetic pledge, but where the spirit harking back to a receptive youth was still strong enough to enable him to get a hold of the tottering figures "which early at one time had appeared to the cloudy vision."

The development of a people, even less than that of a person, occurs in awareness of a task to be done. The mental faculties of a people are distributed over countless heads, which alongside each other and in succession seek to think first as leaders and are prepared to follow as a multitude. Of all the plans sketched, abandoned, and newly formed by the ambition, insolence, passion, delusion, and narrow-mindedness of the leaders only those carry through for whose realization the people possess sufficient energies and which are not ruined by the energies of the surrounding peoples. Those plans for which native energies, and gradually exceed by far the horizon of the first leaders whose attention always was riveted to proximate tasks and who could not foresee the astonishing turns which the future held in store. In the mind of the old Roman peasant people there sensibly could not be any room for the idea of world dominion. This people could not have been as capable as it was if it had not entirely oriented itself to the realities of its historic

condition. It was assured of the future because — prepared to cope with any distress — it always had left the reserves of strength necessary to measure up to further afflictions. Seven centuries had to pass from the capitol's founding until a Caesar could set out to implement Rome's dominion over the world. The national strength which had to be built up after the catastrophe of the Thirty Years' War and after the dismemberment by the Peace of Westphalia in order to reestablish the German Empire gained ground under such rutted conditions that even the best German could not reasonably think of devoting himself to the task of reinstating the empire. Everybody who at that time wielded influence in German territories was occupied with permitting the last remnants of the old empire to waste away and to put in its place a body of small and extremely disunited states which was opposed only by the princely power politics of Austria and Prussia. The splintering of Germany was remedied against the will of the German princes and of the German people, which was submissively attached to its princes. Napoleon, the foreign terrorist, contributed more to overcoming the political splintering than did any German down to the time of Bismarck. Nevertheless, the period of extreme national weakness following the Thirty Years' War was not a political loss, as the best specimens of the German people in quiet cultural work assembled the building blocks of the modern German cultural achievement, at long last still to be crowned politically. It is true, though, that the years immediately following the terrible war elapsed in mental calm, with seemingly nothing left of the strength which had given birth to the Reformation. Only the soul-inspired sounds of a pure and earnest music revealed that the spirit of the nation had recovered itself during the calm spell after the raging of the war. Then it suddenly broke loose in an inner storm and stress and now brick upon cultural brick was chiseled and carried in place. Goethe's "Faust" was one of the fundamental building stones. However little Goethe with his "Faust" had a political goal in mind, equally little did the many others think of this, who, following their inner urge, brought building blocks to the work of culture. Only the men in the Paul's Church, representatives of German culture around the middle of the 19th century, had advanced to the point that they could unite in the endeavor of rebuilding the empire. Now the preparatory work was sufficiently advanced that this task could be confronted, although of course the men in the Paul's Church — apart from being at odds concerning important aspects of the goal — also fell short of understanding the construction technique. For this was needed the political expert who at the same time knew how to use the military means in order to remove the historical obstacles which still stood in the way of completing the reconstruction. Fate gave to the German people the foreman in the person of Bismarck, who was in a position to set himself the task of combining the available resources for the final goal, a task he met with sovereign mastery. Before Goethe and Schiller he could not have addressed himself to this task. The German Empire could be established only after having found in the cultural vigor of the German people the still missing elements for its formation.

2. The Problem of Historical Formations

These words provide us with a base for distinguishing the

concept of historical formation from that of social institution and for portraying the nature of the former.

Social institutions are created by governments or by other Order powers for a definite purpose and following a deliberate plan. They are called into being for the sake of the objective pursued in the interest of the collective or perhaps of one's own power only. They are modified or abolished if it is thought that the objective requires this. The institutional forms are exceedingly diverse: offices, establishments, and works of the most varied kinds are encountered in such profusion that it becomes difficult to enumerate them completely. On the other hand, historical formations grow up without the possibility of one's becoming aware of a specific creator. They are results of historic development, born from the energies welling up from the depths of society and proved by success, sweeping along and dominating human beings instead of being dominated by the latter. All associations, from family and tribe to state, people, nation, and society itself, are historic formations. Aside from such personal formations there are, however, also objective ones which are by no means planned institutions but results of historical development nurtured by success, an example of this being money in its original form, as yet unregulated by the state. For all that, such objective formations are felt to be more closely related to planned institutions and are therefore probably referred to as "creations" ("Gebilde"), a name which suggests that they be viewed as half-created by the human will. We will be better off, though, not to separate them in name from the personal formations because it would be hardly feasible to draw a clear distinction. Time and again, personal and objective elements are mixed, and since a firm boundary exists only between formations and institutions, we will let it go at these two names and concepts. We recognize in the historical formations the results of a searching force — not yet sure of its content, pressing, erring, and finding itself anew — while recognizing in the social institutions, on the other hand, the fulfillment of tasks set for itself by the organizing will endeavoring to meet the given objectives.

More or less closely, all social institutions may be said to rest on the foundation of historical formations. The market system presupposes the market as created by the coincidence of supply and demand. The special monetary arrangements of a country are based on the general characteristics of money, which has come about as a result of the tortuous paths of commerce not fully explored by theory as yet. The military affairs of a state receive their orderly arrangement by a strong prince or a commander-in-chief, but in its historic antecedents it can be traced to the spontaneous configurations of fighting strength. With all institutional arrangements it can be clearly seen how in their effect they always depend on being properly adjusted to the nature of historical formations which serve as their foundation. A market system which is in contradiction to the law of supply and demand cannot succeed, nor can a monetary system attempting to maintain a value of money which has become untenable by an excess of monetary media issued by the state. Similarly, it will never be possible, however stern the rules of monetary discipline, to imbue a military unit with true fighting if its members have been recruited from an exhausted people. Every effective institution receives its organizing

principles from the internal law of historical formation on which it rests.

To be sure, the ordinary citizen is always inclined to think that every good government has it entirely within its power to control things as it sees fit, and he will therefore severely accuse the government whenever things don't go according to his desire. He does not see deep enough to recognize that what the government prescribes, and what undoubtedly can and must be prescribed within certain limits, follows an internal law always governed by forces which do not permit themselves to be directed in any way and must be taken as they happen to be. Even supreme wisdom of the state could not keep state matters in balance by its stimulating or inhibiting measures let alone advance them, unless it were able to build its institutions on historical foundations which maintain themselves in equilibrium and have it in themselves to prosper. The statesman's highest art consists in developing a feel for the driving forces which give the people its optimistic outlook. He must be clear about which social institutions are demanded by the given historical formations and where the internal law governing the latter draws the boundary lines to which he must proceed with his institutions.

For the statesman it is immaterial whether he knows how to distinguish conceptually social institutions and historical formations; he doesn't even have to distinguish them by name. It is incumbent upon him to judge in the individual case how far the bedrock goes on which he intends to erect his creations. It is incumbent upon the theorist to derive from the sum of individual cases the general insight as needed to explain broad historical trends. And since clear notions depend on unambiguous names, he must begin by paying attention to the names by which he introduces the notions of formation and institution. Why do we have to label the formations we talk about "historical" and the institutions "social?" There is a good reason for this, and as we pursue it we immediately hit upon the essential problem which must be solved with regard to the historical formations. While the designation "social institutions" tells us that they have been created by certain originators with a view to certain social aims which become known as such, the designation "historical formations" refers back to the darkness of history. One doesn't know anything about their origins except that they have existed from times immemorial, and if one then immerses himself into the mystery of history in order to trace a certain originator, one recognizes that such a one cannot be ascertained — to be sure, not because the historical sources fail but for the deeper reason that authorship in this case never can be assigned to a certain person.

But how otherwise could the origin of historical formations be understood?

For a long time already, scientific thought has been occupied in the case of certain especially striking historical formations with clearing up their origin, on which their nature and internal law depend, of course. Principal examples are offered by the phenomena of money and of the state. Is it not surprising that the simplest man on the street under orderly circumstances knows very well how to avail himself of money, whereas the sharpest theoretical minds of a long series of scientific generations

reaching all the way back to Antiquity have labored in vain in trying to explain the origin and nature of money? Is it not astonishing that money closely ties together human beings who live far apart and know nothing about each other? The state stands in the spotlight of life, its citizens give their lives for it, but the scholars of all countries are still not in agreement about how it originated and which internal laws it obeys. For all historical formations without exception there exists the same contrast between practical effectiveness and problematic scientific nature. For all of them the origin, and with the origin their nature, lie in the dark: they are all human creations without humans being able to fathom the law of their own actions.

3- About Former Solution Attempt*

Science at first came to terms with the problem of historical formations by trying to illustrate through comparison or picture what it was not able to classify conceptually. The historical formations are depicted to us — to mention only the most familiar illustration — as artistic edifices, with foundations and coping-stones, or as geologic formations with super- and subordination of strata, or — perhaps most frequently, in analogy to organic creatures — as organisms with all their organs and vital functions. Such comparisons suggest themselves automatically. No presentation, not even the most exact, will avoid them if it tries to impress, because each of these comparisons places in the proper light one or another of the relationships involved. On the other hand, they all entail the danger that the comparisons are continued even when no longer appropriate, because one has fallen prey to the tempting effect of associations which they automatically conjure up. Without noticing it, one takes the image for reality. Thus the image of the edifice, by bringing home the meaningful elements of historical formations, also implies the inadmissible idea of a builder. The comparison with geologic formations gives vivid expression to the length of the epochs required for the historical formations as well as to the strong pressure under which they originate, but in doing so it allows the idea of development, which is peculiar to organic life only, to become lost. The comparison with organisms, which is especially suggested by the idea of development, is the most dangerous of all. It fits with respect to so many points that many who attempt to explain it altogether stop viewing it as a comparison but use it downright as an explanation, without recognizing how many alien elements they bring into play through the force of the associations. There are brilliant social thinkers who have hounded the analogy to death and who seek and find parallels in state and society for every vital function of the human body. In all seriousness the state is viewed as a living being, structured just as uniformly as is man, equipped with consciousness, reason, and will, and provided with the organs which perform their service in the human body. It is not possible to obscure the truth more glaringly. The problem of historical formations consists in the accord of many personal units which to a certain degree give up their independence, but without a higher encompassing unit of dependence taking their place. The human organism does not, pose this problem. In it operates the superior consciousness of the mind, while the parts of which the organism is constituted — the

organs or cells — do not have full consciousness on their part. The consciousness of which one may speak in conjunction with the soul of the organ or cell is of wholly subordinate nature. There can't be any question of organs or cells in the body behaving as independently as do individuals in society or, to put it the other way around, of individuals in society being so dependently subordinate to a central organ as are the organs or cells in the body. The obedience which the soldier has to bring to the order of his superior must be blind inasmuch only as he does not have to heed what the superior wants to leave unheeded; all the more luminous attention has to be brought to bear on what the superior indicates. The army owes its impact to the harmony of all the thousands of consciousnesses of the combatants, but the why of this accord is not explained by the comparison with the organism. The comparison of historical formations with the organisms breaks down in the essential point with which the problem begins.

The individualistic interpretation of historical formations must be taken more seriously. It attempts a real explanation and begins in logical neatness. It avoids bringing into the discussion alien elements by taking the individual — indeed an element of society — as its point of departure, but it spoils everything by taking the individual differently from the way he acts in society. The individualistic explanation takes the individual in society as if he were dependent entirely upon his personal strength, it takes him as a being who proceeds resolutely with rational calculation of his advantage. In reality, even the most vigorous man in society is so strongly influenced by exogenous forces that thereby the manifestations of his strength are modified greatly, being either enhanced or else repressed or inhibited. The individualistic view has no explanation for the origin of historical formations other than the one which suggests itself in the personal sphere for the relations between individuals. As marriage or a corporation or an exchange relationship rest on contract, so money and the state are also said to be based on private contracts. No explanation is offered for the element of constraint or command without which the state could neither originate nor endure and which can be clearly established for money as well. The force of compulsion which cannot be separated from state and from money would be lacking in a contractual state from which an individual could disengage himself according to his liking or in a contractual money whose acceptance could be refused at will. The individualistic explanation of historical formations does not pass the test of reality. The personal strength to which it appeals is too weak to make plausible the dominating mightiness of historical formations.

Guided by such reasoning, a number of authors who had a full appreciation for the greatness of historical formations have passed over to a collectivistic explanation. They evoke the soul of the people or mass soul as the creative force in society. These words offer a highly efficacious rhetorical expression which emphasizes the full accord which is believed to govern the merging together in great movements of the many souls in the multitude of the populace, as if they were directed by a single soul. But does this provide an explanation for the unanimity of their coming together? As had already been remarked occasionally in connection with our discussion of the psychology of power* there is in truth no soul of the people or mass soul if the

latter is imagined, as suggested by its name, as being of the game nature as the individual soul, though of greater potency. But it cannot be imagined otherwise — it remains an empty word if one were to suppose it differently. Strictly speaking, the collectivist,ic explanation in a roundabout way leads back to the individualistic explanation by taking the people or the masses as a magnified individual.

Each of the mentioned explanations appeals to a certain single element — it is monistic, if one may use this expression. Since the monistic explanations fail, should one not attempt a dualistic one, which works with two different elements? One has indeed done this, by introducing the two elements of the subjective and the objective. It was believed that the subjective element would do justice to the personal or individual influences, the objective one to those influences which transcend the personal or individual, but one also had to find a suitable way for firmly connecting the two elements with each other. This difficulty, one which is common to any dualistic interpretation, has also not been overcome by most of those offering explanations concerning historical formations.

The distinction between subjective and objective exchange value, as postulated by classical economics, furnishes the desired opportunity to lay bare with the help of a relatively simple case the misunderstanding of which the dualistic explanation usually has been guilty. The language of the market refers to traded goods as having an exchange value which corresponds exactly to their market price and which is supposed to be the same for all market participants; a good with a market price of 100 monetary units is said to be worth 100 units for everybody without exception. Based on this linguistic usage, classical economics formulated the concept of objective exchange value, which it opposed to that of subjective use value. It asserted that the former is the economically crucial value while the latter applies to private economic units, considering the former as objectively uniform, the latter as subjectively changing. In contrast, the more recent theory has made clear that there is not, and cannot be, an objective value, that rather the objective exchange value attributed to goods is always the reflection of a personal utility experience. The so-called objective exchange value does not by any means apply objectively to everybody. On the demand side it holds true only for those who can pay the current price, i.e., for those for whom the acquisition of the good brings an increase in utility which at least offsets the decrease in utility brought about by the payment of the price. Similarly on the supply side, where the objective exchange value holds good only for those to whom the attainable price brings an increase in utility sufficient to compensate for the sacrifice which giving up possession of the good involves. The same objective market price bids some persons to buy and bids others to sell, telling all the others to stay away from the market. Among those called to the market, the price suggests to some that they buy or sell more, to others that they buy or sell less. But even to those who acknowledge exchange value, the objectively determined price gives only the proximate base and not the ultimate standard for valuation, for one and the same quantity of money — a quite different utility experience for the poor and for the rich person, for the needy and for the person having few wants or being well provided. The so-called objective exchange

value is the subjective exchange value, based on the same price, of all persons participating in exchange. It is oriented to the same objective base, the price, but for the rest its outcome is as subjectively determined as is the personal use value in each individual case. Correctly understood, the contrast between objective exchange value and subjective use value is transformed into the contrast between a multitude of parallel subjective cases and the isolated case.

4. About the Theory of the Objective Spirit in Particular

Dilthey's teachings, widespread in Germany, about the "objective spirit" in society are distinguished by the fact that they introduce the dichotomy between the objective and the subjective in the correct sense. Dilthey interprets the objective spirit as the expression of a parallel-directed multitude of persons and correctly sees the reason for the emergence in society of expressions by parallel multitudes in the fact that the human beings are of related stock. This insight yields an exceedingly important conclusion with respect to the coherence of the social system: it becomes clear that the human multitudes manage to mutually understand their parallel-directed manifestations of life. Through ourselves we understand the others. "We read" so teaches Freyer, following Dilthey, in his "Theory of the Objective Spirit" — "what they wrote, we see what they painted, we find what they built, a piece of the earth has been partly shaped by the work of their mind.... Because the course of the world has handed down to us in remnants the embodiments of this work, spirit now confronts spirit across time and space.... Because we ourselves are moved by emotions, follow impulses, act purpose-oriented, connect mental images, forge concepts, and because this structural coherence of minds, characteristic of our very nature, falls within the realm of our experience, we can imagine ourselves as partaking in the consequences of the acts of foreign human beings and can re-create what spiritual values they contain... What is foreign becomes a signpost which we are able to follow even when it does not guide us simply in a certain direction but leads us to a plenitude of heterogeneous realities: languages, literatures, states, architectural styles, churches, customs, arts, and systems of sciences."

As we will see later, such an evaluation of the mutual intellectual understanding of human beings goes much too far. There is good reason for Goethe's word about the spirit of history and the seven seals of times past, although it isn't quite as strictly true as Faust in his annoyance at the world thinks. However, this is not what above all we must reject in this exposition, rather we must oppose it because it does not fully exhaust the power of social coherence. The historical accomplishments of our own people which we continue are more than a mere signpost for us which we may follow or again need not follow. Where they seize us in all their vital strength they are like a current to which we are glad to yield because we feel its supporting power and whose superior strength we possibly may not be able to escape at all even when we are terrified to discover that it will carry us toward the abyss. If the theory of the objective spirit is to measure up to its task, it must be able to explain to us the compelling nature of historical formations* But it doesn't do this and cannot do so because it does not fully

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appreciate the energy with which the spirit can breathe life into its "objective creations." Dilthey is positive that the fact of the objective spirit can be delimited against the sphere of the actually spiritual, postulating that the "inner quality" inherent in states, churches, customs, books, and works of art is nothing spiritual. He believes it to be a mental creation of a "peculiar" structure obeying its own laws: the spirit of a certain ffjdy of law, of a certain religion or art, which are said to be manifested in the external apparatus of objective creations. Spranger's penetrating mind is most acutely aware of the tender threads leading from individual valuations to social formations, and from these back again into the individual sphere, but in the end he still comes to postulating the existence of an objective spirit "which has become largely detached from the individual soul, which encompasses it and outlasts it."

We on our part must insist that the objective creations of the spirit have their binding effect only through the mind which works them and senses them. If it should really be true that the "objective spirit" leaves the spiritual sphere, that it breaks away from the individual soul, its binding effect would be done for. What has become objectively solidified ceases acting as a spiritual tie. A church building to the indifferent observer is a mere agglomeration of stones, mortar, wood, iron, and all kinds of other ingredients, a structure which he perhaps tears down in order to put the materials to different uses. To the contemplating art connoisseur the church building may, depending on its artistic value, be an object of visual enjoyment, and to the construction expert it may be a more or less notable technical feat. To the passionate adherent of a hostile religion it may be an object of hate worthy of being destroyed. Only to the pious believer it is the church, disposing him to prayer. The fact that the whole flock of believers meet in their religious conviction makes it a firm ecclesiastical association, as the nation is tied together by patriotism, the army by its esprit de corps, the class by its sense of solidarity. The fact that the binding force of historical formations is possibly so enhanced that it squashes the individuals which it binds must not undermine our recognition that it is borne out of the spirit of the united individuals. The urge to attune oneself to the surrounding multitude, the inability to withdraw from it, are possibly so great in the individual that they motivate actions militating against his very own personal interest and do not end until the individual has been destroyed. It is even possible that this urge and this powerlessness are so magnified that as a consequence the whole multitude collapses.

Historical Formations as Power Formations

These considerations are not new to us, having already occupied us when we attempted to gain clarity about the realities of the psychology of power and of social decision-making, and in that connection giving rise to a discussion of the supra-individual and anti-individual aspects of power. If those observations were correct, the attentive reader will now be rewarded for his patience in following them, for he now has a clear road to solving the problem of the origin and nature of historical formations. All historical formations are power formations. He who understands the origin of power has shed light on the mystery

surrounding the origin of historical formations. The correct theory of power is at the same time the correct theory of historical formations, which, after all, we have to view as power formations. As power formations, they grow up by the success of the given forces by which they win dominion over the minds. They grow up by the success of the given forces without the latter being placed into the service of systematically pursued aims. They grow up not purely purpose-oriented but power-determined, with explicit and anonymous leaders walking ahead and the masses following, as formations of welfare powers, public order powers, and culture powers, as well as of supporting, ruling, and dominating powers and as partial formations which on the one hand seek to impede, fight, and surpass each other, and on the other also encourage each other and unite in a symbiosis. Having perhaps dwelt all too long upon the theory of power, we may as an offset dispose of the theory of historical formations with this brief reference.

Only one special point should still be discussed in a few words. It concerns the influence of leadership, which comes into play with social institutions in one way and with historical formations in another. Every social institution calls for overt, personal leadership. It is required in working out the blueprint, it is needed in shaping and carrying out the plan, it is called for in administering the institutions. In the case of elaborate institutional arrangements there may well be need for an entire leadership apparatus. For the varied interests which the institutions are to meet, specific leadership organizations must be active which supplement each other by vying with and superseding each other. It may even happen that a whole series of leaders are working at the same time and in succession in shaping very complex institutions, although it will always be possible to single out the decisive leaders and among these the one or the ones who are responsible for the essential features of the institution. In contrast, the historical formations without exception, in respect to both their entire make-up and the time and space of their evolution, are of such tremendous scope that even the greatest leadership figures pale before them. National characteristics basically always rest on the vitality of the people, for which the great leaders are merely the outstanding representatives around whom the masses gather. If we enumerate the whole series of great names in the history of the Roman people we thereby still fall far short of covering the development of Roman nationhood. Among all those who had a share in the formation of Christianity, the originator beyond any doubt made by far the outstanding contribution because he was the first to proclaim the idea of Christianity in words never to die away in the souls of people. But in order for Christianity to unfold and be able to penetrate the world, Paul already had to summarize the teachings, and untold later leaders as well as untold multitudes of believers had to partake of the work down through the centuries. A historical formation is not realized by the underlying idea alone, but everywhere in the social body this idea must be vitalized and kept alive. The poet's saying, "For the greatest work to be completed, one mind is enough for a thousand hands," is surely true, but of course the thousand hands must also bestir themselves, and the leader pointing ahead must be supported by the followers' indefatigable readiness. If it now happens that the work is so great that it spreads from people to people and grows through historical times it takes on ever new shapes, like

a plant which, desired everywhere, is transplanted everywhere and now must acclimatize in country after country. Depending on the varying art of the gardeners, it will be further developed, and everywhere special training schools are formed which gear themselves to the mental disposition of the masses. Here, too, Christianity gives us a clear-cut example: the one name (Christianity) encompasses many successive sects and, in spite of many external resemblances, perhaps even many kinds of religions. For this reason we will never be able to enumerate the creators of historical formations even where their growth takes place in the bright light of history. Their creation is the accomplishment of leadership and masses combined. The greatest leaders, even the commanding leaders of the soul, are also being moved by the currents of the forces whose results are the historical formations.

6. Education in School and in Life

According to Freyer's view, the remnants of the works of ancient peoples which we discover serve as "signposts" because in them "across time and space" mind speaks to mind. Indeed, inasmuch as the discovered remnants are mind of our mind we will be able to reconstruct the works at least in theory. For the modern architect it is a rewarding task to reconstruct the grandeur of the Acropolis of Athens. Thanks to the incessant efforts to fathom the finesses of Greek art, the contemporary artist is so well trained that he may succeed in making a faultless replica on paper even though he cannot hope to reproduce in marble Phidias' masterful form in equal perfection. The Greek spirit guided the hand of none of the later sculptors. Already the reproductions undertaken during the era of Rome are no longer a match for the originals. The great artists of the Renaissance who in their training had taken the Greeks as models were moved by the special spirit of their own time, and when later one tried again to approach the spirit of Antiquity one first didn't get beyond copying its empty form with a sober mind. Needless to say, a signpost only helps the person who can read it, and in order to read a signpost which is to give a clue to the great cultural continuity, it does not suffice to read the words which may be inscribed, on it, but it is also necessary to be able to bring the meaning of these words to life before the inner eye. The scholar who learns to read cuneiform characters is thereby not automatically at home in the Assyrian outlook on life. Of Hammurabi's law, only those portions become clear to us today which have the same or at least similar counterparts in contemporary life, while all the rest will remain a mystery to us. Mark Twain with precious humor wrote a book describing a Yankee driven to the count of King Artus. The book was intended to lay bare the coarse reality which is veiled by the romantic charm in which the poem enveloped the heroes and heroines as the guests at the table. It at the same time is proof, however, for the conjecture that the Yankee spirit and also Mark Twain's own mind, however sensitive it is, could not immerse themselves into the life style giving rise to the sagas about King Artus, and that for this very reason we could not comprehend the most exuberant features of the real life of that time. Modern culture owes to the Roman church as well as to Humanism the preservation and revival of precious treasures of Antiquity, without which our education would have followed quite different paths than it did. All the same, we must admit that modern man is not capable, and that the harder

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man of the Renaissance was also not capable, of turning his mind completely back to the life style of the master races of Antiquity and that therefore substantial aspects of the character of Antiquity are incomprehensible to us and must remain so forever. From the mouth of Socrates teachings have been preserved for us which strike us as an advance proclamation of Christian teachings — how can we reconcile with the mellow sentiments of these tenets that a Xenophon, author of the "Recollections of Socrates," found it to be compatible with the precepts of his master after the Retreat of the Ten Thousand to capture a rich Persian along with his family for sale on the slave market lest he have made the dangerous trip in vain, after all? At the time when Cicero wrote his philosophical essays in which the Humanists delighted, fights of the gladiators and other still more ferocious circus performances, which modern spectators would turn away from with dismay, were the order of the day.

We modern people, too, are encumbered with a great many evil habits which we ply without qualms of conscience but which would be bound to disequilibrate the spiritual life of later generations which will be more attuned to the progress of the human race. For every time and every people there exists a specifically equilibrated attitude toward life which only few of those belonging to the people at that time resist, while the masses, including in this case also a large majority of the leaders, feel reassured by it and completely adjust themselves to it.

The barbarous peoples find their equilibrium solely through the education which life furnishes to them, whereas the civilized peoples are also aided in this by formal education.

Education in school has the dual task of providing general education and professional training.

The aim of the latter is easily understood: every professional school gives students knowledge about certain social institutions and instructs them in the know-how, abilities, and skills needed in order to utilize the institutions. A war school is devoted to military facilities, an engineering school to technical ones, a theological school to spiritual matters, and a law school to legal institutions. If these schools are to attain their goals, however, they must also familiarize their students with the meaning of historical formations on which have been erected the respective institutions. This goal is missed only too often as the teacher confines himself to external aspects of the subject matter, which are easier to describe even though they cannot be grasped without the underlying basic ideas. In the case of the medical school it becomes clear that it must not confine itself to teaching how to use instruments with which the physician must equip himself but that it also must give information about the laws of the formations of the human body, as the natural scientist must do concerning the varied formations of nature outside the human being.

Instruction in the professional schools is being prepared for in the elementary school and the next higher schools involved in providing a general education. General education is not oriented to specific social institutions. It is to convey basic knowledge and to develop those faculties which must be used when one wants to rise above the most confining aspects of life. ^{on}

its higher and highest levels it is to impart the knowledge and develop the skills needed in order to find one's bearings vis-à-vis the more and the most demanding problems in life. The value of general education cannot be exaggerated, but one must become clear that school in the first place only provides the rules which must be obeyed while it does not always get around to making students sure in their application. In this respect training in school is being completed only by life's education and as soon as the latter has done its job the rules learned in school are mostly forgotten as they are no longer felt to be necessary. Now and then the rules, given the arid manner in which they are drilled into the mind, even become a hindrance to grasping the variegated configurations of life which to the novice seem to defy any rule. The young person who has learned in school how to read, write, and calculate has thereby obtained the keys to the vestibules of life. Having entered these, however, he must first learn how to move about in them, just as a traveler who has learned a foreign language must first get to know the country and in the foreign market can utilize his arithmetical skills only after learning about the prices which are current in this market. Education in school only trains the intellect and the memory; it provides instruction which must be followed by the pervasive education of life.

Education for life begins in the parental home when the child takes in food, learns to behold and to grasp, and stammeringly imitates the first sounds of the mother tongue, and it ends with death. In the parental home mother and father are the affectionate teachers, rousing the comforting feeling that an individual is not alone but finds encouraging aid. Siblings and companions in play and school are the first to introduce us to the cooperative manners. Their influence is greater than parents and teachers are inclined to admit, for a child best understands another child because it is of the same kind, and in the child awakens the ambition to do as the others do and to surpass them. What in later life makes itself felt by way of educating influences we need neither to pursue in detail nor to illustrate by examples, as it may be summarized in few words. In part it serves to familiarize persons with social institutions and in part it adjusts persons to power structures. Power is the real educator in life. While in the parental home and in school and play the power of love and of the cooperative spirit were at work, in later life aside from supporting powers — which only the most unfortunate has to do entirely without — there are all kinds of rougher and hostile powers to contend with. The powers which human beings encounter in life are not only those we have to call welfare powers, they also include public order powers and culture powers. One develops a feel for all of them on the one hand by the advantages he gains by adapting to them and on the other by the knocks he receives in fighting them. One gains experience in the psychology of "one" and thereby learns to move ^{1x} the general tracks and to align oneself with the others. One ^{out} about opportunities which still leave room for free Movement, where companions can be found who would help offer Resistance to encroaching powers and where there are leaders who

*As in "one does," "one does not." (Tr.)

may be followed on new paths. It is an immense amount of knowledge and skills which power as an educating force imparts even to the most insignificant individual if he only knows how to use common sense. Power as an educative force serves the simple man as an infallible signpost, enabling him to take the place in society which is appropriate to his circumstances. The scholar who a thousand years later reads the traditional historical works will not be able to find his way in many respects which the most untutored man of the time could take for granted because he had been educated for them.

The great majority of individuals is being educated only for the narrow sphere which is appropriate for them in a society stratified and structured according to the division of labor. They obtain no insight into the play of the great powers of the state and the people, only learning through experience about the occasions when they meet them head-on and about the ways in which they have to yield to them. While persons occupying a large sphere of activity have a broader range of vision, there is still nobody who would be familiar with the totality of the historical formation of only a single state or people. It always requires the collaboration of a great multitude to keep the system as a whole going. Although no single person can discern the whole context, collaboration is nevertheless possible when everybody knows his way around in his environment in the usual manner. This way the chain of links is closed everywhere, and the cooperation between the most populous aggregates of people with all their endless complexities can run its course almost without a hitch as long as one moves in the historically accustomed tracks, and it is even possible without too much friction to enlarge the given tracks as long as development does not push too fast into virgin ground. The view of the leaders is always restricted, too; they, too, are as much bound by historical education as they are enlightened by it. Most of them are of course contented with tasks whose aim is the improvement of existing institutions, and for this purpose it is enough if they have an edge on the masses in the use of the instruments serving the institutions. There are only relatively few who want to do more and lead the way in harnessing new forces. However, these great and greatest leaders also link up with the historically given set of data, even when they are bent on shaping them anew from the bottom up. In the end it is always decisive for the success of their leadership that they win the following of the masses for the forces mobilized by them, and this following cannot be gained entirely outside of the historical context.

X. Historical Power, Its Forms, Its Transformation

1. Entrenched and Growing Historical Power

The supporters of the existing forces cannot visualize anything other than that the existing things by the very fact of their existence justify their purpose. For them old things mean steadiness, order, strength, whereas new things denote unrest, collapse, impotence. The innovators in turn deny that there is any sense to the old things, which are said to owe their continued existence only to external power. They claim any kind of sense exclusively for the demands to which they are led by the dynamics of everyday life, but they certainly like to take the measuring standard for these demands from the airy realm of pure imagination. For them the status quo means restraint, stagnation, stultification, impoverishment, servitude of the masses, while the novel means mental and material progress, freedom, the common weal. In this connection each party proceeds in good faith, for the enthusiasm with which each feels qualified to protect those social values for which its own interests have opened its eyes also makes it blind for everything lying outside the focus of those interests. The theorist views both parties without prejudice as he regards them both as representatives of functions which cannot be missed in social life. If there were no drive for the preservation of power in society, it would have no internal stability and would be prey to disintegration from day to day. And if, in addition, there were no drive for the renewal of power, society would become paralyzed.

Of the tasks confronted by the theorist who would pursue the interplay of the two drives the one we take up first is to be as penetrating as possible an analysis of historical power.

We must talk of historical power if we are faced with a power to which time was given to exert persisting dominion over the minds and thereby to gather strength. In historical power we find the expression of a collection of forces which are active a long time and thereby are magnified to exert tremendous effect, although a single force may do its work quite unnoticeably only. Willingly or reluctantly, all the world bows to the historical power, and every great statesman includes it in his calculation the way he sees it before him. Only the ideologues do not notice it until after their extravagant ideas are being discredited by it. Sociology and historiography have given it much too little attention. Although the historians have continuously told about its impact, its nature has practically remained alien to them. Historiography which is unaware of the law of historical power can master its subject matter no better than a geology which does not take the effect of time into account. May the science of temporal events leave aside the power of time?

There are two great forms of historical power: the historically entrenched and the historically expanding power. Everything historically entrenched has augmented power if only because human beings adapt themselves to it in their thoughts and institutions, and it becomes intimately entwined with numerous other formations so that the latter also contribute to its firmness. The accretion of power must be greater still for those social

forces which gain in effectiveness with the length of their duration. As the healthy tree in the course of years and centuries can grow up to stately, nay to commanding, height, so in the course of time there may rise stately and imposing historical formations from modest social beginnings. And as the trunk of the tree, even after it has atrophied, on account of the firm structure of wood and bark can remain erect for a long time yet, so historical power, once it has accrued, can maintain itself in rigid structures for a long time still even when the generating force which was at its origin is no longer operative.

2. The Collective (or Mass) Habit

If, as happens frequently, one acknowledges the existence of a social power of habit, of convention, and of tradition, all these concepts are too narrow to cover the large phenomenon to which we have to address ourselves now. These names suggest the idea that the power of a collective (or mass') habit is a mere multiple of the power of a personal habit. But this is not so. Although the collective habit shares a certain element with the personal habit, another element raises it far above the personal habit so far that we should no longer regard it as a mere multiple but rather as something raised to a higher power. The personal habit holds its own by saving the effort of will which one has to muster for a free decision. The collective habit, however, asserts itself not only by providing to all the participants the ease of staying in the chosen decision track, but as a further and much weightier element there is the understanding that everybody must stay in his track as soon as the latter has become the generally followed one. If one wishes to stay together with others, which in social matters even the freest spirit must do to a certain degree, one must not remain entirely aside from the highway of feeling, thinking, and acting, and inasmuch as one must walk it, to that extent one must yield, of course, to its regulations which are bindingly laid down in the collective habits. The mass habit binds individuals by the fact that everybody must reckon with all "others" also feeling bound by it. Even if one wanted to change his personal style, he still has to stay with it as long as the others continue in the traditional style, and because everybody thinks this with respect to the others, all are bound. The will of every single individual is powerless vis-a-vis the general will. It would be necessary for all or at least most, to change their will at the same time in order to break the power of the collective habit.

But this very thing is out of the question owing to the character of the masses, the law of mass technique. The masses as such cannot make decisions or confer in the way this is possible within a small circle of individuals. A few neighbors may agree to change certain practices which were customary among them, but it is no longer possible to come to such an agreement as soon as it is not merely a question of usage concerning just a few neighbors but of a country-wide custom or at least one involving a whole village. Once something has become widely adopted, it continues valid for the time being simply because it is there. One might almost speak of a social law of inertia, which maintains the existing patterns of life wherever the multitude is not driven by new impulses into new directions of activity under new leaders. The good, once it has become generally

adopted, is the enemy of the better, and even the less good is the enemy of the good. Time and again this observation has offered itself to the astonishment and dismay of those who are always anxious to have everything at its best and to whom it appears to be the simplest thing in the world to bring the thoughts of millions under one hat. On the contrary, one should always be surprised to find the work of mutual understanding of millions, or even of only hundreds of thousands or of thousands, completed somewhere, without the millions or hundreds of thousands or thousands having been given the opportunity to be in touch with each other and to come explicitly to terms about their procedure. It is a publicly and widely accepted judgment today that every economic production process has its own law and that it is necessary to do without many an economic success because the production technique cannot overcome the opposing impediments at all or at least not without excessive costs that even mass technique has its law, precisely our engineers are least willing to understand. Mass technique permits people only this one kind of agreement: that they all, and indeed everyone by himself, follow the same models. This is a laborious and cumbersome procedure, where it remains to be seen whether truly the best way is being found and where the path which has the advantage of time on its side perhaps precludes every other way by virtue of the fact that it is generally used. Circumstances have to change from the ground up, and the hitherto accepted practices must be felt to be downright intolerable if a new set of practices is to come about by virtue of the fact that, as we just said, the masses are driven into new lines of action by new impulses and under new leaders, while the customary way of doing things crumbles away.

2. Sense and Custom, the Conventional

Mass technique works with the two elements of sense and of usage or custom. The layman thinks that the sense pure and simple must settle things. This is not the case at all, however, for it all depends on whether the greater success with social decisions always hinging on success — is achieved through sense or through custom. Sense stands in proximate relation to success, being the recognized practicality, the result viewed as satisfactory. Success brought about by custom, giving custom the power it has, is not so clearly perceptible. It does not lie in the subject matter of the custom where one is first inclined to look for it, but in the uniformity of usage gained in the course of time. A practice failing to meet the inherent purpose of its subject matter will nevertheless draw from its uniformity the special sense that obeying it will obviate the frictions and disturbances which any purely personal solution would entail.

The power of usage is shown most clearly with reference to the importance of the conventional in society. By this one must understand everything that is hallowed by usage but is so firmly adhered to as if it had been laid down in a binding convention. Of course, there can't be a question of the conventional having been agreed to by a formal convention. No more than state, language, or money could have originated through contract can this be the case for the rules of external custom or for any other conventional subject matter. In all probability the conventional as grown up under the imperceptible influence of anonymous leadership. in many a case it may perhaps go back to regulation

instituted by some kind of organized force, although for its validity the way in which it originated does not matter any longer. Although its sense also does not matter too much, surely the conventional must not defy its purpose: a tool for linear measurement must somehow be adapted to longitudinal relations whose measurement is called for in practice. Within this margin, however, there is a whole series of possibilities, and the conventional solution is always only one of many possible ones and often not even the best.

Let us take for example, the customary division of the year into months and weeks. By no means has it taken root because it might be the most sensible of all possible divisions. On the contrary, it is so impractical that probably a majority of people still could not feel sure which months have 30 days and which have 31*. The person knowledgeable in history can tell how this division originated, what other divisions preceded it in a preparatory fashion, and which worldly or spiritual authority was responsible for the latest arrangement. For the masses of people, however, these things do not matter at all, for them it is simply the historical power which keeps the traditional calendar in force. The naive person subordinates himself so completely to this historical power that he views the applicable names of the days of the week not as names but simply as the thing itself. Sunday, for him, is not that day of the week called Sunday, but it is Sunday, which is clearly distinguished in his view by the special custom of this day and the special feeling associated with it. The calendar which the legislature of the French Revolution measured with compasses, with its well chosen designations and its nearly regular sequence of decades, was undoubtedly more meaningfully arranged than the traditional calendar, but nevertheless its proclamation was a mistake. The revolutionary drive of the time, the belief of the French people, more specifically of its revolutionary leaders, in the victorious power of reason made it possible all right for the legislature — what no absolute king would have dared — to introduce the calendar in official use, but in the minds of the populace the latter is hardly likely to have overcome the historical power of the old calendar. At least a clever observer of that time has told that the decades did not win out against the "power of the white shirt," going without which the worker found to be incompatible with his feeling for Sunday. At any rate, the French Republic did not have the strength to force its calendar down the throat of the rest of the world, and thus in the end there was nothing else to do than to return again to the general usage if one didn't want to be limited to his own national world.

The conventional practices at first always took form in relatively narrow locational divisions. Only with growing intercourse did a uniform system assert itself over wider regions, and it most likely began to spread outward from the system of that district which dominated the intercourse. In many cases there was a need for state or ecclesiastical assistance in order to wipe out completely the old local differences. In this connection state and church probably had to engage all their power in order to overcome the resistances posed by the historical power of the widely adopted arrangements. In order to put through the scientifically unassailable Gregorian Reform of the calendar, in the Catholic world the church had to muster all of its authority: thanks to its organization being in a position to proclaim the

papal directive from all pulpits. It took some time until the Protestant world resigned itself to the good sense of the reform. In the world of the Greek Orthodox church the historical power of the old calendar still offers resistance, although the increasing importance of world communications increasingly calls for a uniform system for the entire cultured world. Even such a relatively restricted task as the change of the monetary order or of the order of measurements and weights encounters extraordinary resistances in the form of popular customs, and quite special interests must make themselves felt before the government resolves to go to war against these resistances. In spite of its persuasive advantages the metric system so far has not completely asserted itself yet, and a uniform world money for the time being has altogether no chance to succeed.

4. The Historical Power of the Welfare Powers and the Culture Powers

All great welfare powers have a strongly conventional streak. Their forms are fully entrenched, and therefore their mere use bestows upon them a historical power by which they are able to maintain themselves even if they had no further support. The same also holds true for the most lofty culture powers. Faith always acts upon the great masses also through the ritual of religious exercise, and every church knows how to use this means of exerting an effect. Pious devotion to traditional religious exercise easily accounts for as large a share in the religious feeling of the multitude as does religious conviction. Likewise ethics, law, art, and science always also have their external rules. These rules have a life of their own and continue to count with the later generations by mere tradition even when these generations don't quite understand any more why they hold true. They may even continue to be adhered to for a while after they have virtually lost their inner worth. But in the last analysis in the case of the culture powers the inner worth is still decisive, in the final analysis every cultural power rests on its sense, and the usage will prevail in the long run always only if it is corroborated by the sense. It is true, of course, that always only that sense counts which the multitude comprehends, and in the early stages of the cultural life of even the most amply endowed peoples this is a rude, almost brutal, but then again a childish, almost naive, sense. To top it off, the sense as comprehended by tribes incapable of any development strikes a mature view as rabid nonsense, the former's faith being viewed as dullest superstition, their morality as criminal brutality, their law as violence, their knowledge as stupidity, their ^{aj->t} as mere stammering. And still such a scarcely developed and already at the outset warped sense speaks eloquently to people on this level, and it helps the welfare powers, in addition to the respect which they enjoy through external custom, to gain an inner worth which gives them firm command over the winds. The cult of a wild tribe has no relation to a good and just god whom a crude mind cannot comprehend. It has a relation only to demons or to some other manifestations of elemental fear, but by this relation alone it is intimately bound up with the souls. Interference with the cult will encounter not only the Assistance of habit but the incomparably greater resistance with which instinct defends itself against everything which it is felt to be against human nature. The same kind of resistance is

offered by the mind of a low-level people against everything which for it embodies too lofty a sense. Embittered, it rejects any attempt undertaken to raise it up, resembling knee timber which cannot rise much above the earth and which one would break if he tried to raise it up to tree stature. The densely overgrown *Macchia** of unculture of retarded peoples in spite of its baseness, weakness, and impotence is an historical power. For people of more advanced development the culture powers unite with the innermost being in the most intimate way. The whole profusion of sense radiated by a pure faith, a healthy body of law, penetrating understanding, and high art is avidly absorbed by the most receptive souls and coalesces with them to a higher form of life. Every intervention from outside is felt like a painful cut into vital organs and arouses the most violent forces of resistance. A faith rooted in deep conviction defends itself with the whole force of the instinct of self-preservation.

In the growth of historical power the vitality of sense is put to the test. The historical power of convention appears to be greater because its formations often defy time in unchanged shape. This tendency toward durability proves to society's advantage where sense does not matter any more. But where a lively sense is to operate unchangeability would be torpor, and in those cases therefore the interest of society calls for, instead of rigidly entrenched historical power, a living and growing one, destroying when it creates but also creating when it destroys.

5. Historical Symbiosis

In every developed association of people there always exist and grow alongside each other a great number of historical powers with divided tasks and of greatly varying strength. Often their evolution is accompanied by obstinate fights, and while each one would like to have hegemony over the others, a battle breaks out between the strongest powers for the commanding position. So it was between state and church. But it may also be seen that powers which for a long time were battling each other later join hands in an alliance as soon as new powers spring up against which they are able to hold their own only by turning against them jointly. Thus state and church, prince and nobility allied themselves against the rising middle class and eventually, along with the middle class, against the rising proletariat. In such cases we face an external association of historical powers which may become very intimate in the distress of battle, but which under changed circumstances will perhaps soon fall apart again. The church will not feel beholden to the sinking monarchy to the end, only to go down with it, but in line with its principle to recognize the powers that be it will know how to adjust to the republican and even the socialistic forces unless these in turn declare to it *way* to the knife. There are, however, associations of historical powers which become much more intimately bound up with each other* than those which are joined together by mere alliance. One may almost speak of historic symbioses. where each

**Macchia* is an evergreen scrub found in the Mediterranean area. — (Tr.)

of the linked powers in its existence depends on being able to cooperate with one or several others. When the landlord shoulders the chores of war by which he shelters the peasants against the external enemy, and when the peasant in turn renders economic services to the lord which make it possible for him to carry on his household, there is a case of genuine symbiosis, a mutual life dependence to mutual avail, grown from success. Incidentally, even such a symbiosis may not be able to maintain its worth forever, for in history everything is in a state of incessant becoming, and if success fails to appear the symbiosis may lose its character completely in the end.

We may well find the most multifarious symbiosis in the relationship between the state and its subordinate members. The state gives its members not only armed and legal protection, but in addition also the most diverse help wherever joint force is necessary, individual force no longer being sufficient. On the other hand, it receives from its citizens in incalculably numerous ways the means for its powerful existence. All the threads running back and forth between it and the citizens have been spun and knotted historically, and the state has thereby attained an historical power which dominates the minds from every side, having in turn a flair for the need to respect on all sides the historically acquired position of its citizens.

6. The Development of the Vernacular Language

May the reader now permit the use of a particularly plain example to show how historical power maintains itself through custom while at the same time growing up and vanishing with its sense, and how eventually it adds to its weight through symbiosis. For this purpose we choose the development of the popular tongue. This is a problem being given much less attention to than the amply investigated problem of the origin of the language. As a matter of fact, this is much more in the sociologist's line, for the origin of the language leads back to the mysterious dark of the beginnings when instincts decide the issue while sociology pursues the connections in the more illuminated consciousness of social life. The development of language takes place in this more illuminated sphere.

A living language has received its historical power from both sources which we distinguished. As far as the forms of its expression are concerned, above all the words of the language, they are in the main conventional formations. Their recognition depends on general custom where the latter, to be sure, may again be occasioned by instinctive stirrings of human nature. Thus every language has certain words whose sound is a copy of certain nature sounds and which thus have their own sense of sound. On the other hand, as far as language content is concerned, it is determined by the accumulated wealth of views, sensations, and thoughts which press for linguistic communication.

In every living language form and content are most intimately connected. Nobody using his mother tongue is conscious *any* more of using conventional forms, because for him the word and its meaning are inseparably tied together. Only the stranger who does not master the language as yet has to wrestle his way through the word to its meaning, just as a stranger unfamiliar

with the prices in the host country must first call to mind the value of the sums of money offered to or demanded from him. Linguistic form becomes familiar through custom, and because it is familiar it is so firmly established that it would hardly change from within itself. Linguistic content, however, grows and decays with the historical development and disappearance of the wealth of life values which in a nation press for communication. Again the comparison with money can give us the clearest demonstration: as the volume of monetary media needed for circulation is conditioned by the wealth of economic values which change hands, so with an increasing stock of things worthy of communication more and more word symbols must be formed or, as one says, coined. A primitive people can make do with quite few and coarse word coins, but a great nation has a rich vocabulary in daily use, and its poets, writers, and orators of powerful expression know how to augment this treasure in the most precious way, either through their own creative power or by drawing on the hidden depths of popular usages, and to make it shine in the splendor of variegated change. The German farmer colonists who without ties to the homeland have settled in distant Russia, where they carry on their monotonous peasant life, have preserved the simple German from the time of their migration. In contrast, the new rich cultural substance which the German parent people had gradually accumulated required additional means of expression which the dialects having been spoken so far from district to district could not offer. The same is true for all civilized nations. Everywhere growing culture necessitated the creation of an enriched and refined language which could give expression not only to the concrete phenomena and events of a simple life but also to the new composite life phenomena and the accompanying thoughts. The raw material of the dialects had to be filtered for this purpose. At the same time, in the logic of its form, in its grammar it had to become clearer and more flexible. In particular, the new language had to discard the separating peculiarities of the dialects, for it had to speak to the people as a whole because the treasure of the meaning which it had to convey had grown and was to continue to grow in the populace as a whole. Within the narrow region of a single tribe, even the most talented, the new cultural work could not succeed; the leadership potential of the people as a whole had to be mobilized in order to manage the immense task. It is true, though, that always a specific tribe, a special region, a particular town assumed the leadership role and, being the culturally most saturated part of the commonwealth, was the first to "take the floor," urged on by the wealth of meaning of which the heart overflowed. As other segments of the population avidly absorbed what new things this part of the population had to say, along with the contents the dialect which it had been able to elevate to the status of the written language became a national possession, subsequently to be augmented and refined by the contributions flowing in from every side. In this manner the Florentine language became the foundation of modern Italian, but in the end it was still necessary for all the good minds of Italy, from the north as well as the south, to work together in order to complete the Italian cultural language along with Italian culture. The same is true for France, England, Germany, and every other civilized nation. For them all the miracle of the millions of people in a nation speaking the same language could become a fact only because the leading minds of the whole nation, motivated by the same endeavor, created the language in which they talked to each other and because the

masses following them on their cultural paths confirmed the new written language as the national language.

In the case of the peoples of central and western Europe the rise of the new national languages has a particularly instructive counterpart, the extinction of Latin, which hitherto had been the cultural language of the Occident and whose lively basic ideas they absorbed so that soon it became a dead language in turn. Until then Medieval Latin, without the constituency of a state or people, had nevertheless been a living world language which couldn't be missed because in the barbaric vernaculars of that time the cultural content of the then existing world, scanty though it was, could not have been conveyed. A corrupt language when Medieval cultural life was at its nadir, Latin during the educational buoyancy of Humanism rose again to magnificent purity, only to become a dead language with the collapse of Humanism. After the Humanists had completed the task of scooping out classical education — for which the Occident had only now become quite ripe — clear down to the bottom, the foundation of national culture had been laid in such breadth that this culture now could grow up of its own accord. Next to the ecclesiastical education a modern lay education had sprung up which soon outgrew the former and essentially derived its dynamism from availing itself of the national cultural language and therefore wasn't oriented any longer to a narrow and segmented group of people but, speaking to the people as a whole, could maintain its vitality by involving the people and complement itself from the growing awareness of popular culture. Everywhere all of the educated strata and, increasingly through school and life, large numbers from the uneducated strata have been familiarized with form and purpose of the written language, which in never ending communication is transferred from one generation to the next. Today it is unthinkable that a force could ever rise which would be strong enough to weed out all the widely ramified root fibrils of a living cultural language. A living cultural language can lapse only with the culture of the people with which it is united in a widely ramified symbiosis. As long as the nation maintains its vigor, the language also remains vigorous. In the era of nationalism the historical power of the national language is invincible.

• About the Law of Small Numbers

The significance attached to the recognition of historical power for the understanding of history and society is shown by the fact, that it gives us the key to explain the strange occurrence so often encountered, namely, that the few can maintain dominion over the many. It is the problem of the Law of Small Numbers, as we called it at an earlier point. For the man on the street there is no other explanation for this problem than force. But how should the one ruler marshal the force to impose his will on the collective? He can prevail against the material power of the masses only if, in addition to the power of the street, he may dispose of, he can throw some kind of moral element into the scale. This moral element is his historical power as it accrues to him as personal and even more so as dynastic power. Likewise an aristocratic regime or the regime of a "master" race always derives an essential portion of the dominion

it has over the minds from the increasing power it has acquired in the course of history.

No history of a people gives us as clear an insight into the growth of historical power as does the history of the Roman people, which was the strongest master race of Antiquity and probably of history altogether. Let us therefore trace the process of growth of Rome's historical power in its main features in order to develop by this grand example the Law of Small Numbers.

The Roman people could not have made its triumphal march across the world unless it had been superior to every one of the peoples with which it had to grapple in the course of the centuries. Needless to say that the strength with which it entered into history could not be great enough to brave at the same time all peoples which it subjected little by little. At first it even was at a grave disadvantage vis-a-vis its neighbor to the north, the mighty Etruscans, and even vis-a-vis the kindred Latins, its neighbors to the east and south, it did not have a clear-cut advantage. It took centuries of hard and eventful battles before the Romans had warded off the Etruscans and had subjected the Latins and subsequently the bravest tribe in central Italy, the Samnites. Only when after further battles, during which the outcome was on the razor's edge, the Carthaginian rival had been cleared out of the way did the later conquests in the larger world follow each other more easily and quickly, for only now the Roman superiority had become evident. Rome had become the center of a great state, ever increasing quantities of power resources were assembled with it, the world victor, ever more allies and subjected peoples were at its disposal, and it could increasingly concentrate its forces on the riches which kings and free states all around had accumulated and now had to surrender to the victorious city. Decisive, however, was the fact that the Roman people had been given the talent to grow itself along with the greatness of its circumstances. It didn't remain a mere warrior people as most other victorious peoples, but it knew how to set up an admirable legal system for itself and, notwithstanding all the arbitrariness of many of its governors, for its subjects as well. During the uninterrupted sequence of victories the Roman master disposition developed into a master will which could set for itself the highest goals and, in addition to its military mastership it acquired masterly skill in politics which fully exhausted the sense of rule. Has there ever been a political corporation concentrating in it so much experience and, aside from the most unhesitating recklessness, so much foresight and cleverness as was the case in the Roman senate? Tremendous, too, had to be the effect of the countless victories on the circumstances and the disposition of the subjected peoples. While mighty Rome kept ever growing in power, they were disarmed, impoverished, and, what counts for most, deprived of their organization, leadership, and self-confidence. Who could still hope to prevail against the world victor? Now and then a tribe here or a region there revolted, but the Romans against any [redacted] would always employ, aside from their own strength, the reserves of the whole empire. The Romans had gradually subjugated so many countries that within their realm they were only a distinct minority against an outsized majority. While Rome could easily have thrown down an alliance uniting all the subjected peoples, all the historical preconditions for such a pact were absent. Absent was any precedent for

such a pact, absent was any mental attitude which could have created such a tradition, and among the vanquished peoples hardly any national consciousness was left, let alone a connection between one people and another. As in the magnificent road system of the empire, Rome was the center to which all roads led, so also for the minds of the world's people Rome was the hub to which everybody bowed in subservience. The word of the Roman poet "vos non vobis," unbeknownst to him may be applied to Rome's subjects: "You exert your strength, but you toil not for yourselves, you toil for your masters." They all served the victor with their energy, adding to his power, while he could claim the lion's share in war and peace of the jointly achieved success. According to the external calculation of population figures, the Romans in their empire were a very small minority against an overwhelming majority, but according to the moral calculation which is politically decisive, they held the absolute superiority. At the height of its power Imperial Rome was much more superior to the peoples of the Mediterranean Basin than the original Rome of the kings had been superior to its neighbors; it had won unprecedented additional historical power. As long as this historical power remained intact, the Law of Small Numbers had to hold true.

The more the historical power of the Roman Empire grew, the more also grew the power of the leaders within Romanism. Along with the enlarged circumstances the significance of the military and political leadership relative to the performance of the masses also grew. It was the leaders whose political experience made masters of them, they alone understood the rules of the political game, and it was they, therefore, who played the great game while the simple citizens became the dice in their hand. The winnings from the game became ever more lucrative the more the power of Rome spread over the lands of established wealth, and of the great prizes the leaders were able to retain for themselves an ever larger share. While the mass of the citizens deteriorated in the wars without end, the will to rule on the part of the leaders grew all the more strongly. Eventually the citizens acquiesced in also getting intoxicated with the splendor and for the rest having their vital needs being taken care of. From then on with the Romans — and this is repeated with every victorious people experiencing the same course of events — the moral calculus carried weight which we just had to examine for the victorious people vis-a-vis the vanquished and for the nobility vis-a-vis the masses, for whom the nobility in the sequence of victories supplied the leaders. In this way the populace of the leading nation also comes to know to its disadvantage the onerous meaning of the "vos non vobis," with its attribution favoring the leaders in advance, as well as the Law of Small Numbers. At the outset the populace still is in a privileged position as compared to the subjugated, but once it loses the idea of its inner solidarity and is held together only by means of its leaders, it also sinks into the depths of the subjugated and along with these is dominated by the aristocratic class which through its historical power is enabled to bring the Law of Small Numbers to bear for its benefit.

The dominion exercised by the minority composed of a class of economic leaders must be construed in the same way.

Monarchical rule is the perfection of the Law of Small Numbers. The paramount military and political leader who was able to eliminate all powers, the external enemies as well as the internal rivals, becomes the autocrat because all minds have been taught to bow before him and because nobody knows of anything but that all power is combined in his person. The often cited saying, rightly or wrongly attributed to Louis XIV, "The state is I," expresses most concisely and accurately the facts of the monarchical state. All connecting threads of a people converge with the monarch, and therefore all power is his. Everybody hears it from somebody else that he holds everything in his hand and that nobody can prevail against his superiority. He uses the energies of all persons against all, and in the general view they are imputed to his power. He is the absolute ruler because he is the uncontrolled master over the minds.

8. The Historical Power of the Church

We are now also in a position to solve definitively the problem of ecclesiastical dominion, which appears to be still more difficult to get at than that of the worldly dominion of the small number. May the reader excuse if on this occasion we come to discuss once more many things which we already had to mention in the section about the culture powers. The subject is so broad that it deserves and demands to be illuminated from several sides. Is it not astonishing that the unarmed church won out against the secular power for some time? The widespread popular explanation in this case cannot rely on superior power; it makes do by referring to the deceit which the church is said to have perpetrated vis-a-vis the innocent minds of the multitude, an interpretation in which it is impossible for us to find comfort and which presumably we don't have to refute either. Aside from all the arts of leading astray and of moral misuse to which it possibly resorted, the church was in need of genuine and overwhelming moral strength in order to defeat the weighty material forces which stood against it. Close observation of the development will tell us that the church had indeed been given from the start such overwhelming moral strength and that indeed such strength was inherently capable of leading the general social development through more than a millenium of continuous growth. The church represents the greatest example of a growing historical power. Due to the unusual dimension of circumstances, the power of the church is of course a special case, unrepresentative of the general type. In no other case will we find in combination all of the characteristics which we observe with the church, and perhaps we will not see again elsewhere so clearly any one of these traits which appear here under the magnifying glass of history, as it were. We therefore have to apply every bit of caution if we want to use elsewhere the insights gained here, but nevertheless the case of the church will do more than any other to enhance our understanding of historical power.

We must take as a point of departure that the power of usage or convention, however much the church leaned upon it in later years, still takes second place only in the accumulation of its historical power. The sense is the rock on which the church was built. Usage was derived from sense in the first place, and as soon as we see the church in decay we recognize that it falls

into decay precisely because the rock of sense crumbles away which empty usage cannot permanently support.

The church received its sense from the idea of the other world and of the realm of God which Christ had taught. Never before had a novel idea so struck the human soul in its very core. To the soul a new world had been opened up of whose unfathomable truths it could not get enough and compared to which all the splendor and wealth of the material world came to nothing. When the founder of the Christian religion had become a victim of persecution, his teachings continued to live only in a quite small circle of poor and simple persons in a corner of the Roman Empire. The idea of the realm of God, however, had so seized the soul of the disciples that it could remain alive in them although the leader was dead and that it inspired them personally to leadership and through them and alongside them aroused new leaders, including the mightiest of all apostles, Saul converted to Paul. For all that, this deep emotion of the souls is not like one of those ecstasies which sometimes seize the peoples and pass quickly, but it became a lasting state which, though sometimes slackening in lassitude, in the depths of the souls to which it penetrated roused the most potent forces. Above all, from it the church gathered the strength to assert itself against all the persecutions by the all-powerful imperial Rome until it eventually gained imperial recognition and, superior to the state, even outlasted the collapse of the empire. The work of elaboration of its dogmas and of its rite occupied the minds of the people incessantly through centuries and centuries, and the task of their spreading continued to occupy it to a degree best judged by the popular movement of the Crusades. In a memorable transformation, Christianity later turned to the secular concerns from which it had first turned away completely. But its power over the minds was not diminished thereby, for Christianity now found its compromise with the material values of life as well, and by knowing how to spiritualize these, it gained new power over the minds. From the sense of its goal in the beyond it gained a sense of the life in this world which gave human beings the strength to overcome the despair of the collapse of the old world, the crowding catastrophes of the Migration of Nations, and the confusion of the endless struggles of reconstruction of the state. The newly found sense of life found its most radiant expression in medieval art, though there was no aspect of life into which it did not penetrate. The church was the leader in the realm of ethics as well as that of external custom, in the realm of law as well as that of careful administration, in the realm of science as well as that of the economy. No external force could be so capable of transformation and so fertile as was the internal force which gave birth to Christianity and which out of the depth of the souls dominated all the paths of the souls. All developments which filled the lives of the peoples were creations of the church or had originated under the protection of its blessing hand, and even for the work of war it had to implore the favor of heaven. There never has been a power which could have dominated the minds more completely and which could have been connected with the configuration of life in a more fertile symbiosis.

Every growth of life, therefore, meant a growth of ecclesiastical power. Against the omnipresence of its power, external power as wielded by secular rulers through the terrors of their

arms did not prevail. The church obtained the crucial preponderance against them all by being the general church, the world church which held good for all peoples of the Occident across the state boundaries, an all-encompassing association which by virtue of its general scope alone already appeared to confirm its divine institution. Thus the secular arm was at its disposal in order to enable it to support its power with its means of coercion. In the struggle against the medieval imperial order it remained victorious, for it remained upright and grew whereas the imperial power atrophied after many a humiliation. If one adds what the church was able to gather in riches from the gifts of the pious, it can be seen why it was capable of maintaining itself for a certain time merely on the basis of its historical power, even if it should have lost all of its internal power. But so far this has never happened, for notwithstanding all its deprivation, a necessary consequence of almost unlimited power, even in the worst of times there was in clergy and laity still a widespread, blindly devoted faith, however much dull superstition may have been admixed to the pure sources of faith. When from time to time the movement threatened to ebb, from the depth of the souls there always erupted a new suree of that emotion which, dating back to original Christianity had not come to rest as yet. The holy Francis of Assisi, who more than a century after Christ roused anew the spirit of piety, is more closely akin to the originator of Christianity than any of the saints who had appeared on the scene until then. With an artistry of organization which we may well view as the legacy of Roman statecraft the church has known how to draw benefit for its firm hierarchical structure from the ever recurring stirrings of the religious sense by associating with the priests of the world monarchism in ever new variants. Visionaries going too far it disposed of as sectarians, and, viewing its unity as its strongest bulwark, it did not hesitate to apply to them in the most cruel fashion the means of both spiritual terror and of secular strength.

The power of the church decayed as soon as the strength with which it dominated the minds was no longer up to the unfolding of the cultural forces. First it alienated the minds by the degeneration of the spiritual life and especially the depravity attending the abuse of the power of its high office by the papacy. Protestantism was at first a moral protest, but it was still more, for otherwise the church, as it had done quite often before, could have won back the minds through purification from within. At that time it did not spare any effort in that direction. As never before, it subjected itself to a reformation of head and limbs, teachings and practices, but to no effect, as it was unable to return the Protestant north to its ways. The Germanic peoples in the north at that time had outgrown the sense of life as the church had interpreted it, and in turn it did no longer possess the strength to participate in the new sense. It ceased being a growing historical power, and from now on had to content itself with remaining an entrenched historical power. The Protestant spirit severed the symbiosis into which the church had united faith and life. It purified the faith, but at the same time it gave freer vent to vital energies although it, too, continued to derive from faith the purpose and essence of life. From now on the Catholic church had to share with the Protestant churches the dominion over the minds. It is true that even before it had to share such dominion with the Greek Orthodox church, but the new division had a much more severe effect

because it concerned the peoples of the Occident who alone embodied the vigor for growth. Much as the Catholic church may have lost its efficacy in the process, it must not be overlooked that Christianity through the Protestant churches gained access to the mind of peoples whose development it otherwise would have been unable to follow any further.

Only much later a new antagonistic force arose which at the same time, though to a lesser degree, threatened the Protestant churches: the force of modern scientific thinking. Under the influence of this new internal force the historical power of the Catholic church has suffered more severe damage than it did as a result of the gravest assaults to which it had been exposed before. It is clear that the power which put Galilei, and with him simultaneously modern scientific thinking, on trial was freer rein to knowledge, the Protestant churches couldn't do so either. But who might be able to say whether of that first emotion of the souls there has remained an impulse enabling a purimore? The greatness of the historical power which the Christian churches still possess today, in spite of all the losses sustained, gives them at any rate an unequalled opportunity in the human mind for a new ascendancy.

9. The Power of Historical Memory

A people having risen to historical power is fond of recalling its successes and the men having made these possible. Historiography in telling about its victories and its heroes thereby bows before the greatness of historical power even if it should not recognize its nature. Peoples which after a time of powerful independence have lapsed into dependence in their historical recollections save for themselves a last vestige of the old historical power which may become a strong prop for them when during more propitious times they strive to regain their freedom. The monarchical idea, which had maintained its historical dominion over the minds of the masses, has served the Irish, the Poles, the Czechs, the Magyars, and the Serbs as a beacon to new ways of wielding national power. The ambition of the leaders had been excited by the traditions of past grandeur, and they found the task of carrying the masses along as followers on their ways made easier by the fact that these ways were familiar to these masses at least in their memories. The more deeply rooted and the more widely spread the recollection, the greater the willingness to follow on the part of the masses.

10. Transformation of Historical Power

As the human being changes in progressing from childhood to the completion of physical and mental growth, so it may be said of every living, growing power that it changes during growth, for by gaining for itself additional forces, it is changed in appearance and substance. In the case of decaying powers one might speak of a retrogressive process of transformation which corresponds to the retrogressive transformation experienced by human beings in their advanced age, when their physical and mental

energies vanish. Historical transformation of the most pronounced kind may be said to occur when during growth the whole character of historical development changes because, in addition to the means at its disposal, the goals after which it strives also change. Of this kind is the transformation of the wild warrior tribes into peacefully becalmed working peoples. It won't be so easy to recognize in the Romanic and Germanic civilized nations the descendants of the barbarians who, beginning with the Gauls of Brennus and the Cimbri and Teutons, terrified the Roman world. Nevertheless, even this development took its course in a strict sequence of transformation, and fundamentally the pure strength as it finally appeared in radiant splendor had been implanted in the souls from the beginning, as the vital energies brimmed over in mad Prince Henry to which King Henry V owed his triumph at Azincourt.

The transformation of power within a people frequently takes place in such a way that newly rising strata bring new leaders to the top. Thus the rise of the middle classes as well as of the proletariat has elevated new leaders, other people from other circles who exercised their power under new forms of freedom. Here it may occur that the old leadership powers remain intact for some time in their external appearance while in fact they have already lost their hold over the minds, which turn to the new, more successful leaders. The enfeebled dynasty of the Merovingians continued to occupy the royal throne through several more generations while the rising majordomos fulfilled the official duties of the ruler until at last they partook of the throne's external dignity as well. Not infrequently the letter of the law is also upheld for some time yet while the meaning attributed to it becomes different because it is applied to different facts of life under altered distributions of forces. In this way occurs the transformation of the constitution to which a well-known teacher of public law has called attention. The content of religious and moral laws as well changes in both intensity and direction under the influence of new life contents while the letter of the law remains the same.

That change of leadership power under which the old rulers retain power but accommodate themselves to the new forces which appear in life is of special importance for understanding history. The existing leadership group by dint of being in power is given the favorable opportunity to attract to itself the newly emerging forces. It enjoys the advantage of time, it is in place before the young leaders are, and the new dynamic groups, unless they are downright opposed to the status quo, in their own best interest first turn to it as the established power in order to lean on it and to receive its protection against the many resistances which everything new is bound to encounter. At the royal courts of Louis XV the royal physician Quesnay proclaimed the Physiocratic economic doctrine which became one of the roots of liberal and even of socialist economics. The popes founded and protected the universities which later were to become the seats of free learning. The ruler who has a good nose for what lies ahead will use the opportunity to prepare for it in good time. When the native forces flourished in the economic and educational realms, the wise prince recognized that his rule must no longer be directed against the populace. Confronted with the choice of either retaining the traditional oppressive form of government and thereby jeopardizing its power or of changing direction and

assuming the leadership of the new aspirations, the European princes during the transition from the Middle Ages to the New Era sooner or later, in a more obliging or a more guarded way, internally responsive or reluctantly pressed, in a major change of attitude practically everywhere chose the constitutional way. Where princes in their narrow-mindedness, arrogance, or inertia missed taking advantage of the favorable opportunity for change, they had to pay for it in the end when the rise of the masses occurred over their heads. The depraved way in which Louis XV dissipated the historically accumulated capital of the French kings made the impetuously growing forces of modern France fall prey to the revolutionary leaders. The papacy owes its rise to world dominion to the memorable transformation which we had to discuss in detail already before. In contrast to the more meditative way of the Oriental church, the Roman church transposed its goal from the other world to a spiritual life here on earth, being able thereby to be the supreme leader of the Occidental peoples through the centuries during which the latter began to unfold their intellectual energies. Can it not be seen clearly with the radical and even with the revolutionary strata as well that, once they have come to power, they experience a transformation designed to get rid of their excesses and to reconcile to their cause the persevering forces of the people which they have to take across into the new state of affairs? The socialist, having attacked capital as a tool for exploitation while the capitalists held power, becomes a patron of capital when, having attained power, he sees in capital the indispensable tool for success.

One likes to explain historical change by evolution and revolution. The transformation, as we understand it, comprises something more than mere evolution, which only implies growth as it occurs in the course of development. Transformation at the same time implies adjustment of the old forces vis-a-vis the new and also of the new forces vis-a-vis the old, a mutual adaptation of forces which is much more important than the much discussed adaptation to the geographic or the external milieu. A revolution comes about when the carriers of the old or of the new forces are too unreasonable or too obstinate to decide upon an adaptive transformation of power.

The adaptive transformation of power assures the continuity of historical progress. The transition from the violent states of affairs in early times to the later state of culture in large part took place, to the good fortune of mankind, through adaptive transformation of power. The rude external powers of coercion prevailing in early times in large part united through peaceful change with the aspiring internal powers. Even in the revolutions the acts of violence accompanying them did not decide the issue, but lasting success could always be achieved only by a genuine transformation by which the clashing parties after severe frictions in the end made up again.

XI. Historical Leadership

1. The Willingness of the Masses to Follow

The fights within the state by no means always agitate the whole populace. Very frequently they occur only between the leaders and their immediate adherents, while the masses do not participate in them and do not even have to suffer from them in all cases. In his "Six Centuries of Work and Wages," Rogers relates that the battle lasting for decades between the Red and the White Roses took place during a period when the English peasantry enjoyed the highest prosperity. The fighting parties carelessly abstained from damaging it, and, according to Rogers, the House of Lancaster had to pay a high price when the Burgundian mercenaries of Queen Margaret committed transgressions in the countryside which had the consequence that the peasants now championed the House of York. Although the masses did not take part in the battles, they readily put up with the decision on the battlefield and became as submissive to the victorious House of York as they were previously to the House of Lancaster and later to the House of Tudor. Through all epochs of rule by force we meet with the same trait of willingness of the masses to follow the changing wielders of supreme power, where, to be sure, we have to abstract from the stirrings of disobedience and resistance which interrupt it from time to time. The willingness to follow is the historical consequence of the pressure which rule by force exerted in connection with the establishment of the state, while in the case of the small, freedom-loving peoples of the dawn of history the masses had reacted strongly against force. Only at the time of advanced development do we encounter again the sense of liberty of the democracies which is being newly awakened by the surging force of the mass movement. In the case of completely exhausted peoples, the willingness of the masses to follow is magnified to the point of complete subservience. The daily meeting with all the "others" who submit to the rulers even in the case of strong spirits does not permit the striving for freedom to really assert itself. Once the propensity to subordinate oneself is found in the masses, it continues to act through social autosuggestion by spreading the poison of helplessness through self-intoxication in the social body.

Whereas the English peasants were willing to follow the victorious branch of the ancestral House of Plantagenet, they would have offered determined resistance to a usurper with no blood ties to this House or to a foreign conqueror. The same is true for the willingness to follow of all peoples which have not become degraded to the point of submissiveness. Being conditioned historically, the willingness to follow always benefits only the historical leaders.

The historical autocratic leaders were elevated by the fact that during the period of the founding of states the job of fighting, in which originally all freemen of a people participated, gradually became the business of the nobility and their retinue, while for matters political the church supplied counselors to the prince. The multitude of free persons was over time increasingly absorbed by the tasks of making a living, which it could not slough off without jeopardizing its existence. Therefore the national disputes and decisions occurred entirely within

the leadership class, and the masses had to accept the resulting consequences just as they had to resign themselves to whether the sky had rain or shine in store for them. Within the historical leadership class, personal leadership might then assert itself, or else the historical power of the dynasty might win out, and decisions might result from personal or group rivalry or they might be arrived at through peaceful settlement — always the masses were equally willing to follow unless there were entirely new turns of events which affected their interests or habits too drastically. Every leader who brought his influence to bear within the historical leadership class could feel assured of the multitude's willingness to follow. In the case of historical leadership, the personal selection of the leader is preceded by the selection of the leadership class.

It was also possible that within the historical leadership class a quite specific leadership institution was historically determined without the masses having to exert influence on it. The Roman class of Patricians, by and by joined by the capitalistic knights, after the traditional republican leadership constitution was no longer sufficient for the needs of the worldwide realm had to consent to the institution of the empire which created the leadership genius of Caesar and educated his heir Augustus. As a result of the historical circumstances, this institution was so rigorously demanded that it held good to the end of the realm, although only a quite small number of emperors called to the throne possessed sufficient personal talent for leadership. The nature of the call could only in very rare cases be adequate to the principle of personal selection. Most useful proved to be the nomination of his successor and co-emperor by the emperor himself, who had to be quite sure of his power, however, in order to be able to pass it on. Not only was selection by the people out of the question, but the times were too troubled for selection through inheritance to become the rule. In the majority of cases selection occurred through military power, the dominant power of the time. In this the Pretorians initially had the lead because they immediately surrounded the throne, and later the legions which were stationed in the provinces also intervened. They proclaimed the leaders to their liking emperors, whereby the idea of personal selection as a rule became deprived of all its good sense. Between the provinces the arms had to settle the issue, but notwithstanding the endless disruption resulting from the battles by the rival emperors, the imperial institution remained intact because it was required by the circumstances. The victorious emperor could always count upon the willingness of the masses to follow, and even the least fit and most unworthy of the selected emperors remained in the driver's seat as long as no rival emperor was found to bring their days to an end.

The power of historical leadership also gradually asserted for itself the whole system of leadership hierarchy. The entrenched hierarchy of offices has great staying power, and even a strong ruler will not be easily able to revitalize and even cleanse it, but in the main will let it stand as it has been historically formed. With a majority of persons employed in the military and civil services, even the most sincere effort will never succeed in placing the right persons in all the slots, and placing incompetents into jobs will now and then be unavoidable. Here the saying applies that the job will create the right

person for it. Although meant in jest, it also carries the more serious implication that the parties have to subordinate themselves to the office, whether or not the holder has the right mind for it. This is a demand made by mass technique which, as things now present themselves, one won't quite get around because the desire to fill every post of an extensive hierarchy of the offices with the right man can never be met. In supplying the necessary efforts for this, which by the way could never be completely successful, so much social energy would be lost that it is more prudent to accept in individual cases now and then a less capable or incapable public servant. The fact that the office demands leadership is a certain advantage, though, and it won't be fully offset any more by the fact that leadership selection won't quite succeed all the time.

When in their ascent the masses achieve freedom, their willingness to follow doesn't cease at all. The interests of the party point out the objectives to the party leader, but the multitude of party members in their turn must be willing to follow if leadership is to succeed. Within the party the comrades must harmonize the individual having to take his proper place in the multitude and to be ready for collective following. A special compulsion for readiness by the masses is exerted by the fact that the companions now pay heed that everyone go along with the others; the organization compels general joining and consistent procedures. It is part of the tactics of the parties to resort to the means of autosuggestion of the masses. One seeks to vie with another in public displays which turn into formal parades designed to demonstrate publicly the strength of the parties, similar to the military review of earlier days, though the latter couldn't help impressing the public more deeply because it was the monopoly of the prince. And doesn't the willingness of the masses to follow find clear expression on the occasion of political elections? The electors of each party readily cast their yes vote for the slate of names presented to them by their leaders, and besides, casting the ballot is an implicit declaration of one's willingness to follow the chosen leader.

A power group having succeeded in seizing the apparatus of government will enjoy the willingness of the masses to follow until the forces for counteraction have been assembled. Given the cumbersomeness of mass technique, this takes a correspondingly long time. Wise leaders will avoid damaging the multitude by useless conspiracies, as attempted by the most passionate among the malcontents. The men of determined ferocity do so through attempts on the life of the ruling persons or a system of terror vis-a-vis the especially prominent representatives of government power, but this only elicits all the more severe reactions on the part of the rulers for which their power provides them with the necessary means. Gandhi in India, where the English can't be got at by force, attempts peaceful resistance, a form of passive resistance which cuts off following by the masses. The final decision is prepared for by the quiet work of public opinion, which deprives the ruler of the people's mental disposition to follow them, until some day matters have developed to the point where the rival leaders have won the willingness of the populace to follow, so that they may dare doing battle or perhaps don't even have to really fight any more. The restoration of the Stuarts by General Monk provides an example for this.

In other than political relations, the willingness of the masses to follow also has its great social importance. The power of the churches is based on it, also the power of capital vis-a-vis a proletariat not yet conscious of its strength. While entrepreneurs fight each other as the cliques of nobility or dynasties did in bygone days, the victor in the competitive struggle may always count on the rush of workers nutting their services at his disposal as they did vis-a-vis his predecessor. The self-conscious organized work force launches a strike designed to secure the willingness of the masses to follow until it has become possible to improve the conditions for following. While the historical leadership power of capital is not canceled by this temporary restraint, it may still be notably diminished.

2. The Dynastic Power

Where the dynastic sentiment is alive, the willingness of the populace to follow is not bestowed on every holder of the throne but is oriented to the hereditary dynasty. This is the classical example of historical power. Dynastic leadership is historical leadership, it is initiated by a great leader or a family of leaders which through a few generations successfully performs the leadership tasks. The continuing success of the dynasty wins for it dominion over the minds, and in addition allows it to accumulate power resources sufficient to permit the holder of the throne to meet his understandable desire to transfer his position to his heirs. Inheritance title takes the place of personal leadership selection. The heirs of the throne need not all have the same stature as the founders of the dynasty, nor could they all fill the bill as many of them lack every talent for their high calling while still being able to hold their position. In this connection the dictates of mass technique are instrumental to no small degree. Since this technique demands the leadership position, the fact that there is a top leadership clearly regulated by the legal system is felt to be an advantage in public affairs which it isn't so easy to resolve renouncing even if in a given case the position should not be properly filled by the person of the leader. It means much that succession de jure will spare the populace having to face the struggle for the leadership position. To be sure, to make this possible there must exist an adequate apparatus of leadership hierarchy, and the legal and administrative system must be such that the Prince is relieved of the bulk of the burden of service, which automatically continues in its regular course. If the holder of the throne performs the rite of governmental affairs, it is easy for him to deceive the rank and file of the gullible populace into believing that he is indeed the leader walking ahead. In this way for some time, provided that the tasks at hand are not too difficult, the well-established office of the leader may replace the personal leader without shaking the willingness of the masses to follow. Dazzled by the splendor of the office, the masses at least for a while may be deluded as to the insignificance and even the unworthiness of the person occupying the throne. As soon as the principle of legitimacy has taken root in the minds, the most magnificent success of a great minister will not suffice any more to elevate him to the position of the prince which the latter occupies by succession, for the minister could not count upon the masses' willingness to follow him. A

Richelieu and a Bismarck performed their great feats in such a way — and could do so in no other way — as to subordinate themselves to the legitimate ruler as his advisers. Standing in the background, they were the personal leaders of the historical occupant of the leadership position. Only when the historical leadership of the dynasty fails will choosing the leader through personal selection be able to come into play again, even for the top management of the state.

3. The Papal Power

Papal leadership, too, can only be understood as historical leadership. The Holy See has sometimes been occupied by decrepit and incompetent and even by wicked men but its splendor was so radiant in the Catholic world and the hierarchical apparatus continued to operate so efficiently that the papacy lost nothing of its prestige with the broad masses, although surely the judgment of a Luther could not be deceived when he beheld the Rome of the Renaissance. The pope's position is so consolidated historically that it accommodates even the evil pope, while a great pope occupying it will create a downright extraordinary impression. Of course, the pope is a historical leader through his office even when he does not have an authoritarian leadership personality. His power has its ultimate support in the historically cultivated readiness of the Catholic multitude to subordinate themselves to the pope, elected as Peter's successor. Even the weak or unworthy pope was made powerful by this historical fact, and it was given to the strongest popes, who believed in their spiritual leadership calling, to appeal with maximum effect to the existing willingness of the masses to follow. It was thus possible that Gregory VII in Canossa forced the ruler of the German Empire into submission and that Innocent III erected the papal rule over the world. The readiness of the masses of believers offered to them the technical support for their leadership role, as does the dynastic way of thinking for the dynastic office.

The cardinals choosing the pope, knowing all of his weaknesses and perhaps having been bought off by him through criminal simony in order to get their votes, as soon as he has been chosen are no less overwhelmed by the historical weight of his position than are the multitudes of the Catholic world. The election of the pope by the cardinals is something different from leadership election by companions, for the election not only makes the chosen one the leader within the small circle of the College of Cardinals but raises him up to the seat of Peter and elevates him to the succession of Peter, visible to the whole world, high above the heads of the cardinals, who thence have ceased being his fellows. As soon as Sixtus V was elected he became the terror of the College to which he only just had belonged.

4. The Anonymous Powers as Historical Powers

The anonymous powers are historical powers. By the historical education of the masses they have become so entrenched that the willingness of the masses to follow has become commonplace and a matter of course. Mass technique again has contributed its share to this result. Every individual senses as a relief that

by general custom he has been exempted from the need to do his own reasoning and whenever practicable is protected from social frictions and collisions. One gets over the fact that here the enjoyment of the peculiarities of one's own nature is diminished where the advanced public affairs do no longer quite permit the individual a contemplative lingering. The greater uniformity of English and American conditions relative to our continent is founded in the speed with which material advances are made there. One has the feeling that time is money. The stranger coming from Europe to the United States only gradually finds himself capable of adjusting to the often pedantically and minutely regulated public order. In a number of American cities on September 15 one puts away the summer straw hat and dons the winter hat, and this "one" doesn't mean just "high society," which in America doesn't set itself apart from the rest of society, but the whole public, including the petty bourgeois, and the worker, and the farmer out in the countryside as well. Changing the hat on such a fixed date gives people the assurance of being able to find the needed hat ready for sale in stores. The bunching of demand saves costs to the seller, and the buyer benefits from this as well through a lower price. In addition, one is sure not to stand out, as it may happen if one wears the summer hat too long or pulls out the winter hat too early. The newly arrived visitor, not knowing yet the cadence of American society, may in this case hardly deem the advantages of uniformity to be important enough to make it plausible for him how the custom could have become so generally binding. Nor can its compelling power be explained by the circumstances of this single case, but may be explained only from the whole context of American life. By its sweeping conformity this life must be geared to making possible their orderly movement for a rapidly growing number of millions of people and a still more rapidly growing number of material values. As the masses must be prepared for uniform following on a large scale, they are so also on a small and smallest scale.

The willingness to follow the anonymous powers is such as to create the impression that a person acts of his or her own free will. But it isn't, and can't be, so. It could never have occurred to millions of American city dwellers to change their hats precisely on September 15: one would have done so earlier and another one later. The exact concurrence of the date clearly proves the intervention of a social command of pronounced rigour. It happens that people who do not conform to the date get the custom-offending hat knocked off their head. This is an excess of crass arrogance, which again proves the power of the general custom, though. One sees in the conduct of the person infringing the general custom a disdain of the social will, which calls for blunt punishment. The same respect of the social will which here manifests itself so coarsely and insolently exerts its anonymous power to the benefit of society in the most important aspects of life. Law, ethics, and freedom must be in a happy state where the public everywhere is so rapidly and emphatically present in order to put into their place those who offend the general commands.

Anonymous powers can never be lacking in leaders. Those persons in a crowd who sense their direction most strongly are the natural leaders of the rest. In order to point the correct way by their example they need not possess exquisite leadership

qualities, because their leading the way is not in search of new goals, but they continue to advance on proven paths, and by their determined perseverance they keep the masses together on them. For this purpose it suffices that in one respect or another they rise a bit above the average. Whereas the strong leader is needed for a truly new accomplishment, the anonymous leader with his more limited strength will suffice because he sticks to the historically tested and can count upon the willingness of the masses to follow. Most of the anonymous leaders would hardly have the courage of walking ahead if the power of tradition had not made them sure of themselves and if they didn't hold the firm expectation that they will not lack the backing of the masses.

The anonymous powers grow up little by little. The commands given by them have not at all been the common property of the multitude in their totality and from the beginning. Perhaps they counted only in the minds of few excellent persons or only in the higher strata, and perhaps it required the uncompromising intervention of a spiritual or secular lawgiver and many years of strict discipline in order for them finally to become deeply rooted in the masses. For numerous prescriptions of more refined custom we can retrospectively trace with great clarity the path they had to traverse from the cream of society all the way down to the depths of the populace. The development of writing was the admirable work of generations of leaders, and even after a people's system of writing had become consolidated, its use for a long, long time still remained the secret of a narrow group of adepts who starkly stood out against the multitude. Today the children of the poorest are duty-bound to learn how to read and write, and in its schoolteachers society has available for elementary instruction an army of lower-level leaders who rise little above the level of anonymous leaders. In many middle-class families the mother provides her children with the rudiments of knowledge, as a truly anonymous leader following good tradition. With every cultured people the luxury laws have long become unnecessary. A large majority is no longer in need of them because the historically accustomed-to anonymous powers suffice in order to preserve a life style of healthy customs.

Where anonymous powers have entrenched themselves in the depth of the masses the social system becomes steady and secure. With peoples of reduced or otherwise scant vitality the danger of torpor or standstill looms, whereas with peoples who still have the strength for further development the steadiness and security of the foundation will be an advantage for development. One is protected against precipitate turns where the conservative sense of the masses refuses to follow. The historical line of development has been drawn for once, and the progress one makes moves in the same direction. A people whose national character has been formed historically has its line of fate marked out by it. It can enjoy life to the full, but fundamentally it cannot change its ways anymore. Its leaders will have to be nationally oriented in order to find the masses willing to follow them, conditioned as they are by the historically active anonymous powers. Not that the anonymous powers are incapable of any development! In a people capable of development they, too, register progress. Anonymous leaders do not reject everything new* of course. Examining and weighing carefully, they accept what

can be combined with the tested old because it is of related character. When the masses imitate the successful model, the historical stock of power- of the people is enriched.

XII. The Historical Work of Force and the Law of Decreasing: Force

1. From "helium omnium contra omnes" to the Free People's State

While according to Aristotle man is a social being, Romain Rolland's Clerambault refers to present-day man with his high level of culture as still a beast of prey. The two assertions, however sharply they appear to contradict each other, can nevertheless be reconciled, and history can be understood only if one knows how to reconcile them. Man entered into history as a beast of prey, but in himself he already had the calling for a social being. The work of history consists of the gradual transformation of the predacious animal in man into a social being. This education, which could be initiated only by the firm pressure of force, as practiced by predatory man at the dawn of history, is still far from complete, and force still has an essential share in it even today.

In the preceding sections it was already discussed what tasks force has performed in the beginnings of history. Let us briefly recapitulate these arguments in order to show subsequently what work it continued to attend to and is still attending to.

The first communities of life of human beings were hordes, herdlike expansions of the family, who were united by consanguinity. These human hordes were not capable of the kind of expansion found with animal herds. They were much more demanding than, say, the bee or ant populations or the buffalo herds which feed on the grass of the flowering plains. On soil not yet developed by the achievements of culture man needs much space in order to find the necessary food, and from generation to generation the additions of new blood have to break away from the mother tribe in order to look some place afar for their subsistence base. The separation need not be prolonged for the sentiment of consanguinity to ebb away. Only too soon the hordes have become strangers to one another, and the struggle for existence which all have to wage against nature drives them to an all-around battle of horde against horde, which is the true historical manifestation of that bellum omnium contra omnes, of that fight of all against all, of which earlier political scientists talked. When forests or fishing grounds yielded no food, what was more natural than to obtain the loot from the neighboring tribe, which did not deserve mercy because one had to fear that it would start preying itself as soon as distress or greed had led it into temptation! Thus the law of force was introduced into history.

It is this law which opens the path from family to society. In this sense the craving for the neighbor's possessions, for his land, and for his wife is the first social stirring. However, as long as the victor still exploits his victory to exterminate all the male offspring of the enemy, one still remains within the narrower concept of blood association, the decisive turn toward society being made only when the defeated enemy is turned into a slave. The strong victorious people which subjugates large numbers of peoples couldn't help growing weary of exterminating its adversaries and had to recognize

advantage in having; the subjugated persons perform work for itself. The idea to recover by the work of another person, and to augment one's own strength by the strength of the other, when it first emerged was not antisocial, but it was the constructive idea of society. Now states could be founded, world empires could spring up, the chaos of incessant and fruitless wars on a small scale could be resolved by development on a large scale. In a first crude selection by sheer force the weak peoples are definitively rejected while the strong ones are lifted up. By a more refined selection subsequently those among the strong peoples who are capable of raw force only are separated from those of noble stock who have in themselves the calling for culture. and from this derive the superior forces without which a state cannot endure. Attila's realm falls apart with the death of the brute who founded it, and nothing is left but the rubble of endless destructions. Alexander's empire is divided up among his weaker successors, but it nevertheless remains intact in its components thanks to the vigor of Hellenic culture. The realm of the Roman people through centuries dominates the Mediterranean basin and, like before it the Greek city states, lapses only when the people's strength to use the sword flags. But until then, what a blossoming of the finest forces of the mind! The power of the sword and the vigor of the mind mutually served each other. That the small nations of the Greeks and the Romans could conquer the world was possible because their warlike spirit was at the same time the carrier of antique culture in comparison with which all other peoples looked like barbarians, but for their culture to have blossomed as it did, it took the fiery breath of battle and the sun of victory. What straining of every nerve of the people was indeed necessary to endure the war against the Persians and Hannibal, and what an excess of vital energies had indeed to be set free after victory had been won! In this struggle a matchless work of historical self-education was completed, no less severe than fertile, and the triumph of victory pulsed through the most magnificent works of sculpture and architecture which the world has seen.

Young peoples of noble stock which have taken possession of old cultural realms complete their self-education by imitating the attainments which they learn by observing the vanquished. Conversely, the defeated barbarians lifted themselves up by the great models of the victors which they saw before them. By means of the language Greek culture spread in the east of the antique world, nay, it was even able to intrude into the educated strata of the victorious people of Rome while Roman culture nationalized the west. The community of language and custom; the security of internal peace which united all the vanquished and relative to the earlier war of all against all was only rarely interrupted by extortions of governors and sporadic revolts; the economic prosperity during peace; and the diversity of intercourse throughout the vast realm brought home the noblest fruit of historical education, namely, general confidence and common sensibility. The noblest fruit of common sensibility in turn was the feeling of humaneness which flourished alongside a purified religious sense. As in all world empires, in the Roman empire, too, a world religion developed. In this succession a necessity, a law, is hidden. The Roman sword had to pave the way for Christianity, for people would have had no ear for its message as long as they were separated by the insurmountable wall of foreignness and were torn by interminable fights. Even later when the church had

already grown powerful it was in addition to the sermons of the missionaries whom it sent out to the heathens still in need of a sharp sword.

It follows that without force not only the task of the founding of states but also that of the creation of culture could never have been initiated. Only through force was it possible to overwhelm the defiant sense of independence of the barbarian, and only through force was it possible to pacify the vast expanses in which millions forgot about being strangers and began to view each other as fellow-citizens, as fellow-beings, as individuals. It is, therefore, understandable that the old historiographers tell us only about battles and state actions, about princes and generals. At that time the fates of peoples were primarily decided on the battlefield, and it was force which then shaped all the pervasive social powers. Only very gradually, alongside force, did the spirit of culture grow strong enough to be able in its turn to shape pervasive social powers which increasingly filled the foreground of the world stage. Historiography which tries to confine itself to the history of culture misses the gist of the millenia which had to be fought through before an assured level of culture had been won which could be maintained and developed without resorting to force.

The more force and culture interpenetrate, the more the originally rude manner of force is transformed into finer shapes. At the outset, in its wild beginnings, it aims as shown earlier mercilessly at the destruction of the enemy. Later, after having robbed him of whatever there was to be robbed, it is content with subjugating him. Finally, however, it finds forms of subordination which permit the victor to exploit the enemy on a continuing basis so that his power grows at an increased pace. At this point force passes over into coercive leadership. The ruler demands from the subjugated masses, and enforces, a following in the form of all kinds of tribute which he just happens to find serviceable to his purposes. This is done by the lord vis-a-vis the slave or vassal, this is done on a higher plane by the ruler or the ruling class vis-a-vis the subjects. Whereas the lord still keeps the slaves under bondage because mistrust makes him restrain their strength, the ruler has risen to the idea of personally letting the subjects go where they please and, by letting them develop according to their type, to augment their performance. Enlightened absolutism marks the zenith of leadership by coercion, coercion becoming a means of advancement. Charles the Great or Peter the Great were still tyrants in whom violence and greatness were so combined that they were viewed as mighty by their contemporaries. Frederick the Great or Emperor Joseph are leading rulers who deliberately devote themselves to tasks conducive to promoting their domination. Enlightened absolutism is judicious egotism of the ruler who understands that his own power grows in proportion to the strength of the populace. The enlightened prince claims leadership as his dynastic personal right, bestowed on him by God but at the same time imposing on him the duty to use his power for the benefit of the state, which he always interprets from the viewpoint of his power, of course. When he appoints the top civil servant of his state he nevertheless does not want to renounce his right to govern, being convinced that he has to have an unlimited right to the office in order to attain complete success. He does not shrink from developing the strength of the

populace, for he expects the people to comply with his wishes in grateful loyalty and that success will enhance his authority. To implement the measures designed to promote the welfare of the people he doesn't hesitate to resort to coercion, for coercion appears salutary to him. To be sure, it is predominantly legal and moral coercion with which he strives to attain his goals. Is it not natural that in its historical time leadership by the ruler accomplished a great task? In this leadership force becomes aware of its constructive quality. The egotism of the ruler, by allying itself with the public weal, succeeds in reaping the largest possible political return as long as the aspirations for freedom have not come fully into their own yet. During this time it performs the role which later, when these aspirations have fully developed, the egotism of producers in a competitive market performs. Incidentally, a competitive streak is by no means absent in political life either, but it is the competition for the external signs of power which imparts to the egotism of the ruler its passionate tension.

A great many peoples, including all the Asiatic ones, have been historically ruined by one form or another of coercive leadership. Soon the people under the burden of their sacrifices became exhausted. The ruling families became excessively powerful, and soon these became enervated themselves so that populace and ruler fell prey to new despots. This fate also befell the European peoples of fine stock during Antiquity as their historical task overtaxed even their energies. The peoples of modern Europe, which could continue to build on the foundations created by them, were better off, and for the most part they were able to preserve the physical and mental health necessary in order to advance to the height of despotic leadership and thence on to the democratic state. With these peoples despotic leadership had completed state building to the extent that a democratic constitution could follow and had to follow. It had performed its historical task by having trained the subjects for their civic duties whereupon their civic rights could no longer be withheld from them. In society the law of greatest strength holds true, and as soon as the citizens had been educated for life in the political community the greatest strength was lodged with them. The transition to a free state subsequently took place partly in a peaceful transformation with abandonment of their prerogatives by the ruling dynasties and classes, which willingly or unwillingly yielded their place to the rising popular movement, and partly by the use of force. But force was on the side of the populace as soon as the army had become aware of its popular origin. One way or another, the princely realms everywhere were transformed into national realms, and at the same time the courtly or lordly culture turned into national culture, carried by the intellectually leading stratum of the middle classes. The modern national cultures are full-blown cultures, in substance and splendor by no means less important than the most brilliant lordly cultures of the past and superior to them by the fact that they are not peculiar merely to limited favored strata, but belong to the whole educated populace and can bring to fruition all the forces dormant in the depths of the populace. In the free people's state, not only does culture get a firm base but the state itself is more secure in its existence. As long as the state was geared to a narrow ruling class its fate had to be tied to that of this class. When its vigor was exhausted — and it couldn't help exhausting itself in the endless battles which it

had to fight to maintain its rule — the state came to an end as well. The energy of a great people united in peace is likely to last for a rather long time. If the Roman world empire had been national world empire, the realm of a freely united nation, it would have repelled the assaults of the Goths and Huns, of the Franconians and the Vandals, no less forcefully than those of the Cimbri and Teutons, at a time when the ruling Roman tribe was still in its prime.

2. Coercion in the Free People's State

Even in the freest people's state there is a task reserved for coercion. Freedom is not absence of rule, as certain mad enthusiasts have thought, and a free people as well must marshal its total strength for a series of life objectives. This calls for unity, which cannot be guaranteed without compulsion. It defies all probability that millions of human beings can arrive at their decisions without friction if everybody's decision were entirely at his discretion. The free people's state is distinguished from the autocratic state in that it is an association by force which fundamentally coheres by moral coercion, whereas the autocratic state fundamentally was held together by external compulsion. The communal spirit, which binds together the association by force, in turn is exposed to the pressure of strict social powers. The will of the individual vis-à-vis the state is not as free as is his private contractual will. One still yields to the state's power, but the latter is now devoid of everything violent, everything brutal, and appears in the mellow form of moral or legal force. One is born into the state as an association by force, and once one belongs to it one has to go along with it on all its collective paths. The minority must yield to the majority if the state is not to collapse, but where community spirit really prevails the minority submits willingly, of course. The poll for elections and in the parliament is a more civilized form of combat: the parties no longer compete with arms but with words, and since the latter, of course, are almost always spoken on behalf of one's own party, they ultimately compete with the numbers of their adherents. The parties must be completely at one with respect to the love for the common state — and this they are, indeed, under the rule of the communal spirit — in order thus to replace the war with a mere war game. Where they are no longer at one, the gambling table is upset, and the earnest of arms must again settle the issue. Then force again does its job.

He who sees through the realities of political life and imagines to lift the veil of the customary clichés sees how extensive is the addition of force under which quite many of the states exist which have provided themselves with their constitution under the pure democratic formula. Not infrequently the majority rules by force or, even worse, only the will of a minority greedy for power and posing as the majority counts. To exercise their franchise according to their own will is something for which the masses in many places have not matured yet. How, after all, could they have after a history which through generations has taught them only dull resignation? A historical education of the kind which brings to maturity the innate strength of the people has been obtained only by specially privileged peoples, and even within these for the most part only by the privileged

classes. Many voters do not participate in elections at all but, as long as they are not challenged to the utmost, they are willing to submit to any ruler chosen by election; they are the dead mass in the populace. Even of those voters who cast the ballot many are nothing more than mere ballast which moves back and forth depending on the inclinations of the ship of state. For many voters the franchise is a right whose exercise taxes them far too much. One is able to exercise it according to its true sense only if one is able to fulfill the crucial function of the masses, which is to control the leader. How rarely is this the case! Whole groups of voters submit without resistance to the means of force used by an unscrupulous despotic government, or they blindly follow the slogans given to them by a demagogic leadership which knows how to bait them through flatteries, deceitful words, and irresponsible representation of their proximate narrow interests. To it one might apply Faust's saying about the weaver piece: "No voter knows what he is voting for." The election, which according to the law is to be free, is not only unfree for all groups of voters who evidently are under external constraint, but also for those others who fill out the ballot under moral constraint or — as often it would be more correct to say — under the immoral constraint by the leading companions. For the latter the election, which is supposed to be secret according to the law, takes place in the public eye of the party accompanied by the most efficacious controls which a people-oriented leadership can devise. Where this is the case, the democratic constitution in its effect must be converted from a liberal one to one characterized by the use of force, and moreover to a coercive constitution which, relative to the coercive constitutions of the strong old times, has the peculiar feature that an inferior minority coerces. It is clear that such a state of affairs becomes untenable in the long run, but still society cannot get rid of it any more by itself but requires a democratic Caesar type in order to accomplish the change with violence and cunning. When such a Caesar learns the tricks of demagoguery he exercises its power in order to release the inhibited prolific energies of the populace and to bring to bear again the forestalled law of greatest strength.

In free states club activities have become free. In the strict autocratic state things were different. A prince who really wanted to be the absolute ruler in the end had to destroy the corporations of the elites, except that even the strongest prince could never fully dominate the church.. But although the autocratic state was lacking in political associations, professional associations and other interest groups were all the more frequently represented. They all had to have in them some element of coercion in order to be able to keep their place and their cohesion in the bustle of life. From the sexes and the casts to the religious orders and the guilds, everywhere there was the same drive to keep aloof from alien matters and to commit oneself through firm rules which derived their compelling force from an enhanced community spirit. Our modern associations in the legal form of clubs have become quite loose formally in that joining and leaving are free and members by exiting can always get rid of their legal obligations. Nevertheless, in every viable association there operates a moral constraint which is supported by a feeling of solidarity. Not merely reflection but the social instinct alive in every group demands that one not disassociate himself from his companions. Even the weaklings, never

absent from any group, who are too undecided or too indolent to go along of their own initiative, are swept along by their environment, whose movement is imparted to them and which by the way has at its disposal the strongest social means of coercion, namely, the judgment of the companions. The individual likes to absolve himself from his social duties, content if only he can enjoy the social advantages, but of his companion he demands categorically that he fully meet his cooperative duties. To allow another person free play militates against the rationale of the crowd once it starts moving. As soon as the cooperative sentiment has been passionately aroused it is prepared to push the constraint of solidarity to the extreme of physical terror, and the internally pent-up excess of energies will then be violently discharged externally. In political rivalries, within the parties and even more so between them, there is always passion involved, and correspondingly there is at least some kind of elbow law[#] in force, with the provision that when all is said and done one may proceed to the use of open force.

3. The Law of Decreasing Force within the State and the People

In spite of all these admixtures of force which still continue in a free state and people, in surveying the course of centuries and millenia one may nevertheless notice that the development within the state and the people obeys a law of diminishing force. When force creates and expands areas governed by a tolerable peace, the seeds of law and morality planted deep within human nature receive an opportunity to unfold more freely. In mutual communication one learns how to control himself and to respect the other person, and one realizes that in the long run legal prudence is stronger than force and that genuine willingness to abide by the law is smarter than subtilizing reasoning. The victory of law over force takes place most drastically in the city, where a capable population through the success of peaceful work achieves freedom and prosperity. The people who reside and are active within the precinct of a town congregate as citizens. Subsequently sentiment and name of the citizen of a city extend to state citizenship, and the sentiment of a fellow citizen is elevated to that of a fellow-being as soon as the world's religions gain ground in the human hearts. But where law and morality are binding, there is no longer any need for force because they discharge the tasks of force more comprehensively, more purely, and more lastingly. The arms which can now be dispensed with are at rest and fall into disuse. One does without self-help, which the completely free man at the dawn of history had practised as being in accord with nature, and the rulers of the state contribute their share to promoting the feeling of peace by disarming the populace for the sake of their own power. At the end, as a result of human beings trusting each other and getting along together, peaceful work becomes so much the normal state of affairs that walking about in arms loses its sense and that even lords and knights who are still permitted to bear arms do so only for decorative or symbolic purposes, until in the end they likewise discard them. The great political parties also gradually learn to adjust to the state of peace and to

of practice of jostling for position. - (Tr.)

wage their battles without bloodshed, although from time to time they may experience relapses to the use of force. When the power ambition of the state impels it to raise the tribute demanded of its citizens in treasures and blood the scope of public legal duties expands, and at the same time the idea of public legal duties takes deeper roots the more citizens feel inwardly committed to the state. Here, too, the mode of coercion turns into legal form. Now the feeling develops increasingly to be duty-bound not only to the individual person one has to deal with, but also to the abstract, invisible general public. The sense of duty develops most strongly in public office. The state has the greatest interest in committing its employees during war and peace as firmly as possible. Externally, it provides them with a position of prestige which in their professional arrogance they not infrequently abuse, but on the other hand it subordinates them strictly to its directive control. Every developed state has performed a great task of historical education by knowing how to encourage its employees — abstracting from isolated exceptions which can't be avoided — to fulfill their official duties in an impartial and selfless manner. The true officer and the true public servant have a strong feeling of professional honor, and fulfilling their official duty to them becomes a duty of honor. What one could say of competent nobles by the phrase, "noblesse oblige," they could express for equally good reason in reference to themselves by "power obliges." What it means to summon up the ethical spirit demanded by the duty of office comes out clearly when a revolt drives experienced functionaries from their posts and puts in their place men whom the revolutionary ferment has catapulted into prominence and who now administer the office with all the arbitrariness of factious spirit or even of personal lust..

In its final development the duty of office in the princely state binds the prince himself as the highest servant of the state, a designation which, though it often has remained an empty phrase only, even then clearly brings to light the great change effected by the law of decreasing force in the course of time. How long has it been since princely rulers could flout with impunity the nearest moral precepts, as far as their person was concerned? Who in the world should have prevented them from doing so? The church, which alone could have done so, was magnanimously tolerant of the prince who showed affection for it. The Italian prince might use bandits without any scruples. He could, as far as female members of his family were concerned who had violated the honor code of the house or were suspected of having committed this offense, practice arbitrary administration of justice of a kind which was not too far removed from murder while absolving himself of the command, "You shall not commit adultery." Still more striking was the fact that even the most haughty nobility and the populace exonerated him; the princely mistress in many countries had almost become a fixture of the state. In no profession was the command, "You shall honor your father and mother," violated more frequently and more grossly than in the princely one! How often, indeed, did it happen that in his irresistible greed for power the son reached out his hand for the crown of his father! The rising prestige of general morality is proved by the fact that in the end even sovereign families had to pay at least lip service to it and that the ruler himself, unaccountable according to constitutional law, could no longer disregard it publicly.

4. Relapses into Force within the State and the People

The historiographer must not close his mind to the observation that from time to time the peaceful development of state and people is interrupted by terrible relapses into the use of force, as evidenced in civil and religious wars. The opportunity for resorting to force is present time and again as soon as a new stage of development must be cleared where it is necessary to overcome resistances of the old historical powers which are not willing to adjust to the sense of the times but only bow to force, after all. As was explained in an earlier passage, even ideas — such as the religious or the freedom idea — which in their nature are peace-oriented also tend to win through by strife, if there is no other way. Such relapses into force, which burst out of an atmosphere of peace are viewed by sensitive observers as proof that human nature is repugnant to peace and cannot get away from its predatory-animal disposition. But precisely in such cases it is apparent that force is used only as an expedient in order to succeed with the idea of peace to which the heart clings, and, after all, force is called off no sooner than its task has been accomplished. The French Revolution and the subsequent dictatorship of Napoleon are a classic example of the job which must be accomplished by force in order to elevate a state to a new stage of development which is blocked by internal and external resistances. On this occasion the revolutionary passion spent itself to the limit, and it required the imposing authority gained by Napoleon through his victories to rearrange the unleashed forces. The world echoed with force, and to the people who experienced that catastrophe, even to those of the following generation who still felt its consequences, it appeared as if force had never been more violent. But compared with the historical task which had to be done in order to found and consolidate the French state, the period of the Revolution and its taming by Napoleon, as well as his own despotism, were nevertheless only a short postlude. The Revolution of 1848 and the second empire of Napoleon III interfered still considerably less with the given pattern of life, and Boulanger's attempt ended as a farce. In the case of a cultured people, as soon as force has cleared away the obstacles standing in the way of the great movements, the populace of its own accord turns away from the tyrannic leaders and switches over to the leaders of peace again.

In a closed nation state the fight altogether is no longer aimed at destruction but exclusively turns around priorities in national life. Since it is felt that the national interests are intimately entwined, the fight cannot last too long, and it must end with an accord concerning the order of precedence. No state which formerly was nationally united has been torn to pieces by the religious wars raging in it. In spite of all the religious battles England has remained England and France France, and even Germany has remained Germany. Although in every significant stage of development it may require force to put through definitively the constitutional change which mirrors the new circumstances, although dictatorship may be called upon from the right and the left in order to let blood and iron settle the issue, in the end that great statesman will be proved right who employs blood and iron exactly up to the point only which is necessary to unfold all the inner energies of the highest powers of peace. There is no doubt that the national history of every people which preserves its physical and mental health will end everywhere with

the victory of the powers of peace over force and that the interventions of force necessary to clear away obstacles in the way of the powers of peace will become increasingly rare and short..

5- Force in the Class Struggle

Will the class struggle, underway for quite some time in the culture states and having here and there already ignited open civil war, eventually also ebb away into a settled state of civic peace? The souls of the haves already before the World War were very seriously worried, and since the upheaval anxiety has been augmented most briskly. A relapse into force is expected, one more serious and lasting than any ever experienced when culture was at its height. Stirred up is not only the worry about property and the orderly course of economic events, but also worry about culture as a whole and about the ethical system. The fierceness with which the class struggle is being waged in places where it has broken into the open gives rise to fears for the worst if it should become general. Will not the postulate of a law of decreasing force be fundamentally belied once things have taken such a turn?

However they may develop, one must realize that here, too, force does not burst out of some indomitable ferocity of human nature, but that it is a new social task which calls for the use of force because its peaceful attainment has not been possible as yet. This new social undertaking is not launched by the proletariat but is initiated by capital, and the movement of the proletariat with its incidents of violence is nothing but the reaction to the pressure of force which capital exerts in carrying out its task. But the capitalist entrepreneur, too, when exerting such pressure doesn't simply act from crude selfishness, but he feels urged to it as a social innovator. As human nature happens to be, the accomplishment of the task calls for the use of force because there is no other successful way, although it must be admitted at this point that human beings have not yet attained the level of moral development at which the task could be accomplished on friendly terms. The miraculous achievements of modern technology promise returns whose dimensions make the economic interest vulnerable to temptations vis-a-vis which this interest will be able to preserve its moral equilibrium only when the advance of social morality has caught up with the advance of social techniques.

The new social task which the capitalistic entrepreneur has to accomplish resembles in its objective and evolution the task of the founding of states, however different the circumstances otherwise may be. The transition from dispersed small-scale production units to extensive ones — a transition which, according to the socialists, must end with a standardization of the whole economy — in the economic realm performs the same process which in the political realm took place in battles fought through centuries for the integration of many small states into a large one. As there, so here, too, the transition to greatness and unity must be brought about by force because the resistance of historical power cannot be overcome in any other way. What happens in the economy under our eyes is a repetition of the typical historical accomplishment of force. The forces of nature detected by modern science are of such large dimension that they

must be utilized on a large scale if the extravagant potentialities they open up are to be brought to fruition. Why does the majority of manufacturers and wage earners not have an eye for the present possibilities? Why had it not mustered the initiative and the courage to develop large enterprises out of small beginnings, as was done by stray manufacturers and wage workers who were lifted up from the rank and file by their bold and enterprising spirit? It can't be the ownership of capital pure and simple which bars the manufacturer or the wage worker, for how many successful entrepreneurs have indeed begun with the smallest of means! The capital of the large-scale enterprise for the most part has been accumulated only as it kept prospering. Why has the majority of manufacturers and wage workers not joined together in cooperatives when singly they were too weak? As in the process of the founding of states, in the case of this economic process, too, the majority of individuals are not able to come to a decision of their own in taking this path to large dimensions suggested by the nature of things. They are too much attached to the habitual small scale to be able to leave it behind of their own free will. As in the development of the state, in the growth of the economy, too, the walking ahead of strong leaders is necessary. Also necessary, in order to overcome the obstacles in the way, is extreme coercion and — one must not shy away from the word — force. The number of casualties who fell by the wayside during the economic march toward bigness, the total amount of suffering involved, border on the colossal, no different from the political battles. Whereas different weapons were used here than there, the wounds are equally deep.

Of the costs the entrepreneur must incur, those for wages account for such a significant share that it is understandable if he is particularly anxious to cut down on this expenditure. It is not the profit motive alone inducing him to this. In the bustle of competition he cannot help using any practicable means. In addition, he has a very strong desire to accumulate reserves from the increased earnings because they increase his equity and permit expansion of the firm. Finally, an added consideration during the early years of large-scale production was that it was easier to depress wages than to reduce expenditures for tangible things where one had to reckon with the hard resistance of matter itself. During the beginnings of large-scale enterprise the labor market was exceedingly unfavorable for the workers. It was the time when the labor market was glutted by the industrial reserve army, which when machines were introduced was fed by the unemployed who were thrown out on the street by industrial reorganization. The workers had to put up with being paid lower wages for increased hours of work and to acquiesce in the most miserable living conditions. Only gradually did conditions for the work force, or at least large groups thereof, improve, and this especially after they had learned how to organize. Now entrepreneurs had to find out that the resistance of human strength is more substantial, after all, than the toughest resistance of matter, because it has the potential of switching from defense to attack. The organized proletariat proceeded to attack all along the front of large enterprises and won SUCCESS upon success in the matter of wages as well as of work time and general working conditions.

Is it astonishing that the rise of the proletariat began with passionate violence? State and society for a very long time failed to do a great many things while doing all too much whereby the ethical substance of the proletariat was allowed to go to the dogs. Lassalle knew very well what dangerous force he conjured up when he started agitating among the German proletariat. He put it emphatically in the motto which he placed in front of his work, "Capital and Labor": "Acheronta movebo," meaning "I will set the underworld into motion." If he had not set it into motion, somebody else would have done so in his stead, because the proletarian masses were so ready to leap and strike that they couldn't have lacked a leader. As far as the capitalists were concerned, they couldn't stem the movement either. The newly opened possibilities were too tempting not to have pressed for action regardless of any misgivings: a force had been stirred up which was stronger than any worry that it might shake up the social order. In spite of all apprehensions capital continued its irresistible work of economic construction, which at the same time is economic upheaval. As in his time the lord had degraded the peasants to the status of landless workers, so the manufacturer now pressed down the independent craftsmen to the wage-earning class wherever large-scale enterprises crowded out those of small and medium size. At the same time capitalists drew to their enterprises additions to the population, failing to take into account that by concentrating them in their plants they also pointed to them the way of how to get organized as a class. The increasing dominion of force, the decreasing impact of law and morality are necessary concomitants of this economic transition — it would be foolish to deny this. But it may provide no small comfort to recognize that what takes place here is not an outbreak of indomitable ferocity, but that the presently experienced relapse into force, like other historical relapses before, has been challenged by a new task which occupies the present time. With that there is hope that as soon as the new stage has been definitely achieved and society has adjusted to it in accordance with the given situation, the passion of force will die down and social morality will rise to the heights making possible a peaceful arrangement.

How the economic process now going on may come to an end, how much its pace may be stepped up, what the new system may be like, are questions which we will not take up in detail. We are satisfied to be able to state there is a prospect that this process might end in the same way with the victory of law and morality over force as did the process of the founding of states. For that matter the final decision may again be accomplished through blood and iron, but with every people keeping its physical and mental health — to repeat the point made earlier — it is likely that again the great national statesman will be right in the end who resorts to blood and iron only to the extent necessary to unfold all the inner strength of the highest peace powers. Strong individuals have a stormy youth but just the same a level-headed old age, moved only rarely by passions any more and, if so, not from the bottom up. It is just so with the strong peoples as well. In their early years they rage along in battles while in their maturity they put their strength to peaceful work. Although changing times may later on at one time or another entangle them in battles, the law of highest strength will still lead them back again to peaceful work as the most fertile force as long as they preserve their physical and mental

health. Their battles will be exceptions from the rule of life, as are illnesses surmounted by a strong body although in the process this body may, depending on circumstances, require the assisting scalpel of the surgeon.

6. The War of the Civilized Peoples and the Command of Charity

The relationship of peoples to one another, even the relations between civilized peoples, are different from those within an individual people. It is true that the civilized peoples are so dependent upon the returns from their labor and their capital that as a matter of fact one should believe they would be interested in avoiding war as a disruption of their economic activities. But it isn't so. Wars between civilized peoples are still so frequent that they can't be viewed as exceptions; rather do they belong to the regularities of life, as do storm and rain after sunshine and calm. One is always prepared for them. Not only that, but the right to engage in war is deemed to be an unrenounceable right of every strong people, and many of the best men of every nation hold that a people's vitality would flag if war did not bring it to its highest potency time and again. There is altogether no doubt that fighting the barbarians and semi-civilized peoples is permissible: the civilized nation in this case absolves itself of every war guilt because it prides itself on the noble task of spreading civilization across the earth. Although predatory war, and unjust war in general, between civilized peoples are despised, the opportunity for just war is present whenever it is desired because every people is its own judge in its matters. The historiographer will be hard pressed to find in the long series of wars which have been waged between civilized peoples one where not both parts asserted the justness of their cause and where not each of their churches invoked God's blessing on their just cause. The populace has always liked to interpret such wars as a matter of the dynasties, and public opinion was absolutely convinced that wars would come to an end once the populace was in control of the state. But the expert historian could hardly have any doubt that even democracies would not swear off war without further ado, and the World War has proved irrefutably that the dynastic war in all its regularity is dwarfed by the international war which the World War, if not in its origin at least in its devastating expansion, turned out to be. Isn't it indeed the peoples who conduct the civil wars which are much more abhorrent than the military wars; isn't it also the peoples who have imparted on the religious wars their cruel obstinacy and fury?

Laborers like to accuse the capitalists of war. It remains to be seen whether the workers will not likewise have the will to conduct war once they have become masters of the state and of the economy. Martial spirit still runs in the blood of the great masses as long as they have not become exhausted yet. They still regard valor as the typical virtue of man, and for them war is still the ultima ratio for the determination of the fates of nations.

Before the World War there could be no room for the idea of a common world mission of the civilized states, and no room has appeared for it since then either. No state feels to be a member of a world empire, each takes care of itself, and when it enters

into agreements with others, this happens in its own best interest and under scrupulous safeguarding of its sovereignty. There is still less room for any sentiment of a personal nature, as, for example, pity between states. This would be almost against the nature of things as they are viewed all over the world, for the foreign state appears to the general sentiment of the populace not as the sum total of human beings of its own kind but as an entity of a supra-personal and hence impersonal kind. Most easily the state assumes a certain personal character in the sight of the princes when these know and trust each other as relatives or from protracted intercourse; the uncle tsar or the gallant emperor Francis Josef might have created the impression of being figures who vouched for peace. But in other cases precisely the person of the prince or of the leading statesman aroused deepest mistrust. Fundamentally, however, the individual person is of no further concern as the foreign state remains an impersonally demonic entity which, now disguised, but now also recklessly and with unveiled brutality, follows the law of principle of power, and which must be carefully watched because something dangerous is hidden in it. What we confront as a state are not Englishmen, Russians, or Germans, as we have come to know them as human beings of our kind in diverse situations of life. It is the Englishman, the Russian, the German in his objectified, historically molded character, or, to be still more precise, it is England, Russia, Germany following the gravitational law of power as geographically and historically conditioned configurations. It is sea-girt England which could not do without reign over the seas, it is land-locked Russia craving for an ice-free ocean, it is Germany exposed to war on two fronts which had to measure up to a dual attack.

At the same time members of the civilized states in their private dealings with citizens of other civilized states have learned to dispense with self-help no less than they did with their compatriots. One tends to be somewhat more distrustful at first, but soon one learns to put up with foreign peculiarities, one is surprised to learn how to appreciate many things which have not been encountered at home. Where one finds fault with one thing or another, one learns to adjust when making the experience that, all things considered, one still comes out well. One realizes that, all told, one is dealing with well-mannered people with whom one can live and work because — apart from exceptions as they are found more or less everywhere — they adhere to the dictates of morality and decent behavior. But when citizens meet each other in the pursuit of service for the state, when the soldier in battle clashes with soldiers of the enemy, things change. The soldier does not act of his own free will, he acts as the organ of his state whose order he cannot refuse to obey and as a rule doesn't want to disobey, for it is a command of highest order to be loyal to the state, which is one's sword and shield, one's supreme value. For this reason one does not blame the hostile soldier for obeying the order of his state; rather than holding him personally responsible for it, one honors him as a brave warrior; and the bullet fired at him is not meant for him as a person but as one of the hostile bearers of arms who must be defeated in order to win victory for one's own state. For that one's own state is in the right does not admit of any doubt, as, on the other hand, there must not be any doubt that the foreign state is totally at fault because it has stirred up the war from the most evil design, for which reason popular imagination paints

it in the darkest and most awful colors. The captured, the injured enemy soldier one meets again on human terms: being detached from the collectivity of his own state, he is valued as a human being again. Even during breaks in the battle one comes close to another on the human scale. There is a certain set of human rights, and one meets, for example, in following a strictly adhered-to agreement to share the water of the spring which opens up between the battle lines. To be sure, in the passion of fighting the wild spirit of the ancestors starts up again, insatiable for enemy blood and debasing the state-ordered killing of the enemy to murder weighing heavily on the conscience. What is left in the millions of the wild instincts of the predatory animal bursts forth again in the frenzy of battle.

The leaders in the state issuing the orders also cannot act of their own free will; they, too, are not at liberty to make their decisions as human beings vis-a-vis other human beings; they, too, are in duty bound to the state. Because they stand in a quite special duty to the state, they are subject in a quite special degree to the powers of the state. They can comply with their duty only if they orient their actions accurately to the realities of the political systems which they confront and which they must recognize as formations of power. Those among them whose ambition is limited to fulfilling their duty in the traditional sense thereby submit from the start to the powers who in the given political constellation just happen to give orders as rulers. Those among them who as strong personalities have a will of their own and appear to the populace as the great dictators are all the more obsessed by the demonic nature of power, their free volition is all the more an absolute must. The spirits of the new social forces they sense are masters over them, and they cannot help serving them. The colossal aspect of Napoleon's individuality lay in his gift, possessed to an enormous degree, to gather the forces of his time and bring them to bear. He was a stupendous social medium, possessed of an energy which nature is only rarely able to create. This energy of his enabled him to sweep up and discharge what there was of martial instincts in the Frenchmen and in other peoples whom he carried away into the war. The phenomenal wars conducted by him are human documents not only in respect to himself but also in respect to the peoples of his time. It has been no different in any war. War is never merely a matter for the leaders, but in it the instincts of the mass of fighting human beings always come into their own as well.

It is one of the strangest mysteries of human nature that the same minds which recognize charity as the highest of commands subject themselves willingly, even joyfully, to the call to war by the state. Isn't murder committed a thousandfold, a millionfold, during war? How can human sentiment which revolts against single murder tolerate the mass murder of war?

Down to the present time human beings were so enveloped by war and war cries near or far that they hardly came to a realization of this contradiction. Only since the states have become internally mature for secure peace and peaceful sentiment, has the will for peace between nations also been roused. As in its time peace within the state was advocated against the domestic club-law, so since then world peace has been advocated against the club-law in international relations. The modern peace movement has got into its stride.

For its first adherents pacifism had the irresistible quality of a new faith. War, especially war among civilized peoples, struck them as an incomprehensible degeneration of human nature. They held to the facile belief that nothing would be easier than to convince people of this — it would only be necessary to demonstrate to their eyes the horrors of war in all their brutality. The authoress of the book, "Down With Arms," was so shocked by the impression she had received from the War of 1866 that she had to grab her pen in order to shake her readers to the same extent. While her vividly written book exerted a strong effect, the will to conduct war was not weakened thereby by a notable fraction. Had Bertha Suttner lived to see the World War, she could have learned that even horrors multiplied beyond all bounds were not enough to stifle the will to go to war. The Russians and the people belonging to the Central Powers did not turn against war because they were frightened by its shudders. They all would have continued fighting if only there had remained some hope for victory, just as the members of the Entente, after having experienced during bad times many temporary shocks in their will to fight, became quite unshakable again once the prospect for victory had firmed up. Finally, the same proletarians who had condemned war by the nation did not tarry to start the class war, and the horrors of the Bolshevik war exceeded all the horrors of the tsarist war without being able to offer the excuse that they were necessary to attain the war's objective. They were eruptions of the most cruel lust.

Just as the physician intent upon healing the human body must know it exactly, so the advocate of peace must know the social body exactly if he wants to cure it of the evil of war. He must be clear that the inclination toward war proved through the centuries reveals a fact of human nature which cannot be overcome by merely blaming it for being contradictory because it revolts against a single murder while approving of the mass murder of war. Before one undertakes to refute the feeling through argumentation one must trace back to its innermost meaning what at first appears contradictory in it. There the contradiction will be cancelled, for nature never contradicts itself, and an experience repeated through the centuries cannot be directed against nature. It just happens to be this way: killing the enemy in a just war is not rated by the feeling of the masses — apart from very few exceptional people — as murder; i.e., the command, "thou shall not kill," is not applicable in a just war. Why is it not applicable? How can it be explained that the ethical command valid within the nation does not operate between the nations? This is the fundamental question which everybody must answer who wants to form a balanced judgment about war.

We find the answer clearly formulated by the highest moral authority of Christianity and of mankind. The very Christ who taught man to love his neighbor as himself did not want his command to be understood to mean that he thereby wanted to do away with war immediately. By adding the second command, "give to the emperor what is the emperor's," he gave recognition and free play to the secular power in peace as well as war. In the armies of the Roman emperor Christians also served with bravery. Later, when all the peoples of the Mediterranean Sea had been converted to Christianity, they took up arms time and again not only against the heathens but likewise against each other, and they did so with the blessing of the Church which knew how to use the

arm resolutely for its purposes and whose prelates themselves not infrequently wore the suit of armor. As did its masters, the Church taught the believers to give to the emperor what is the emperor's and to be obedient to the existing secular power which did not even have to be the legitimate power.

This teaching abounds with most profound wisdom. Already the command, "love thy neighbor as thyself," is beyond human strength and only very gradually was somewhat of a success. Only when after incessant endeavor it has become possible to lift interpersonal relationships to its lofty heights will it subsequently also become possible to blot out from interstate relationships the admixtures of force. But the founder of Christianity was well advised not to address to the self-conscious secular powers a command which would be heeded only very gradually even by the more yielding types of individuals. Suffice it if the seed of love first germinates in the feeling hearts.

But why is governmental power self-conscious, why do individuals yield? This is the crucial point for which we have to find the explanation.

7. Governmental Autarchy

We find the explanation we are looking for in the contrast between individual strength and governmental strength.

Individual strength is negligible. Awareness of its deficiency from the very start drove people together as closely as possible in their family associations, and when in the long run the latter also proved to be too weak, they were gradually pushed into associations on a statewide basis. The weaker strata and individuals sought protection with the state and found it the more readily the more robust the state became. Some of the strong classes and individuals assumed leadership at the top and the lower levels in building the state, thereby attaining a personal power advantage; others, however, strove strenuously and stubbornly to maintain their untamed independence and to keep their smaller units from being swallowed up by the rising formations of greater size. Inasmuch as these strata and individuals were not wiped out as victims of their will to resist, they, too, or at least their descendants if they were capable of development, finally managed to fit in with the victorious states and to benefit from their size and peace. In every healthy people the citizens finally became united in a fertile symbiosis.

A state unit of sufficient power, however, in the main relies on itself. It does not need another state to lean on; rather it resists the other state because it senses in it an alien manner which it mistrusts and fears. This is why every state strives for autocracy, for autarchy, and if it feels still too weak to this end, it will do everything necessary to grow in size so that it can become self-sufficient. Trial and error in each case determine the size adequate to the prevailing circumstances. The impotent small states in the course of fighting were bunched together into large states, and the latter expanded to their national boundaries, beyond which the dominating national state still subjugated as many weaker neighbors and colonies as its strength permitted. Surrounded by neighbors

striving for aggrandizement, even the most peace-loving state had to watch jealously over its independence. It couldn't please any state to relinquish its autarky; each deemed it incompatible with its task and its dignity to submit to a higher state or even only to lay down its arms.

War is the logical conclusion from these premises. As long as there was no authority to settle issues between the states, the civilized nation which felt threatened in its vital interests had no choice other than to seek a settlement through the use of arms, as individual men who had to answer for themselves were forced to do in barbarous times without peace. Considering the historical evolution of the state, it is not unnatural for it to seek a decision by arms; what is more, its self-consciousness demands this course of action when its survival and honor are threatened. On its present level of cultural achievement it is on a par with the knight who still practiced club-law long after peasants and citizens had readily yielded to the law of peace. As the knight was surrounded by other knights of whom he knew that they were likewise anxious to uphold their male self-respect with arms, so the state sees itself surrounded by other states prepared for war of which it knows that they will observe their power interests by summoning all their strength and whose love for peace it must — warned by the experience of centuries — distrust. As the knight sought justice by throwing down the gauntlet to his adversary in case of need, so the state now thinks it should do likewise. Once things have developed to the point that war seems inevitable, statecraft demands that it is preferable to anticipate the attack rather than running the danger of being caught by enemy attack. Prompt attack looks like half the victory. Frederick the Great and Moltke, like Napoleon, clinched their wars by surprise action at the outset. Princes and statesmen who, when war seems inevitable, miss the auspicious moment would have to compare themselves to the doctor who makes himself guilty of malpractice. Bismarck compared the situation in which states find themselves before the start of war with that of a man who in a wild forest meets an armed stranger and shoots him down from fear of being shot down first. The image is as striking as one would expect it to come from Bismarck, but this very fact suggests the monstrous relationship in which the greed for power places even the great civilized nations. It is horrendous to think that no sooner has their reciprocal greed for power been aroused than they cannot view each other except with a feeling of most hostile mistrust. It is horrendous to think that notwithstanding the light generated by all their cultural achievements they meet each other like strangers in an uncanny forest and that they, the logical heralds of peace, find themselves forced to kill without hesitation lest they be killed.

It is horrendous to think so, but as the situation evolved before the outbreak of the World War, governments and peoples were forced to think so by the inexorability of the logic of power. The contradiction evinced in human feeling was not a contradiction in thought. It was the ~~same law of~~ power, the law of greatest strength or of success, which between the citizens of the state calls for justice and between the states for the use of force. The citizens relate to one another in such a way that they are able to recognize that they assist each other by peace-Xijl cooperation. Down to the present the relationships between states were such as to convince them that remaining independent

assured them of greatest success, and for this reason they preferred shouldering the burdens and sufferings of war, however great the shudders of human sympathy which it provoked, to dispensing with the weapon of war.

In a well-known passage Kant says of the English that in their domestic relations they are the most worthy collective of human beings, but as a state confronting foreign states the most pernicious, violent, imperious, and war-provoking of them all. With us this passage was already cited before the World War and then especially during it, with a view to corroborating the accusation of hypocrisy which one likes to raise against England. But the contradiction emphasized by Kant, however forcefully it must strike the observer, is resolved according to the logic of power in the same way as is the one between the disposition for peace of the citizen and the disposition for war of the state. During times of external threat everybody will gather up the more resources of power and will use them the more resolutely, the more profound are the internal and external values which he has to defend. In such a position were the English of the 18th century as they appeared to Kant. They had to preserve more ample and more developable values than any other state and simultaneously were ahead of the other states in the art of wielding the instrument of power politics. How could it be otherwise than that the English esteemed more highly still their most worthy body politic than did foreign observers! How could it be otherwise than that they were determined to launch the most extreme efforts in order to defend it against external intervention and to build it up according to its potential in which they staunchly believed!

8. Private and Public Morality

The contrast between private and public morality is by no means confined to the fact that the state absolves itself from the command, "thou shall not kill," which applies to private individuals steadfastly except in the case of self-defense. According to generally held views, even in the most highly developed civilized nations the state is absolved from still many more moral commands by which every decent person feels bound. Where great interests are at stake, the statesman does not feel called upon to perform the moral duties, which in his private life he could never bring himself to violate. When circumstances demand, or seem to demand, the statesman has the right, and even the duty, to lie. To him the command, "thou shall not deceive and defame," does not apply, for how else could he with the desired effect engage in the propaganda for war which he cannot resolve to do without? The state covets the neighbor's land. One must be altogether clear that the form in which the divine commands are couched, "thou shall not," are always addressed to individual persons only, not to the community of human beings. The power commands addressed to the general public have their origin outside the conscience and only very gradually do the convictions of personal morality trickle into the headwaters from which they originate.

This is true not only for interstate relationships but also, though not to the same degree, for internal power politics practiced by the government, inasmuch as it is power politics, i.e.,

inspired by the egotistical interests of a group wielding power which wants to exercise it within the state. Besides, it is also true for the power aspirations of all parties in the state and whatever other aspirations to power may manifest themselves in public. Like the statesman, the party boss also does not simply derive the rules of his public demeanor from the code of private morality. The party is a state within the state, deeming the egotism of its aspirations as sacrosanct as the egotistical aspirations of the state are deemed by the populace. Not only the political party, but also the ecclesiastical party and every social party, whatever may be its origins and goals, imposes upon its members the law of party interests. This explains why sensitive consciences do not quite feel at home in party matters. The duties of the party are delineated by its drive for power, and it is therefore in the nature of the party that it is self-seeking, reckless, intolerant to the point of pitiless harshness, unjust, and ungrateful. The seasoned party leader will do everything in order to preserve its unity, and he will therefore strive particularly to maintain unblemished the confidence which it must have in its cause and, needless to say, in his person as well. When he deems it necessary to immerse his companions in flattering words of praise about their behavior, their virtues, their successes, then he will flatter them. When he finds that it will make his people feel better if he disparages the cause and the person of his adversaries, he paints in the boldest colors and talks himself into a passion which automatically drives him to stepping over the line where slander begins. This need not keep him from talking in high spirits with his just abused adversary if he happens to meet him privately. Face to face and in their secret get-togethers party rivals may talk without inhibitions and nearly without reserve, but woe to him who abuses the confidence and wishes to exploit the private concession in public! A secret yes is, as Luther says, a public no.

Political science and statecraft incorporated the totality of power politics into a system which, known as reason of state, was dominant through the centuries during which the modern state was perfected. The most characteristic book of this genre is the much maligned "Prince" by Machiavelli. This book, introducing us in a clear and sovereign manner into the natural history of the state, was written with the imperturbable factual sense which the Italians inherited from the Romans. The bluntness of its statements confuses the modern reader whose chaste ears do not get to hear, and don't want to hear, such frank utterances. Even Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia was not yet able to read Machiavelli with clear-headed judgment and wrote an "Anti-Machiavelli" in order to refute him. He first, as king, had to be seized by the demons of power to be able to act in his spirit. At bottom King Frederick the Great was even more Machiavellian than Machiavelli, for at least in the beginning, before being attacked while attacking himself, he did not have the same strong driving motives for his power politics as did Machiavelli, whose flourishing native city of Florence, along with all the rest of Italy, which as his fatherland he would have liked so much to see great, was mangled by all the horrors of war. Machiavelli's "The Prince" was written in a state of moral emergency, a lot worse still than the one which is now spreading again across the political world. The statesman couldn't do without lies and cunning everywhere he was surrounded by lies and cunning. This is why Machiavelli declares point-blank that the statesman is not

bound by his promises; that he should abstain from unnecessary cruelty but consider as permissible any kind of force needed to accomplish his objectives; that it is his purpose to rule, a natural endeavor of human beings; that he who wants to maintain his rule must, above all, rid himself of the rival ruling dynasty, to be exterminated down to the last generation. In "The Prince" Machiavelli finds nothing blameworthy in Caesar Borgia — in his reports as an envoy he blamed him for having lacked in reckless determination after the death of his father; he praises him for actions which nowadays we can't read about without disgust. One only must not overlook that Machiavelli, who recommends any means of force suitable for overcoming the predicament of the times, recognizes at the same time that in the long run the prince cannot consolidate his rule by violence, but can do so by trustful reliance in the strength of the populace. The material interests of the citizens must be promoted, the army must be wrested from the leadership by the salaried Condottieri and must be recruited from nationals under princely order, and the decisive power which is mobilized eventually against the foreign oppressors is the power of a united Italian nation. Machiavelli's reason of state, however unhesitating it is in the choice of its means, was guided in its objectives by genuine nationalism and thereby was raised on a moral plane which was attained by the European peoples only during the period of the national state. If reason of state was successful, this could be only because it also had the necessary moral forces on its side. In the case of the civilized peoples, in the long run only that kind of politics of power can be successful which has the touch of morality called for by the spirit of the times.

Thus one is inclined not to agree fully with Fichte's saying that issues of political power can never be settled by ethereal means. The general public also has its power morality, which is linked to private morality even in its roots. Only it is behind by centuries or even millennia because it has to reckon with the near-immobility of the states and the other public bodies, which are designed to proceed with suspicious caution as a unit. In addition, this charge of backwardness must be mitigated in one essential respect. Public morality lags behind private morality only as far as the relationship of states and other bodies of power to one another is concerned. But as far as it is a matter of the relationship of the public bodies to their members, public morality imposes duties of an importance not known to private morality. He who acts as a public servant must submit to the most severe commands whose transgression is often punished most ruthlessly. Martial law is harsh not only against the enemy, it is also inexorably harsh vis-a-vis the soldier and citizen of the same nation whom it threatens with the severest punishments unless they do their utmost. In interpersonal relations the command is, "thou shall love thy neighbor as thyself," but the state demands that its citizens love it more than they do themselves and that for its sake they sacrifice, if necessary, their lives and material possessions. It not only demands this but in fact also succeeds with its demands, because citizen loyalty is prepared for the most grave sacrifices. Who knows, but the public authorities may have done even more to train the will of the masses for dutiful performance than has private ethics! The pacification of individuals in the state is at least as much the accomplishment of the public authorities as it is one of the good intentions on the part of individuals. The sacrificiu@

voluntatis rendered by the citizens to the state goes extraordinarily much farther than the one they usually impose on themselves in their private relations. Dulce est pro patria mori! The cooperative spirit is also willing to make sacrifices for the party, but the number of those who have given up their lives for their party falls far short of compensating for the hecatombs of people who in the course of history have given their lives for their state.

From this vantage point war assumes a different appearance than it has when it is actually going on and the horrors are revealed in whose commitment the combatants degenerate. What kind of a feeling did well up in the millions of citizens who at the outbreak of the World War flocked together in all the affected states in order to do their military service? Was it the instinct of the predatory animal which inflamed their resolute enthusiasm, or was it not rather a highest sense of duty to serve their country whose peace they deemed threatened by a perfidious enemy? Certainly, the sense of duty in war is mixed with an elevated feeling of strength, joyfully aware of itself and intensified by the collective sentiment of the masses who are gathering together under the flag. Without this added animal element the moral instinct probably would be too weak to bear the almost superhuman measure of trouble and danger demanded by the war, but for all that only extreme injustice and a supreme lack of psychological insight can attribute this animal element to the bloodthirstiness of the animal in man. It is the uplifting agitation of the instinct which all of a sudden becomes aware of the undreamed-of energy which lay dormant in it.

The military eulogists of war with insistent emphasis praise it for keeping energized — more than any other human activity could do — the physical and intellectual-moral forces in man. Is it not the training ground for highest audacity and discipline? Without the historical scaffold of war, could the development of the political and thus of the social order have succeeded at all? In the states which after the World War were disarmed by the dictate of peace, out in the countryside hears quite a number of the most prudent men, who are far any desire for war, complain that their sons are deprived of military training which could convey to them significant pieces of worldly wisdom which they don't have access to in their rural seclusion. In such considerations the military eulogists of war are surely correct, and undoubtedly it is a sign of too narrow a social view for a pacifist to pay no attention to such thoughts in his indictment of war. But it is equally plain that these beneficial effects of war cannot by themselves justify it. War is justified only if it can be shown that the nature of the state makes it necessary. If the states created through war could not survive without it, then wars will continue to be waged, and this will be a good thing because it is good that the states remain intact. If, however, people could enjoy the blessings of the state without a need for further wars, then reference to the educational effect of war will not induce a reasonable person to demand their continuation. Perhaps one will instill a new, peaceful content into the idea of military service — not only for young men but even for girls — and transform it into, let us say, a duty to work, promoting the physical and intellectual-moral education by virtue of being simultaneously placed into the service of certain social works demanded by a general need, but

which otherwise would remain undone. But war itself would be deprived of the most fruitful aspect of its educational power if it could no longer be said to be necessary for securing the peace.

What Stendhal says in favor of war is of a special nature. He had shared the experience of the greatness and the splendor of Napoleon's victories and couldn't get used any more to the Philistine mentality after the Restoration. Without the towering figure of the emperor the world appeared to him as poor, and since the present offered him no prospect for being lost in his dreams of strength, he was irresistibly attracted to the idea of recreating poetically the life of the brutal figures of the Renaissance. Nietzsche took a still broader vista. The few truly great men are what gives history its worth, and the masses are the stuff needed by the great man to become famous in history. The morality of the masses is that of slaves; in the big sweep of history the morality of masters is decisive; equality which presses down greatness is decadence. The morality of love of Christianity with its equality command reflects the need of the masses, serving the weak person who needs pushing. The great man, however, must not in his public service be bound to this morality. While one must categorically reject these statements by Nietzsche inasmuch as they fail to appreciate the greatness inherent in the genuine morality of love, one will readily agree with them if they are addressed to the dull moralist who condemns the great man because his actions violate the rules which must apply in the bourgeois home.

In public life public morality with its special standard counts. Here force, which in private life is rejected as injustice, has its place. Here the emperor must be given what is the demand. Here the needs of the polity must be met as the times demand, even if this can be accomplished only by force. If in the process the great man himself goes a little further still than do his contemporaries, he will be vindicated before the general judgment by his greater successes. He carries the day through the law of greatest strength. The masses follow him under the spell of demonic power, which is the irresistible overwhelming of the mind by the exercise of supreme strength. As the eye can't break away from a gigantic spectacle of nature, which we admire while it frightens us, the mind of the great leader and of the masses following him cannot shake the spell which unfettered human strength, however terrible, exerts. To be with it, to lead, to rule — vis-a-vis these sensations danger and suffering are not weighed. The conflict between the morality of personal life and the acts of violence committed by the ruling powers in public life may be felt painfully enough, but the law of greatest strength is not being undermined thereby.

But should it be out of the question that the time will come when throughout public life the most profound powers of peace will be proved the powers of greatest strength and when the public authorities will be as completely disarmed as is already true today of the social powers in private life? In that case the great man, just as he was the champion of force in the age of violence, will be the champion of love. To be sure, complete elevation to the duty of peace can become the supreme law only after that duty has become a supreme force. Before having done its utmost, force cannot be bound to peace yet.

Q. The Law of Diminishing Force Between the Peonies

If one condenses history into quite long periods and does not allow himself to be misled by the lapses into violence which occur from time to time and may indeed take on large dimensions in the process, one will become aware of the fact that between the nations as well the use of force is declining the more they gain in civilization and culture. One will not be able to resist the impression that these happenings were not accidental but an inner necessity which follows a law. As soon as the peoples are beyond their early epochs, war ceases to be the regular occupation of the men, who until then lived for war and from its booty. For a barbarian people war is hunting on a higher plane, the enemy is the most precious game, and as a matter of principle fighting continues to the point of annihilation. A people like the Romans are already in a quite different stage. The Romans were a martial people of the highest order, but still their wars from the beginning were not oriented to conquest. Their battles were at first defensive in nature, certainly provoked time and again by the circumstances; they were battles for the preservation of power which in the imperative interest of safety certainly led to progressive expansions of power and therefore in the end assumed the larger dimensions of a great system of conquest. Yet the annihilation of the enemies was not intended, and only when there was war to the knife, as with Carthage, were the Romans swept along to this extreme objective. To the battle of the Romans responded by a war of destruction and the demand, "Carthaginem esse delendam," that Carthage was to be destroyed. The collapse of the empire and the Migration of Nations ushered in a period of gravest lapses into force. On the other hand, in the following Christian era the wars between the Christian peoples were attenuated by the common interest in the church, thereby giving wars the character which later found expression in the international law of war. War of annihilation was aimed only at the infidels and the sectarians.

The objective of war was considerably narrowed in the wars which during the period of development of the European states in the Middle Ages and the New Era went to and fro between the dynasties. The leading idea was the augmentation of the realm, but one was eventually content to win a piece of adjoining land for the purpose of rounding off and consolidating the ancestral political structure. In the process the wars came to be conducted ever more gently. The Italian Condottieri nearly transformed war into a war game, but in this they were not followed by the great war lords who were looking for the decisive victory on the battlefield. The setback of the religious wars, of the battles against the Turks, and of the extensive wars incited by the Spanish and French big power politics spurred the military genius to highest development. Yet the wars were tempered by the fact that by and by they became battles between professional armies from which the citizens and their property were to be excluded as much as possible.

Gradually one entered into the period of European balance-of-power politics, conditioned by the fact that the majority of the large states had become fairly consolidated and watched over in mutual progress with anxious concern. Not infrequently, the coalitions which nations joined with a view to checking their

dangerous rivals led to widespread wars, but their ultimate effect was to impart increasing stability to the system of states. This was helped especially by the recognition that the big states through their coalitions became fairly closely matched in strength, so in the long run no state was able to obtain a decisive edge over another. As far as European soil is concerned it eventually became a matter of certain small border regions which, as war fortunes changed, fell from one hand into another and were not worth the blood which was shed over them.

War between the civilized nations appeared to lose sense completely when one began to understand that every such nation was in itself an invincible power which couldn't be dominated by any external force. This insight was won after the lapses into force which were a consequence of the French revolutionary movement and were aggravated by the person of Napoleon, whom they set on the pedestal. His feeling of strength led him to believe that he would be able during the 19th century to renew the fame of the world conquerors of Antiquity and to subjugate Europe as Caesar had subjugated Gaul. But even his genius as a strategist was in the end ruined by the strength of national resistance. After the wars of liberation Europe appeared to have more or less found its equilibrium, and when subsequently Italy and Germany had completed their national expansion through relatively short wars, the tranquil citizen might believe that peace had been established for good between the civilized nations. The peace conferences in The Hague and the institutions of a world court which were set up, for the time being within modest limits to be sure, could be viewed as symptoms of a progressing spirit of peace which might justify the highest expectations of further progress. Only during the 20th century did new frictions arise, which erupted into the World War.

The latter most bitterly disappointed the hopes for peace. The growing frictions between the big powers, their armaments, and their pacts for some time already had given rise to fears about its coming. At one time or another it appeared inevitable, but each time it was possible to save the peace again. In spite of all worries of the statesmen and of the forward-looking citizens, one still couldn't bring himself to believe that the profound peace, to which the civilized world had become used and to which it had oriented all its actions, might one day not exist any longer. But when the World War broke out all the same, it turned into a world catastrophe such as not even the wildest imagination could have foreseen. Terrible as measured by the sacrifice of lives and goods which it swallowed up, it became even more oppressive by the long duration of the material and moral shocks which it inflicted in prospering Europe, not only on the vanquished but on the victors as well. Even today, several years after its conclusion, the feeling of peace has not yet become sure of itself. The peoples have come barely close enough to each other to justify their beginning to sit together for joint deliberations about the peace task, but in the hearts there is not yet a true belief that attainment of peace might be enduring. The terrible relapse from the most delightful peace into the horrors of mass murder and mass misery by the majority of those who believed in humanity is viewed as proof that the predatory-animal nature of man cannot be tamed after all and that all of his culture in the end will only serve him to multiply the means of annihilation in combat.

When in the third part of the book we will discuss the ways of power in the present we will have to take into closer consideration the possibilities of world peace. At this point we want to limit ourselves to drawing the conclusions which may be drawn from the historical retrospect. We have to make two observations.

The first concern is the fact that the World War was as little provoked by the murderous instincts of human nature as was true for all wars which have been waged since the time when people ceased being barbarians. No doubt the fighting instinct has contributed its share to the World War, as it does to every war. If human beings were peaceful creatures like the angels in heaven, there could be no fighting among them. The fighting instinct with which civilized man has remained afflicted is not such, however, as to demand war under any condition; it confines itself to conducting with resolute courage wars deemed to be necessary and felt to be just. All peoples participating in the World War at its outbreak felt it to be a just war because they all held the view that they had been wantonly and maliciously attacked by their adversaries. The courageous determination with which they went to war must by no means give rise to the conclusion that there must always be wars between them. There will again be wars between them only when they feel again as provoked as they did this time. The World War did not emanate from man's fighting nature, but it was one of the relapses from the sentiment of peace to the use of force, as were the religious and liberation wars. As these, it was caused by the fact that people were mobilized for a new historical task in whose performance the existing historical powers and the newly emerging social interests came into conflict with each other. A new stage of development of peoples had to be achieved for which the necessary arrangements had not yet been prepared historically. The great nations had become so wealthy, so exuberant in strength, that their expansionary drive pushed them out into the world over the division of which they then came to blows. Having fairly found their equilibrium in Europe, the European nations were now challenged by their expansion to find their world equilibrium as well, and in the process they had to come to terms with the world powers of the United States of North America and of Japan as well. It is understandable that each of the participating nations was keen on throwing every ounce of its weight into the balance and to let force decide when it felt that it was at the mercy of foreign force. But does this prove that the task of dividing up the world will also have to conjure up force? Should it really be out of the question to discharge this task in peaceful agreement, as a social work of civilized nations? Could it possibly be true that the law of decreasing force, which is almost fully in operation within the states and which also has gained considerable ground in the interrelationships between states, might not be able to prevail all the way to the desired attainment of a secure world peace?

The second statement we have to make takes issue with the cited argument that the state has grown to maturity through war and can maintain itself only through war because to it also the general law of life must apply that the continued existence of life demands the continuance of force, which created life in the first place. The fundamental flaw in this argument is that it does not reckon with historical development. In the realm of

nature, what we see as valid today we will have to continue to accept as valid, for natural development OCCURS at such a slow pace that we must not expect to become witnesses of change of one of its laws. Historical development, however, progresses with discrete changes, and in dynamic times it evolves at a rapid pace and under the eyes of man, as it were. As we were able to show, the warring state was the historically required scaffold for the civilized state, and why should there not come a time one of these days when the scaffold can be removed without harm, nay, should be removed in order to make room for the full enjoyment of the work? The war of all against all certainly could be overcome by force only, and at that time hero fortitude was therefore a necessary virtue of man. But should it not be possible to overcome the war of all against all — passe in intrastate relations in interstate relations as well so that between states there would be no task left for force either? The command, "thou shalt not kill," was not appropriate to the state during its emergence, and until a short while ago the civilized nations as well did not prove mature for it yet — but does that imply that the states shall forever be subject to the command, "thou shalt kill"? As culture and civilization continue to grow, will they not finally have to come to the recognition that between them, too, the forces of peace assure the greatest success?

XIII. The Law of Increasing Freedom and Equality

1. The Interrelations between the States of Force, Law, and Morality

At the beginning of history there was room for the innermost social powers of law and morality only within the family and its extensions, inasmuch as the sense of belonging to the same kinship group happened to be still alive. Even within this narrow circle, however closely intertwined the family was in its activities, the state of social relations was still entirely unfree, and paterfamilias might quite frequently be a cruel master over his wife and children. But this is no reason for ignoring what moral values were effective at that time. The state of family relations rose above the then general savageness of life by as much as, and perhaps more than, it rises today above the conditions outside the family. Out there, outside the clan, the "primitive right to steal," to cite Fourier, was accepted, whereas today the principal moral commands, or at least moral prohibitions, demand respect everywhere. If the state unit was to reach beyond the circle of the kinship association, this could happen only through force; from the earliest historical time until much later the mode of operation of the state could be only one of severest force.

Within the state as a going concern, the passable security which it furnished gradually permitted the emergence of work associations which through their successes managed to obtain their own guaranteed rights inasmuch as these were compatible with the arrangements of force operating for the benefit of the rulers. All early law was severe in its nature, but if it was to be regarded as law, its rules of reason still had to have an ethical base as well. The unfolding of the law, therefore, always also meant the unfolding of supportive ethical powers which, though they were quite demanding themselves during hard times, were able nevertheless to inject into the state of law a note of gentleness. The more secure life in the body politic becomes the more room there is for law and morality. It is a natural reaction that the growing recognition of these internal powers will weaken the hold of external constraints whose imperative directions are gradually made superfluous by the former. One now manages better without external force. Law and morality are more intimately binding than force was able to be, and in their emotional paths penetrate depths which it can never reach since it inhibits and deters the minds. Thus may be explained the law of decreasing force, which is the accompanying counterpart of the increasing weight of law and morality. At the peak social maturity there occurs a turn in the sense that law and Morality are taking the lead over force. It is they that now Point the directions. Relying on their own strength, they gain ground by means of their beneficial successes, and force is used only as a last resort where improper resistance must be broken.

In its later stages, this development is connected with the mass movement. Townsmen, peasants, and laborers manage to secure through their accomplishments their separate rights, which Jj-Ve them a base in the first place for their resistance against the pressure of class superposition and later for their rise in the social hierarchy.

To a large extent this development occurs gradually under inconspicuous, anonymous leadership and with quiet following by the masses, but thanks to its duration and the abundance of individual cases it will still have a large and pervasive effect. In the process the law of rulers is being transformed and gives way in the face of the vital strength of the rising law for the masses. After it has reached a certain height, development yields certain significant total results to which the basic ideas of society must be adapted. Where the principal ideas of the old powers stand in the way, development is concentrated into revolutions of ideas which if resistance cannot be overcome in some other way, will assert themselves as revolutions by deed in conjunction with grievous lapses into force.

Most strange are those intellectual revolutions which are so sublime that, as long as they maintain their purity, they spurn force, while at the same time being imbued with such breathtaking vitality that they are not in need of force. Of this kind are the great moral revolutions taking hold of the minds after these have long enough been prepared by the discipline of force and the education of law. Their original configurations are the revolutions in religious belief, born out of a religious idea which includes the ethical idea and lends it its ready persuasiveness. All world religions have gained ascendancy this way, i.e., as social inspirations which, following the call of prophetic leaders, overwhelm the masses at the right moment.

The example of Christianity provides the clearest insight into the course of this mass phenomenon of the breakthrough of social ethics due to the strength of world religions.

Christianity got its start on the soil of the Roman world empire, conquered by the Roman sword, and without the preparatory work of this sword it could not have spread as a world religion. Without this work the Christians would have remained a Jewish sect of limited range, and without it Paul could never have become the great apostle for the heathens. In its ideas, Christian doctrine had been prepared for by Jewish monotheism and Greek philosophy, and in addition its stirring force is also due to the religious wave which leapt over from the interior of Asia. Notwithstanding all this preparation, the Christian way of thinking was still something historically new, being so by virtue of the incomparable strength of feeling with which the idea of the beyond penetrated the minds. In the Old Testament writings and the philosophical works of the late Antiquity a not inconsiderable series of statements may be found which were entirely conceived in the Christian spirit, although Jehovah was always regarded by the Jews as the god of the chosen people, and the philosophy of the heathens was not able altogether to grasp the highest concept of god. Besides, the ringing words of the prophets and philosophers were always refuted by the facts of life, which alone reflect the thinking of the populace. The cold cruelty which marked the enjoyment of triumph over the enemy and the matter-of-factness with which one denied the original right of personal freedom to a large part, perhaps the major part, of one's fellow human beings, thwarted the written word. We read in the book of Samuel that King David, after having captured the city of Rabba of the Amalekites, ordered the imprisoned inhabitants burnt in brick kilns or mangled by saws. While he had had to atone by a pest for the insolence of the census of his people'

we read nothing about a punishment for the heinous chastisement of the defeated enemies — what's more, it is apparently being told with the intention of bringing to light the power which the chosen people could gain over its rivals. The New Testament is the genuine book of love. There is no longer any suggestion of violence, the Christian religion seizing the soul of its adherents, as this has been done by all world religions. By placing man in relation to God, the world religions have succeeded in making the greatest of all discoveries, the discovery of the human soul. He who believed in God believed from his soul, and as he became aware of his soul he knew that along with him all other human beings as well were united with God through their souls and thus were his fellows. By becoming aware of the soul through the power of faith, which is the one thing people have in common among all the confusing differences between them, one had hit upon the idea under which all human beings could be united. Awareness of the soul bestowed upon ethics its broad and strong foundation. The command of charity is the ethical proclamation of human rights. Now everybody who exists is included in the ethical community of life, and since the soul knows no gradations, all persons are equally included, at least in theory.

The extraordinary effect of this discovery is indicated by the attitude toward force and law. The deepest foundation of human society has been found, the state of social relations being henceforth recognized as the one demanded by the nature of men. A reappraisal of all social values is the inevitable consequence which, contrary to Nietzsche's view, takes place under the banner of love. Relieved of the burden of history, the soul unfolds and now on its part imposes the highest law on society. The moral sentiment assumes the leadership role, setting limits to the use of force and providing the foundation of law.

2- Freedom and Equality in Christianity

No other world religion matches Christianity in the practice of moral behavior. Islam remained far behind because it commits its faithful not only to belief but at the same time to fighting for that belief; Mohammad was as much a national conqueror as he was a prophet. Buddhism is turned away from active life, its great goal is renunciation of the world. Christianity, too, at first was oriented entirely to the hereafter, and in the oriental church the natural bent of the peoples of the orient, among which it found its believers, betrays the continuation of much of this original, spirit of Christianity. The Roman Church was again turned toward this world by the zest for living of the occidental Peoples, but from the orientation to the hereafter it gained the necessary perspective for organizing life in this world in an ethical spirit. Wisely hesitating, it didn't at once draw from the notion that human beings are equal before God the conclusion that they would likewise have to be regarded as equal here on this earth. It was content to admit the idea of equality to the realm of canon law, which then had a further effect on secular duality before the law has been fully put into practice, it still has been approached to a significant extent, and everywhere one managed to realize the idea of personal freedom, prime prerequisite of equality. The victory of this idea must be ascribed to Christianity, above all. Most of what was done along this

line was accomplished in the era of the predominance of the church under its patronage, and all that was left for enlightened princely rule and for revolutions to do was to get rid of the remnants of peasant inequality.

A large number, perhaps the majority, of the educated today in the catholic and especially the protestant countries sees in the Roman church only the depravity of the popes, the arrogance of the clergy, the licentiousness of the monasteries, the sale of the indulgences and other such dark superstition, the cruelty of the inquisition, the resistance to freedom of conscience and spiritual progress, and the Jesuit hypocrisy. Who could deny that the church has become guilty of the gravest aberrations! But any unbiased historiography must also recognize that these aberrations were historical necessities, for like any other great power the church had to degenerate into predominance. On the other hand, unbiased historiography must not tire of admirably enumerating the moral values with which humanity adorned its existence under the leadership of the Roman church. Much as it may have involved the world in fighting, it has brought into it much more love yet. As a fighting power the church was one after many others and certainly not the worst, but it was the first great historical power of love. Among all the great powers of the world the church was the first to adjudge to the indigent the right to the means of livelihood, and for the benefit of the suffering and the oppressed it complemented the legal system with a system of mercy. Nor should it be forgotten that it granted men the right to spiritual existence, a claim to spiritual development, in the way it just happened to be able to interpret such development. In its schools it nurtured and in its offices it found any talent, no matter in what social strata it may have found it. It went to fetch its thinkers, scholars and artists, abbots, bishops, and popes in the depths of the populace, and through a millenium it was the only power to appreciate the worth of the human mind and to illuminate the utter darkness of the times.

Nietzsche's view that the Christian power of love reveals a morale of weakness and decadence is refuted by the historical counter-evidence pervading a millenium which the era of ecclesiastical predominance supplies. The Christian power of love was able to hold its own against the barbarian violence which had reigned in the era of Antiquity. Whereas during Antiquity it was force which had to perform the task of the establishment of states and initiation of culture, in the era of ecclesiastical predominance the church as a dominant power was decisively involved in the performance of this task. The clerical leaders here rendered the service of protagonists which put them in the front ranks of the heroic leadership figures of history. At the end of the epoch the masses were physically and spiritually healthy as they never were at the end of an era of princely rule. This is valid proof of the fact that the power of love aimed at breaking the bonds of mass servitude or at least of making them more bearable, was not conducive to weakness, but to strength. How could it be otherwise if the masses were given the opportunity to partake actively in the social task from which they had been barred heretofore? Without the idea of human solidarity which Christianity instilled the states could never have received their firm foundation in the form of the pervasive

spirit of liberty of the entire populace. Without the preparatory work of the ecclesiastical power of love the free nations of Europe could never have been formed, let alone have attained their power and cultural achievements, and they could never have gained their world predominance.

3. The Revolutions of the Protestant Idea of Freedom

During the Reformation the renascent faith once more proved its capability of becoming the champion of a new morality which established a new law of freedom. Although the German peasants, when they tried to interpret Luther's doctrine of evangelical freedom to their own benefit and rose up to get rid of the bonds and encumbrances burdening them and their enterprises, suffered defeat, in the Netherlands and in England the sense of freedom awakened by the craving for religious liberty led to national freedom in the first case against the foreign dictator, in the second against the princely lust for power.

The uprising in the Netherlands marking the beginning of the period of modern revolutions was motivated by religious faith and, thanks to the strength provided by faith, attained its objective. In England the decisive share in the battle against Charles I fell to the sect known as "Independents," which came close to the contemporary proletarian "Independence Party" with which it has the name in common — among other things by the fact that from the idea of religious freedom it arrived at the demand for political freedom in the same way as the latter arrived at the demand for economic equalization from the idea of equality. The first English revolution was led to victory by Cromwell's "Holy Men," the "ironsides" who derived their invincibility from the conviction of faith. The deputies of Cromwell's modern parlance — the soldier councils, as we might call them in declaration of human rights, an act which they rationalized by the idea of religious equality which the "levelers" in their religious visions had brought into circulation. They thereby fell back upon the declarations of human rights which over there in the new American colonies the pilgrims decided upon, who for the sake of religious freedom had exchanged their new home for Europe and whose stout-hearted mind gave birth to the pervasive strength enabling in the following century their grandsons to achieve victory in the War of Independence against England. The second, or glorious, English revolution, which permitted the Protestant succession to the throne to prevail, also achieved victory under the banner of faith, although it cost the English High Church a severe effort to resolve resisting the king, whom to obey the populace felt duty-bound by God's command.

The world-historical importance of the glorious English Revolution rests in the fact that for the first time one of the great modern nations broke with the king by the grace of God in full cognizance of what it was doing. Now as before, the English populace remained willing to give to the king what was the king's, but with the added sentence that the king on his part was to give to the people. Locke represented the prevailing public opinion when he taught that the populace enjoys the right to adopt the form of government which it deems suitable. For centuries already English citizens had enjoyed freedom as far as their

person was concerned. Now the populace had also won its political freedom, and like the former it had been won by the strength of faith.

4. The Revolutions of the Bourgeois Idea of Freedom

The second English revolution forms the transition to the modern revolutions which have followed each other since 1789. If the earlier revolutions were ethical revolutions, fought from the rock of faith, the later ones may be regarded as revolutions of the sense of justice which took as their point of departure the fact that new social forces had grown strong by their successes and sought their juridical expression within the constitution. One no longer rationalized the new demands by reference to the word of God, or — if one is permitted to say so — via a detour through heaven, but one derived them from human reason in which one believed to possess the unfailing tool for cognition. The adduced rational arguments were cast in very bold and far-reaching abstractions. The most noble human principles were invoked, and theories of the state and society were contrived. The model of the English and American constitution of liberty gave some empirical support to the roaming ideas. The model of Antiquity also exerted a strong effect on the minds. One experienced a kind of political renaissance and wanted to equal the Roman heroes of freedom. In addition, through Rousseau conceptions were brought into the discussion which had been borrowed from the Swiss political system and the simple conditions found in the Swiss cantons. What a concentration of effort, ingenuity, and eloquence was indeed marshaled to derive from this airy edifice of ideologies and foreign experiences — which one had not lived through as a person — the legal rules by which the French nation was to live henceforth! It became clear within a very short time that this artificially constructed body of law was completely lacking in security and soundness. How differently the moral sentiment had proved its worth which supported Christianity! Since it originated in the very depths of human nature, it could become the fertile fount for the legal development of a whole era, for which it staked out ever more far-reaching goals. In the end, of the legal doctrines derived from "reason," only those proved tenable which gained a hold on the minds by virtue of being confirmed by the sentiment as it had been formed in confronting the actual social task of the French nation. The fermenting abstract law of reason in a long-drawn-out process of purification settled into the concrete French law of experience.

Of the triple slogan of liberty, equality, and fraternity, the fraternity part in France itself very soon was smothered by the fratricidal battles which accompanied the revolution, and likewise the idea of worldwide fraternization perished in the battles which spread from the revolution all over the world. When the middle classes inscribed on their flags the slogan of equality, they didn't really mean it in the full sense of the term; one didn't have economic equality in mind at all, and one was extremely shocked when the Jacobins embarked upon making concessions to the proletariat which would serve its class interest. The Jacobins had rather good reasons for doing so. They saw in the proletariat ready helpers for the realization of their power schemes and therefore had to be willing on their part to live up to the slogan of fraternity at least to the

extent necessitated by the present emergency. Later, when one tried to get rid of the proletariat, Babeuf and his adherents had to pay for the fact that he tried to be serious with the demand for equality. Nevertheless, this demand was not an empty word. It made good sense inasmuch as it was directed against the legal inequality which privileged the landlords at the expense of the oppressed peasant masses and which lifted the first and second estates of the nobility and the clergy above the middle class, which felt equal to the privileged ranks in external and internal worth, in wealth and education. Besides, the democratic mind of the Frenchmen also hankered after equality, or at least a strong approximation thereto, in social intercourse. In the first revolutionary excitement one went a good deal farther in this than one was willing to sustain in a calmer mood. The practice of addressing each other as citizen clear across all strata of the population was soon abandoned again, but all the same, thanks to the decidedly social sense of the nation, the social after-effect of the idea of equality remained enduring.

Although the slogan of freedom was the one taken most seriously, for a very long time it was not possible either to find for it the juridical expression which corresponded to the historically formed character of the nation. One constitution after another was erected and torn down again. It took almost a century-long education until the French gave themselves the constitution which was so tailored to their conditions that it could be effective for the duration.

The declaration of human rights, deliberated and proclaimed in a frenzy of enthusiasm, is copied after the declarations of human rights which had been laid down in the statutes of the American colonies as a confession of the sentiment of religious freedom. The sentiment of freedom to which it had to give expression in France was of more secular origin, and it bespoke above all the uplift of a feeling of strength of the citizen seeking safeguards against arbitrary rule by the government. Properly speaking, the human rights of the French revolution are only fundamental rights of the middle classes, supported by the pervasive feeling of freedom of strong citizens. What went beyond this dimension, e.g., the abolition of nobility proclaimed with so much fanfare, could not stand up against the French national sentiment. The human rights of the French Revolution, if they are evaluated in the light of their lasting substance, are the execution — limited to the political horizon — of the ethical declaration of human rights, as they had been proclaimed by Christianity. They fell far short of embodying the high humane significance pervading this declaration, which was less pretentious in name but infinitely more momentous in practice. Whereas the Christian command of charity originated in the soul and therefore at bottom was oriented to the whole range of humanity, the governmental declaration of human rights originated in the modern public spirit and therefore is confined to the political realm and the civic sense. The more far-reaching cosmopolitan connection, which was also sensed at the beginning, was soon lost again in the worldwide conflicts of the Revolution.

The revolution of the idea of civic freedom spread from France all over Europe and into the very far east and had its continuing effects in Asia as well. What rights it brought to the Peoples constituted a tempting model whose imitation was not

deterred by the unrest and the horrors surrounding it; even more tempting was the propagandizing force exerted by the revolutionary ideology over the minds. It had an educational influence on world public opinion, and every people first had to experience by itself how far reality lagged behind ideology.

5. The Revolutions of the Proletarian Idea of Equality

The middle-class revolutions were followed by the proletarian ones. Their spiritual impulse is found in the ideology which the middle-class revolutions had developed. In addition, the situation of the modern proletariat has been an especially efficacious factor underlying the proletarian uprisings.

The latter moved still further away from the ethico-religious revolutions than had those of the middle-class variety. To be sure, the first proletarian thinkers proceeded from ideas grounded in religious mysticism and were devoted to a visionary morality designed to fraternize the classes and the whole world. The labels "socialism" and "communism" attached to their systems were given to them for good reasons. However, as soon as the proletarian movement passed from the world of ideas into the real world and seized the masses, it became a plain movement whose leaders did not hesitate to openly announce the class struggle. The middle-class revolutions had not advanced the cause of the proletariat; on the contrary, they had set it back by calling on bourgeois capital to take control. Is it surprising that the proletariat now wanted to use in its own interest the example of the revolutionary struggle which had been held out to it?

From the constitutions which middle-class liberalism had made known in the name of popular sovereignty the proletariat had come away politically empty-handed, although it was of course one of the strongest groups within the populace and in its own view accounted for the majority of the common people, nay, was itself the populace, as its exponents didn't tire of repeating. The constitutions of the liberal system barred from the franchise the great majority of the wage workers, whereas the logic of the idea of popular sovereignty demanded the same universal right to vote. How much more still the masses of workers had to resent the contradiction existing between the revolutionary slogan of equality and the actual economic inequality. In the praised era of most rapid economic progress these masses succumbed to deepest misery during the transition to machine-powered large-scale production. Since the propertied class did not of its own accord summon up the will to meet the proletariat half-way, there was reason enough for the latter to fight for its own interests with all means at its command. The middle-class revolutions showed it the way to success. The organization which it developed rapidly gave it the strength thereto. The breathless progress of large-scale production unexpectedly enlarged the masses, and the magnitude of the circumstances, the dimension of actually existing poverty, and the scope of the hoped-for power aroused the great leaders which the movement was in need of.

The leading proletarian thinkers were almost without exception men of bourgeois origin and education. Their accomplishment was to adapt the scientific system, which the middle-class

thinkers had devised in the interest of the third estate, to the horizon of the proletarian interests. In the apt designation given to it by Anton Menger, the system of doctrines of the socialistic thinkers is a system of proletarian legal philosophy, derived from the necessities of mass life. The basic rights, as developed by middle-class legal philosophy and made effective by the middle-class revolutions, have been framed entirely so as to reflect the outlook of the propertied class and therefore cannot suffice for the propertyless masses. For the bourgeois it meant something to be granted legal status and the protection of the acquired legal rights, and he might take comfort in the thought that the "same rights" were guaranteed to all, the idea of equality thus being fully realized. But what did the propertyless worker gain by the universal extension of legal status and by the protection of legal rights? For he did not acquire a noteworthy set of property rights, and he therefore lacks the material foundation to use his ability to exercise legal rights for the acquisition of assets. As the middle-class legal philosophy had called for middle-class basic rights from the viewpoint of the bourgeois, the proletarian legal philosophy now demanded basic economic rights from the proletarian vantage point. Without economic basic rights the "same right for everybody" in the abstract becomes naked inequality in fact.

The most important basic economic rights which were set forth by the proletarian thinkers were the right to the means of subsistence and the claim to the full output of labor. The right to the means of subsistence covers the means necessary for survival and in an expanded version the means to sustain a reasonable standard of living. This right derives from the ethical spirit of mankind. It appeals to the original emotions of pity and sympathy and of human love, and consequently what it demands is not in the nature of a mere legal claim but of a genuine ethical claim. However, the proletarian philosophy of law a long time ago abandoned entirely the claim to the means of subsistence as did also the socialistic platforms; today the right to the full output of labor rules the proletarian world of ideas. It is asserted that all output, is the product of labor and that capital and land are mere aids to labor rather than being independent factors of production, the worker thus being entitled to the full product. As Karl Marx explains in "Capital," it is out of the question for the worker to be handed over in the form of wages the true fruits of his labor as long as the legal system of private property prevails. As he sees it, as long as this system remains intact the propertyless wage worker is forced to offer his labor power to the capitalist for a wage which covers only his subsistence needs, whereas the entire additional product of his labor, the "surplus value," must fall to the capitalist. It can't be otherwise at all, he says, for the private exchange economy must conform to the law of exchange value: the wage is a price which, like every other price, must reflect cost, and therefore, as long as the private exchange economy remains in force, the worker who has created all value will be cheated out of the surplus value.

The doctrine of surplus value is most resolutely contested by bourgeois economists. It can't be our task to get involved in the theoretical dispute of the parties. For our purposes it will suffice to show that the doctrine of surplus value itself does not retain to the end the idea of economic equality.

The claim to the full product of labor, which the doctrine of surplus value tries to prove, itself demands unequal distribution of the product, because it demands a correspondingly higher wage for the more capable worker contributing more to output, and in the socialistic state of the future he must also be granted a correspondingly higher income. This demand, of course, also accords with the sense of justice of the labor force, and union politics is geared to it. A skilled worker would never put up with the wages of an unskilled one. The law of success, you see, irresistibly asserts itself in all strata of society, and the proletarian philosophy of law recognizes it no less than does the practical sense of the worker. Where performance differs, it is not inequality but equality of treatment which militates against the nature of law — the rigid law of equality could win through only by force. As it applies to wage work, this principle must also apply in the economy as a whole, and where social success leads to inequality of wealth, the law of highest strength will have to grant legal recognition to the inequality of wealth as well. Of course, this does not imply approval of a success which has been won by mere force, for in every healthy people the law of force will in the long run have to yield to the peacetime law of liberty.

The higher achievements which leadership performance brings to society are always apt to assure to the leader a legally privileged position vis-a-vis the masses, and it would be as inappropriate in the economic realm to treat leader and masses alike as it is elsewhere in society. Here as elsewhere, inequality in performance will have as a necessary consequence inequality in law. Only if social tasks should no longer require leadership must the right of the leader be equated with that of the masses.

This finding by no means disposes of the proletarian philosophy of law, for by no means does it stand and fall with the slogan of equality. However mistaken it may have been with respect to the right to the full product of labor, the right to the means of subsistence asserted by it is incontestable. Certainly the proletariat may not want to content itself with this right, nor must the proletarian philosophy of law do so, but nevertheless the establishment of the right to the means of subsistence is in itself of great significance. This right sets a lower limit to the system of basic economic rights, it designates the minimum of which society must not fall short. As long as conditions for the labor force are such as they are today, the measurement and defense of this lower limit is a question of life and death for large groups of the labor force, to wit, for all those whose incomes fluctuate around the survival minimum or may even be permanently depressed below the minimum compatible with human dignity. Measuring the means of subsistence is, after all, a question not only of the physical but also of spiritual and moral means of subsistence, not only of survival but also of development of the vital energies! Hasn't the slogan of equality indeed found a splendid application in grade school, where all children are to have equal access to elementary instruction! It is a great task for the proletarian philosophy of law to show the many things still remaining for society to do in order to bring to fruition the rich talents which today still remain stunted in the masses.

1. The Historical Possibilities

Social action requires the leader and calls upon him. Purely in terms of the idea, the leader is the technically required organ of the masses enabling the latter to win success and power. But how about the leader in his turn winning power over the masses? Since he walks ahead of the multitude and seemingly must be stronger than it, must he not win power over it? Or is not perhaps this multitude stronger after all because, like a wanderer having arrived at his destination, it is entitled to dismiss the guide after having utilized his services? If it could do so it would indeed be the stronger of the two parties, but it is characteristic of the multitude that it cannot do this so easily. It can — and does — do so only when it has become generally incensed against the leader and a storm of indignation about him sweeps through its ranks. Ordinarily the contact among the individuals forming the multitude is not sufficient to permit reaching an agreement that the leader be dismissed. Even if the number of malcontents were quite large, one will not arrive at a consensus to cease following until one has become sure that "the others" are likewise ready for it. In order to break with the old leader one must have come together under a new one who uses his time to win general support. Before things have developed to this point, conditions for the old leader remain favorable. He can count upon continued following and therefore is in a position to win a certain predominance or even superiority allowing him, to a certain and perhaps very high degree, to place his personal aspirations ahead of those of the masses.

These general considerations only show us the possibilities of how the relationship between the will of the leader and that of the multitude may take shape. In order to see clearly how these possibilities have in fact materialized by and large, one must trace the big sweep of historical development. In this connection one need not go to any great length as even a brief survey will already show that all socially significant positions of leadership from the beginning until nearly the present time were characterized by a strong superiority over the masses. If it did not do so already before, at least since the beginning of human history, i.e., since the clans and tribes began to coalesce into peoples, the Law of Small Numbers has been in operation in that few leaders ruled over the many aggregates of the masses.

2' Photic Leadership and Its Consequences for the Masses

Everywhere the history of peoples begins with a period of brutal force. The task of force which had to be done in the beginnings called for despotic leadership. Under strongest leadership the strongest warrior tribes subjugated the masses of inferior stock. In the (West, in black Africa, and everywhere else in the barbarian world the strong races set up despotic regimes over the weak ones in extensive regions, and these remained solid as a rock, submerging the masses into hopeless slavery. Even where victors were not of such superior stock, the ruling strata had rather been elevated by the temporal lead of their development, tyrannic rule could be established

the opportunity to assume control over the material power resources of arms and capital, along with the moral power resources of organization and culture. The deep furrows which the use of force at that time dug into the stratification of the populations lastingly affected the structure of even the strongest peoples and are still far from having been filled in completely even in the case of the most progressive peoples. When the city of Rome came into being, the Romans in the main were still a tribe of vigorous peasants which was hardly superior to the other rural tribes of Italy. When the city of Rome had become the holder of world power, the never-ending battles had so jumbled up the population that a small number of too powerful and arrogant optimates held command over the land and over a mass of impoverished coloni and slaves who had to cultivate the soil. Today in Italy and in other vast expanses of southern Europe the after-effects of this can still be perceived in the condition of the cultivating population, which economically and socially has been depressed to the level of metayage tenants. With the Germanic and Slavic peoples of Europe, too, the warrior rule with which their history begins had its legal consequences in the form of rural bondage and subservience which lasted into the 18th and 19th centuries, and even after the elimination of bondage and subservience it manifests its actual consequences in the lesser vitality of the rural mentality which is found over large areas. Inasmuch as later the industrial proletariat was recruited from the peasant strata it is recruited from the lowest strata, the rural proletariat, to boot the latter's impaired condition also determined the shape in which the industrial proletariat began its employment, which imposed on it burdens demanding a maximum of physical and moral robustness. Historically worn down, their stamina were so slight that the capitalist class, helped by wealth growing at an astonishingly rapid rate, was able to subject the proletariat to a modern despotic rule which in severity did not fall short of the tyrannical rule of arms and which could only be restrained after state and society, along with organizations of the proletariat, had turned against it.

As things stood before the masses rose up during the age of revolutions, with nearly all the civilized peoples the lower classes had lost the capacity to perform the essentials of mass service and to be active followers exercising effective control over the leaders. The masses had become habituated to following traditional leadership in dull resignation, the idea that they might get rid of it being foreign to their way of thinking. Although one group or another perhaps desired a change in leadership, it still could not expect to be able to carry along onto new paths the great multitude of "the others," and everything remained as it was. If it pleased the leader to select his successor, he might have to fear opposition on the part of his companions, but not on the part of the masses. They obeyed the son as they had obeyed the father. In this way personal leadership strengthened into historical leadership; specifically, princely rule by election was replaced by hereditary princely rule. Hereditary choice of the leader entails the loss of the idea of selection, which is an essential strand of the purely social idea of leadership. Whether succession by inheritance doesn't have advantages of its own we need not discuss now, but let us merely state that it has the effect of supporting the Law of Small

Numbers, even where the leader lacks the inner calling for leadership and where the position shapes the leader instead of the latter creating the position. Where the masses have become tractable by historical pressure, it suffices for maintaining control by the few that they are smart enough to meet the masses halfway as to their necessities of life and their customs and for the rest not to make themselves obnoxious by emphasizing their dominant position. A prince who, in addition, knows how to preserve his personal dignity is bound to illumine his rule with the halo of patriarchal solicitude, no less.

The hereditary taint of the individual descending from sick parents or forefathers today are not only a concern of the physician and the judge but also of the social thinker and the psychologist-poet. Ibsen in his "Ghosts" presents to us a heart-wrenching example. How much more widespread and of graver consequences is, indeed, the historical affliction which the lower strata have to bear as heirs to the pressure to which their parents and forefathers had been exposed. For peoples of sound extraction one nevertheless does not have to despair, for the historical ghosts can be banished. The condition is not hopeless, the disease is not incurably lodged in the blood. The weakness is a historically acquired one which with improved circumstances can be got rid of again, but as is the case with every mass sickness, the cure demands the employment of substantial resources and the patient work of generations. Historically entrenched evils demand for their elimination long continued effort.

3. The Transition to Lordly and to Democratic Leadership

The first step toward improvement was taken when, in the case of the European peoples capable of development, the violent rules by arms, when they had performed the bulk of their historical task, gradually had to make room for the newly ascending, milder powers of the church and the middle classes. Thereby the realm of stringent coercion had come to an end, but that did not spell the end of the Law of Small Numbers. The church shared with prince and nobility in the power, and later the wealthy and educated middle class also entered into the ranks of society's upper ten thousand. Church and middle class were by no means working only to further their own interests, they both made and pushed through demands envisaged as being in the interest of the whole society. They both approached the pure idea of leadership much more closely than did the old despotic leaders, although they, too, did not bring it to full fruition. During the period of ecclesiastical supremacy, as during that of bourgeois liberalism, the leading powers retained something of the character of masterly rule. Although the middle class was no longer able to apply the historically acquired superiority of its means and to the violent suppression of the masses, but had to recognize their existential rights, it was still able to utilize them for the excessive pursuit of its interests. It enjoyed ample opportunity for doing that. It was zealously intent upon maintaining the historical lead in means and resources which the masses in their restrained circumstances could not hope to eliminate. As administrator of the leadership office it was in a position to so select the common aims as to be advantaged in the process. It had it within its power to grab the lion's share of

the leader in the jointly achieved successes and to become less encumbered in the allocation of burdens. Even when it did not enjoy any other advantage, it was still able to reserve the most remunerative posts in state and society for its members, who through their education and their connections had first claim to them.

In the new atmosphere, matters of princely rule also changed. More and more the princes were absorbed by the tasks of peace, which alongside the work of war grew profusely, and increasingly they had to face the new powers of the people. The enlightened prince craved being the patron of the intellectual leaders. His well-understood interest made him the benefactor of the middle class and the liberator of the peasants, if only because he thereby settled the fight against the nobility in his favor for good. Perhaps there has never been a leader in the state who came closer to realizing the pure idea of leadership than did the enlightened despot who vaunted himself of being the highest servant in the state. All power was joined in him, he enjoyed absolute freedom of action, and since he was bound by judgment and conscience, it did not matter at all that he did not have to face an opposite power which would be able to rein him in. To be sure, conditions depended on his two eyes, and although for the rest he did everything to develop the strength of his people, he hardly had an interest in educating it to the exercise of freedom. Individual and nation can rise to freedom only from their own accord.

The European peoples, after all the historical pressures, had retained enough vitality to develop their wealth and education progressively during the extended times of peace and improved order. Along with greater strength, the desire grew to make freer use of it. The ascendancy of the masses — first of the middle class and along with it of the peasantry, and finally of the proletariat as well — could not be stopped. Long after despotism had been changed to princely rule and the latter to lordly leadership, lordly leadership was displaced by cooperative-democratic leadership. The frozen historical leaderships were rejuvenated, leadership by religious authority already having been reformed for some time. All along the line of the state-church community the traditional rigid forms of leadership were replaced by looser ones, which kept developing ever more freely. Europe had entered into the period of democratization, of revolutions, of upheaval.

The frightened rulers of yesteryear see in the democratic movement the victory of the street, the victory of the masses, the victory of mass will over leadership will. Certainly where the movement achieved its objective the masses succeeded in securing considerably enhanced attention to their interests in the process of social decision-making. But they could get to this point only where they had learned to place themselves under leaders who, in order to act on behalf of the interest of the masses, could not be lacking in a well-functioning leadership will. In the grave battles which had to be fought with the old powers the leadership organ had to function extremely well, and how often indeed did it happen that the leadership function was enhanced at the expense of the masses! All these great revolutionary movements needed and had their strong leaders in thought and deed. The English revolution was intellectually prepared for

by the reformers' teachings of religious liberty, the middle-class revolution in France by the enlightenment down to Rousseau, the proletarian revolution in Russia by the socialist thinkers down to Marx. And those who governed were stern leaders. Calvin, Rousseau, and Marx exercised sovereign influence over the thinking of their followers. And the intellectual leaders at the appropriate time were joined by the leaders in action whose historic mission it was to transform the ideas into practical success and who through their success gained a hold on the masses. They, too, were stern leaders, and they had to be, for it was not possible without an extreme effort to overthrow the old powers. Charles Stuart was followed by Cromwell, Louis XVI by Napoleon after the men of terror, Tsar Nicholas II by Lenin. If in the princely state the motto had been, "The King is dead, may the King live!", when the people's state was set up it was quite often, "The King is dead, may the Dictator live!"

4. f-; of the Masses and Will of the Leader during the Period of Revolutions, Especially the French Revolution

The first of the modern revolutions, the English one, began as a revolution from above. Charles Stuart wanted to be an absolute prince as were the princes on the Continent. Perhaps he would have forced through his will to power if he had not had to cope with the resistance of the puritanical spirit of liberty and with Cromwell's outstanding leadership strength. The victory gave Cromwell a fullness of power such as no English king before him had enjoyed, and under the title of Lord Protector he ruled over England as the undisputed dictator.

The great French revolution was the eruption of a new immense force. In the thought of popular sovereignty, in the blissful belief in liberty, equality, and fraternity, the French people had identified itself as a closely knit unit. However, the intellectual leaders who had disseminated the new idea were not immediately followed by the leaders in action. Robespierre was derided when he rose to speak in the Constitutive Assembly. One had his fill indulging the new sense of power. But the power of facts irresistibly forced its way through the flood of big words which were spoken and through the ecstasy of the souls. The radiant rise of the idea of popular sovereignty eclipsed the idea of royal sovereignty which until shortly before had put its spell on the minds. Taine puts his finger on the decisive fact in saying that France had no government, for the old government was done with and the new one had not yet taken shape. The sovereign people wanted to listen to itself when it talked in the original assemblies of its 25,000 communes. For all that the tasks of government admitted of no delay. One had to be done with the famished and desperate rabble of the cities and likewise with the agitated peasants who rose up against the landlords everywhere. Quite apart from any detailed concern, the new idea of popular sovereignty imperatively pushed toward reconstructing state, church, and society according to its image, and the further one walked on the new paths, the more one had to grapple with internal and external rivals. The newly born phenomenal force needed its great leader and looked for him in vain. The french people had to stand the historical test for the significance of the saying that the leader is indispensable for the masses and that the suitable leader is selected only by

success. As long as this did not happen France remained in the state of interregnum, as did Germany after the fall of the Hohenstaufen dynasty when it experienced "the emperorless time, the terrible time," as is written in Schiller's ballad of the count of Hapsburg. The newly unleashed forces, stronger than one had ever experienced before, could not rest. In the ever more frequent scenes where the passion of the multitude broke through, management first fell to the accidental leaders as they were created on the spur of the moment. During the course of the World War such ad hoc leaders in the starving cities of the Central Powers were often enough seen rising when in front of the food stores or warehouses excited men and women were brought together by their common distress and who, as a crowd having become conscious of its strength, all of a sudden burst forth as soon as one of them had thrown out to "the others" the inflammatory word. All at once the wild deed was done which "nobody had really wanted to do." What happened here on a small scale occurred on a gigantic one at the outbreak of the French Revolution and during its days of terror. While the level-headed minds were still groping uncertainly, the enthusiasts with the determination of their narrow mind pursued the idea of popular sovereignty to an extreme. This idea now happened to have seized the minds, and no other thought could prevail against it as long as its feasibility remained untested. The ringing word "freedom" had been proclaimed, and it exerted its magic. It also loosened the chains which heretofore had restrained the violent elements of the people. In these the passion of the leaders found ready followers. The alliance of zealous madness and brute force was successful over all other forms of leadership which were tried, and assured to the new rulers dominion over the masses to an extent which the kings of France had never possessed. Even Louis XIV could not marshal against the external enemy such a contingent of fighters as did the men of terror with their universal compulsory military service, nor did he wield such a nearly unlimited fullness of power to quash internal resistances. What was the royal star-chamber justice compared with the justice of terror of the populace! This very exuberance of strength turned out to be France's undoing, for it generated the whirlwinds of the revolution just as a stream not dammed in by firm embankments generates whirlpools when it has been swelled by cloudbursts. This whole immense power first wore itself out in the drive for self-preservation and expansion. An indomitable drive came to life to extend the nearly boundless strength born from freedom to its fullest potential; a drive to communicate this strength to the surrounding peoples who were still under the yoke of their princes; a drive to cultivate it to perfection in the French people and to make it impregnable to any kind of resistance. The zealous mind considered any means to such a lofty end as permissible, even necessary. The strength born from freedom became as intolerant and cruel as the strength of love of the church had once been, and the guillotine did its work more expeditiously yet than did the stake. Keeping in check the newborn immense strength with its indomitable drive required the highest degree of masterly skill such as a Caesar and an Augustus and perhaps a Tiberius had possessed. But the men who had to control that strength were — apart from the one Danton with his revolutionary instinct — as shortsighted as Claudius and as bloodthirsty as Nero. Being placed at those dizzying heights, they were all bewitched by Caesarean delusion. The sovereign populace squirmed under their blows. It was its salvation that in the furious

struggle for power they betrayed one another. With Robespierre's fall the worst was over. The Directorate no longer needed the extreme means of terror, and instead of the guillotine resorted to deportation. But in the process it didn't know any better than did the Jacobins how to put the new strength to use for the populace, being in the main still caught up in the struggle for power. Strength was only ennobled to fertile deed when through the selection of military success Napoleon, a man who had the calling to become dictator, was elevated to leadership. Passing lightly over the ideology of popular sovereignty, he placated the French by directing the strength born from freedom into domestic channels of lasting effectiveness and through an incomparable series of victories lifting the nation up to the heights of world dominion.

As was true for Cromwell's dictatorship, Napoleon's likewise did not pass the test of time. In the French people as in the English, the impulse to freedom was too strong to be held down for the duration, and, moreover, the provoked peoples of Europe turned against Napoleon. In England as in France dictatorship was followed by restoration, there by the Stuarts and here by the Bourbons. But since the Stuarts, like the Bourbons, had neither learned nor forgotten anything, the restorations couldn't last either. Through a series of upheavals and changes, which we need not pursue here any further, England and France finally obtained durable liberal constitutions.

5. The Roman and the English Systems of Control of the Leaders

By predisposition as well as history, the English people among the European peoples is the one most qualified for freedom. It redounds to its benefit to have passed through its revolutionary epoch at a considerably earlier time than did the Continent and to have had a headstart of centuries over it in the organization of its political freedom. The way in which political freedom has been organized in England can teach the nations of the Continent that even a free people needs firm leadership. This is true provided it also has the countervailing power which keeps the will of the leader within bounds and obliges it to safeguard the interest of the masses. This countervailing ~~power~~ is not the will of the masses as such, however, for the masses can't act without leadership, and on their own they could do extremely little against the leader. Whenever they try to rely on their own devices, they fall prey to accidental leaders who oblige their most brutal instincts and turn order into chaos. In England's case we see it clearly demonstrated that the power which through its opposition must control the existing government is itself organized under modes of leadership which are as firm as that of the governing majority. This is the rationale for the English two-party system, which is the fruit of the political experience of the English people and which can hardly be done with for good as a result of the disturbances to which it has been exposed recently. While the majority party through its leaders attends to the business of governing, the opposition minority party in its leaders holds in reserve the ministry which is to take over the government as soon as the party through elections has gained for itself the majority of votes.

The English system is a refined development of the system of the old Romans which strove to attain liberty and order by rotating the Consuls at regular intervals. The Consul, for the year of his stewardship equipped with all the authority considered necessary for the successful management of his office, was restrained not only by having next to himself his equally empowered colleague, but also by having to vacate his seat to the elected successor at the end of the year and by being subject to accountability for his administrator. The political maturity of the Romans is still more clearly attested by the institution of the Roman dictatorship. In times of emergency the masses obediently submitted to a dictator endowed with unlimited power and free of responsibility, well aware that the Roman people was strong enough to be able to expect with confidence that, with his job done, the dictator would return the reins of power into the hands of the regular governing authorities. The will to power of the Roman people was triumphant because it knew how to submit to the will to power of its leaders, which at the same time it was able to curb. The English system is refined in the sense that it does not tie the change of government to the formal rule of annual turnover, but makes it dependent upon a vote in parliament and the outcome of the general elections, where the majority of voters decides the issue. The government remains in office as long as its management encounters the confidence of the majority. The leaders of the governing party as well as of the opposition must therefore always be careful to act in the interest of the majority of the eligible members of the populace. Incidentally, the outcome of the election rests with a relatively small group of voters, estimated by an expert to have accounted for one-tenth of the eligible voters in the recent elections. The majority of voters is always committed to the traditional party position dictated by the party interests, and only the most discerning group of voters is prepared to move independently. It turns away from the government when it suspects it to have acted against the general interest — or perhaps only against its own special interest which, as it always happens, it equates with the general interest. It is its votes which help the opposition gain victory, which in turn exposes to the public the mistakes committed by the government. As long as this most mature group of voters decides the issue, the radical sentiments will be overcome, and the moderate view of the center will give direction to the will of the populace.

Of course, it was not the letter of the Roman consular situation and it is not the form of the English party system what keeps the leaders of the governing party in line, but it was and is the impulse to freedom which is particular to the English people, as it was particular to the Roman people during the centuries of its greatest strength. The impulse to freedom in every people possessed by it has its base in the unbroken vigor of the bodies and minds, in the excellent work performance which brings economic prosperity, in the mores which maintain order, in the urge for culture which gives forward momentum. The powers of economy, morality, culture, as they flourish under anonymous leaders, or beyond, that have developed their own leadership hierarchy and organization, are the supportive powers of political freedom. They give the people the strength to resist the attempt by ambitious leaders bent on grabbing the reins of government. Organized under their leaders, they form the subgroups of which the associations of the political parties are composed;

and to a large extent the leadership of the political parties has been recruited from their ranks. The will of a free people is not the will of the masses; it is, down to its very roots, the fusion of mass will and leadership will.

6. Will of the Masses and Will of the Leader after the Upheaval Especially in Russia

The revolutions since the World War have been of different origin and in the main also have followed a different course than did the English and French revolutions. At the same time, however, like these they attest to the extraordinary significance attached to leadership precisely on the occasion of great political upheavals. Whereas the English revolution was one from above vis-a-vis which the middle class had to prove that its strength was firmly grounded, and whereas the French revolution was the eruption of a new vitality of the French people, the revolutions after the World War were debacles. They were not volcanic but ~~tectonic~~ tremors, although tectonic tremors of extraordinary reach and impact. In the vanquished states of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary the foundation rocks of the time-honored dynasties of the Romanov, Hohenzollern, and Hapsburg-Lorraine collapsed. The Houses of Romanov, Hohenzollern, and Hapsburg-Lorraine all had ascended their thrones as supreme warlords after a string of victories, and the inexorable logic of history had to bring their rules to an end when world defeat was an argument against them in the eyes of the masses. Already before, each of the dynasties at one time or another had to get over painful defeats. Although Napoleon had successively humbled them at Austerlitz, Jena, Wagram, and the Moskva, they had never been struck at the vital nerve, but time and again they could recover through new successes. The professional officers and non-commissioned officers and the soldiers — drilled during extensive peacetime service — forming the core of their armies were committed to the flag by hallowed traditions of honor and duty. They were sustained by the soldier's particular psychology of power, which compensates him for all professional sacrifices and even for the threat of losing his life by elevating him to a plane on which he shares in the intoxication of battle strength and the power of victory. The old professional armies, too, had not always been able to stave off despondency and enervation, but all the same they always reunited in military loyalty. The spirit emanating from the professional core of the militias enlisted during the World War was so vibrant as to maintain firm discipline in the immense military body. Then there was the idea imbuing all the peoples which were drawn into the war that they had been attacked by an insidious enemy and had to defend their national heritage. Everywhere the weighty duties demanded by the state were shouldered with joyful enthusiasm. But it so happens that civilized peoples are unable to bear a national war going beyond certain limits. The loss of professional soldiers affects the army, the loss of militia soldiers affects the populace, and in a national war, along with the soldiers, citizens in the hinterland, the aged, the women, and the children suffer. If the war stretches out over years and the prospect for attaining victory or at least an honorable peace vanishes, the multitude asks what use there is for continuing the war. When in the unending battles the professional core of the army, which had to bear the brunt, had been practically used up, the spirit of the army had

also changed. The psychology of the bourgeois worried about his business, home, and family and with an eye on his own welfare won out over soldierly psychology, and the question of the "what for" of the war now was also asked throughout the ranks of the army, first in the hinterland and at the base, but finally all the way up to the battle front. The minds of people inside and outside the army turned away from the monarchs who were blamed for the war and its terrible suffering. The moral sway which the monarchs had held over the civilians and the army had vanished. All it took was the initiative of a few determined men demanding their dethronement, and no hand would be lifted in their defense. The armies had ceased serving as the shield and sword of the dynasties. In Germany as in Russia it was generals of the highest rank and proven loyalty who successfully insisted on the abdication of their emperors. The peoples endured what a great majority among them perhaps had not desired, but what to prevent they lacked any kind of inducement.

When the dynastic keystone dropped out of the monarchical edifice, things were not over and done with. The moral effect spread out across the entire society witnessing this unheard-of event. Shaken was the structure not only of the political but of the entire social edifice, which fundamentally was held together not by external resources of power but by forces of the soul. By far the most disintegrating effect occurred in Russia. Outside the Tsar there existed on the national plane no leadership power of some strength. The church clung to the Tsar, the Duma did not yet have traditions on its side, the land-hungry peasants had for a long time been wrought up against the nobility, the educated middle class was numerically weak as compared to the masses, the occasional big industrialists had the multitude of workers — who had every reason to be unhappy about their situation — against them. For a short while the Duma was still able to maintain a democratic government, but its directives were already interfered with by the councils of workers and soldiers. Kerenski attempted a test of strength by resuming operations on the front-line. This was the signal for complete disintegration. Leadership everywhere had come to an end, everywhere the many at the bottom rose against the few at the top. The great majority of the soldiers, tired of war, went home. What was left of the military organization were the councils of soldiers which, along with the councils of workers formed by organized labor, could now overthrow the newly established government. As couldn't have happened otherwise, in view of the general excitement, the most radical group, the Bolsheviks, got the upper hand in the councils. The Bolshevik organization had already been completed long before the war, it had been sifted and hardened in the advanced school of conspiracy for years. The hatred for the old establishment which had pitilessly persecuted the revolutionaries and the fervent belief in their mission to renew the world united them in an iron discipline. In cold logic the Bolshevik organization had contrived its program for equality and was determined to carry it out with ruthless energy. It was clear to the Bolsheviks that the first order of business was to capture power. After the collapse they were given the long-hoped-for opportunity to do so, and they could build up a regime which had to be more durable than that of the Jacobins in France, over whom they held the great advantage of being internally united and prepared to the last detail. Their theory of equality gained for them a firm grip on the instincts of the unleashed masses, who

were anxious to get rid of the leaders placed over them. Aside from the soldiers workers, the rabble, and the scum of the proletariat it was especially the peasants who obliged them because the Bolshevik platform demanded distribution to them of the feudal real estate. The revolution, having started with the army's defection from the Tsar and the liberal intelligentsia abandoning him, then came under proletarian leadership and reached its crucial finale in the upheaval of the landed property. There was no turning back for the peasants who distributed the feudal land among each other, and since they constituted a large majority of the populace, the Tsarist system was deprived of any prospect for a return as long as it failed to give up its historic liaison with the nobility, from whose ranks came the occupants of the leading positions in the state hierarchy. To that extent the Bolshevik interest was at one with that of the peasants. The Bolshevik government exploited the situation to its best advantage. Not only did it leave to the peasant the captured land, but by and large it also spared him the requirements which the old government had burdened him with. Lenin's good sense later granted to the peasant even the indispensable economic mobility which the rigid party platform would not have conceded to him. In return the government could expect that the peasant abstained from interfering with its exercise of dictatorial rule in the rest of Russia.

The Bolsheviks quickly gained the upper hand over the other revolutionary associations because they proceeded most resolutely and most readily acceded to the instincts of the masses. They also were able to cope with the counter-revolutions which broke out in numerous regions of the vast realm. The heroism of the Tsarist officers who took charge of the counter-revolutions was in vain, for the masses didn't go along with them. The Bolshevik leadership didn't hesitate to reinforce their small numerical weight by the most extreme means of terror. Those suspected of being attached to the old state officers and civil servants primarily, but also the members of the wealthy and educated class — were decimated or fled abroad. The Bolshevik organization remained on the scene as the sole leadership authority. However short was its tenure in a commanding position and however small were its numbers — the count of the old conspiratorial Bolsheviks who had begun the struggle has been estimated at about 15,000 — it nevertheless succeeded in establishing a rule which looked nearly impregnable. Outside Russia one couldn't believe that such a great people could be swayed by such a small number of men, whose origins were a mystery, to boot, or who plainly hailed from the most oppressed strata, the proletariat and the Jewry, an alien race pushed aside, persecuted, and disdained in state and society. One could hear it said that Russia had fallen prey to foreign rule as it had under the Tartars, no wonder since the first reliable crack troops of the new regime were composed of Chinese, Latvians, Bashkirs, Hungarians, and other non-Russians. A people without the mental framework of masters just can't be without masters. The bodyguard of the sultans of Egypt, which had been put together from Caucasian prisoners of war, made itself the ruler of the land because the Mameluks' martial profession gave them the mentality roasters which the rest of the people lacked. After the moral breakdown of the old leaders in Russia and after the personal annihilation of their most determined representatives the association of Bolsheviks was the only one which had the will to

rule and, what's more, was admitted to leadership altogether. After the removal of the old top leaders it had under its command a leveled mass incapable of functioning. In place of the personal leaders who had fallen prey to the masses, a supreme leadership authority had been set up which combined under its control nearly all the leadership tasks and in particular had also swallowed up the economic leadership, which even the almighty Tsar had left to personal initiative. Only the church escaped the Bolshevik management, yet it had lost much of its authority, and the Bolsheviks did all they could to unsettle religious thinking. The pliable remainder of the intelligentsia was incorporated into the government service, and while their talents and experiences were utilized, they were pressed down to the general level of living. Of the former government apparatus everything was restored that was needed in view of the tasks taken over and especially of the need to assert power. In many respects it became more severe as the standard set by the Jacobinian institutions of force was imitated and even exceeded. The *hatgg* "Ochrana" was continued in the form of the terrible *Tscheka*, and in so doing a considerable portion of its personnel was taken over for whose support the cruel lust of the rabble furnished ready helpers and henchmen. In the wars which had to be conducted military discipline was tightened again, and such tightening was also applied to work discipline in the factories. The governmental machine could be set going, after the hopeless disorder of the beginnings the worst abuses could be eliminated, and foreign countries could be moved to acknowledge the status quo. In a short time the government felt so consolidated that it could even afford to tone down its terrors because it could expect that of all the millions not one would readily dare to stand up against a power which all "the others" allowed to operate. In the name of the great number a small, a tiny, number of people who appointed themselves to representatives of the people could impose the law upon a huge people. This law was not only to hold down the existing leadership strata, but it shook up the whole national life because it began its dominion by depopulating the large cities, by letting their houses and streets decay and the railroads fall into disrepair, by ruining the forests, by destroying the farms and the best of their equipment, by reducing agriculture to peasant narrowness, by letting industry and trade shrink, the schools wither, the churches become deserted, the morals degenerate, and the living conditions of the masses in terms of clothing, food, and heating deteriorate.

The small number could impose its harsh law on the Russian people because its history had not permitted it to secure supportive powers of freedom and free leaders who could have offered resistance to despotism. Now the pernicious consequences of centuries of Russian bondage came to the fore. The autocratic Tsar had begun too late to allow room for freer movements, and his autocracy collapsed before being able to complete its

'German word for the secret police in Tsarist Russia.
(Tr.)

"German word for Soviet state secret police (originally the extraordinary commission to combat counterrevolution and sabotage). — (Tr.)

transformation, which had already released potent forces and held out hope for more potent ones yet. The weakened body lacked the strength to ward off the obtrusive, unbidden doctors who, with feverish zeal but blinded by passion, tried to cure it by violent measures. The new masters knew of no remedy against the traditional crass inequality with its stunting of vitality in many circles, who no longer were able to subsist, other than to extinguish inequality totally. They pressed down what reared its head above the level of mass conformity, bearing out Grillparzer's prophetic word, "Everything the same because everything debased." They proceeded like a gardener who lops the healthy trees down to their roots because they overshadow the weak plants. But since they had to deal with people whose resistance against the violent encroachment had to be suspected, they were above all bent upon accumulating with themselves superior power which for the foreseeable future would rule out any countervailing power. In the process they became addicted to the same law of power which had held within its grip the rulers of the old Russia: that power encountering no resistance in the end becomes predominant force. They wanted to be fighters and philosophers at the same time, but since they didn't belong to those exceptional people to whom it is given to do double duty, their thinking was shaped by the requirements of combat. Like the Frenchmen of terror, they fulfilled the law of historical wave motion by restraining the fighting power of the old regime through mobilizing the fighting power of the masses until the new superior force matched the old one. Perhaps the historiographer of some future time will have to give them credit for having removed the burden of inequality which depressed the freedom of the lowly people, but the present-day observer must note, above all, that by their equalizing pressure they repress the most precious impulses for freedom.

7. The Circumstances Governing the Central Powers and the Victorious Nations

In Austria-Hungary the destructive force of the revolution was still stronger than in Russia in that it tore asunder the army and the monarchy into their national constituent parts. In Hungary as well as here and there in Germany the dictatorship of the councils was proclaimed, but it did not last anywhere. In Germany, in Germanic Austria, and in the new national states everywhere the democratic republic asserted itself, and, apart from the early fluctuations, the political revolution nowhere was followed by the social revolution. Missing was preparation of the kind that had been created by the Bolshevik conspiracy in Russia, the lures of Russian emissaries and of Russian money not being enough. In addition, in the new national states the buildup of national power demanded too much attention to woo the winds for the social revolution, and this is why the Bolshevik endeavors in Hungary could be negated quickly by national counteraction. As for Germany and Germanic Austria, in particular, even after the overthrow of the emperor and the dissolution of the great armies sufficiently strong forces of social leadership had remained intact to prevent the spread of the social revolution. The parliaments, the civil servants, the entrepreneurs, the educated circles in general, and the churches due to their traditions enjoyed a considerable degree of stability, and the peasantry was satisfied. It is true that the malcontent

industrial proletariat succeeded in expanding its rights considerably in the state constitution and the industrial relations laws, and it also managed to exert attraction on a goodly number of employees. But nowhere did things advance to the point that the democratic idea was violated in the state constitutions — or one let it go at developing them to the limits conceivable — or that the private economic order was violated at its core. To be sure industrial workers as the strongest of all organized social groups have won a degree of influence on decision-making in the state which especially during the first years after the revolution went beyond the influence which they should have enjoyed according to the number of votes of their constituencies and their representatives. Likewise, in the enterprises the actual influence exerted by them not infrequently transcended their legal rights. Here and there the agitated masses of workers believed that the time for them to rule had come, and where the more moderate old leaders tried to restrain them they found new leaders who would rule according to the wishes of their promoters. Where existing organizations wanted to go slow, wildcat strikes erupted, and there was even new unrest in the streets. Although the citizen used to order had the feeling that the revolution still continued, it was only the aftershocks of the disintegration of the dynasties which made themselves felt in the social structure. The big moving forces which typically attend a revolutionary movement were not present. As there was no great popular movement, there was also no great leader of the people. The many parties into which the people had been split in earlier times retained their leaders of party-oriented, limited perspective and influence. Leader and multitude were and are equally infirm. The evil to bemoan was and is not the rule of the masses, but the general impotence.

Like the German people and the peoples involved in the upheaval, the victorious peoples of Europe are also confronted with enormous tasks in order to recover their strength and to continue the fertile development which they had begun before the World War. World War and upheaval have not resolved the conflicts of power which everywhere had been stirred up by the tempestuous progress; on the contrary, they have further intensified them. The masses sense this precisely, and everywhere one longingly expects the great leader who would lay down the law for the troubled minds. The present time proves unambiguously that great national tasks simultaneously are always great tasks for leadership and that it is the will of the leader which must transform mass impulses into a mass will and must give direction and consistency to the latter. He who feels called up to assume leadership is not afraid of foundering in the sea of great numbers. Unlike the faint-hearted who wavers before the heavy sea, he will march on upright, confident that the waves will carry and lift him.

XV. The Historical Circulation of Power and the Sequence of Epochs

1. .About the Theory of the Coincidences in History

All peoples of the Occident are blood-related and companions in history. They all have turned from fighting peoples into industrial ones; they all had to settle the same conflicts between ruling classes and dominated masses; aided by science and technology, they all turned to machine production and large-scale enterprise; in the period of growth of capital and railways they all reshaped the body economic and politic in town and country; guided by the same ideas and ideologies, they all have been brought into the democratic movement, with the center of gravity veering increasingly toward the proletarian masses. The observer cannot expect anything but that their evolution has to be largely synchronous, although differences in their talents and their external endowments will somehow manifest themselves. A backward glance into history reveals to us a substantial parallelism, for modern nations no less than for the peoples of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, not only in the Occident but all over the world, and not only with respect to the peoples belonging to the same epoch but also from one epoch to another. For example, modern systems are really in multiple ways related to the conditions of earlier peoples which, having reached an advanced stage of development, were no less flourishing while having to suffer similar evils. In the representation given us by Mommsen of the Roman state in Caesar's time, we recognize one trait of modern life after another.

Among the writers who set out to depict the big sweep of history, many were inclined to identify nothing less than a law of parallel historical development. For example, Draper in his "History of Europe's Intellectual Development" tried to show that there were five epochs of European intellectual life which all other peoples passed through as well. He calls them the eras of credulity, exploration, faith, reason, and decay, and he traces in the five intellectual manifestations of philosophy, science, literature, religion, as well as political system, while mentioning material development only occasionally, inasmuch as it provides reference points which serve the purpose of his investigation. Beginning with the examination of intellectual currents in ancient Greece, he goes on to show that the intellectual evolution of the whole continent had essentially the same content although it stretched over a much longer period of time. The idea of historical coincidences was developed to the greatest length by Spengler in his "Decline of the West." He asserts the existence of a strict parallelism for the evolution of cultures, everywhere comprising the same duration of about a millenium with the same typical periods. According to him, peoples separated from each other by centuries or millenia still evince in their development the same coincidences, each having to pass through the same cultural stages at equal intervals. In the same way, Preysig already thought that a Greek living five centuries before Christ had the same age as a Roman in 130 A.D. or a German in 1500 A.D. Spengler refuses to give any explanation about the reasons for the historical parallelisms, taking these as data which offer themselves to historiography on a grand scale, with no way of tracking the law of how they came about. He views

their course from the same beginning to the same end as being so rigidly determined that he has to deny any interaction between them and the existence of any world-historical connection.

We will not further pursue the fact that Spengler is not able to stick to his bold theory in its particulars; certainly his strong sense of history, his flair for it, must have put him at odds with his doctrine in many places. We called attention to his presentation not in order to examine it critically but because, notwithstanding its overstatement, by its grand sweep it places us in the very center of facts which certainly we now, upon cool deliberation, have to interpret differently.

The object of our inquiry cannot be confined to the history of cultures, but we must synthesize all aspects of the history of peoples as it is affected by both internal and external powers. Everywhere the external powers must provide shelter for the growth of the internal ones, and all aids or impairments experienced by the former will always have their impact upon cultural achievements.

Our presentation will be confined to the advanced civilizations. We leave aside the peoples wholly or even only partly incapable of cultural achievements. Their stunted growth can be as little representative of the highly articulated structure of a great history of peoples as can the growth of a plant failing to survive a summer be representative of a giant tropical conifer or of a legendary linden tree. But must we not, in addition, distinguish viable peoples by the degree of their endowment? Should not the development of peoples who so towered above their contemporaries as did the Greeks and the Romans be viewed as especially long and rich in its contents? As is well known, the Chinese, a richly endowed people with a 'great culture, whom Spengler includes among his ten world civilizations, nevertheless paused at a stage which was surpassed by all European peoples. The latter, among which we include the Americans who immigrated from Europe, historically in the long run proved to be the strongest of all peoples, and therefore their history exceeds by a few degrees the cultural height attained by the most accomplished Asiatics. European and Asiatic history do not proceed "synchronously" at all. While the latter at first developed at a speed which was far from being matched by the former, at the end of a period of competitive striving European history won an edge which Asiatic history has hardly a chance to eliminate any more.

Aside from differences in endowment, differences in the external circumstances under which a people lives are bound to affect its development. A people dwelling under the warm sun of the south brings its talents to more rapid maturity. A people which must wrest its food from the environment of a nordic winter will have to labor longer and more strenuously, but as it must sink the plow more deeply into the ground it cannot help awakening rather substantial inner resources. More significant yet than the material environment is that provided by other peoples. No people remains entirely autarchic and self-oriented, each in the course of its evolution time and again encounters others which have a stimulating or an inhibiting effect on it. The proud empire of the conquering Aztecs in Mexico tumbled down from splendor into nothingness under the blows of the Spanish conquistadors. Distress caused by overpopulation forced a

peoples which had not yet progressed to more intensive methods of production to migrate, and migrations have mingled the peoples. The most successful ones became mighty ruling powers; many others, not lacking in strong positive impulses, lost their idiosyncrasies when they blended with others; and the weakest ones were pressed down to the status of inferiority or even of slavery. The history of a despotic people is not paralleled by that of a slave people, they move apart like ascent and descent. Even a people with the strength of the Normans, which in the course of its predatory migrations established dominions on all European coasts, had to adapt to the ethnic environment which it penetrated. The Normans, who in England associated themselves closely with the vigorous Saxons, were called to assume world leadership, while the Normans in southern Italy spent themselves relatively quickly. The Aryans who conquered India after all the great feats eventually became Indians, unable to keep pace with the Aryan culture in Europe.

Even under otherwise like external and internal circumstances the course of the history of peoples is always determined by the order in which the peoples line up historically. The most heavy workload was imposed on those peoples which had to be first in addressing the task of establishing states and civilizations. They spent themselves in stages of development which later peoples were still able to scale with ebullient strength because they became heirs of, and could enjoy, the historical advance work done by the earlier ones. Couldn't the lead which Europeans have gained over Asiatics be most intimately connected with the very fact that the latter, still lacking in experience and provided with few resources, had to perform the very demanding spade work and thereby exhausted their energies prematurely? If the Teutons instead of the Greeks had had to grapple with the Persians and instead of the Romans had had to set up a world empire around the Mediterranean Sea, and if then the Greeks and the Romans had followed them with unimpaired strength, who knows whether the latter might not have stood tall above the Romanic-Germanic culture? The heritage which the ancient Germans received from Antiquity for their work during the Middle Ages is invaluable. It cannot be doubted that along with the Roman Empire an immense stock of cultural treasures perished, but what was left as a remainder saved the Germans the work of ages. On the masterfully built Roman highways the Germanic tribes invaded the Roman Empire, and these highways, braving the storms of centuries, they could continue to use during war and peace. Thus the misery of roads typifying the Middle Ages only began when the young states had to rely on their own as yet undeveloped art of construction. In the provinces in which the conquerors settled they were able to take over the remnants of Roman administration, which went far beyond what their own statecraft could have established. Notwithstanding the ravages from the battles of migration they still found a fairly numerous population living in decent order in well-built towns with advanced craftsmanship and agriculture, speaking a cultured language and already committed to Christianity. The Roman church in itself was for the barbarian victors a gift of fate which they couldn't have expected so soon if they had had to rely on their own strength. Through the intermediary of the ancient Germans who settled on Roman soil, the preparatory work of the Romans then also benefitted those ethnic Germans who founded their empires on ancient Germanic soil, and in due course the Slavs in the east also obtained their

share of the heritage of Antiquity which in part they also received from the Byzantines and the oriental church.

The cultural legacy was so great that the culture-absorbing capacity of the new peoples was not sufficiently strong to assimilate it right away. As the son inheriting as a boy the library of his forefathers only gradually acquires the maturity to familiarize himself with its treasures, so the Middle Ages only over a series of developmental stages were able to exhaust the ancient treasures of culture, extending from Charles the Great to Humanism and the Renaissance and being added to even later. To be sure, we must not think of the Renaissance, as its name might suggest, as simply the rebirth of Antiquity. Taught by the zealous Humanists and having attained the receptive maturity which allowed them to understand the works of Antiquity, the Renaissance people absorbed them with alacrity and buoyancy, but in letting these have an effect on them, they remodeled them at the same time. The Renaissance was a fecund combination of antique and modern ways. The people of the Renaissance did not themselves immediately recognize this. They deemed the antique achievements nothing less than perfect because within their frame of reference they were characterized by excellence of form and intellectual penetration. Only later one began to realize that the configurations and conflicts of modern life are still too deeply immersed in darkness to permit their being arranged in calm, classic rhythms. All peoples of the Occident took a bow before Antiquity, and after many ups and downs they all arrived in the end at a fuller self-realization. Why did the Humanists, no sooner than they had rendered their service as teachers, become the object of general disdain? Because they were not able to go along with their time, which was out for self-gratification. If the Renaissance had really been so addicted to the ancient heathen spirit as external appearances would lead one to believe, it would have been impossible for the Reformation to follow on its heels which, as is well known, not only set into motion the Germanic north but also led the Roman church to a drastic renewal. Without humanistic training, an Ulrich von Hutten would not have been able to express what he had to say, and no more would the Reformation or Counter-Reformation have been able to do so. Without this humanistic influence, Luther would not have been able to fall back upon the bible, but the Reformation would still not have been able to be what it was if Luther had not at the same time felt the strength and the urge to translate the sacred original into his beloved German idiom and if the German people hadn't felt the strength and the urge to confess its faith in its own way.

When peoples, one following the other, join their works, world history begins to have continuity. World history is not sheer repetition of the history of peoples, as it would be if the doctrine of the synchronism of the histories of peoples could be taken entirely at face value. In the context of world history the ethnic histories of the first periods are of different structure than those of the last periods. In the former the early stages of development are more protracted and more laborious and the latter ones are less perfectly developed or are absent entirely, while in the latter the early stages are more quickly left behind and the main development occurs in the later ones. The last among the great states to attain stature, the United States of America, did not begin its history until the European

states had already a millennial history behind them and deemed themselves to have attained the apex of their development. Of the time span covering the settlements of New England, by historical standards a short period indeed, a large portion represents early history, the labor of settlement and of fights against the indigenous Indian tribes, which — compared with the European battles of migration — shrink to a series of romantic episodes. The real act of establishment of the state occurred in the course of battle, as it previously had everywhere in Europe, but the one war of independence, no match whatsoever for the European kind of political wars, was enough to give to the United States their permanent constitution — the political mentality of Americans had thus been completed. As a matter of fact it had already been fully formed when the Mayflower brought to the American shores its pick of free-thinking English citizens who had in themselves the strength to support an upright political system. For these men the conflict between command and freedom was settled when they set foot on American soil. Their religious personality was also complete: the American Constitution begins with a free church in a free state, whereas in Europe the free church emerged at the end of a long, eventful development. The influx of millions of immigrants who then turned to the abundant soil for the time being has not changed this firmly shaped type. The migrants didn't come as conquerors but as devoted citizens, willing from the start to sacrifice to the new commonwealth their nationality and their peculiarity. Where, moreover, do we find the respective synchronous developments in Europe? Things then proceeded at a brisk pace. It wasn't just that America's wealth and the generosity of its resource endowment and its large-scale techniques in many respects left Europe behind, which would be only a difference in degree, but essentially new traits have been formed in the national character. The highest class of indigenous workers is filled with bourgeois sentiments and in its whole attitude approaches the middle class, women are respected in society in a way quite different from Europe, and children are nurtured and educated with greatest care. Not having to assert their national identity in combat, Americans are spared the kind of conflict which threatens to consume Europe. The "United States" are an undisputed reality in America, whereas in Europe such a union is perhaps an unrealizable wish. How broad and secure, indeed, is the flow of American life, whereas the national forces in Europe, like mountain waters, are unable to find each other across the dividing barriers! Whether Europe's national rivalries, once they are kept from going overboard, will not aid in developing most amply the talents given to mankind is a question we do not want to broach at this time, but instead we only want it clearly understood that the development here cannot, after all, follow the same course as it does there. The American character is an offshoot of the European which, historically prepared over here will in the favorable soil over there further develop in its own way. Once American culture has grown to its full potential it will display a character of its own which can't be developmentally aligned with Europe's ancient or modern culture, let alone the Egyptian, Chinese, or Aztec cultures.

The untenability of the doctrine of synchronous parallels becomes entirely clear if one tries to apply it to the life stages of an individual. Is it possible to place all ten-year olds in the same line of development, or all twenty- or fifty-olds? How many twenty-year olds understand the painful

exclamation of the youth feeling called up to great leadership feats, "Twenty years and nothing done yet to achieve immortality!" The multitude ends adolescence in dull resignation, but a Tolstoi lived through all stages of life up to old age with the unrestrained impetuosity of youth. Inner growth such as creative minds experience in their formative years may be equated with the work of whole generations of average minds. Between Schiller as manifested in "The Robbers" and Schiller of the classical Weimar period there lies a distance for which one cannot find a manifestation in the life of the man on the street altogether. But in the case of peoples the impulses for inner growth are no less different than is true for individuals. Certainly all healthy peoples will exhibit developmental tendencies of a similar nature, yet every people in the end lives its own life and cannot help doing so, the peculiarities of its national character giving to every event a measure of uniqueness. It is given to all peoples in the front ranks of world history to advance to social formations which hitherto had not been experienced anywhere else. In this way world history becomes development.

2. Measuring Social Forces by a Common Standard

By what standard can the development of a people be measured? It is customary to gauge it by reference to the forces as they move in a sequence of growth, prosperity, and decay. But how to weigh against each other the multitudinous forces in the life of the people? While some decay, others rise to new flowering. In order to bring unity into this motley picture, one must use some kind of value judgment as a standard of comparison. But which hierarchy of values is to be accepted? Historiography is wont to put into first place those forces whose working clings longest to the memory of people. The Greek force of culture, the Roman force of victory have left imperishable tracks in world history, and the periods when they were in their prime are therefore likely to be viewed by the expert historian as the zenith of ancient history. Modern intellectuals like especially to cling to the pinnacles of art, and he who feels congenial to superman feels at home amid the excesses of exuberant vitality. In spite of Caesar Borgia, or really because of him, Stendhal and like-minded persons view the Renaissance as one of the culminations of history while regarding Christianity and the morality of pity as manifestations of decay.

But as long as there is no common standard, or at best an arbitrary one, for the many cross-currents of life, the substance of history must remain beyond grasp because, as long as this is so, historical evolution appears to the retrospective view as so many separate movements as there are principal forces alive among the people. Political history remains apart from religious as well as from economic and art history, the latter again dividing up into the history of the separate arts. The inner separation is not bridged if a hard-working historiographer combines all the separate strands of material into an overall narrative which is bound to lack the unifying bond. Granted that historiography must start out looking separately at the various dimensions of the life of a people and that the specialist will always be an indispensable aid to the universal historian, but in the end the latter must synthesize everything, after all, and must be able to produce a genuine unity of perspective.

In the reality of the life of a people there is no mere coexistence of forces. The richer such life becomes, the more these forces will interpenetrate in the course of competitive striving, passing and displacing each other in the variation of triumph and defeat. Once a people has come to an awareness of itself, it experiences its history as an integrated whole. The work of a great nation will be divided up among individual tasks along a broad front without splintering in the process, however. More like a commander aggregating his troops wherever danger lurks or success beckons, a great nation also moves its manpower of leaders and masses always to the principal foci of decision-making, unconcerned about the possibility of having to break off prematurely tasks in full progress — it will resume them in due time as soon as the equilibrium of national strength has been restored. During the century in England following upon the reign of Queen Elizabeth of glorious memory the country was agitated profoundly, and the dead earnest of events spelled the end of merry old England. The unthinkable occurred that Shakespeare's name almost fell into oblivion. Numerous domains of culture obviously decayed, and later on literature had to be resuscitated altogether. It couldn't be otherwise because all other interests were of secondary importance compared to the fight which was waged for political and religious liberty between the King and Parliament. With sure instinct the masses, alternating their leaders, always followed the leader who just happened to be confronted with the most severe distress — after the traditional king the national dictator, after the dreary puritanical regime the traditional king again. And then, after the Stuarts had become completely alienated from the sympathy of the populace on account of the licentiousness of the Court, the undignified submission to Louis XIV, and renewed attacks upon the political and ecclesiastical constitution, the masses turned away from them for good. English pride yielded to the statesmanlike leadership of William of Orange and eventually to the foreign House of Hanover, which secured the protestant succession to the throne and under which the Whig nobility lifted the Parliament above the King. In all this criss-cross of decisions the substructure of the world-dominating future England was nevertheless completed, and what interests had been neglected for the sake of first things first in the end could be nurtured again with concentrated strength.

As does the active man, the forward-striving people also gauges the strength of forces by their effects. For every single activity experience supplies the technical standard, and in the final analysis all activities, however diverse they may be, face their collective social judgment in the success as measured by the dominion gained by such success over the minds. Power is the common measure of the social forces, and in the competition of these forces, to the most successful falls the supreme power. The historiographer who aspires to understanding the unity of the work of society will stick to the power decisions. One must not be misled by the fact that in thousands of cases external power, perhaps of a rude and most brutal variety, carries the day. It is not the historiographer's task to moralize or otherwise to discuss value judgments — at least this is not his proximate task. His proximate task is description, and it is incumbent upon him to describe with the impartiality of the natural scientist, having to inform us about the events in the life of a people beyond the pale of good and evil. Compared to the natural

scientist, he happens to be in the favorable position of being able to penetrate with understanding the connections between the events in the life of the various peoples, whereas the human mind is barred from lifting the veil over the secrets of nature. History can and must be portrayed in such a way that the reader comprehends it. To be sure, strictly speaking, the soul of a person remains as much of a mystery to us as does external nature. We don't know from where come the forces setting us in motion, we don't know how the great man is called upon when the times are out of joint, we don't know why from the depths of the soul at a given time break forth the uplift of faith, the light of ideas, the inspirations of artistic feeling. But we do know as soon as the forces have asserted themselves that human beings enjoy their effects and bow to their results. Or, to put it with utmost brevity, we do not understand the emergence of the forces, but we do understand the principle of power into which the forces become transformed. When the historiographer explains to us how external and internal powers through testing their strength gain dominion over the peoples and how changing forces entail changing powers, we can follow his presentation with understanding. The sequence of historical powers reveals to us the meaning of history, although it may not infrequently be of repulsive brutality. As is known, even the civilized person of the present era has left enough in him of untamed human passion to be able to sympathize with the excesses in the history of peoples.

The universal historian solves the task of synthesizing which is put to him when he succeeds in integrating all the various strands of material in order to portray the great nexi of power as they come to light in the history of peoples, and then, intensified, in world history. Here as there development takes a circular course. This movement is more easily recognized within the narrow framework of ethnic history than within the broad one of world history. We therefore want to begin with an exposition of the historical circulation of power within a people.

3. The Circulation of Power Within a People

As each people progresses, it expands either when an excess of births adds to the number of inhabitants or when in its growth it absorbs other peoples. The Roman patricians finally had to concede to the plebeians full democratic rights. The Roman people joined to itself as allies the Latins and other closely related tribes of middle Italy from whom it eventually could not withhold civic rights any longer, and it set up colonies of citizens abroad and bestowed citizenship rights on some towns and regions. The constitution established by Caesar and Augustus imposed as a duty on the imperial government to look out for the entire population of the wide realm, and finally Caracalla extended civic rights, which of course had long been rendered valueless, to all freemen of the realm. Any such enlargement of the ethnic frame is bound to enlarge the path for the circulation of power as well and will intensify the tension between the moving forces.

Two impulses set in motion the process of the circulation of power within a people. The first emanates from the leaders, other one from the masses. The first lifts into ruling position a thin stratum of leaders leadership individual

cast and classes, leadership peoples — whose pressure upon the masses sometimes comes close to forcing the latter into an extremely degrading position. The second involves a drive on the part of the masses, lifting them up in a balancing way. The old leaders are removed, or they have to become responsive to the multitude because they are unable to maintain the Law of Small Numbers in all its rigor as soon as the multitude, benefiting from the established law and order, has turned its strength to new tasks and now can also bring the weight of its numbers to bear. The superposition of leaders for the time being is assured mainly by the exercise of external force, but subsequently abundant inner resources are also released. Although the rise of the masses rests in part on external forces as well, internal ones are always decisive — forces awakened and nurtured by healthy work and acquired by individuals as they expand their education. The internal strength of the masses paves the way for the supportive powers which offer resistance to the ruling powers of the upper classes, and as they gain further ground begin to participate in the exercise of power by those in control.

Within the close compass of the Greek city state it is easy to see the process of circulation which here follows a relatively simple movement. No wonder that the bright spirit of the Greeks discerned it clearly, and Polybius already tagged it correctly as "cycle of the constitutions." In their migratory battles the Greek tribes submitted to the leadership of kings who were called to the top by the incessant business of war. The bulk of the burden of fighting was borne by a wealthy noble elite who went to the front in heavy armor, and its members included, in addition to the king, the socially most privileged. As soon as the migration battles had come to an end and there was no longer a need for the wartime firm royal leadership, the concentrated might of the nobility proved to be superior to that of the king, and monarchy was followed by oligarchy. Given that the Athenians were a highly talented people, the oligarchy was unable to stand its ground against the multitude of free citizens who also had to share in the fighting and who also had a part in the cultural achievements which bestowed upon the state its inner grandeur. First it was a tyrant who set himself up as leader of the people. Later on a purely democratic form won through, but nevertheless this was compatible with a situation where a leader of the stature of pericles was in fact the manager of the state. Following Polybius, the circuit of power becomes closed when demagogic degeneration again calls upon the monarch to take charge. Incidentally, Athens' fall was due not so much to demagogic degeneration as to reckless and, if you please, oligarchic treatment of its allies, who were dominated by the Athenians almost as if they were their subjects and who defected from them as soon as during the Peloponnesian War military success turned to the Spartans.

The history of Rome is instructive because it shows us how the cycle, which at first tended to come to a close within a relatively small group of people, was revived time and again by the progressive enlargement of the scope of the empire. At first, in the evolution to monarchical rule, and from monarchy to the Patrician rule and to the rise of the plebeians, the movement was the one in Athens, except that the rise of the plebeians did not bring about full democracy since the nobility, of the Patrician as well as the newly added plebeian kind, was left

with important privileges of leadership, which was vested in me Senate. This may be explained by the Roman national character which was fit to obey in order to rule; but another explanation may be that the Roman people, advancing from one battle to the next, had to adjust its constitution, more than was true for the Athenians, to the rigorous design of the military constitution. In the course of the unending resumption of fighting, the multitude of plebeians sank into proletarian misery, and along with the Romans this was also true for the Mass of Italic peoples. On the other hand, in addition to the old aristocracy, whose most worthy representatives ended their lives on the battlefields and as a result of the civil war proscriptions, a new class of capitalist optimates was elevated who feathered their nest by exploitation of the provinces, state leases, and other great enterprises — a result of development of state and economy on a large scale. Then the whole populace, along with the old aristocracy and the new realms, came under the rule of the Caesars demanded by the vast expanse of the world empire. The old city constitution was no longer suited to this empire, and to its defense the depleted strength of the Roman militias and of the Italian allies was no longer adequate. Even after any further expansion of the empire had been dispensed with and the defense of the established borders had become the goal, the battles didn't come to an end, because it was necessary to beat back the incessant attacks of the barbarians. Under these circumstances the victorious general, who with the hired legions repulsed the enemy and through victory gained the power due to success, controlled the situation. Under the strong and conscientious emperors of the second century, from Trajan to Marcus Aurelius, prosperity and education flourished throughout the vast realm. The masses were gaining in strength, and the cycle seemed to close in the broad setting within which the peoples subjugated by the Roman sword were able to unite in the environment of Roman-Greek culture. It was to become of incomparably greater consequence yet for mankind that the pax Romana prepared the ground for the rise of the power of peace which the Christian world religion constituted. To confront the attacks of the barbarians, it was still necessary to resort to the sword, however, and therefore military emperors had to be continued in command. Since with the gravity of fighting the pressure of their power became more intense, imperial rule more and more assumed the despotic forms of the Orient, and the populace again lost out. Although by forging closer ties with their allies the Romans proved to be more prudent and successful than the Athenians had been, their statesmanship likewise was still not sufficient to be able to turn all the subjected peoples into loyal and battle-ready citizens. The idea of also elevating to freedom the immense number of the unfree occurred neither to the Greek nor to the Roman mind. To be able to close the cycle of power within this widest possible frame was granted only to later ages which were favored by the preparatory work performed during the age of Antiquity.

Of the Asiatic peoples, none traversed the cycle far enough to find back to the freedom in which the ruling tribe had started the movement. The freedom in which the strong tribes of the beginnings had grown up fell victim to the battles through which the far-reaching Asiatic realms were extended, and this is why Asia by and large remained bogged down in despotism. In the Europe of the Middle Ages, too, the return to the freedom of the beginnings was not consummated in any single one of the great

states. Perhaps it may be said of the rural cantons of Switzerland that they remained abodes of full freedom. Never were they really exposed to a hierarchy of classes; the tensions between power and impotence were never so pronounced in their narrow confines, and never was a sovereign power of the authority, as found with the peoples who stood in the center of the political battles and of economic development, able to assert itself. That even in the case of those European peoples who were exposed to the great battles the military princes eventually had to yield to the ways of democracy is testimony for the incomparable vitality of these peoples whose masses, after all the adversities of history, were still strong enough to rise again so that freedom everywhere could be proclaimed as a right. We do not want to examine further what is still missing to give full substance to this right. We are content to state only that all peoples of Europe were able to consummate the historical cycle of power to the extent that they could apply to themselves the proud name of nation, a label which says that in their large ethnic confederation they again feel as closely and freely united as companions as they did in the closely knit tribal federations of their historic beginnings.

4. The Sense of History

And what now is the meaning which awareness of the circulation of power within a people teaches us? Have we not found in this cycle of power a meaningful law at least for those peoples which are able to complete it? With these peoples all the existent forces develop fully and join together in achieving a state of healthy social equilibrium. At first a ruling upper class gets control of the collective forces which it seeks to organize so as to achieve maximum success for itself. Then, in the process of transformation of power and the rise of the masses the tensions between leadership and masses are allayed, and maximum success is won for society as a whole. Such is the simple scheme of the movement which is modified in the most diverse ways by the multitude of the forces at work and the amplification of the social framework.

The consistency with which the movement runs its full course automatically inclines the observer to tracing it back to a uniform propelling tendency. This is a delusion one must keep free from. The forces which propel the ruling class to the top are directed against the multitude, and likewise the forces by which the multitude resists and then uses to aspire to the top are directed against the ruling class. Only in the eventual balancing out do the endeavors of the two parties meet. And how in the world could one justify the assumption of a uniform tendency for those peoples which are altogether incapable of development, or show only little capability, and which therefore have stood still in the most primitive conditions? And if now in anticipation we include in this study, which in the first place is to encompass a people as such, also the cases of peoples meeting each other, how could then the assumption of a uniform world tendency be reconciled with the fact that the peoples in their battles oppose each other to the point of annihilation? Totila, the brilliant hero of the Goths, along with his people forming the spearhead of the ancient Germans, came to naught when he met the eunuch Narses and his mercenaries who had been recruited from

the leaven of the peoples. In the life of the peoples there are plenty such events which strike us almost as aberrations of the world-juridical judgment of history, just as personal life is full of events where righteousness suffers injury and vice triumphs, without there being a subsequent earthly compensation. Faced with such facts we have to be satisfied with being able to state that nevertheless enough people of sufficient strength participate in the historical task to obtain generally optimum results and that, everything considered, the healthy peoples are sufficiently balanced, after all, to consummate the cycle in a satisfactory state of equilibrium. Notwithstanding the many victims who drop by the wayside without fault of their own, we still come away with the impression of an irresistible movement of society as a whole, which seems to compensate for the damage of society as a whole, which seems to compensate for the damage of society as a whole, which seems to compensate for the damage of society as a whole. To be sure, if we are asked to explain what we mean by "society as a whole" we must confess that we are no longer able to give a scientifically rigorous answer. At bottom we thereby also share in the delusion just referred to in that we view mankind as a unit and assign to it a task of which acting human beings know nothing themselves. This assumption presupposes the operation of a superhuman force which deals with human beings as its creatures, but we must be clear that such an assumption reaches out from the realm of strict scientific objectivity into the religious-transcendental realm.

5. The Circulation of Power in World History

History of world stature starts with the world empires which were founded in the vast territorial expanses of Asia. The topography of the soil on which people settle must exert an influence on whether the settlements are close together or far apart and whether they are loosely or highly connected with each other, and therefore it will always also make itself felt in the scope of state federations. If habitable land everywhere were so split up into little islands as it is in the South Sea or so divided into remote mountain valleys as in Switzerland, then realms of large dimension couldn't have come into being anywhere. Europe exhibits the spaciousness of Asia only in the extensive lowlands of its eastern parts, and it is not surprising that the Russian world empire, which has so much of an Asiatic character, was founded there. In Asia, matrix of the peoples, the large regions of China, interior Asia, and India are externally so protected by natural boundaries and are so integrated within that we can understand why the expansionary impulse of power led to the establishment of homogeneous states in these regions. The fertile river basins of the Euphrates and the Tigris were bound to tempt the mountain and the desert peoples surrounding them to wage war for their possession, which would make the victor master over the Near East. Nevertheless it would be mistaken to deduce the course of history from an examination of topography alone. Geography is not world history yet. The driving force of historical evolution is man, for whom the soil becomes aid or hindrance depending on how far his own strength has matured. For a long time rivers and seas were insurmountable obstacles for people, but later they became highways of long distance traffic, and in the end the ocean tied together the whole world. The Indians of Central America, having already developed into nations, were able to establish the mighty empire

of Mexico, while the hunting tribes of North America were unable to become unified into states on their immense territory which the European immigrants, trained by history for statehood, recognized as the obvious soil for the world empire of the United States. In western and southern Europe, too, the Romans with their superior strength subjugated rugged land irrespective of all topographical obstacles. That in the following historical epoch the divisions of the land here at the same time remained the divisions for the people and the state therefore cannot have been caused by the character of the land alone, but one must find the ultimate explanation for this in the aptitude of the peoples which settled here. This simply happened to be a selection of peoples having the strength of asserting themselves in battle and in making a living on their long migrations from Asia to the far end of Europe, and in the end of subduing the Romans as well and of entering into the spirit of their culture. Since they were strong, the natural lines of defense offered by the land itself were sufficient to enable them to ward off the floodtides of Arabs, Mongols, and Turks, and subsequently they finally managed to carry matters so far as to be able to take advantage of the favorable features of their coastlines and to master the open sea, on which they carried their victorious arms out into the world.

Apart from the Siberian north, the extensive regions of Asia were for the most part favored by fertility and climate. Because the peoples settling in them were able and willing to work, it was here that people could first proceed to establish state and civilization and that the historical tendency toward large-scale configurations could materialize. The fundamental historical work was done in Asia, from where the threads of tradition could be spun out into all the places to which the power of success had spread. We have to imagine the peoples of every epoch as being involved in brisk cooperation inasmuch as the power of success was able to overcome the barrier of distance. As the backward peoples and those of more recent origin learn from their predecessors, so those which are contemporaries and labor at the same historical tasks learn from each other. What is true for individuals also applies to peoples as entities: interest in the task is the strongest inducement for imitation of successful performance. As liquids in communicating pipes, so ideas communicate in the minds of the peoples which touch each other. Peoples which are politically separated thereby merge into extensive worlds of shared culture. The more insights into the intellectual life during the Asiatic heyday historical research opens up to us, the more admirable appears to us the wealth of internal powers with which the peoples of those past millennia were filled. Eventually Asia's ethnic realms were fashioned into world empires whose establishment was made possible by Asia's vast extent, but this very establishment subsequently caused the development to come to an end. In the colossal battles which were fought for supremacy, the superposition of the sovereign power became overwhelming and the masses were hopelessly graded. Even if they found opportunities for peaceful work, their freedom nevertheless was done with and hence also their strength for equalizing upward social mobility. The population expansion made possible by the certainty of remunerative work did not add to, but diminished, the strength of the masses, for it curtailed the attainable per capita food supply and the standard of living to such an extent as to exhaust the vital energies.

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Disarmed and disaccustomed to battle, the masses were at the mercy of the despotic rulers and fell prey to those warrior tribes which managed to break in across the frontiers and to overwhelm the ruling dynasties and families. In China, as in Egypt, one dynasty followed another in governing over the always subservient populace, while in India Aryan tribes and the Mongol pushed in from abroad and proclaimed themselves masters. I could happen that the conquerors brought with them the requisit vitality for cultural revival, as was true for the Aryan conquerors and likewise for the Arabs spreading Islam and further developing the culture they found. But in the long run none of the victorious peoples could escape the fate of standing still along with the inert masses. The worst happened where the conqueror had only the strength to destroy. The triumphant advance of the Tartars turned flourishing regions of Asia into sparsely populated and destitute areas, and even the Turks were, after all, only a warrior people on whom the desire for culture had hardly been imparted. The fragments of people which had remained intact between the large realms had also lost their vitality in the course of the interminable battles and eked out a living by skimpy savagery as peoples of the steppes or mountains, stunted like their pastures or karstic like their mountains. Only on the Japanese islands there lived a people which enjoyed the same seclusion as did the peoples of the Occident and which therefore like the latter, was spared the fate of perishing in the vortex of the Asiatic hordes.

The vigorous tribes and peoples which had migrated into tight-spaced Europe removed from the waves of Asiatic population movements were able to preserve their vitality and freedom whole. Given their isolation, their development got underway only late, allowing them to benefit amply from the work done in Asia. What they acquired they were able to enrich further through cooperation. How much in talents, indeed, did the rivalry between the Greek cities bring to fruition! How much, indeed, did the Romans learn from the Greeks! When the Roman world empire expanded and its emperors followed the oriental model, it appeared that Europe, too, would be bound to share the fate of Asia, yet the vitality of the as yet unspent peoples kept this from happening. The Romans were stopped short by the barbarian core peoples of the Teutons and Scythians, and at last the barbarians subdued Rome-dominated Western Europe thanks to the uninjured strength. The world empire disintegrated into tribal ethnic realms corresponding to topographic conditions, and tribal ethnic groupings broke up even further into tribal domains at territorial sovereignties. Europe in its state formations vis-à-vis Asia had been thrown back into the state of affairs in which it had found itself before the Greeks and the Romans. What had been lost of external power, however, was gradually and through steady work replaced by internal powers, whose foundation was the church which was part and parcel of the Roman legacy. The politically sundered world was united by the ecclesiastical bond. Deprived of its secular power, Rome had yet remained the capital of the Occident, and the spiritual power emanating from it more durable and emphatic than had been Rome's power as a political unit. Only the humane spirit of Christianity has given true meaning to the word populace, which still lacked some of its substance in the case of the freest peoples of Antiquity because nowhere were the masses of the unfree and demi-free counted as nationals. The Roman people had been only a small segment to the

total population of the Roman Empire, and the masses owed their elevation to full-fledged citizenship to Christianity and to the church as its organizational form. Never before had there been an internal power which would have effected a similarly magnificent upward movement of the lowest strata of the population.

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More decisive yet was the counter blow from west to east when the Romans spread out. For many centuries Asia Minor was now ruled from Europe, first from Rome itself and then from Byzantium.

After the downfall of Rome the young barbarian peoples of Europe marshaled less power of resistance against the Asiatic world empires, with Arabs and Saracens penetrating deeply into Europe's south, Mongols into its east, and Turks into its south-east. The occupation of the Holy Land by the Crusaders was a quickly passing episode. The firmly built dominions of the Orient soon proved again their superiority over a Europe still unfinished politically, which had become united only because of a surge of the religious spirit. It took centuries of political consolidation until there was no longer any need for fear of the Asiatic danger. After the last attack by the Turks had been repelled in front of the walls of Vienna, the matured strength of the Occident finally poured out over a stationary Asia. The Austrian armies pushed back the Turks from Hungary; much more territory against the Turks did the Russians win, who then pushed forward into the Siberian east. The great contest was carried out at sea. The progress made by the European intellect in scientific techniques turned the open sea into a highway for European expansion. The old world of Asia was subjugated in large part, the new worlds of America and Australia were settled, little Europe gained predominance over the world. Only in the very far east were the Japanese, the Europeans of Asia, able to bring the Russian advance to a stop.

Since the division of the world occurred via the sea, it naturally became a concern for the seafaring nations. Venice and Genoa, the seaside cities of the Mediterranean, could not keep pace any longer and dropped out of the ranks of the naval powers. It was the Spaniards and the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English, the French, and in the very end also the Germans, who extended their colonial rule over the peoples of the warm regions, created through emigration from the homeland colonies in the temperate zones, and otherwise divided up the world into spheres of interest. After the declaration of independence by the United States the American colonies became almost completely lost to the Europeans, and since then English statesmanship has granted far-reaching independence to the overseas dominions. This considerably restricted Europe's supremacy in the world, but the predominance of the European blood — European predominance in the broad sense — was singularly extended because the American states of the temperate zone absorbed the great streams of emigrants who now also poured out of the European heartland. Europeans who in their native countries were hampered by the constraint of the law of population thereby obtained the freedom to propagate at a rapid rate in the virgin territories of the New World. The share of European blood in the world population total was considerably raised thereby, and European supremacy had to be more firmly anchored because it was erected on a broader ethnic base. American supremacy as represented by the United States zealously guarded its own continent against Europe's influence, but Americans did not object to Europe's continued predominance in the other continents. So far the United States has made only the single advance to the Philippines and has protected its interests in China, which is situated closest to them.

Little Europe won its world supremacy first by the superiority of its arms, but in view of its much smaller number of people it actually owed the superiority of its arms to the superiority of its culture, to which its spiritual and social freedom had elevated it. European world supremacy represents the triumph of the ascending internal powers over the superposition of force, the triumph of a free community of nations over the controlling world empires, the triumph of freedom over despotism. The rising internal power of Europe had such an expansive force that across space and time and in a mighty sweep it was able to bring the cycle of world history back to its first starting points. The urge to achieve great things, which had done preparatory work in the civilized nations of Asia, turned back to these and included them in the world association which spread out from Europe over the old world and the new. What has been formed is still far from being a full community of peoples, especially is it not — abstracting from the groping experiment of the League of Nations — a politically or otherwise legally ordered community. The world of European peoples having attained supremacy is, after all, a free community of nations. Being always divided in many things, it loosened up considerably as a result of the World War, and in addition it has had to share its predominance with the United States of America. Furthermore, this predominance is threatened by the growing resistance of the Asiatics and of the North Africans belonging to them, a resistance originating in the growing internal powers spawned by nationalism and being about to achieve significant external power. Besides, the world supremacy of the Europeans, as it exists today, cannot be the end of the movement. It is an act of lordly superposition, to be followed — if the movement is to work itself out fully — by the equalizing rise of the dominated peoples. Certainly the Europeans, wherever they have subjugated the native peoples, claim to have brought to these order and civilization in balancing plenitude, but the subjugated peoples in turn have included in their growing protests the accusation that they were dealt out force instead of law. Today nobody is yet able to tell where the truth lies, but that the circulation of power in the world has not yet come to an end is beyond any doubt. The cycle will continue to be broken, reduced, expanded, and complemented in many places.

The fact of European world supremacy appears to bear out the thrust of Gobineau's race theory. Does it not confirm the view that the Aryans are called upon to rule the world? However, considering the way we have explained the circulation of power intranationally and internationally, we have nothing in common with Gobineau's doctrine. We have not claimed that it has always been the Aryans only who superposed themselves as masters on others; on the contrary, we have cited examples of superposition by other races as well. Besides, the scientific exploration of the races has not advanced far enough to permit building upon it theories of general historical scope, although it may supply significant insights into the history of particular states. Any presentation which must be formulated as broadly as does the theory of power would be endangered if it had to rely for support on the unfinished theory of races. Moreover, Gobineau's theory suffers gravely from the fact that it has nothing to say about the tendency of the rise of the masses. It ends on such a pessimistic note because it envisages only the ruling class which, it is true, indeed, is frequently wiped out in the power struggle. The upward mobility of the masses is a fact which can be observed

Disarmed and disaccustomed to battle, the masses were at the mercy of the despotic rulers and fell prey to those warrior tribes which managed to break in across the frontiers and to overwhelm the ruling dynasties and families. In China, as in Egypt, one dynasty followed another in governing over the always subservient populace, while in India Aryan tribes and the Mongols pushed in from abroad and proclaimed themselves masters. It could happen that the conquerors brought with them the requisite vitality for cultural revival, as was true for the Aryan conquerors and likewise for the Arabs spreading Islam and further developing the culture they found. But in the long run none of the victorious peoples could escape the fate of standing still along with the inert masses. The worst happened where the conquerors had only the strength to destroy. The triumphant advance of the Tartars turned flourishing regions of Asia into sparsely populated and destitute areas, and even the Turks were, after all, only a warrior people on whom the desire for culture had hardly been imparted. The fragments of people which had remained intact between the large realms had also lost their vitality in the course of the interminable battles and eked out a living in skimpy savagery as peoples of the steppes or mountains, stunted like their pastures or karstic like their mountains. Only on the Japanese islands there lived a people which enjoyed the same seclusion as did the peoples of the Occident and which therefore, like the latter, was spared the fate of perishing in the vortex of the Asiatic hordes.

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with the civilizable peoples of all races, and in Asia it also brought to full fruition, with peoples of all races, long periods of prosperity. Eventually, however, it was stopped everywhere in Asia by the superior strength of despotism, and only with the European peoples did the upward momentum of the masses have enough persistence to be able to break through the oppression exerted by the traditional historical powers. If the European peoples in their variegated composition were of strictly Aryan blood, one might perhaps be inclined to find herein proof for the assertion which Gobineau makes with respect to the superiority of the Aryan masses. Now is it so that the European peoples are entirely of pure, Aryan origin? It appears that race theory is not yet able to settle this point unequivocally. The author of one of the most widely read books on race theory assigns Beethoven, along with others, to the category of inferior blood, and he even claims that Goethe's figure was not Nordic, conceding that Luther, too, had a strain of inferior blood. If we are to avoid confusing the idea of the circulation of power, we must abstain from connecting it with race theory.

6. The Epochs of the History of Peoples and of World History

The content of facts encompassed by the circulation of power is too diverse to permit being categorized by the usual division into the epochs of Antiquity, Middle Ages, and Modern Times. This division as a way to organize world history is obviously ill-conceived, and, as is well known, it has been contested often enough by far-sighted historiographers, with Spengler, in particular, making this point very well. The customary division corresponds to the narrow point of view from which the European equates Europe with the world. The shock caused in the countries of the Mediterranean Basin by the fall of the Roman Empire was not felt at all in the Far East of Asia, the year of ruin of 476 A.D. being a matter of complete indifference for the history of China or India. Altogether one would be hard put to name an event of world-shaking significance having occurred prior to the discoveries by Vasco da Gama and Columbus. During all those millenia there was not yet world history; there were only ethnic histories which gradually widen into the history of communities of nations and of world empires. Subsequently the interrelationships between these become increasingly close, and ever more significant preparatory work for the later tasks of world history is done by them. But these world-historical relations do not yet stand out enough to furnish the framework for the portrayal of the history of peoples. Such a framework is provided only by the conditions affecting communities of nations and world empires.

Even from the restricted viewpoint of the European community of nations the division into the three epochs is not quite adequate. It is constructed too superficially and makes no reference whatsoever to the content of historical evolution. The designation "Middle Ages," taken literally, means nothing more than that this age is located midway between Antiquity and Modern Times, and if it were to say more, e.g., if it were to suggest that the Middle Ages lie between Antiquity and Modern Times in the same way as manhood stands between youth and old age, it would lead us totally astray. In Antiquity the course of life of the ancient peoples of superior blood was fully completed. In the Middle Ages new types of peoples appear which must again

start from scratch, although their early stages were extraordinarily facilitated and compressed thanks to the abundant legacy bequeathed on them by the ancient world. The name "Antiquity" suggests more substance than does the name "Middle Ages," carrying the association of the old peoples, the ancient peoples of superior stock whose life forms such an important part of the development of Europe. Perhaps it would be more fitting to speak of the age of classical antiquity. Correctly understood, this era must be said to have come to an end as soon as antique splendor ceased and the power was exhausted which was brought to bear on its world empire by the dominant Roman people. If history receives its rationale from the phenomenon of power, then the historical epochs must be divided into power eras. But Roman power didn't come to an end only in the year 476, when the shadow emperor Romulus Augustulus was dethroned; the Roman Empire "had gone down" already long before that. The world-commanding power of the old Rome made place for a new world power when before the gates of the Eternal City the conquering Attila was stopped by the spiritual authority of Pope Leo the Great instead of by Roman arms. From that point on it must have become clear to the contemporaries that the Roman military state had been replaced by the *civitas Dei*.

For the Occident the Middle Ages are the era of ecclesiastical predominance. This predominance, however, didn't start only with Leo the Great, but already had to be very effective if the appearance of the pope was able to impress the barbarians. Perhaps one could date its origin by the time when Emperor Constantine publicly recognized the church with whose help he was able to be victorious against the anti-emperors, and at this time, of course, it also happened that the emperor relocated his seat from Rome to Byzantium. If one views the Middle Ages as the epoch of ecclesiastical predominance one does justice at the same time to the idea of the Christian era, a new era dating from the birth of Christ. Shouldn't the new chronology also find its expression in the division of time into eras by giving its name to that age in which the hope of the new era finds fulfillment?

What point in time should designate the end of ecclesiastical predominance? It is obvious to view the beginning of the Reformation as the decisive juncture, which means only a small deviation from the year of the discovery of America, which is usually taken as the beginning of Modern Times. But is the Reformation a more meaningful date than the discovery of the New World? The new era must be the era of the new power which overcomes the ecclesiastical predominance. The Reformation has an important share in pushing back the catholic faith power, but — as its name already implies — it wanted to reshape it by cleansing rather than by eradicating it. The ecclesiastical predominance was broken not only in the case of the peoples defecting to Protestantism, but it could not be continued even over the peoples which had remained Catholic. Everywhere the dominant power of the church devolved upon the state, this shift having been in the works already long before the Reformation and even having advanced quite far in some instances. France's King Philipp the Beautiful already got the better of the church when he induced the popes to exchange the exile in Avignon for Rome. The church schism, the degeneration of the Roman court under a series of Popes further shook the papal authority, which in turn benefited the princely authority, and the Reformation, too, contributed

extraordinarily to the strengthening of princely power. Nevertheless one would go wrong in equating the substance of the new epoch with princely power, for the latter of course later had to yield to the freedom powers. One might perhaps label the first period of Modern Times the period of princely predominance, even though the era as a whole needs a broader designation in accordance with its broader contents. The enlarged designation, state predominance, also still fails to meet the bill, for it is not the state alone which restrained the church. Along with the state, and probably to a still greater extent, the rise of science cramped the faith, and how many other forces, indeed, have moved European society! During this era the culture powers and the economic and political freedom powers asserted themselves in the European community of nations, establishing the superiority of Europe over the rest of the world. It is the era of European world supremacy, which at the same time expands European history into world history.

If one understands the content of the new era in this sense, one may stick to setting its start as of the year of the discovery of America to which one has always adhered, guided by a felicitous sense of history. By the discovery of the New World the expansionist drive inherent in an exuberant European vitality broke through the boundaries to which one felt confined from times immemorial. For the first time, and in the most surprising way, this discovery gave notice of the superior strength which little by little conquered the world.

Since the World War we have been under the impression that the era of European world supremacy has come to a close and is being followed by an era of advanced world history. The European Concert has been enlarged to a world concert, in which Japan and the United States are also represented. If one lets the preceding era start with the year in which Columbus with his three caravels discovered the first island of the West Indian Archipelago and seized it in the name of the Spanish king one may well let the era of world history begin with that other year in which the American fleet brought the millions of combatants to Europe. This action settled the World War in favor of the Entente, and with this decisive success the United States proved its will and its ability to participate in the leadership of the world.

The era of ecclesiastical predominance, the "Middle Ages," as well as that of European world supremacy, the "Modern Times," are so rich in content that it will be necessary to subdivide them into particular periods. It is not part of our task to try our hand in this as well; we will consider it sufficient to state that the era of European world supremacy ends in the period of liberalism, which outwardly develops nationalism and imperialism, while inwardly expanding into democracy.

XVI. Liberalism

1. --The Birth of Liberalism in the French Revolution

Liberalism is the political and social view one might almost say world view, of the third estate. It was its very own interest, demanding the breath of freedom, which impelled the third estate to voice freedom as its creed. It was the greatness of liberalism, and became its undoing, that it made this confession of faith not only in its own name but at the same time in the name of the people as a whole. The third estate wanted to be "everything," to use Abbe Sieyes' well-known word; it regarded itself as a representative, as a part of the whole people, which it deemed as capable as itself of freedom and equally called upon to its exercise. Thus the great demand for freedom was proclaimed as a cause of the entire people, whereas in its proximate origin it was, of course, only the matter of a single estate. The fight for freedom taken up by the bourgeoisie received its invincible momentum by the fact that the bourgeoisie swept the rest of the people along into emulation. The old powers could not resist the mighty assault, but in the long run the bourgeoisie itself could not identify itself with the lofty idea of general freedom — what other social group could have done it! — and little by little began to consider its own narrow interest. The consequence was that it lost the emulation of the masses and that almost everywhere liberalism resulted in the party creed of a restrained and derided minority by being identified with an individualism declared obsolete and being thrown on the scrap heap. But even as it collapsed, the bourgeois idea of freedom celebrated its last great success, for it is that idea which, transformed into the democratic idea, opened the gates to power to the broad masses. In the process there was again success — the inner limitation of the idea of freedom, for a great deal more than was already true of the bourgeoisie, the large masses admitted to freedom lacked the capacity for its exercise. In reality, the people almost everywhere fell far short of the idealizing assumption under which the demand for freedom of the people had been rationalized.

As is true for any other basically new social view, liberalism also rose up in sharpest conflict with the existing views. It regarded the ruling powers of princeliness, feudalism, and ecclesiasticism as the evil results of violence and deceit. It credited itself with the great feat of having explored the connections of social life and of having recognized self-determination of individuals and peoples as the condition demanded by nature. Indeed, in spite of their many aberrations, the liberal thinkers made clear essential social nexi which until then had remained obscure. They had been animated to new insights because society had matured to a new stage where the traditional, historic leadership powers were felt to be hindrances which could no longer be tolerated. The traditional historic leadership powers were adapted to the social tasks of

...coilmen U states, with its orientation to combat and order, and to the establishment of religious culture with its authoritative ways, and they were, therefore, lordly leaderships, leaderships of order and rule. But now the ground had been prepared for an expansive economic task and an equally expansive, scientifically founded educational task, and now those strata of the population came to the fore who were occupied with these tasks. The new strata raised up their characteristic leadership groups, entrepreneurs and intellectual preparatory workers, and at the same time they gained recognition for a new leadership principle, namely, that of freedom, which in the nature of things was needed for the new social tasks. One was not inclined to be content with free leadership in economic affairs and in science alone, one also demanded it for state and church in order to be assured that the political and ecclesiastical powers gave free rein to the economic and scientific forces. Since liberalism at first lacked external means of power to make itself felt, it had to strive to overcome the existing powers by force of intellect. From this stems its urge to penetrate more deeply the social nexi. It had to justify its existence vis-a-vis the prevailing powers by being able to base its teachings on persuasive proofs. In this way liberalism received its doctrinaire, didactic trait which later was ridiculed by the practitioners of Realpolitik who had to push it back to within its proper domains and which is altogether derided today after experience had laid bare its fatal errors while its extraordinary truths are well worn and therefore forgotten.

Having been prepared by the combat lasting for centuries of strong men and people who strove for religious and national freedom, liberalism on its victorious sway appeared in France at the threshold of the great revolution. One can single out the hour of birth when this memorable event took place. It was at that time when Louis XVI had summoned the general estates and when the third estate, against the will of the King and of the ministers, prevailed with its demand that votes be cast not according to estates, but according to heads. It thereby was acknowledged that the free people rests on its citizens and that the institutions of princely reign had outlived their usefulness. In Europe the French were the first to declare themselves for the idea of the free people which so far had been accepted only by the citizens of the newly founded United States in their American isolation. Now the French had gained an edge over the British, who until then had been viewed as the model of political freedom in Europe. In 18th century England, freedom actually was not freedom of the people, but was in essence the possession of a privileged class keeping the King at bay through Parliament, which in turn was dominated by this privileged class. The majority of seats were at the disposal of the great nobility. Nobles of the Whig and Tory varieties were agreed to keep the masses of the people in the countryside practically barred from the exercise of political rights. The Whig nobility further intensified the rule of the nobles in particular, because it had the tradition of the Glorious Revolution on its side, by which it was enabled to make the limitation of the King by Parliamentary government a firm practice. The franchise was severely limited and most inequitably distributed, and the bourgeoisie made itself felt only the few relatively large places which were not dominated by the nobility. The sharp political stratification of the people was a true mirror image of its rigid social stratification. The lord

was the grand master of the people, being practically above the law, almost like the King. The peasantry had gone to rack and ruin, the masses of the people in the villages were without possessions and in the clutches of the poor law, which condemned them to some kind of work slavery. The common man was free of military duty, but he had to reckon with being pressed into naval duty. To be sure, the sciences prospered, and in the big cities the indigenous class of enterprising bourgeois gained ground successively, growing visibly in wealth and recognition by its activities, which little by little were extended across the world. The rising bourgeoisie clamored for economic freedom, and the economic doctrine which took care of its interests attempted to place the idea of freedom on a scientific foundation. Adam Smith's masterpiece about the Wealth of Nations summarizes in classic eloquence and with great effect the works of the economists of the time. But after the movements and the achievements of the revolutions of the 17th century the English were now too conservatively disposed to advance to the demand for political freedom as well; they were calmed by the prosperous conditions in which they found themselves. This decisive advance was reserved for the lively disposition of the French, in whom the drive for freedom had been animated much more than in England because the pressure of the old historical powers burdened the populace much more than was true in England. The drive for political freedom was reinforced by the drive for social justice, which had become irrepressible with the 18th century French educated class. Beaumarchais' "Figaro" is the literary expression for this. The valet who feels to be the count's equal would have been unthinkable in England, while in France the piece was staged before the court. That at the height of the revolution the French people addressed each other as "citoyen," as citizen, was provoked by one of those emotional surges, many of which took possession of people in revolutionary ecstasy. Even so, this manner of salutation was especially apt for the Frenchman with his impulse for social reconciliation and leveling. Whereas the Englishman is aristocratically inclined, the Frenchman is democratic here. Napoleon found the strongest prop for his imperial rule by being able to wed the latter to the democratic propensity of the French people. In the heady beginnings of the revolution it appeared as if the millions of Frenchmen had risen to full freedom for good. The political doctrines of Enlightenment thinkers, especially Rousseau's teachings, had found a millionfold resonance in the minds, and for the slogan of the free people public opinion of a kind had been won, such as until then had not been known yet as a political phenomenon in France and as even England's political life had not encountered in like intensity. In its dissemination only with the public opinions of a religious nature which had seized the peoples in times of strong movements of religious fervor. This public opinion from the very start determined the victory of the revolution! It penetrated the ranks of the army, it disposed the best minds of the nobility favorably to the cause of the populace, it gained to its side almost all of the low clergy and a not insignificant portion of even the high clergy. The cool critic of later times who had not shared the experience of the revolution considers the high-sounding words which the Public did not tire of bandying about as empty phrases. He views a declaration like the one on human rights as a mere jingle of words, whereas in truth it was a deeply felt declaration for the social contract, for the idea of modern society. To be sure,

later France's public opinion began to lose faith in itself. Amidst the wild party struggles of the civil war, the meeting of minds came to grief. Political thinking, apart from just a few enlightened minds, was still too inchoate to allow finding the apt constitutional phrase for the driving social idea. During the years of the empire, political endeavors appeared to be dead altogether. The Constitution of the Restoration, to which the immense movement of a quarter-century led, gave the people — or rather, only to a small segment of the people — a bare minimum of political rights, the masses not seeming to become worked up over the fact that in political terms they had again become deprived of their rights. In the France of Louis XVIII and Charles X almost the same top classes were determining who had been uppermost before the revolution. Had the revolution not been in vain? The historiographer who accepts only the letter of a lawfully proclaimed constitution may view things in this light, but he who allows himself to be guided by the social realities will have to judge the matter differently. A historic result of the utmost relevance had remained intact: in the turmoils of the revolution, in the Napoleonic institutions, and even in the battles into which Napoleon had led his armies, the populace which had previously been torn and layered by estates coalesced into a united nation. This fact held good, however unsteady and imperfect were the constitutional forms through which one successively sought to find a political expression for the changing circumstances. From this point on the French have their national history. Only a few decades had to lapse before the nation, in a series of thrusts following in quick succession, burst the constitution of the Restoration and of the era of citizen kings, as that of the second empire, in order to provide itself finally with its constitution of freedom.

2. England's Role

From France the idea of freedom, thanks to the power of public opinion, in relatively short time conquered the whole continent of Europe — first the neighboring countries in which liberal-thinking circles were stirred up by the impact of Napoleonic rule and later on also the more distant ones as far as into Asia. Never before in the course of world history had such a great movement taken place so rapidly. Most significant was the repercussion on England. During the incessant wars which it fought against the revolution, against the republic, against Napoleon, England in its constitution remained standing at the point which it had reached before the revolution. But as in France, in England, too, a generation had grown up during this quarter-century which had received its political education in considerably altered circumstances. During war, England's industry, commerce, trade, and colonial possessions expanded astonishingly, and when peace led to further developments, and subsequently to grave setbacks, the conservative English character also could no longer refuse to cope with political innovations. Now there were people present who transferred the revolutionary ideas to England, and a vehement radical party was formed which absorbed the slogans of the revolutionary doctrine and found a following outside the bourgeoisie and quite especially in the industrial proletariat, which had grown much but was miserably situated and utterly malcontent. It is true that the radical party was not able to prevail with its far-reaching plans. The

concessions contained in the Reform bill were too paltry compared with the radical demands, but a decisive turn had been effected nevertheless. The Whigs transformed themselves into a truly liberal party, and the Tories also had to take a more popular line. From here on, England is the stronghold of liberalism. While France is being fitfully tossed about, England provides the world with the model of a more steady evolution of the liberal idea. Historically prepared from way back, England's liberalism has shown more healthy growth than has France's. However, even the former has not been quite able to steer clear of an ideologically didactic streak.

3- The Liberal Era

The last decades before 1848 and the following decades until after the unification of Italy and the foundation of the German Empire constitute the heyday of liberalism, which now has overcome the violence of its revolutionary birth pangs. The uncouth masses have been put out of commission, leadership has been transferred upon the educated middle classes whose political views have been clarified and which, given the limited franchise to which one becomes attuned, decide the outcome of the elections. Princely governments, notwithstanding many a reactionary setback, are also more accessible to the liberal idea, especially in matters of the economy and of general education, and civil servants are occasionally completely devoted to it. The middle classes are by no means strong enough to shoulder the job of governing all by themselves; they must get along with the old powers. Still the influence which they exercise on government on account of their domination of public opinion is indeed much greater than the sum of the rights which have been constitutionally bestowed upon them. From the point of view of the universal suffrage, which won recognition later, the political freedom of liberalism can scarcely be called freedom. The stratum of the liberal bourgeoisie which was endowed with political rights is viewed by contemporary democrats as a privileged class which, though being considerably more inclusive than the old hierarchically privileged stratum, yet comprised only a small sector of the entire populace. The Social Democrat dismisses the bourgeois stratum of the liberal era as a ruling class, exercising lordly rights 3 la prince, nobility, and church in earlier times. As a matter of fact, however, in its good days it is more deserving of the name of a genuinely leading stratum than had been any upper class before and probably has been since. The liberals had not forgotten that they had advanced and fought for their demands for the sake of the populace. Although at first the masses at the bottom were wholly denied their constitutionally guaranteed participation in governmental affairs, being conceded later only haltingly and in gradual steps, one still did not hesitate to apply the liberal principles in governmental institutions to the best of one's knowledge, and it happened in only a few places that vested interests were allowed to stand in the way. The enlightened citizen saw his task in continuing on an enlarged scale and in bringing to fruition what already had been started by the enlightened prince. The substantive content of law and administration, their rules and procedures were cleansed of their residues of a medieval character and were modernized in the sense of a general character which at the same time would leave to the individual the widest possible scope for the

exercise of his energies. All state citizens without exception were guaranteed basic rights, and the ennobled sense of social responsibility gave more attention to the protection of and regard for the weak among the populace. The social sense of liberalism proved its worth most impressively in the devoted nurture of general education. Even in the area of taxation, fiscal egotism had to make its concessions: genuine liberalism included among its demands for equitable taxation also the social demands of exemption of the subsistence minimum, of a progressive rate structure, and of encumbrance of funded income. The free state also established the free commune, and although the commune — like the state — in its constitution gave preference to the bourgeois class, the latter was still influenced by the liberal spirit of the time. How much closer to each other the various strata of the population had been brought by the liberal spirit is demonstrated most palpably by the dress and all the external manners and customs of the populace. Whereas the streetscape of the 18th century gave striking evidence of class divisions by the dress and attitude of the people, in the streetscape of the second half of the 19th century the contrasts were largely effaced. The general style of dress of the worker as soon as he lays aside his work clothes is almost the same as that of the bourgeois, and in the countryside, too, manners of dress follow the general mode. Even between different peoples manners and customs become assimilated, in the very way that liberalism strives to level not only the differences within a people but also those existing between the various peoples. From its origin, liberalism had a cosmopolitan orientation, and the peoples were to be reconciled in the great idea of liberty. It was thought that war was a matter of the power-hungry dynasties and that once they were free, the peoples would forever keep peace among each other.

The liberal party during its prime could claim to have initiated a period of most ample development of social and economic values and to have maintained external peace all the while. Its system appeared to receive its most clear-cut corroboration by the numbers which express the astonishing growth reflecting the economic successes. The sum total of the quantity of goods being produced and consumed or reinvested, the aggregates of wealth accumulating, and in this connection the sum total of human beings filling Europe and flowing out from there into the world — these figures never in the course of history have been matched, let alone exceeded, in absolute amount or in the rates at which they grew. Relative to the wonders of the world produced by modern technology, the wonders of the world of Antiquity appeared to be mere exercises in barbarian splendor. The modern spirit became intoxicated by self-admiration and expected in the near future the coming of the golden era of general peace and universal contentment.

4. The Transition from Liberalism to Democracy

The principle of power, however, as it has always done in the course of history, also asserted itself in the case of liberalism. The success garnered by the extraordinary forces released by it guaranteed to liberalism widespread social power. Miraculously rising success enhanced its power and the triumph of success transformed its power into predominance. The liberal

party had not been bent on gaining predominance. It did not want to rule but to lead, and to the very end it had a profusion of ideally minded men who only wanted to achieve for the party what they had in mind for the whole populace. Precisely where the greatest success was attained in economic matters, the temptation to exercise superior force was too great for successful captains of industry not to fall prey to it. The great entrepreneurs became the mighty of the times. Fabulous profits in their hands were piled up to fabulous wealth, and they turned by far the larger part of revenues into new capital investments, enriching not only them, to be sure, but along with them the economy. A just judge could have hardly called them liars for saying that they were not selfishly after their own welfare alone but felt like being pioneers of economic progress — but it was still true that they were too little sensitized to the situation of those whom they pushed aside or even caused to plunge into the depths of misery. The great entrepreneur became the master, and when he was of obdurate mind or pressed hard by competition, the pitiless master of hundreds and thousands of workers. In the aggregate, large capital commanded millions of submissive workers, while also impairing or ruining the economic position of millions of bourgeois craftsmen. The Law of Small Numbers found in the economy a field of application of equally great effect as it once had in the victory of arms. While the multitude of the weak was pressed down, out of the bourgeois middle class there rose to dizzying heights the elite of the capitalists, joining the rulers of earlier times and exceeding them still in wealth and finally even in social influence. The great economic rulers had won under the slogan of liberty, which opened for them the road to unchecked activity. They demanded ever more impetuously the green light for themselves, but the uninhibited unfolding of their energies meant coercion for all the weak who stepped into their way. Could the liberal still talk about freedom?

The principle of power was realized much more quickly for liberalism than it had been for the old historical powers. The veins of wealth which modern technology had opened up were unexpectedly rich, and scientific work indefatigably sought to augment them and to raise their yields. The scientific-economic task with which modern man is occupied exceeds the earlier political-ecclesiastical task in outward productivity, and for this reason the influence which it had to exert on the reorientation of society was also much greater. The growth of the cities and of the industrial districts in a few generations surpassed the extent of it during centuries of earlier historical periods, the relationship between town and country was fundamentally upset, and capital grew at a still faster rate. But just as quickly as the capitalistic power of the few had grown, there developed the countervailing power of the many who were challenged by it. The proletariat and the lower and middle ranks of bourgeois handicraftsmen formed two great camps of resistance. The peasants formed a third one because they, too, suffered from the ways of capitalism and also because their whole way of looking at life was at odds with the liberal spirit. The proletariat received its first great leaders from the ranks of the critical thinkers and the circles of the educated who were friendly inclined toward the populace. Craftsmen and peasants, on the other hand, received theirs in good part from the ecclesiastical circles who took offense at the positivist and materialist views of certain liberal thinkers, or they obtained them from the

conservative circles who in liberalism had to fight their historic enemy. The development proceeded at such a fast pace that the rising bourgeoisie didn't at all get around to consolidating its position as formerly the prince and the estates had done. Now only did it really come to be recognized that the liberal bourgeoisie did not want to act, and did not act, exclusively on its own behalf, but at the same time also on behalf of the populace. The first thing for a conqueror to worry about was how to maintain himself in power, and for him the subjected remained the enemy whose power of resistance had to be broken. The liberal party had nothing of such a conquering spirit. Viewed as a party, it always stuck to its goal to lift up the entire populace through the force of freedom, and whatever capitalistic rulers might do to insure and extend their predominance, and however badly they pressed down the masses, this was a personal matter of the upper middle-class with which the core of the bourgeoisie, the educated bourgeoisie, had no common bond. The educated bourgeoisie went astray in that, like all the rest of society, it saw at first only the brilliant sunny side of economic development, the miracles of technology and the dazzling value figures; the dazzled look had not yet penetrated the dark side. When finally one became aware of the sacrifices demanded by economic growth, the educated middle-class did not fail to contribute with great seriousness its share to the great task of social reform. But in the meantime the proletariat itself had also become organized against its rulers. It was favored in this by the best possible external conditions because by the nature of its service it was assembled in the factories and because the majority of factories were concentrated in industrial districts and towns. The entrepreneurs recruited and paid the troops which were destined to march against them. How different in this respect was the position of the martial king, of the barons fit for military service, of the knightly nobility, compared with the position of the railroad kings, the financial barons, and the moneyed aristocracy! The former were, visible to all, the leaders in man-to-man, deathly combat whose dangers they exposed themselves to, nay, exposed themselves to before all the rest, and where victory lifted them above all the rest and called them to rule; of the latter, the common man glimpses only the rich booty which, he thinks, they pocket as a result of his efforts while having no understanding for the wide range of their plans and of their exhausting efforts. Incidentally, in the case of the former, how much enhanced was their personality by their accomplishments in fighting with arms which steeled their manhood, and how different, too, was the heritage of blood and courage they passed on to their sons! A much more healthy heritage of blood and courage than found with the newly rich came into its own in the able upper strata of the proletariat itself once it had found improvement in the labor market and protection against exhausting work demands. The proletariat, and no less other groups in society which gradually assumed a hostile attitude toward the liberal party, benefited in many other ways as well from the things which a liberal idealism had instituted with a view to promoting the welfare of the populace. How much, indeed, has liberal school legislation already done for the masses! How much has rapid economic development done for the very masses who were also very adversely affected by it! How much the multiplication of the possibilities of communication the freedom to associate and to assemble, has meant for the masses! How in the liberal era the peasant fully equipped with the legal power to act rises above

the vassal of times past! How the little man in town also rises above the Philistine of yesteryear under police guard! Formerly these socially insignificant groups were practically mere numbers in the population, but now they began to feel like constituents of the populace.

Liberal economic doctrine rendered a service of extraordinary significance for the endeavors of the proletariat. As the entrepreneur in his factory laid the base for the organization of the proletariat, liberal economic doctrine worked out the program for proletarian organizations. It provided the proletariat with the scientific ideas it needed, and it even formulated the slogans, or at least the proximate supporting documents for the slogans, in order to make the program palatable for the masses. Adam Smith taught, albeit still with certain reservations, that all returns are the product of labor and that value is fundamentally labor value. When Ricardo then sought to surmount Adam Smith's reservations, the socialist theory of economic value was given the foundation as well as the highest scientific authority. When socialist doctrine teaches that entrepreneurial profit, interest, and rent constitute exploitation, it thereby only seemed to have drawn the logical conclusion from the premises postulated by classical doctrine, and if it could be said that property is theft, this sentence only seemed to have made starkly explicit what classical doctrine had concealed.

It was even more significant for the eventual outcome of things that liberal political doctrine had based the idea of freedom on the concept of the people and of popular sovereignty. What the third estate demanded for itself, it at the same time demanded for the people as a whole. It didn't seek for itself a prerogative of freedom, but it looked for general freedom, for which it thought to have found overwhelming substantiation in the very majesty of the people. That during the liberal era one prepared for a limited franchise was in blatant contradiction to the original idea incorporated in the doctrine. It was a political compromise. One had to reckon with the existing conservative powers. Moreover, the acts of violence committed by the masses during the revolution were still sadly remembered, and — although one wasn't quite willing to admit this — the natural egotism of the party was also entering into the calculus because the limited franchise assured to it the majority of the mandates. A clairvoyant politician like Disraeli already recognized and brought out during the deliberations over the English Reform Bill that in the limited franchise such as it then was adopted the general franchise was included because the latter had to be the inescapable conclusion from the idea of popular sovereignty on which the Reform Bill rested. And the general franchise did come, after all, in England as well as everywhere else, and everywhere it came quickly, once the parties shunted aside by the liberal power had grown strong enough to fling down the gauntlet to liberalism. As soon as the demand for the general franchise had been thrown into the public discussion, liberalism was defeated on theoretical grounds. Its doctrine did not leave it with a counter-argument. The thinkers of liberalism had invoked Popular sovereignty, and, helped by the idea of the validity and supremacy of the people, had given recognition to the third estate as leader of the people. But by this it was decided at the same time that for liberalism the time had passed as soon as leadership of the populace had slipped away from its hands.

Liberalism owed its quick victory to its appeal to the people, but, with some degree of political foresight, one would have had to admit that victory would be followed by defeat. Incidentally, the liberal party may find an excuse in the fact that it shares the lack of foresight with no lesser a man than Bismarck who incorporated the general franchise in the constitution of the German Empire because he recognized that he thereby had brought to fall the liberal majority, while nevertheless lacking an eye for the fact that thereby the proletariat was assured of its political ascendancy. And didn't the managers of the Prussian state commit a blunder still more fatal for them when they introduced universal military service into the army?

Liberalism had been hailed by its faithful adherents as the final stage of society, guaranteeing the supreme general welfare. Instead it became a transitional stage which, by historical standards of time, was overcome very quickly. The outcome couldn't be any different. Under the impact of the forces which had been released and nurtured during the liberal era the mass of the people gained in numbers and in weight within the short span of two or three generations, and now the populace to which liberalism had opened the gates of the political world flooded in unchecked. One had merely invoked the name of the people, and now it was here. Liberalism expanded into democracy.

But even within democracy the middle classes maintained a weight, which went far beyond their actual numbers. Much as it lost in political leadership, it was still able to retain the essentials of intellectual leadership. Only now the bourgeois culture expanded into a national culture, and through this liberalism created as its SUCCESSOR nationalism. Social democracy finds itself deceived in its expectation to claim the inheritance. Modern democracy is, above all, national.

1. People and Nation

During the period of nationalism, which the cultured peoples entered into in the course of the 19th century, the nations become the bearers of state power. From here on, the size of the national masses imparts to the political movements a force which they could not have possessed during the period of princely predominance, yet what is missing is the positive self-assurance evidenced by the princely governments in their prime. Whereas the strong prince was able to keep a tight rein from his safe and secure spot, the national body could only during a long period of historical education bring to maturity the specific organs of freedom which it needed. Before we turn to a description of these organs, we must have formed a clear picture of the overall condition and of the vital instincts of the national body.

The nation is a modern ethnic creation. The first signs of nationhood, to be sure, go rather far back in history, and this is why the term has also been in use for quite some time. But only in the present has the formation of the nation been completed, and if one is inclined to associate a fixed notion with the term he is well advised not to apply it to the older, incomplete formations. Antiquity did not have the concept of nation in the modern sense, and antique history would have taken a different turn if it had been supported by full-fledged national forces.

Among all the nations spread over the world today the most modern is the one covering the United States of North America — the American nation, as it is typically called for short. Having been formed last, it hardly had to grapple any more with the resistances with which Europe's national unification had been confronted, and it is therefore almost free of the historical remnants which in the case of the European nations are mixed in with the essential features of national development — the admixture of Negro blood, which we will still have to discuss, is really the only element which makes itself severely felt. The American development will, therefore, reveal most distinctly the essential characteristics of the nation. Already the New England colonies from which it was shaped were nationally sifted. The Dutch, French, and Spanish admixtures were soon absorbed by the unifying spirit of freedom, and the later immigrants, however large their influx, adapted themselves from the start to the given national character. That it happened this way is not at odds with the national idea which dominates the present time; on the contrary, this idea demanded that it so happen. The national idea receives its force from the compactness of the old historical settlements of the members of a nation. In contrast, the immigrant from overseas has broken with his native country and come ashore in full readiness to join the new home country. Denationalization is a change in national orientation which reveals the sway of the national idea in all its strength. Every new arrival knows that only as a citizen of the American community can he prosper, and he expects for himself enhanced prosperity from the ambience of freedom and the vast economic opportunities. The American public, in turn, expects him to become completely engrossed in it. With the intolerance of taking

things for granted, that public expects that he make the nation's language, as well as its customs and political beliefs, his own, and the German-American, as a hyphen American — so called during the World War — is regarded spitefully. The national education of the native-born starts immediately in school by one's mates, whose childlike spirit reflects the general tenor of thinking still more openly than do the adults who, after all, have to take various cautions into consideration. Irresistible is the effect which, in view of the huge dimensions of all categories of life, emanates from the sentiment of the American masses. What a pride to belong to this powerful polity! What elation to participate in the decision-making of the most populous of all culture nations! Every citizen has his share in the formation of public opinion, whose commands everyone must obey. Only insiders know that there are ways and means for the country's powerful to impose their views on the free populace.

American conditions clearly reveal that there are two concepts of the nation, not just one. The American nation split off the English one, with which it is culturally still closely united in spite of certain characteristic peculiarities. As we do in this case, we must quite generally distinguish the cultural nation from the political nation. Not as if a political nation could endure which were not also a culture nation — a barbarian people can never be regarded as a nation — but in the sense that a culture nation can endure which either not at all, or at least not in its whole dimension, has become a political nation. For many centuries the Italians have been a leading culture nation, but only for a short time have taken their place as a political nation. Of the German culture nation, even after the reestablishment of the empire those millions did not belong to the political entity who as citizens belonged to Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, or Russia, or who as German-Americans had preserved the link to German culture.

The political nation is the complete nation, the nation pure and simple. He who has identified its essential characteristics will easily recognize which of these characteristics are applicable to the concept of culture nation.

Neither in the one form nor in the other does the nation exhibit the identifying characteristic of the original blood community. Every complete nation feels so self-contained that it is convinced of its consanguinity and only reluctantly accepts the historical counter-evidence which puts beyond doubt the multiplicity of its ethnic origins. The Americans, too, once the foreign elements of the immigrants have been completely assimilated, will feel as if they had been a unit all along, and they will be inclined to forget that their English element is weaker than the elements of other blood which made their appearance later. As is true for the Americans, no nation would have achieved greatness if it had not increased its numbers through the mixture of peoples, and none would probably have gained as much strength as it did if different blood had not enriched it with different talents. As with the Americans, all the different elements must also be so intermixed that in the end they feel like an integral unit, otherwise the nation would not become a complete whole which can no longer be broken up into its component parts. A liaison which has been effected only through force, as that between the Vandals and their African subjects or

between the Goths and the Italic peoples, under the strain of combat with an external enemy dissolves of its own accord. The example of the Irish perhaps shows most clearly how long a time it takes in order for nationally different elements to become completely merged. The Irish masses have accepted the English language not only as a language of communication but also as their mother tongue. The Irish regiments under the English flag have proved their loyalty on innumerable battlefields with devoted valor. Poets and prose writers, orators, and actors of Irish blood with their versatile spirit have animated English culture. In spite of all this, an ineradicable remnant of national tradition in the end called the Irish nation to an existence of its own again. In the old Austria during a certain period the educated strata of all ethnic tribes represented themselves as German, and the dynastic feeling also subordinated the masses to the ruling family, and yet in the course of a couple of generations the democratic movement was able to revive the seemingly almost extinct national languages, and along with them national consciousness. Many observers, especially foreigners who were unable to quite see through the complicated circumstances, have been deceived by the compactness which the Hapsburg monarchy demonstrated in its external relations during the time of its unbroken strength, and have talked about an "Austrian nation." In truth, the population was never nationally unified, and the experienced statesman always knew that he had to deal with a number of separate tribes whose peculiarities he had to include in his calculus. Even during the time of unified political consciousness one could not properly speak of an Austrian nation, but only of an Austrian state populace. The Hungarians in their constitutional law retained the notion of the *populus hungaricus*, but this they also could properly have interpreted only in the sense of a Hungarian state populace and not of a Hungarian nation, as has been clearly proved by the national disintegration after the World War. If it had been possible to rule Austria through a few additional generations in the spirit of unity and solicitude characteristic of Josef II, "the appraiser of mankind," the German culture would perhaps have sufficiently taken root to overgrow the other cultures completely, and the state, which protected and nurtured the weak, would have won over the masses for good. In tsarist Russia, the sternness of the regime was able to tie the peoples more firmly together because the latter, with the exception of the Poles and a few other tribes in the west, had not yet matured to national self-consciousness; moreover, in Russia, as in America, the boundlessness of the political dimensions had to have an overwhelming effect on the small ethnic groups. This explains why, even after the collapse, the entire remaining large number of ethnic groups, with the exception of the west, remained in the old realm. If a Tartar manages to be elevated into one of the top Bolshevik administrative offices, it is understandable that thereby he and the whole circle close to him are tied to the imperial federation, which lifts him high above the petty circumstances of his home region. It is another question whether things will always remain so, or whether in the long run the forces which separate will outgrow the forces which bind together.

Language merely as a joint means of communication cannot suffice for the creation of a national bond. The lingua franca which has been spoken in the Levant since the Crusades has not

brought the peoples using it more closely together. It is a welcome expedient of communication between people who for the rest remain wholly alien to each other. For language to be able to link the minds, it must be more than a simple life value it must be sensed as a cultural value, as the expression of a rich common possession of culture. Moreover, the mutuality of the cultural language must be accompanied by a community in all the other domains of culture which do not call for linguistic expression. How much, indeed, does the sound of native music bring the human hearts together! How much, indeed, is the Italian folk spirit linked together by the rich storehouse of architectural works which are sensed as a national possession throughout Italy! Deeper still than the effect of common recollection of a past culture is that of common participation in the works of a living culture. All European nations have a superabundance of traditional treasures from earlier cultural work to which they still add on and on. In the United States of North America the possessions of common cultural recollections are less numerous and deep because of too short a time of togetherness, and the cultural achievements of the present time also do not have a richness comparable to the European achievements. One is too much oriented toward outward economic attainments and does too much cold calculating, and where there is immersion into inner values it is more in the direction of religious and social matters. On the other hand, the pace of domestic life is so rapid that even today a special national character has already been formed, one by which Americans recognize each other and find common ground. Foreigners migrating to the country are anxious to adapt to this character, though in the long run through their own character they help to influence it, to be sure. Completely alien to the American community to this day have been the Negroes, although they have given up their native tongues. Apart from just a few exceptions, the Negroes have not yet, or not at all, matured to rising up to the cultural community of the American people, and they also have not been able to overcome the instinctive rejection by those with nordic blood, whereas Spanish blood in Central and South America has linked itself to the colored race. The law which has granted civil rights to the Negroes does not prevail against the social power of the race instinct. The Negro, declared free, encounters the popularly sanctioned law of social exclusion and possibly the brutal court of popular vehme.

For a political nation to come into being, the common bond of culture must be joined by a common state feeling. We have already seen by the examples of Ireland and Austria-Hungary how many delays and setbacks occur before the state feeling obtains control over national consciousness. On the other hand, the example of Switzerland shows that even the most vivid state feeling without the community of language does not suffice yet for the emergence of a nation. The Swiss citizenry consists of the members of three nations, but the Swiss themselves are not a nation, they are a state populace composed of different nationalities. To call them a political nation in which three culture nations are represented is to play games with names. The case of Switzerland is sui generis and cannot be compared with anything else. The peculiarity of Switzerland emerged only from the fact that in this case the members of three developed culture nations who did not want to renounce their bonds with them are nevertheless intimately bound together politically by the common memori-

of the great deeds in their political history, in a way normally found only with the members of a national state. In William Tell and Arnold von Winkelried, the Swiss people have the figures they need for the cult of heroism which unites the minds, as France has them in Bayard, England in Nelson, and Italy in Garibaldi. In the memories of the Swiss people the names of celebrated victories and of dangers met are found in such profusion as would bestow richness on the history of a large people.

More than any other great nation, the German nation has the peculiarity that, quite apart from those ethnic groups who settled far away, even along its borders many immediately adjoining members of the culture nation do not feel they have a stake in the political nation. This has something to do with the political history of the German people as it was conditioned by the German propensity toward a separate existence. The Germans in Switzerland have shared in the Swiss confederation the political experience which unites the souls, the Balts have experienced it within the Russian realm, the Alsations within France's, and the German-Austrians within the Hapsburg monarchy. There was something quite peculiar about Germanic Austria. Its heartland was established by Germany as a mark of the empire. Subsequently it shared in the experience of important periods of German history, and as hegemonic power for a long time gave to the realm its emperors. In addition, as it grew territorially it had its own political life, in view of the grave dangers and crises it experienced also being rich in great memories, and because of the peculiar course of events it remained unknown to, and not understood by, the Germans in the empire. Guided by its own interests, it resisted great movements of the German spirit in crucial epochs of history, and fairly often matched forces with Prussia, the predominant power of Protestant Germany. Is it then surprising that it was impossible in Germany itself to obtain agreement on whether or not the German-Austrians, who in addition could not be separated out of the connection with Slavic admixtures, were to be counted as part of the political nation! The pan-Germans held the one, and the Germans in the Reich excluding Austria held the other view, and both parties in doing so were under the spell of historical power.

The political consciousness which is to breathe life into a nation must be that of a free people. A people which has been subjected to its state by coercion must not be classed among the nations; not even a people which — without being bowed down by force — is faithfully devoted to its state may be counted among the nations as long as it does not rise above mere faith-inspired obedience. Only those peoples living their own life in freedom have the strength of a nation. The others, which haven't come that far, will not muster that supreme effort which the national spirit of sacrifice calls for and discharges in situations of extreme distress, and they will not have the sprightliness of Progress which bubbles in the free nation. The Brandenburgs, the Pomeranians, and the Prussians were always loyal to their kings. Their townspeople and peasants compliantly submitted to the crude dynastic rule of Frederick William I and furnished to Frederick the Great the disciplined and unflagging soldiers enabling him to gain his victories, but they would have been incapable of any self-acting national movement. The Alsations, notwithstanding all the horrors of the revolution which they had share in suffering, still drew near the French nation because

for them it was the source of the will and the strength for freedom which the German people, still unaroused nationally, could not offer them. The Holy Roman Empire of Germanic Nation does not deserve this name addendum because at that time the German people did not yet have any of its national sense of freedom, but willingly followed its princes if they deigned to ally themselves with the French kings in order to promote their personal interests or to submit to Napoleon in the Rhine Alliance. The war of liberation against Napoleon could never have erupted if not finally the national sense of freedom had been aroused. Only by virtue of the fact that finally the German people still became consolidated as a free nation was it able to sustain the collapse after the World War without again breaking up into its constituent regional organizations, as would have happened a hundred years earlier.

To be truly free, a nation doesn't have to be organized as an outright republic. England's example proves that a nation can achieve the mature self-assurance of liberty even when it retains the monarchic form of its historical tradition. The emerging nation may not yet have struggled through to a free form of government. Nevertheless, it may already be considered as a nation if its social strata are sufficiently filled with supportive love of liberty to raise the people to self-confidence and a holistic view of itself, guided by the general interest. The removal of personal bondage is the first preparatory step for the setting up of the nation, and it must be followed by political liberation. The peoples of Antiquity weren't even able to take the first step. Until their end, great masses of the population in the Greek City State and in the Roman Empire had remained unfree or half-free, the Greek people and the Roman people having always been only an upper class of the population. On top of that, the Greeks were politically separated from one city to the next. The Peloponnesian War, which destroyed the flower of Athens, is proof that they were separated from each other to a degree comparable to states with different ethnic groups. The political orations of Demosthenes could not be addressed to the Greek people but had to be confined to the people of Athens, and here we must always remember that when Demosthenes spoke to the "men of Athens" his address was meant for the free citizens of Athens only. The Romans were a politically strong people, perhaps being the strongest that has ever existed, but even they were no nation, for the nation must comprise the entire resident population of the realm if it is not to lack the indestructible ethnic foundation. It required hard historical labors until the Romanic and Germanic, and on top of that the Slavic peoples, were grounded deep down on this foundation. All the great trouble which Virgil in his Aeneid tells us was necessary to build up the Roman people was only part of the effort it took to establish the nations who later spread out over the soil of the Roman world empire. The establishment of these nations had to take place in a series of successive acts. First, it was a few great princes who harbored the idea of a national kingdom by recognizing that, in order to augment their personal power, they had to augment the strength of the populace and, what is more, that their position made it incumbent upon them to exert themselves on behalf of the people as a whole. Here or there exquisite nobles might take up the national idea, here or there the church might nurture it, or poets and artists might become heralds of the national spirit. * fight with ethnic survival at stake, as the one which the French

had to wage in order to expel the English from their native soil might arouse national sentiment in the populace itself. This is why the Maid of Orleans was able to raise the national flag centuries before, when the multitude of Frenchmen had become conscious once and for all of their national solidarity.

Even today no politically organized people lives on European soil which could be said to be integrally nationalized. Probably only the bourgeois class has become thoroughly nationalized, whereas the other classes have only partly been so transformed, and in the proletariat the idea of class conflict frequently still wrestles with the idea of national greatness. Nevertheless, all European peoples have now turned into nations, for the bourgeois stratum is sufficiently broad and influential to support the national movement. It only is necessary that its representatives in turn have got over their class interest in a degree sufficient to be able to identify the national idea with the whole populace, and this is true everywhere. Bourgeois liberalism from its very origins has understood the people as a whole, and the idea of popular sovereignty from which it started is a national idea. Unlike the master race of Antiquity, the genuinely liberal middle classes view the masses as national comrades.

Everything that was just said about the political nation is also true of the culture nation if we abstract from just the political link. Because the culture nation is not confined to the state it also comprises the fellow nationals of foreign states and of distant settlements. Because it reaches out quite far, it is true for it even more that a great cultural task must be accomplished which is felt to be a common possession. It is also true that this task must be performed by a free people whose freedom enables it to experience strong sensations, and that the whole populace shares in sensing the task, as a result of which the greatness of the task enters into everyone's consciousness even if he is unable to accept and appreciate all the cultural values. Again we have to recall that the Greeks and the Romans were not nations in the cultural sense either. They were culture peoples. The Greeks were a culture people of the highest order, their culture having eternal splendor, but, like the Roman culture, it lacked the impulse to radiate out into the general ethnic environment. Because this impulse was lacking, the ecclesiastical, courtly, and knightly culture was not yet a real national culture, just as the high-flown exclusive poetry couldn't be national poetry. The peoples of these eras were not yet culture nations, they only became so in the course of the gradual dissemination of a culture of ethnic character which strove to be generally understood, as is true for the bourgeois culture of the Enlightenment. In Germany only Herder's recourse to the popular song, Goethe's "Goetz" and "Faust" and his lyric poetry, and Schiller's dramas striking a popular chord gave rise to a true national literature. The whole culture, as it since then has been supported by the middle classes, has been intended for the populace and thereby is national.

We do not have to portray here in detail all that had to be done until peoples were transformed into nations. We may refer to the remarks made about the historical circulation of power within a people. Nations are configurations created when the circulation of power was completed in the populace. These

configurations are created by the power of success through which, thanks to its compactness, its freedom, and its self-assurance, the emerging nation outgrew the population which had only arrived at the initial nation-stage, and thus the mature nation outgrew the developing one.

2. The Jews

As is still true for the Negroes in America today, the Jews during the time of the ghettos in the Christian Occident were felt to be an impure, alien element and were repulsed. After the victory achieved by the armed Christians, for the Spanish Jews the period of happiness was also over during which under the Moorish rule they could excel in the sciences and even in the knightly arts. However, those who decided to leave the country which had become their home found refuge in countries in which they were given free play, and one only has to recall the great name of Spinoza in order to recognize that they also participated in the European cultural task. The belief in Jehovah, which they had taken over from their forefathers and faithfully preserved, gave even to the Jewish masses living in the narrow seclusion of their ghettos unbroken confidence, and by their devotion to the thoughtful religious writings they kept in constant practice their characteristic gift for abstract thinking and for incisive linguistic expression. But, above all, they had an opportunity to put to profitable use their business experience, which they had likewise taken over from their ancestors. During the period when barter trade prevailed, their arithmetic mind made them well suited for the conduct of monetary transactions, and when later money capital was to play a large role in the economy, they were better trained for its use than was anybody else. The free-thinkers of the Enlightenment regarded it as their foremost duty to win for the Jews religious liberty and social recognition. In the case of the ascendancy of Jewry, as always in the case of upward movements, it was the most outstanding men and women who reached the top first. After Moses Mendelssohn, the philosopher, it was Heinrich Heine, the poet, Felix Mendelssohn, the composer, and a splendid array of writers and scholars who, when faced with the general tasks of state and society, brought out to advantage the long pent-up talents of their ethnic group. When Lessing took his friend Moses Mendelssohn as a model for "Nathan the Wise," he may have been fully convinced to be able to characterize by this figure the virtues which distinguish the Jewish mentality vis-à-vis that of the Templars.

The sentiments which inspired the writing of "Nathan the Wise" did not endure. Neither the Christians nor the Jews were able so quickly to dissolve the historic tie of the ethnic formations which for almost two millennia had walled themselves off from each other. Moreover, the magnificent rise managed by the liberated Jews added extraordinarily to the existing frictions.

The most conspicuous act of this ascent took place within the economic realm. The Jews supplied the great bankers for the world market, more than anybody else they engaged in stock market speculation, they became even more prominent in trade — which had long been their preeminent domain, and they extended their business activities also into the countryside, wherever farmers were lacking in business acumen. They acquired a large share of

the growing sector of large-scale manufacture, especially in the less developed economies where a national class of entrepreneurs had not yet had a chance to grow up. In addition to his numerical and speculative flair, the Jewish entrepreneur also brought to bear on his big operations a pronounced organizational know-how, the fruit of long practice during the time of oppression, when one had to resign himself to getting along with people from all classes.

Along with its rise on the economic ladder, Jewry managed the climb to the top layer of learning. Its great intellectual endowment and education, along with its industriousness, opened up for it — in addition to the leading positions in the business world — also the professions and a great many artistic occupations, especially those of the visual and performing arts, to which it was suited by its strong talent for imitation, whereas it doesn't have creative talent to the same extent. For how should its foreign kind of perception succeed in the creative work of art, which is the attendant manifestation of the life of the people! With all peoples nowadays, Jewry in the educated class represents a share exceeding its share of the total population, and in the case of peoples where its absolute numerical importance is great it comes close, in endeavors for which it is particularly well suited, to occupying the majority of positions, or in fact already occupies them. Since the educated class now everywhere provides society with the great majority of its leaders, the fact of strong Jewish representation not only is regarded by their Aryan competitors as a personally disadvantageous constraint on their money-making aspirations, but also social leadership is thereby more or less deflected from the direction which it would have to take according to the population structure. Jewish authors, Jewish lawyers, Jewish representatives nowadays exercise notable influence on the formation of public opinion, of legal views, and of political ideas. Supported by its moneyed wealth, Jewry in many countries controls the powerful media apparatus. The fact that the pressure of the old historical powers was so long and so heavily on the Jews explains why they first aligned themselves politically on the side of the opposition freedom parties. In the process they were enabled by their strong analytical mind to develop political theory further in the direction of the ideas of freedom. In particular, socialistic economic doctrines received their articulation by Lassalle's seductive eloquence and their critical cutting edge by Marx's corrupting mind. Thereby Jewish thinking achieved a worldwide impact whose full dimension perhaps even Russian Bolshevism does not permit us to recognize yet.

The Jewish influence is less noticeable in the European west because the Jewish people is less densely represented here. In German central Europe and in the Slavic east this influence has grown more and more in cultural, political, and especially economic achievements. In the extreme east of Russia the numerous Jewish population until nearly the present time was repressed by government and society, which had the strange consequence that the great Jewish multitudes migrated from there to the sanctuary of the United States, where the Yankee entrepreneurial spirit now must compete with that of the Jew. Far more portentous was the other consequence: that from the Jewry remaining in Russia the onary movement drew most of those leaders to whose lot it

fell to overthrow the tsarist government and to set up the Bolshevik rule.

It is an astonishing fact that the Jewry, which is so prominent in the capitalist movement, also is leading the revolutionary movement. One cannot deny admiration to a people capable of such a dual feat. The power drive reminiscent of Old Testament times is still alive in it. With unerring instinct it has ferreted out the avenues of power which have been opened up by the special circumstances of the present time. On this occasion it has been favored by luck, because in these endeavors it benefited from the capabilities which through all the times of repression it had had an opportunity to perfect. The present time, in its economically constructive as well as its revolutionary tasks, demands the calculating and analytic mind which Jewry has been able to preserve with matchless tenacity from the favorable conditions of its past.

The Jews on their part blame the attacks to which nowadays they are increasingly exposed on eruptions of a narrow-minded religious hate, of vulgar race hatred, said to have been stirred up by envy of their successes. All this, indeed, plays a role, and it won't do to embellish the brutalities of anti-Semitic goings-on. Nor can they be justified by reference to the ridiculous and annoying blunders which the Jewish upstart is guilty of. But motives are also involved which must lead a level-headed exponent of native folklore to stand up against the power of the Jewry. A miserable concoction like "The Wise People of Zion" has been able to strike such a responsive chord only because in spite of all its arbitrariness it also touches strings, after all, which in real life have been dangerously strained. Lessing would not have written his "Nathan" today. The topic of religious liberty is no longer an issue. The wise judge to whom Nathan refers Sultan Saladin in the wondrous fable of the three rings would, if nowadays he were invoked in order to settle the issue between the Jews and the Christians, no longer have to render a judgment about the genuineness of the rings — today entirely different things are in dispute.

The Jews as a religious fraternity are no longer attacked. The fact that they form a special religious body would have become altogether a matter of complete indifference if it were not a distinctive mark for the fact the Jews within the nation and the world have remained a self-contained ethnic group. The number of individuals who as converts disassociate themselves from this group is not negligible in the upper strata, but for the time being the bulk of it nevertheless remains untouched. The bulk of Jews intermarry, which is the surest sign of ethnic compactness. But as much as this ethnic compactness remains beyond doubt, as undoubted it is also that the Jews are not a nation. They are no political nation for they don't have their own state, nor are they a culture nation for they don't have a culture of their own. In their faith and its institutions, and above all in their religious documents, they do have high cultural values of their own, but for the rest they have absorbed the cultures of their host countries. If the Zionists should be successful in turning Palestine again into a Jewish state, in which the Hebrew language would be not only the general colloquial language but also the medium for scholarly instruction, the Jews even then would not have become a nation, for their

overwhelming majority would remain naturalized citizens of the states in which they were heretofore naturalized and would, now as before, share the culture of these states. The recovery of Palestine and its politico-ethnic penetration are ambitions of the Jewish soul whose fulfillment is to serve their enjoyment of the accomplished rise, but without implying a willingness to forego the world status to which the Jews have risen. Aside from a few idealistic visionaries, Palestine will attract only a certain fraction of the Jewish proletariat; for the rest, Jewry will want to maintain and enlarge the power position within the nations of Europe and America which it enjoys today. Lord Beaconsfield would never have wanted to renounce being an Englishman, nor would Rathenau being a German. The educated Jews will not want to disown the culture of their countries of settlement because they are too deeply wedded to it, and the bulk of Jews of long residence are also too committed in their citizenship attitude. The Zionist movement does not resolve the conflict which exists between the Jewish people and the culture nations among which they live.

Lately, this conflict has been much aggravated still by the Jewish immigration from the east. Before this immigration occurred the educated Jews everywhere had already been absorbed, or were about to be absorbed, in the nations to which they belonged. Everywhere they were already counted and accepted as members of the nation, and not infrequently they placed themselves in the ranks of national leadership. It was only the recent migrations which upset this process of national fusion, which encountered new resistance on the part of the newly arrived masses. Things would have developed differently if the naturalized nationalized Jews had drawn a clear line of separation between themselves and the new arrivals. But to all appearances this has not happened, and as a matter of fact one should not be surprised about it, for the anti-Semitic attacks were directed against the ones as well as the others, they were aimed at Jewry pure and simple, and it is understandable that the self-consciousness especially of the educated Jews responded to this provocation with a declaration in favor of their ethnic identity.

In the case of the Jews the humiliation sustained through many centuries has not crushed their self-confidence as the chosen people. In their inmost soul they harbor for the clumsy and sluggish Aryan a feeling of disdain which the most sanguine among them bring out into the open without qualms. Has this not been expressed clearly enough in Disraeli's novels? The hero of his often mentioned novel "Coningsby" is not the Englishman Coningsby but the Jew Sidonia, in whom Coningsby reveres his Mentor. Undoubtedly, success during our times has largely borne out the Jews — but does this really prove their superiority? In a number of countries during the period when capital gained sway the Jews had the advantage of prior business experience, and when public discussion was started in parliament and the press they also had a lead in dialectical practice. They were the ones who had come first, and they amply exploited this advantage. The Jews also benefit from the fact that because of their much more rapidly maturing oriental mentality they steal a march on their slowly growing Aryan age mates upon entry into professional life. Thanks to all this they have established themselves very firmly in certain upper-level strata of society. But they owe their continued rise not only to their personal proficiency but

largely also to their ethnic compactness. The Jewish stratum which gains power prefers being surrounded by additional people of Jewish descent, whereas it does not care much for Aryan additions. It forms an ethnically compact power stratum, seeking to maintain such compactness, similar to the way in which in the days of old the Normans shoved themselves into the corpus of the Saxon people, although — unlike these — they could not take over all the tasks incumbent upon masters. No wonder that the Aryans on their part joined ranks in order to win out in the power struggle! As individuals they have a perfect right to do this, as far as their personal interests are concerned. Their ethnic self-awareness obliges them to follow this course, given their conviction that Jewish leadership would disturb the paths assigned to the people by its disposition and past history.

It is not part of our task to inquire into the ways in which this ethnic conflict might be resolved. Our task of social description is being met by a statement to the effect that the Jews must not be considered as a nation of their own, but that where they are powerful they have made themselves at home in the national body as an upper stratum, able to preserve its ethnic togetherness and using it to promote its own power, thus making itself felt as an alien element within the nation.

3- National Circulation and National Renewal

In the case of none of the most fully developed nations has the circulation of power been entirely completed. Nowhere has the state of healthy social equilibrium been assuredly attained yet; everywhere there is still more artificial stratification than would be necessary for the accomplishment of the social task. Everywhere remnants of historical power can still be found which no longer serve any social purpose. Nowhere has the rise of the masses proceeded to the point where historical education would have brought its lagging energies to full fruition and would have completely made up for its degenerations such that these energies could make their maximum contribution to the accomplishment of the social task. It is true, though, that great princes have always made it their business to work toward an adequate balance of the people's energies. Already in the early period of Germanic political life, a Charles the Great used his immense power with such an end in view. But the work of such princes was bound up with their persons, and after their death a large portion of their institutional arrangements went to ruin again because their contentious and inept successors didn't measure up to such an ambitious task. The enlightened princes of the 18th century could be more productive because they ruled over more mature peoples, but even they were not able to safeguard their work against their successors' less enlightened policies. Of the institutions created by Maria Theresia and Josef II, who surrounded themselves with statesmen filled with the spirit of the Enlightenment, only enough were saved to satisfy the ruling ambitions of Emperor Francis, who was advised by Metternich. Frederick the Great was followed by the weakling Frederick William II. In order to have a permanent impact, the educating ruler would have had to advance his educational work to the point where the energies of the people could unfold freely. From this point on, a people, in order to mature fully, would in addition still have to be given the time to test its mettle and to get

over the aberrations without whose painful consequences, as matters happen to be, human beings don't finish learning. It will take time for a people which has matured to nationhood to see itself as a unit and, in view of the value of such unity, to support with its joint strength the rising ambitions of the various groups. It is not as if all distinctions and conflicts had been removed in the free nation. The nation requires a well-articulated structure and stratification if it is to be able to do much good, but to each group and social stratum must be accorded the living space which it is entitled to in the scheme of general equilibrium. What in the enlightened princely state was granted by the judicious and merciful ruler, the nation is assured of as a matter of right — now everybody is under the uniform rule of law. Legal equality in economic matters, to be sure means in the first place only equal legal capacity, which by itself is not enough to meet a given need if the means are lacking. But here, too, the system of national liberty creates the prerequisites for balance. The universal suffrage accords to the masses not only equal capacity to incur legal rights and obligations but also equal treatment under the law. Lower-class voters vis-a-vis those in the upper classes even enjoy the advantage of being more numerous, and if they know how to organize the masses, they can exploit their numerical preponderance. Placed on his own, an individual proletarian has a chance to improve his position only if he is extremely industrious and thrifty. While only with a rare stroke of luck and extraordinary ability one person or another succeeds in climbing to a higher social stratum, the proletarian organization as such is given the opportunity to improve the conditions for the whole class represented by

Abstracting from its lowest strata, the bourgeoisie of the cultured nations may be said to have nearly completed its ascent. Not only has it gained full political power, but it has also become the main holder of culture power. The work of culture created by the bourgeoisie since the Reformation in religion and poetry and in the arts is on a par with the accomplishments of the most brilliant cultures under princely rule. The bourgeoisie was able to rise to such heights only when it was carried by the buoyancy of free supportive forces. In the realm of Harun al Raschid a prospering middle class also existed, but its fortunes depended upon the wisdom and the mercy of the caliph because it didn't consist of self-confident free citizens, and it was defenseless vis-a-vis a bad caliph. Likewise the defiant spirit of the vigorous citizen in the medieval town in its effect does not match yet the spirit of liberty possessed by the citizen of a self-conscious nation. The free citizen of the nation must have outgrown the narrow horizon of the city dweller and must be able to appreciate and devote himself to the larger interests of the nation.

Within the free nation, thanks to the impetus of the circulation of power, the peasant, too, has regained the freedom which he enjoyed before the vigorous tribes of the earliest times were trampled down by the strains of history. In order to appreciate the full dimension of the rise which the peasantry experienced again after its fall, one must visualize the conditions under which the rural population of the Orient vegetates almost everywhere and under which the unfree and semi-free colons carried on their burdensome life, having to cultivate the soil during the

period of Greek and Roman popular sovereignty. One must also visualize the conditions under which in a free England the peasants were almost completely deprived of their possessions by the landlords; in which the French peasantry found itself before the outbreak of the great revolution; under which the subservient peasantry of Germany and Austria was bonded bodily and by estate to the landlords until some time in the 19th century; and under which the Russian peasant serfs languished until near the end of the 19th century. Even within the free nation the peasant must work hard in order to make a living. While the negligent farm owner is done for very quickly and sinks to the bottom, the peasantry as a whole has become a political power which very effectively champions the interests of its members. For the national culture a healthy peasantry, as it is found today in many countries, means an abundant source of strength.

The proletariat has remained farthest behind. Although the opinion one obtains about its situation in the light of present-day circumstances is bad enough, here, too, if one wishes to assess the dimension of the attained improvement one must keep in mind the depths from which it had to be lifted up again. One has to look back upon the conditions of slavery during Antiquity and the conditions during the beginnings of the modern Machine Age. It is not possible to recognize in the contemporary English working-class the demoralized working force which had to be relieved of its misery by the factory legislation. In England and everywhere on the Continent the organized proletariat is a great power which expects that it will soon be the dominant power. The outstanding men leading the English workers, among them also precisely the kind who came from the working class itself, in the eyes of English society have become ministerial, they are English gentlemen. Orthodox Marxism takes its stand against state and nation, and, given the respect which Marx's teachings enjoy in the proletariat, one would surmise that the proletariat would keep aloof from national life. However, as is so often the case, here, too, the doctrines which are given lip service are different from the purpose which is expressed in actual behavior. During the World War the preponderant majority of the proletariat of all participating nations first followed the national flag, and only later did a change occur in those cases where national optimism began to falter. Then, after the revolution and the victory of the proletariat, a further change occurred. Where the proletariat no longer had to fight the class state the Marxian battle cry lost its footing, and the new ascendant Young Socialist movement openly declares for the nation.

Although everywhere the national circulation of power is still incomplete, it has given an astonishing lift to the vital energies of the people. The state of the original Roman people after an existence of 1200 years had outlived its historical usefulness. The traditional vital energy of the Romans had vanished, and the remainder of the free people in the realm, let alone the multitude of the unfree, had not been raised to civic consciousness. In order to stave off the barbarians, the emperors had to recruit barbarian peoples. In the battle on the Catalan fields, the Roman general Aetius, himself of barbarian origin, along with Franks, Goths, and other barbarians, had to beat back Attila's wild hordes, and a few decades later Odoaker no longer met an adversary in confronting the Roman people when he dethroned the last emperor. In the same way all the great

peoples of Asia ended up in a state where the mass of townspeople and peasants, incapable of offering any resistance, was at the mercy of their despots' brutality and of enemy incursions. The submissive population itself occasionally favored the conqueror, only to get rid of its tyrant and expecting, if anything, to find perhaps better treatment under the new ruler. The nations of contemporary Europe have behind themselves a historical development which has run for about the same length, or perhaps even longer, than Roman history, but what great economic, political, and military strength do they manifest, indeed! They don't have to fear the barbarians, they are themselves the masters of the world, and the international war which they just waged, however horrible it was and however much it must be deplored, has nevertheless furnished proof that wondrous forces have been stored up in them which, if wisely used, would have to yield the most beneficial fruits. Nations with such inherent strength could perish only if they were to rage against one another with full force.

The circulation pulsating in a nation ensures that all worn-out strata are really removed and that all up-coming ones really get to the top. The people matured to nationhood continually renews itself to full vigor as long as its strength has not been altogether used up. Any inference drawn from the conditions found in a people not matured to nationhood with respect to the course of history of full-blown nations is rash. With the rise of nations, history enters into a new epoch which, because of national longevity, will be established for a much longer duration than the previous epochs, which were measured in terms of the life-span of particular ruling strata. To be sure, from this follows the bad result that the conflicts, too, must take a graver course when the persevering forces of compact nations collide.

4. National Culture and National Idealism

The European nations in which we must also include the New World nations of European origin, regard their culture as a collective European culture, and in their haughty feeling as masters they additionally regard it as the flower of mankind's culture. Within the European culture area there runs a line separating the center and the west -- the Occident -- from the east of Russia and the southeast of the Balkans, and at this line the Faustian urge of the west of Europe gives way to the contemplativeness of the Orient. Russia and the Balkan received their first cultural instruction not from Rome and the Roman church but from Byzantium and the Oriental church, but there is also an Aryan admixture in the blood of their peoples. The Russians did not immediately recognize the line of separation. Beginning with Peter the Great they craved to go along with the European culture, and their peculiar national character sought expression in their cultural values only at a relatively late time. Turgenev, Tolstoi, and Dostoevski in their literature mark the turn from western to domestic orientation. All three attempted to interpret the soul of the Russian people. In doing so the first felt as a European, the second as the herald of a refined humanity, and the last as a Russian pure and simple. The Occident, in seeing Russian ways develop ever more strongly, first feared the return of the Tartar danger engulfing Occidental freedom. In the end, when in the chaos of the World War one began to lose faith in oneself, one

was inclined to see in those ways the new light from the east which might again bring salvation to a west collapsing under the egotism of its peoples.

The western-occidental culture is closely united by having its common origin in that of antique Rome and the church as well as in the similarity of blood of the peoples, but even this tie has gradually been loosened. This becomes evident from the time when the language of Rome and the church ceased being the world language of learning and was replaced by the national languages. Now the cultures became indigenous and absorbed the peculiar elements of the national character. The joint occidental culture slowly but irresistibly was separated into a number of national languages, though their interconnections for a long time remained so close that the evolution strikes one as being a joint development. For those arts not in need of verbal expression — architecture, sculpture, painting, and music in its purest forms, where it is not connected with words — it did not make any difference which language was spoken. For science and technology, different languages did not constitute a bar to common progress, and since science and technology became ever more prominent, that in itself was the best bet for emergence of a large area of joint development. Ideas wandered freely across the boundaries, and only that kind of book learning remained nationally confined which survived more by the traditional authority of its teachers than by its inner substance, though such book learning is much more widespread than scholarly pride will admit. It goes with the contradictions of human nature that along with the fertile insights, and no less eagerly, were disseminated those advances which were achieved in the production of the means of annihilation used in war.

For the sake of their own power, church and state had wanted to set up certain barriers to the development of Ideas, and therefore national cultures had to gain their freedom by first fighting for it. The fight which had to be fought was waged jointly by all the forward-striving nations, thereby creating a new element which tied the national cultures together. The culture of the 18th century had a cosmopolitan frame of reference, as did political liberalism which also took part in the fight. This cosmopolitanism did not for long stand the test of the real interests. The admiration which Frederick the Great held for French culture did not in any way diminish the vigor of his attack in the battle of Rossbach. In the 19th century only little was left of the cosmopolitanism of culture, but even now the national cultures, having become fully conscious of their independence, did not become alienated from each other. There was mutual understanding in good harmony, one gave and received, one thought to be intellectually tied to one another forever in the same way as the members of families who know about their common origin. Or perhaps more than these, for while with families of common origin in every successive generation which becomes further separated from the common ancestor the relations cool off, their collaboration in the service of culture brings the nations ever closer to one another. The number of cultural institutions and organizations tying the peoples together grew more and more, and international congresses for the deliberation of scientific or cultural matters were commonplace. Indeed, how many people — held by no means Utopians but men of the most mature judgment — held the view that the international cultural fabric was firm enough

to tie the culture nations together in peace for all times! The World War has belied this view: its first breath already tore apart like spiderwebs the whole network of international cultural relations.

While cultural consciousness proved too weak to conciliate the nations, it has very effectively contributed to the building of the various national states. For the network of national cultural relations has been woven a great deal more densely than that of international relations. Cultural achievements everywhere by the very nature of the subject matter are nationally oriented; the great work of fiction starts with the national epic poem singing the praises of the heroic deeds of one's own people. Linguistic expression also places a national stamp on every work of fiction, which receives its rhythm and its music from the words in the native tongue which inspired its creator, and by its linguistic associations it receives its intellectual overtones, as it were, all of which tends to be lost in even superb translation. Lewes, Goethe's English biographer, aptly says that Faust in translation is not Faust at all. Even the arts which are effective without verbal aid have their national peculiarity nevertheless. The Italian senses his music in the Italian manner, the German his in the German manner. Always and everywhere there have been, and there are, minds of special absorptive capacity which are peculiarly receptive to foreign national values, perhaps because they sense elements in them which domestic national values lack, and which, stimulated by privation, they avidly absorb. Lessing understood Shakespeare as did hardly any Englishman of his time, Carlyle understood Goethe as few Germans did. This is not to say that through Lessing's intermediation Shakespeare in Germany achieved the same recognition as he did in England, or that Goethe through Carlyle enjoyed the same prestige in England as he did in Germany, for intermediation never matches the effect of the original. Carlyle's service as an intermediary between German and English ways had its greatest effect in that he was able to educate himself by the German mentality and in his writings bestowed values on the English which otherwise would have remained inaccessible to them. After all, every nation regards even elements of foreign origin in its cultural achievements as the product of its own cultural leaders, and by virtue of the fact that the populace and the leaders feel as parts of a whole, the nation looks upon those achievements in all their dimensions with joyful pride as a creation of its own. This feeling in its radiations penetrates all strata of the nation which are receptive to culture, whereas the old dynastic culture and also the courtly-knightly culture still were confined to a narrow upper stratum. The ecclesiastical culture, which became common property of the populace, still differed from a truly national culture by the fact that it was brought to the masses by the stratum of ecclesiastical leaders, although this was often done with a fine instinct for the people, whereas national culture arose from a much freer movement. Ecclesiastical culture has followed the people, national culture emerges from the people.

By exerting internal power over the minds of the members of the nation, national culture generates the national idea, which has brought the national state to completion. Through the idea the national state achieved victory over the dynastic state, a victory which the democratic idea in and of itself

could not have won. The democratic idea game as it is power only from the fact that the masses through national culture were linked together into an internally compact body. It is true that the economic progress accompanying the cultural progress in its turn also contributed to making it possible for the masses to become aware of the solidarity of their interests. It also helped to augment the urge for freedom because economic progress could be gained only in freedom. But if the democratic idea had had only an economic foundation, the idealism which was generated by pride in the commonly held culture would never have matured. The economic impetus would have been satisfied if liberty in economic matters had been granted, but only cultural awareness intensified the democratic urge to the level of the national idea, only national cultural awareness imparted to the freedom movement its momentum of enthusiasm, only thereby did the national idea become so strong that it imperiously pushed for national independence and unity. The establishment of the unified Italian state and the re-erection of the German Empire would never have occurred if the Italian and the German peoples had not been internally united by the great cultural work created and enjoyed by them. Dante and Michelangelo have as large a share in the Italian national state as do Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour, and perhaps a larger one because the latter as successors, continued in the paths which the former had opened up. The same is true with respect to the relationship of the intellectual pioneers of German culture to Bismarck and Moltke.

In the Hapsburg monarchy a whole series of nations had willingly obeyed the imperial scepter before national culture, and with it the national idea, had sprung to life there. The government thought that it would be able to put up with the national movement if it gave it free cultural rein, and the nations themselves first appeared to be content with getting culturally organized. But the logic of facts made the movement proceed further and further, and quite automatically culture power changed into political power. The moderate parties of the beginning, which were willing to be content with smaller political concessions, were pushed aside by the next generation, which had already grown up in the atmosphere of national culture, and the radical and most radical leaders swept the nation along with them.

Without national idealism, the World War would not have turned into an international war. None of the participating nations had wanted the war, but no sooner had it erupted than each knew that it had to fight for its existence as a free nation, and each enthusiastically did its utmost in order to come out of it upright. No dynasty would have been able to extract from the nations the sacrifices in life and property which in their national idealism they rendered of their own accord. How without national idealism would it have been possible for the German academic regiments to charge singly to their deaths at Ypres! The reverse effect of national idealism was that it was not possible for any of the nations to do justice to the adversaries, as each was able to see in its adversaries only the malevolent, detestable aggressor. For this reason the military war of the Entente was accompanied by a war of calumny against Germany, and, on the other side, the hymn of hate to which a German poet allowed himself to be carried away found a very broad response in the nation. The national fight was distorted into a

ngnt between national cultures, and this couldn't be helped. Since the character of a nation achieves fullest expression in its culture, hostility against the nation had to turn into hostility against its culture. Even today the passionate bitterness has not yet been completely soothed, and even today the international communities of culture which were broken up by the war have not yet been fully restored.

Will the unifying work in pursuit of international cultural tasks, even if it were fully resumed, be sufficient to overcome the hate which the terrible war has left in the minds? And might its unifying force be strong enough to avoid a new world war? To judge by the experiences we had to run into at the outbreak of the past war, nobody who is able to learn from history should expect this contingency to happen. We have to accept that the cultural community of the world is not, as we are so easily inclined to believe, in itself already an effective guarantee of peace. We must accept that if, for reasons lying outside the cultural realm, a new world war were provoked for within it there is no cause for war the idealism with which national culture envelops national passion will again blow up such a war to the dreadful dimension of a war of ideas. Nevertheless it may be said that a great fund of peace is stored up in the national cultures. The national cultures are so interlocked with one another that their union cannot be severed in the long run. No culture nation can help feeling committed to the others which participate with it in the cultural tasks of mankind, and it would lose its self-respect if it failed to pay due respect to the others. The mutual respect emanating from the community of cultures cannot by itself guarantee world peace, but it is all the same one of the highest peace values which hitherto have been created by mankind. The peace value of mutual respect will reveal its full greatness once those antagonisms have been reconciled which, originating elsewhere, endanger the peace.

5. The National Idea in Germany

The Greek master race created its marvelous culture without being united in a national state, and it must be doubted whether it would have brought into flowering the whole wealth of its talents if it had been joined together so closely in a state as were the Romans. Would the Ionian style have developed alongside the Doric if the Ionians and Dorians had been completely fused into Greeks? Would Corinth have competed with Athens if one of the two had been the enthroned capital of Hellenism? Every single Greek city state willingly supplied within its strength the governmental protection which every culture requires in order to be protected from foreign invasions, and Greek solidarity was strong enough to provide common protection against a common danger. It would have been the end of Greek culture if the Persian threat had not been averted by the Greek brotherhood in arms. Also the sumptuous culture of the Greek cities, which along the coast and on the islands of Asia Minor were subject to the Persians, could not have been maintained without the backing of the free Greek homeland.

The Italian and German cultures, too, unfolded without a National state. For them, too, the protection and nurture were enough which they found at the courts of the spiritual and

secular princes and in the free cities. Again it was the competitive rivalry of the small polities which gave to the development its flavor of richness. If Rome in the Middle Ages had already been the secular capital of the unified kingdom, then Florence and Venice would not have had the incentive to vie with it for the acme of culture, and the most abundant flowering of culture would have failed to appear which, nourished by the jealousy of princes and cities, overgrew Italy. Would a secular Rome have become the Rome of Julius II and Leo X? Would a nationally satisfied Italy have had the yearning for spiritual renaissance? As for Germany, Richard Wagner, when he decided to set up his inaugural stage at Bayreuth, made reference to Germany's culture as always having developed "in the nook." It was no different from the situation in Italy in that German culture had as many abodes of protection and nurture as the realm had aspiring provincial rulers and prospering cities. The fragmentation into small states, Germany's political bane, became its cultural blessing. The cities in which the German king or emperor kept court were certainly privileged, and to this day Aachen, Goslar, Prague, and Vienna in their proud buildings have borne witness to this. Vienna became the classical city of music, not only because of the special talents of the ethnic Austrians but also because of the personal endeavors of the emperors in the 17th and 18th centuries who were zealously active as performing and composing musicians. Following Luther's tradition, the Protestant church, still more than the Catholic, cultivated the serious spiritual style which, due to Johann Sebastian Bach, reached its height in Leipzig. Little Weimar became Germany's literary capital. In Germany the bulk of cultural work had been consummated long before the establishment of the national state. No different in Italy: in the most carefully prepared travel guide-books one will find only few places for which with respect to modern cultural creations there would be something special to report. In the reestablished German Empire, national enthusiasm after the great feats of arms expected new cultural feats of equal grandeur, but the historiographer has not much to tell in this regard. The Swiss Gottfried Keller and Conrad Ferdinand Meyer probably are the only classicists of German literature during the first decades following the founding of the empire. Richard Wagner's great artistic work belongs to the time before and he owes his Bayreuth to the benevolence of a provincial ruler. Vienna, the capital of vanquished Austria which was excluded from the empire, has still remained the great city of music. In Brahms, whom it pulled to itself away from the empire, and in Bruckner and Wolf it has gathered the creators of a second classical bloom.

In England and France, national state and national culture are more intimately tied together, but even here development does not prove that national culture necessarily needs the national state, for here, too, a local culture with many promising young shoots preceded the consolidation of the national state. But national integration occurred so early that the great further cultural development coincides with it, a temporal coincidence which is not also causal. From now on, the leading exponents of cultural development gather in London and Paris at the court or in the trend-setting salons or other joint meeting places all the way to the haunts of the spiritual Bohemians. What is outside London and Paris becomes cultural province, where one obediently submits to the directions from the capital. As the world center

in matters of taste and refined luxury, Paris has achieved a position which the national state as such could not have accorded to it.

While developments in Italy and Germany have in common that the path to the national state goes by way of the national culture, they differ substantially in their speed.

In Italy, cultural preparation for the national state had been completed for centuries in that the country was internally ready for the national state as early as the time of Julius II and of Machiavelli. It would have required some fighting to make it and prevail against the regional powers, but the national idea was so strong that undoubtedly it would have been victorious. Foreign powers were the obstacle to national unification. Italy's political history since the Renaissance has been one of almost uninterrupted suffering caused by enemy incursions and seizures. When Napoleon created the Italian monarchy, which united Italy's north and the center, he had to surmount only scant popular resistance. After the new division of the country ordered by the Congress of Vienna, national conspiracies went on incessantly until the long-hoped-for work of unification finally was done when the country succeeded in freeing itself from the last foreign military power.

In Germany, now and then external obstacles were also encountered, but the core of resistance to unification was found within, emanating from the great many small sovereign rulers who under the nominal sovereignty of the realm in fact shared the business of ruling. It has become customary to blame the egotism of the German princes for having delayed national unification. But such an accusation does not strike all the guilty parties, for the free cities safeguarded their independence as jealously as did the princes, and in the German populace provincial allegiances everywhere stood way above that to the nation. The great national cultural drive which had announced itself so fully during the Reformation turned sour in the schism tearing apart national unity as well as during the religious wars that followed. In numerous regions of central and northern Germany the townscape reveals a long-lasting interruption in the works of architecture, extending from the Reformation until well into the 19th century. During the long calm of German life following the Thirty Years' War the minds of the populace turned inward, whereas in Italy the life of the people at that time was in full swing in spite of the political fissures. The gradually gathering German strength found its first expression in masterly musical compositions and its next one during the literary period of Storm and Stress, which ended in the classical Weimar period. The nation was not yet ready for a great political movement. The grievous battles with revolutionary France and with Napoleon hardly left it with any strength for this. Only the war of liberation against Napoleon united the minds, although the number and strength of nationally attuned hearts were still much too small to be a match for the instruments of power of the Holy Alliance.

The described circumstances make plausible the peculiar configuration which the national idea received in Germany at that time. Those seeking detailed information about this will find it in Frederick Meinecke's excellent book, "Cosmopolitanism and

National State," which traces the national idea in Germany until it flowed into the German Empire idea. The peculiar configuration of the national idea in Germany to which we refer received its classic formulation through the leaders of classical Weimar, Goethe and Schiller, whom as true soul leaders of the German people we may regard as the most competent witnesses of its feelings. It is of special interest to remember their view today because the external political situation in which Germany has found itself since the World War is very similar to the then situation, which influenced the national idea with the Classicists. Shouldn't we also be able to learn with a view to the present from the manner in which the two giants of that time formed their judgment concerning the destination of their people? Schiller expressed his view — in which we may also recognize Goethe's — most clearly and concisely in the collection of epigrams of 1796 edited by the two friends in a distich entitled "German National Character." The epigram reads: "To form a nation, Germans, you are hoping in vain — Perfect yourselves instead to becoming people more free." In a draft written in 1801, entitled "German Greatness," Schiller pursued his idea in a prose version which has some of the elegance of verse into which it ought to be clothed and which bears vivid testimony to the splendor which German prose is capable of when it is the ringing expression of deeply felt thoughts. The draft begins with a sad lament about the humiliation which Germany had just suffered at the hands of foreign powers, and it finds comfort in the fact that the majesty of the German as an individual never rested on the heads of its princes and that German dignity would remain unassailable even if the empire foundered. He closes with the proud words that Germans are destined for the lofty mission of bringing mankind to internal perfection and to combine in a wreath the most noble flowers brought forth by each people. "Every people has its day in history, but the Germans' day is the harvest of the whole period."

The high-pitched nationalism which was in full swing after the reestablishment of the empire must have found Schiller's words strange, being an expression of national despondency or even of outright denial of national sentiment. If they are judged in the perspective of their time, the words manifest the purest national attitude. When Schiller denies to the Germans the ability to form themselves into a "nation," he means thereby the political nation. He was right in this for the living generation as well as the two succeeding ones, and who should blame him for lacking the prophetic eye necessary to look ahead to the more distant future! Schiller clearly recognizes the capacity of the Germans for being a culture nation, for when he asks them to develop more freely their human traits, he doesn't mean a nationally castrated humaneness, but he means — and says so clearly in the draft of "German Greatness" — that the Germans, above all other nations, are called upon to ennoble their national culture by incorporating into it from all sources the eternal values of humankind. How to interpret this is revealed to us by Schiller's and Goethe's poetic work, which constitutes the most magnificent cultural document of the German mind. It cannot be denied that here and there in this work one encounters manifestations of

*Known as "Xeniensammlung" (Tr.)

being carried off to an un-German kind of classicism but how insignificant these are compared with the national fulfillments which the work embodies in superabundance! Schiller early learned to revere German youth as its national poet; how often, indeed, has it edified itself with verses like, "To the cherished fatherland attach yourself!" "William Tell," in Swiss garb, is a German patriotic work of fiction, and the words of the dying Attinghausen, "Be united, united, united!" were spoken for the German nation. If Schiller had shared the experience of the war of liberation, he would have become the leading poet for German freedom, and one would have recognized that it was with pained resignation when he denied that the German people was destined to become a political nation. Goethe's national mission is less apparent than Schiller's; he does not supply the orator at the students' ceremonial drinking session or the popular speaker with the desired striking formulas. But would Goethe have begun with "Goetz" if he had not at the bottom of his heart felt with his people? And does not "Herman and Dorothy" prove that at an advanced age he remained committed to the sentiments of his youth? Could Goethe have resuscitated the German folk song if not with all his heart he had sympathized with his people? And doesn't his "West-East Divan" prove that even in his advanced years he was still able to give proper expression to the music of German lyric poetry? The "West-East Divan" is one of the fictional works which demonstrate most beautifully how German ways can be enriched by foreign ways. The most powerful testimony of German mentality is "Faust." The legend of the popular book has been enhanced to a global work of fiction, which at bottom is nevertheless German. The German people has not only unforgettably memorized the verses in "Faust," but it has also learned to think in terms of its characters: Gretchen is the German virgin, Mephistoŷ has nearly displaced the devil, but in the figure of Faust himself the supreme has been accomplished. As Spengler rightly says, Faust embodies, along with the German character, the character of Western man. In Faust's infinity urge the character not only of the century but of the entire era of European predominance, with its indomitable craving for the great and the expansive, yea, the unattainable, is reproduced. What Schiller imagined by German greatness could not have entered into the world more loftily.

However unsatisfactory the classical conception of Germany's national destination later appeared to the fully awakened national consciousness, it was for its time as proud and upright as it could be. In this time of Germany's extreme political weakness, still not to doubt its greatness was proof of high courage, and it was proof of a lofty mind to show to the German nation cultural goals which elevated it above the other nations. And hasn't the path pointed out by the Classicists nearly led to Germany's greatness in every sense? Within Germany on this path the minds found each other nationally, through this path the sympathetic admiration of the world for Germany's cultural accomplishments was won. When the national unification of the minds was crowned politically by the reestablishment of the empire, there was nobody in the world who could have denied the historical justification of this act.

The political humiliation of the World War has left untouched the cultural goal to which the Classicists had shown the way. That way is still the surest one to Germany's

greatness. If the nation knows how to preserve the peaks of its civilization in the sense, as taught by the Classicists, of crowning achievements of human culture, it cannot lack the internal power over the minds in the rest of the world through which a state gains a maximum of external protection.

6. National State and National Security

The national state is the end result of a long historical development which, beginning with the simplest forms of community and guided by the striving for success, assembles more and more ethnic elements and through various and ever more comprehensive intermediate forms of constraint finally rises to freedom. According to the law of survival of the fittest, which is valid in society as much as it is in the nature world, the national state in the case of developable peoples finally surmounts all preceding weaker political configurations.

Conceptually, the state is the civic community of the entire population of an area for whose size simpler forms of human association are no longer sufficient. Only the national state truly measures up to this concept. Neither the oriental state nor the dynastic occidental state of Antiquity and the Middle Ages did, or could, measure up to it, for they were, and had to be, designed to force ethnic groups into the state which they struggled against and whose unity could be maintained only by the master race which wanted the state. With the decay of the master race the state had to fall apart, for when a strong prince was followed by a weak one the state was weakened. If the right to succession was in dispute, the strongest prince could not prevail on the throne without an exhausting fight. Austria-Hungary, the dynastic community of states, was ruined by the fact that its peoples were not able to become integrated into a nation. Its defeat on the battlefield was primarily caused by the fact that certain national groups in the army were unreliable and in the decisive hour eventually defected — its army was not defeated by the Italian army, but the Hapsburg peoples' state was defeated by the national state of Italy. The national state is superior to the historically preceding state configurations by virtue of the fact that the nation in its totality wants the state and that in the historical cycle after all the difficulties it recovers through renewal its undiminished strength.

In the matured national state, the idea of the state has reached its natural dimension internally as well as externally.

Internally, the national state has reached its natural cohesion because it is a concern of the entire population, and therefore the scaffold of constraints, which the emerging state needed in order to attain unity, fullness, order, and freedom, has become obsolete. The government no longer acts to promote its own power, but it is there to serve the people, in the capacity of a leader legitimated by general confidence. If, as of COURSE may happen, the national state tolerates the continued occupation of the throne by the dynasty, then the prince is no longer the ruler by the grace of God, but he rules by the will of the populace. He need not, for that matter, forfeit the consecration of power which is given to him by the idea of legitimacy. On the contrary, the idea of legitimacy is enhanced by the fact that

instead of being derived from the self-created right of the prince it originates in the capacity of the whole people to create rights. The army ceases being a tool of the prince which he can turn against the populace as well, but it becomes a national weapon. A nation which is externally covered, as is the United States by its coastal and England by its insular position, does not need to have this weapon at the ready all the time but may let it go at having honed it for an emergency. As does the army, the officialdom also acts in the service of the nation. As the old historical antagonism between government and populace has been reconciled, so also within the populace party antagonisms have lost their acerbity, because above them the feeling of national solidarity acts as a binding glue. Once the national state has been truly and firmly joined together, the proletarian movement will not loosen it. The French nation of 1848, and also the one of 1871, was still in such political ferment that it had to endure the outbreak of class war, but since then, notwithstanding all its unrest, the French proletariat hasn't broken the national peace any more. The English nation, the most mature one in Europe, got peacefully over the revolutionary crisis year of 1848, while in the United States so far the danger of class war has been nonexistent altogether. In the matured nation the democratic movement, even when it expands into the proletarian class, has no subversive effect but, in accord with the circulation of power, has a deepening one, comparable to a plough which breaks the hitherto firm top-soil.

It is understandable that a culture nation yields to the national idea if it meets all the prerequisites for the large state but has been hitherto politically fragmented, as has been the case for the German and the Italian nations. It perceives the might and majesty of the neighboring political nations and must feel bitter about not having been able to match them. In Germany, the feeling of national solidarity already a few decades before the reestablishment of the empire was instrumental in creating the customs union, which made it possible for a unified German economy with its natural division of labor and free from the obstacles of internal boundaries to develop in place of the small and economically fragmented states. Of course, only the empire had the necessary compactness to pursue domestic and foreign economic policy on a grand scale, and to pursue social and colonial policies as well. Also, only the empire gave to the Germans the uniform currency, which alone allows money to fulfill its purpose because it ceases being itself a commodity. Only the empire gave to the Germans the uniformity of law, which allows law to fulfill its purpose because the divisions depriving it of its clarity and dignity and inhibiting the judge's arm have been removed. In the nationally united empire the Bavarian no longer felt like only a Bavarian, the Saxon no longer like just a Saxon, and even the Prussian no longer as merely a Prussian — instead, all felt that as members of a great power they had gained an additional value.

Of course, the national state of a small nation must content itself with less power than that of a large one, yet it will develop to achieve the same internal security.

Externally, the national state has its natural boundaries, for since states according to their nature are not territories but civic communities, they find their natural boundaries where

the binding glue ends which holds the community together. When the full national state recognizes as citizens all members of the nation gathered together in a compact settlement and when its national unity is not disturbed by any kind of compact settlement of foreign nationals, it has in a crucial ethnic sense found its natural boundaries even if not everywhere it should have found its natural boundaries in a geographic sense. That the French today still insist on seeing in the Rhine their natural boundary with Germany is against the law of time. They could regard it as natural boundary as long as the Germans themselves did not yet feel like a nation and the French could hope to amalgamate in their own interest the remaining German territory on the left bank of the Rhine to the same extent in which they had succeeded with Alsace. Since the time when the Germans themselves began to feel like a nation, this hope has become vain: since then the unalterable natural boundaries between the two states lie where the two nations abut. Within these boundaries, each of them is internally united and keenly intent on its independence, for whose preservation it is gladly determined to incur any kind of sacrifice. What one seeks to annex beyond these boundaries remains an alien element, which disturbs healthy circulation and threatens the peace because this foreign body keeps craving for reintegration with its national stock, which in turn does its utmost in order to pull it back to itself. Through many decades England and France were embroiled in wars as long as the Norman dynasties, which had become England's rulers, tried to further extend their Norman possessions with the aid of their English instruments of power until they would have become rulers over France as well. These wars ended when England learned to content itself with its natural national boundaries vis-a-vis France.

Wars between the developed nations, as dynasties used to wage with a view to augmenting their territories beyond their national boundaries, have lost their purpose. One has to face the fact that every nation as such is invincible, and one has to be prepared for losing again in the next war what was gained in the last. The world-shaking proof for this was given by the French war of revenge. In the Peace of Frankfurt the Prussian generals succeeded with their demand, made in the interest of military "security," for the cession to Germany of a piece of French Lorraine around Metz. It should have been foreseen that the highly intense French national consciousness would never get over this wound on its own body. If the Germans had implanted ideas of liberation in the Frenchmen whom they forced into their state, as was done by the French vis-à-vis the German-Alsatians, the outcome might have been different. But the Prussian statesmen weren't even able to resuscitate ethnic feelings for Germany in repossessed Alsace, where the German language was still the mother tongue for the peasant and the man in the street. It is dreadful to see that the world-shaking proof of the war of revenge has not been enough to enlighten the statesmen who after the World War undertook to dictate the peace. Once again the generals, eagerly backed by the short-sighted statesmen, have succeeded with their demand to transgress the national boundaries for the sake of military "security." Every self-conscious nation — and it is part of the essence of a nation to be self-conscious — will try at all costs to preserve its possessions as an untouchable heritage, and the blunder of the dictated peace* which challenges the inborn national instinct of self preservation, therefore makes itself guilty of a grievous crime

against nature which shall be dearly paid for. The adversary who takes hold of a piece of the heritage of foreign nationals in order to obtain military "security" will have a certain initial advantage in the next war, but he is not safe from this war itself, rather he makes it a certainty.

The example of France and England reveals that between mature national states there are more reliable forms of protection than the military ones, which neutralize each other. Between these two states the boundaries are morally secured. On this side of the Channel as well as the other it is known that the natural boundaries — nationally clearly drawn — have been reached, and one does not play with the idea of seeking property on the other shore. This would be as absurd as if somebody had the idea of implanting in his healthy body limbs of another body in order to add to his organs. One therefore also does not think of reinforcing the natural boundaries by military safety devices; one knows that they are not in need of such further devices. This feeling of safety operates between fully mature nations wherever their territories abut along national boundaries without friction. In no other respect has the idea of national self-determination become so firmly established in the minds as in respect to national self-limitation. When Wilson in one of his 14 points mentions that peoples must not be moved back and forth like pawns in a game, he strongly reflects contemporary thinking. Regrettably, he himself and the Entente, which proclaimed the idea of national self-determination as one of its great objectives of the war, heeded this advice only to the extent that England did not become guilty of any encroachment on European soil and that France, which avidly hankered for the boundary of the Rhine, was more or less put in its place so that it was willing to content itself with future expectations concerning the region of Saarbrücken. The capital sins in regard to national self-limitation were committed in favor of the Allies whose craving for the neighbor's land was given full scope in the south and the east. The idea of national self-limitation nevertheless must already have achieved great power over the minds, since the authors of the dictated peace yielded to it to some extent. The France of Louis XIV or of the Revolution or of Napoleon I and still of Napoleon III would have been less restrained in the exploitation of its victory. If the idea continues to gain a hold on the minds to the same extent that it has in the short time since it was conceived, it will not be long before it has become unassailable. It would then already happen in the near future that the nations, in mutual respect for their national character, would have won the maximum attainable protection of their national boundaries, which at least would put the fighting for these to rest.

A nation is not always in a position to become politically a full nation. It can do so only if its area of settlement forms a contiguous whole and if no inhibiting historical powers stand in its way.

The area of settlement of the English nation was from the outset sealed off against the Continent by its insular position, and after English statecraft had learned to draw from this the appropriate lessons, it only had to surmount the lesser frictions which resulted from the proximity of Scotland and Ireland. Matters changed when the British world empire grew. The free

English became a world-commanding master race which had to come to terms with all the subjected peoples, and in addition it had to get over the frictions which arose between the mother country and the English settlers who set up their new homes in the overseas regions of the world empire. The particular home sentiments of the New Englanders soon became alienated from the old realm, given the peculiar conditions of New England and its remoteness. The new settlers brought with them their love of liberty which had still freer range over there than in their former home. He who over there was unable to help himself was not able to make it, and this was as true for the individual settler as for the emerging political configurations. In the end the settlers also helped themselves in political matters and set themselves apart in a nation of their own.

The German people sent to the east the large surpluses of people which the sex drive brought about, partly by settling them in the areas which in pushing ahead it wrested from the neighboring Slavs, and partly by letting them establish enclave settlements which their wanderlust ferreted out and the obligingness of foreign rulers favored. Many of the enclaves have been preserved for the German culture nation to this day. However, they had to be lost to the political nation. The political nation, though, also lost groups of ethnic Germans whose settlements directly abutted on Germany as a political unit. We have already discussed this elsewhere and have shown that the historical power with which Switzerland attached to itself its German citizens was stronger than their feeling of solidarity vis-a-vis the German Empire. Fundamentally, the same was also true for the Germans in the Hapsburg monarchy, which incidentally maintained a certain political connection with the Empire. The peculiar German urge for separation even loosened greatly the political cohesion of the Empire itself, thereby greatly holding back the development of German national consciousness. This explains why in German Alsace national consciousness had not yet been aroused when in France it already had strong wooing force. As late as during the last decades of the 19th century in the Hapsburg monarchy — ruled by a prince who himself shortly before 1866 had admitted to being a German prince — the urban Germans in Hungary switched to Magyar nationality and the German peasants there to the idea of a Magyar political state. At the time of reestablishment of the Empire the time was not yet ripe for the pan-German idea. The preconditions for becoming a full nation had not yet been met historically for the German cultural nation even where it existed as a compact body.

Since the time of the Migration of Nations there had existed in the area of the Hapsburg monarchy as well as in the Balkan region and partly also in that of old Poland a condition of national mixtures. There was no room here anywhere for the large national state. Peoples which should receive the assistance which a large state extends had to be unified under a different political idea, which under the given circumstances could be only the dynastic one. That the Hapsburgs were able to augment their realm through propitious marriages they owe to the circumstance that these marriages offered the happy prospect of instilling in the combined peoples enhanced power of resistance, as the general insecurity and especially the grave threat posed by the Turks demanded. Later, when the peoples of the monarchy had acquired national consciousness and now should have wanted of their own

accord to become united in the state there was no end to the frictions. The government and the far-sighted politicians endeavored to reconcile the peoples in the idea of national justice, and it cannot be said that their endeavors were hopeless. The author of this tome has always held the view that in the monarchy, especially in the Austrian half of the realm, the cause of national justice received the benefit of more thoughts and deeds than it did anywhere else in the world. He still holds even today that the advantages of great power and the possession of their national cultures would have been preserved for the peoples of Austria-Hungary if the violent seizure from without occurring during the World War had not incited to an extreme degree national separatisms and thereby had upset the laborious work. The end result was, as it has been aptly named, the Balkanization of a large area of central Europe.

In the Balkan countries and the newly Balkanized countries the situation of national mixtures is often so tangled that there is no room for even the small national state. We will disregard the fact that in the Balkan countries live various ethnic groups of vacillating national character who are claimed by various nations. We only wish to dwell upon the fact that where the national boundaries are clearly discernible they often do not coincide with the geographic boundaries. Now it happens that the geographic boundaries are more important for the nationally not stabilized state than for the old and well established nations. Austria-Hungary as well as Turkey had to pay heed to the geographic boundaries simply because they constituted for them the best defense lines. Add to this that following the geographic boundaries by and by the production and marketing regions have become delimited. Austria with all its nations on account of its customs union formed an economic region, while the Danube-Theiss basin around Budapest is a production and marketing region for all nations residing there. The dismemberment of national states by the dictated peace has torn asunder these economic regions to the detriment of all participants. Besides, it must be noted that because of the situation of national mixtures and for other reasons whose discussion would lead too far, the national dismemberment could not be carried all the way through, so the newly formed states are nationally mixed to a greater or lesser extent. In place of the one large state Austria-Hungary aspiring to national justice, there now exists a number of smaller states of mixed nationality, lacking the advantage of the large state while their desire to enjoy national life to the full suppresses national justice.

For states and nations in such condition the national idea provides none of the safeguards of peace; rather it brings unrest and strife.

7. Nationalism and Imperialism

With good reasons the historical period beginning around the middle of the 19th century is dubbed the period of nationalism. During this span, national power has been the dominant power in Europe and in almost all the world with organized governments. The nations are the unit of culture and state, the governmental and cultural tasks are performed through national cooperation of the forces, which are continually renewed in the circulation of

power. Hosoromg loreign spiritual, ana material values does non neutralize the national character, for these, too, are harnessed for domestic purposes. Nor is the national character neutralized when foreign territories are seized because this, too, is done only for national aggrandizement. No more is it neutralized when many a cultural task is undertaken in collaboration with other nations, for the successes so attained are figured as national accomplishments. Nowhere so far have international undertakings dissolved national cohesion. Economic tasks are also performed nationally. The great vitality of business is also included in the stock of national power. Here, too, the nation is the supportive unit; here, too, national strength is renewed in an unending cycle; here, too, national cohesion is crucial, and world cohesion only serves the end of augmenting the national stock of power.

So considered, nationalism is the performance of national tasks from national strength. But since the manifestations of national strength are accompanied by consciousness of national power as well, nationalism is at the same time the expression of national power. Power consciousness is always associated with nationalism. The minds of the members of the nation keenly pursue the course of national activity. They immerse themselves into statistical manifestations of its value, and while every great success is cause for national celebration, every great failure causes intense national suffering, and every advance of foreign strength is of national concern. For a long time already the English government has taken pains to shield every Englishman in all corners of the world from insults and has marshalled its power to expiate perpetrated insults; today the English government has the whole English nation behind itself in this endeavor. The collision at Faschoda, where an English expedition was unexpectedly overtaken by a French one, put the nation in a state of martial excitement. The expansion of the German war fleet was a matter of gravest public anxiety. Every inconsiderate word of Emperor William was received as over-heatedly as happens with anything which gets into the whirl of public opinion. The detached Englishman in all matters of national importance is feverishly excitable, because here the whole populace goes together, and in England, as everywhere else, the multitude is guided more by sentiment than by reason. English national pride, given its historical nourishment, tends to react to every challenge, real or imagined, with special sensitivity.

Not infrequently the label "nationalism" has that bad meaning which is readily evoked by the addition "ism." This is a nationalism in which the national consciousness of power exceeds the national strength, the nationalism of greed and of phrases, the national chauvinism. A not insignificant number of the small European nations has been infected with this kind of nationalism. One has got a hold of the national idea which — ignited by the strong nations taking pride in their great feats — is everywhere in the air today, and one affects the vain national air without being justified in doing so by one's own accomplishments. Today there is nationalism even where the nation itself has not yet come into existence. There is an Egyptian, an Indian, a Chinese nationalism, but without the Egyptian, the Indian, the Chinese nation having been fully formed. Each of these peoples may point to supreme historical values created by its ancestors, but one forgets that these values were not created

by the nation, but by a ruling class which has long since perished, while the masses, pressed down into submission, were then as little, capable of cultural creations as they still are today. The small stratum of society with European education which occupies the positions of leadership in these countries today has followed the European example in emitting the slogan of national independence and thereby draws large crowds who come to feel painfully their dependence on foreign rulers. Thus an Arabi Pascha had brief success in Egypt in standing up against England, and a Sun Yat-sen did so with greater success in China against the dynasty and the foreigners. One must not reproach the men who dared their life for the freedom of the fatherland, but one must be clear that with all the enthusiasm of their close followers they are nevertheless not backed by some deeper national force. Behind Washington and Franklin there was the strength of the New England nation which, surmounting all the crises of a protracted war, eventually gained its independence by fighting for it and was able to impart to the state which it established the growth and full flowering of a true national state. Suppose the Egyptians managed to gain their external independence. They will still not succeed in creating an internally consolidated national state, for the masses will remain in their submissive stance. The Indian movement led by Gandhi is stronger because ethical and religious powers which are deeply rooted in the people are also active in it, but even this movement will not be able to create the national state as there isn't, and never will be, a free Indian nation. But to refer again to the small nations of Europe of which we began to speak, one must admit that those among them whose masses are vigorous — not true, e.g., of the Rumanian peasantry — and whose upper classes are culturally educated are on the way to becoming a nation, but even the most developed among them still have far to go until they have elevated themselves to a high cultural level. Many of them — again we must say, not all — during the World War stood the national acid test with honor, as this is specially evident with the Serbs, who with their courage so typical of a primitive race, their mastery of the military instruments, and their unwavering national devotion gave a good account of themselves. But let us not forget that the martial feats of state are only the beginning of the national work and that the subsequent cultural tasks place requirements on the strength of the masses which are much more difficult to meet. A well-known dictum by Lichtenberg says that human beings would rather fight for their faith than live according to it, and by the same token one may say that it is easier to get the people to fight for their nationality than to fulfill the national idea in their works of peace. In this respect there remains yet much to be done in the new states which resulted from the dictated peace. A state is still far from being consolidated when it has been given its constitutional form, and these new states have more difficult tasks ahead of them than do the full national states because they are nationally mixed states with arbitrary boundaries, and now they are called upon to fulfill these tasks without proper training in governmental affairs and without supportive historical powers. Their feeling of victory makes them believe that they are strong, but aren't they misled by this feeling? Their feeling of victory is not a victor's feeling, the Entente having won the victory for them. What share the Czechs and the Poles have in the verdicts of the World War? Predominantly they were on the side of the vanquished or stood completely aside, and therefore they could not get to know

the genuine victor reeling WMCH is generated by an awareness of sorely tested strength and which among leaders having measured up in critical combat has become firmly entrenched.

The small nations of the Germanic north, the Swedes and the Norwegians, the Danes and the Dutch, are full nations. Their national consciousness is justified by the ample development of their strength, and on Europe's cultural sky they shine with stars of the first order while having learned to keep their national pretensions in check. The time is past when the Vikings were the terror of Europe, as is the time when the Swedes took their place among the European great powers. For Holland, too, the great era is past when its fleet battled with that of the English for dominion of the seas and William of Orange defied the mighty king of France in the fight for the European balance of power. All these states, in deep tranquillity, now give their whole attention to their small domestic world and have to resign themselves to the fact that their excess population through overseas emigration is lost to the nation; only Holland, thanks to its plantation economy, is in a somewhat different situation. In the national conflicts of Europe these states occupy a position which compares with that of nationally mixed Switzerland. Like the latter they have remained neutral, and their decision to take this stance was automatically called for by their nature. The examining observer finds in them the welcome proof that in a nation manliness and peaceableness can be combined, and they are also proof that moral safeguards must be more highly valued by the state than military ones. What else assures their continuity than does the respect they enjoy in the community of nations? What military instruments of power of any consequence could they pit against the great powers? Perhaps Sweden, which had to leave its Finnish possessions to the Russians, had to fear a further Russian attack as long as Russia in the tradition of Asian despotism was bent on conquest, yet every culture nation would expose itself to condemnation by the world if it were to disturb the peace of these small nations. The European mind considers these states as fortunate islands which have risen from the sea of restless fighting, to whose tempests they were exposed as long as their inhabitants had not yet learned how to escape the temptations of external power. Once all peoples have become of like mind, the foundation will have been laid for a league of nations which in its deepest motivations is a federation for peace.

Like these Nordic states, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal have also withdrawn their world aspirations and are, by and large, as far as it depends on them, favorably disposed toward peace. Their internal peace, to be sure, is not firmly established. Belgium is nationally split, and in the case of Spain and Portugal the after-effects on the masses of absolutism and of ecclesiastical rule have not been overcome yet.

Matters are different for the new states which were formed or expanded on the territory of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and western Russia, as they are the foci of national unrest internally as well as externally. How could it be otherwise given that they are not natural national formations? They are artificial creations marked out by the victors of the World War in order to remove Germany's allies from the game and to reduce Germany in size in the east and wall it in. In reckless pursuit of this aim, everywhere one cut into the vital substance of

nation and economy and of historical power. German Austria is a rump whose survival is the anxious concern of the League of Nations's doctors. The Magyars and the Bulgarians were deprived of possessions which they are not willing to give up nor can renounce easily. The Poles, Czechs, Rumanians, and Yugoslavs received additions to their national homelands which they could never have won by their own strength and in regard to which it is exceedingly doubtful whether they will be able to defend them. As for the remaining new states, which we do not want to list separately, most are also dissatisfied and contribute their utmost to keeping their close and their more distant environment in a state of unrest. We will content ourselves with analyzing the evil of nationalism by referring to the just named nations as cases in point.

In the old Austria, in European Turkey, and in western Russia - the same holds true for the Prussian part of Poland - conquest or other acts of violence, or also spontaneous submission to the protection of the mighty one, had integrated a series of peoples which themselves had previously wielded substantial power and which as political or cultural states had their proud memories. Some of them, notwithstanding the sense of resignation imposed on them by the circumstances, had never given up their ethnic claims, while others had nearly lost their ethnic self-consciousness. But for the ones as for the others the rising national idea, combining with powerful historical recollections, not only resuscitated but deepened ethnic consciousness and ethnic claims, because it was able to infect with them the masses who previously had not shared them. After the collapse of Russia, Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and Germany they occupied with keen desire the positions of power which the generous hand of the Entente assigned to them. Even Masaryk, a man of high intellectual caliber and one of the most ardent proponents of national conciliation with the Germans in the old Austria, turned into a diehard nationalist. In doing so he had a hand in building the Czechoslovak republic on a foundation of national injustice which the old Austria in a sincere effort had in all important respects already left behind. The nationalism of the other new states had still much worse effects than it did in Czechoslovakia. Whereas the strength of resistance of the Germans in Czechoslovakia was so great that one could not avoid taking it into account to some degree, the national minorities are much weaker, and therefore much worse off, in the other new states. None of the new states deserves to be called national state, as they are all out and out nationalistic states in which national greed arrogantly exceeds national capacity. Take by way of comparison the Swiss as a people organized by state! Switzerland has been declared inviolable by international law, but it is so already by virtue of its inner strength and dignity, of the strength of its citizens in whom lives on the strength of the fathers who founded Switzerland during a prolonged struggle for existence and were able to govern it according to prevailing wisdom. The new states did not win their position of power in combat. Only the Rumanians and the Serbs stood on the side of the victors, and they, too, however courageous and honorable an account especially the Serbs gave of themselves, did not win through their own strength. Without apprenticeship and sample, the new states were declared ready for statehood by the biased verdict of the Entente. Without prior training and experience they were launched on their sovereign career, under circumstances so difficult that first-rate

preparation and experience are hardly sufficient. Internally insecure and in a state of animosity amongst themselves, they are a danger for Europe, being so all the more because they are the welcome playthings in the power game of the great powers, as was Serbia before the World War in Russia's power game. The unrest of their nationalism might, as was the case with Serbia, set off renewed fighting all over Europe and the world.

Italy, the oldest one among the culture nations of contemporary Europe, with a wealth of educated citizens and as the cradle of modern statecraft, must not be named in the same breath with the new states in the east, but the diagnosis of its condition must still be that it shares the disease of nationalism with them, nay, it is the motherland of national chauvinism. Its nationalism differs from that of the other great powers by not yet being strong enough to turn to distant lands in imperialist fashion, and this is what makes that nationalism all the more dangerous to its neighbors. When Bismarck initiated German colonial policy, he did so with cautious hesitancy: the merchant, he said, had to do the colonizing, with the state only having to lend him its support. Modern national imperialism is superior in inner strength to that of the old world-conquering rulers in that it does not follow orders from on high, but is animated by an exuberant urge of the citizens which propels them out into the world, like the bees which collect the honey from all around. Venice and Genoa had this urge when they acquired possessions on the Mediterranean Sea, and modern Italy also has it again, so far not beyond the Mediterranean. In the main it finds its national emissaries into the world in its needy and industrious rural proletariat, which seeks the reward for its manual labor abroad where major entrepreneurs have work to offer. The true champions of the national movement, the bourgeoisie and the young professionals, were completely engrossed in the idea of irredentist Italy which demanded the liberation of the co-nationals, who along the national borders and on the other shore of the Adriatic Sea were subject to foreign rule. Originally the national movement was directed against foreign rule in Italy itself. This was the heroic time of national enthusiasm and sacrifice, which gained its triumphant victory in the establishment of a united Italy under the leadership of Garibaldi, Mazzini, and Cavour. The tracks of this movement because of the long duration of the national fight for liberation were too worn out to permit rising above them. Crispi, a man of action and reflection, who as one of the Ten Thousand had himself shared in the fighting, tried his best to calm the movement, but it was in vain. The nation could not appease its hunger with the great words, and the heroic age was followed by the age of the catchphrase when people listened to the intoxicating words of a Gabriele d'Annunzio. Of course, it was also a matter of finally having become spoiled by luck after the long period of an unfriendly fate. Cavour's words, "Italia fara da se," had not fully become true. Although the Piedmont soldier and civil servant, and many others besides them, had faithfully done their duty, the final success was still always due to foreign assistance which Italian statecraft was able to marshal. Lombardy was won by the French at Magenta and Solferino, Venice — in spite of Custozza and Lissa — by the Prussians at Koniggratz. Victory in the World War also was not decided by Italian victorious strength, and this is why one may rightly say of Italian nationalism that it exceeds national strength. In its chauvinistic overacting it seized property of

foreign nationals as a result of the dictated peace and planted the tricolor in the native valley of Andreas Hofer. In addition to German national property it also took possession of Yugoslav one, and already it trains its eyes greedily on irredentist Italy in French possession. Where will Italy find its helper when some time it will have to settle all these conflicts to which its own strength will not measure up after all? Add to this that in its domestic affairs it has not yet found its peace either, lacking as it does the order which the human state needs as much as the bee state if it is to enjoy its fruits. In its beginnings the young monarchy could take pleasure in a number of seasoned statesmen, and trod its path more sure-footedly than do most young democracies. Gradually, however, in its all too rapid pace of democratization it also fell prey to party anarchy, which young democracies always evince in the absence of firm historical powers. To be sure, in a notable reaction nationalism has brought fascism to the fore which tries to overcome the pernicious fragmentation of parties. If fascism were able to keep its theoretical purity, it would become a blessing for the country, but since it also moves in the rutted tracks of ardent nationalism, it remains an open question what consequences for the nation will flow from it.

Czarist Russia since Peter the Great, and more clearly yet since the reign of Catherine, has been an imperialist big power. However, at first its imperialism was not yet a national but a dynastic one, being at any time no stronger than the ruler who just happened to govern. The organs of national imperialism were formed only piecemeal and only in part. The first to move was the Russian peasant, driven by his hunger for land and his roving spirit, as had always been the case with peoples whose multitude cultivated the soil and, given their extensive mode of cultivation, was unable to provide a living at home for the rapidly growing population. The conquest of Siberia, started by Russian arms, was completed by Russian peasant colonists. It was only the mighty cultural movement taking a hold of the best Russian minds which gave Russian society a national orientation. Though genuine and deep, this movement still has not yet had time to communicate its fruits to the masses with which it has tried in vain to establish rapport. Nevertheless, it was genuine and deep simply because it had its roots in ethnicity. The Russian writers to whose greatness an astonished Europe bowed were great because they were able to express in words the spirituality of Russian people's soul presented to them by the richness of the vernacular tongue. Likewise composers drew from the fountain of popular songs, and in stage plays an original force also revealed itself. In spite of all this, the Russians before the World War were not yet a full nation. The thoroughly nationalized upper class, which swept along public opinion in the spirit of impassioned, nationally oriented policies, was barely large enough to fill the higher and lower positions of leadership in the government and the army. Taking everything into close consideration we must say that the World War, for Russia a war with ambitious imperialistic objectives, was neither a dynastic nor a national, but a thoroughly nationalistic war, governed by the nationalism of Russian society but without the mass of the people having their heart in it. It is true that its announcement in the big cities was greeted by the masses with tempestuous eruptions of enthusiasm, and the millions of inducted soldiers submitted willingly to the Tzar's orders, but all the same, the pervasive

national conviction needed to bring the war to a successful end was lacking. The active officer corps was the clamp holding the army together, and as soon as this corps was used up in the battlefield the army couldn't help falling apart, for the rank and file of the soldiers were not tied to the flag by a national incentive, and for them the war with its immense demands was therefore a senseless sacrifice. Those troops which remained together fell into the hands of the Bolshevik leaders and became the weapon with which to demolish the Tzarist state. While this happened under the slogan of peace, peace was not yet granted to the Russian populace. The new rulers first had to ward off the counter-revolutions of the Tzarist generals, and then they themselves took the offensive in order to restore the realm in its old dimensions and, if possible, to initiate worldwide communist rule. Though successful in defense, they were still too weak for attack, and consequently they have since then kept the peace. For how long? It isn't so easy to unravel the mystery of the Russian sphinx. The one and only certain thing is that Russia's collected strength is too immense and too much still in a state of ferment to restrain its expansionary drive in the long run. Since the Bolshevik experiment augments the internal unrest the expansionary impulse must also be heightened, and perhaps it will — unless the new system breaks down before — erupt in a Bolshevik imperialism, which moreover knows how to take advantage of the nationalist traditions.

The English are the born imperialists. The British Isles allured the seafaring Vikings, and the vitality of the Angles and the Saxons, of the Danes and the Normans, added up to an unprecedented stock of ethnic vigor. In its insular isolation this pent-up energy was organized in a relatively short time so as to generate firm political and then also national unity. The English learned comparatively early to relinquish futile plans of dominion on the Continent, and even the continental possessions of their Hanoverian kings did not tempt them to expand these holdings. They deemed their grand continental policies necessary in order to squelch the rise of a dominant European power which might have posed a threat for them. Since their main objectives lay outside of Europe, the European wars were seen as serving the useful purpose of hitting those powers who stood in their way overseas. Whereas their continental allies and adversaries became entangled in exhausting wars over a few miles which changed hands, they were interested in the boundless overseas territories for whose acquisition in the accompanying colonial wars they created the prerequisite through their destruction of the rival fleets. The overflowing vitality at home supplied them with everything needed for the expansion of their world dominance: the mariner, the shipowner, the shipbuilder, any kind of entrepreneur needed at home or abroad, the officer, the civil servant and the colonist, the merchandise for export, and the capital. The English entrepreneurial spirit even created from private means the trading company which subjugated and governed spacious India until the government took the country over from it. The state never was slow in contributing its share in military and political services, the English proconsuls having the strong hand, the enlightened eye, and the calm wisdom demanded by the empire. English imperialism favored national freedom at home, it allowed free play to the nations on the Continent as long as they minded its circles, and vis-a-vis the half-civilized and uncivilized peoples it behaved as a conqueror and with the

imperialistic ways of the master. A full nation state at home, England abroad became a national ruling state governing hundreds of millions of foreign subjects who were denied national self-determination. It was claimed that this was done for the welfare of the subjected peoples who didn't have the strength for self-determination and for whom English rule was said to mean liberation from rules by brute force to which they had been subjected before and would have remained so if they had been allowed to continue. However that may be, it must be admitted that in the case of these peoples it was not possible for the national idea to become violated by English or by any other European rule, for none of these peoples had matured to the status of a nation. It is no hypocritical double game for England to have national self-determination at home and to be the commanding master abroad. Its status as a national dominion state is the logical manifestation of the distribution of power over the world. This state is not nationalistic in the bad sense, for English imperialism so far has not suppressed national strength — perhaps the time will come, perhaps it is not even very distant, when the balance of power shifts.

French imperialism is lacking the ethnic background which English variety; France doesn't produce a population surplus for the task of colonization. Its imperialism is militarily structured and still has its ultimate goals in nearby Europe, goals which can be implemented only by military power.

German imperialism has bloomed late but has developed all the more rapidly because the young German Empire was endowed with not a few of the prerequisites which have qualified England for world rule, although it has lacked, to its great disadvantage, the latter's world experience. The rapid rise of German competition in the world markets was observed by the old imperialistic powers with, understandably enough, anxious jealousy. Whether German imperialism was more power-mad than the English, French, and Russian varieties is a question which need not occupy our attention at this point. The dictated peace lopped the drive of German imperialism insofar as the victors' knife was able to get at it. Might it not be capable of renewed growth from its root suckers?

The United States of America are still too absorbed by their own domestic affairs to be able to spare the requisite numbers of people for the task of imperialism, but they already do have available the capital needed to gain economic world domination. Their leading bankers have already begun to control the European states and economies in the capitalist sense.

The Japanese have their imperialist sphere of interest in East Asia, and perhaps they are called upon to rally Asiatic strength against Europe.

The national imperialism of the present time must not be measured by the standard applicable to the personal imperialism of one of the old world conquerors. What comes closest to it in ancient history is Roman imperialism, which was grounded in the nature of the Roman people just as the modern variety is grounded in the nature of the modern nations. This is why the imperialism of a Caesar was incomparably more effective than that of an Alexander or Tamerlane, its accomplishments thus being able to

continue after Caesar himself had been killed by the daggers of the conspirators. Because modern imperialism, unlike the Roman kind, is not merely supported by a master race which must wear itself out but by full nations which renew themselves from within, it must be still considerably more productive and enduring. But will not the foreign peoples, which European imperialism now holds in subjection, gain strength from European culture for counterthrusts endangering, through the sheer number of unhappy people, its continued existence? And will not European imperialism have to exhaust itself internally because it is supported by a series of nations side by side? The World War was the first great collision of the imperialistic powers which forced almost all other peoples, inasmuch as they did not offer help of their own accord, into their service. Will not further and more disastrous collisions have to follow?

Nationalism and imperialism are a natural result of the youthful ecstasy of the national movement which, like every strong power movement, follows an inner law of striving for its highest potential. To be able to control the huge energies emanating from the millions in the nationally excited multitude requires the severest kind of historical training in the school of life. For the time being even the developed nations for the most part have not yet attained full maturity in the use of their organs of liberty. The cycle of development within the people and the state in its irresistible rise toward freedom has for the most part managed to weaken or dissolve historical leaderships without substituting for them equally strong free and constitutional leaderships. For this reason there is almost everywhere a lack of safe leadership capable of protecting the ship of state from threatening collision and of guiding it back to the calm harbor after the shocks which the latter had to cause.

A. The Modern Organs of Freedom

1. About Individualistic and Organic Sociology

The modern freedom movement has a dual objective: it demands self-determination for the people and for the individual. The two demands are most intimately connected, and for both the same arguments are offered. What force should better know its objectives and its resources than the force dwelling within the people and within the individual? Which should be capable of generating greater energy than the one motivated by its own welfare here of the people, there of the individual? And under what circumstances should the innate energy of a people and of the individual be able to unfold more fully than when it is free from all the constraints of alien force? The individualistic school in economics went on to add to these simple ideas certain observations which give it its special scientific charm and worth, notwithstanding the notable mistakes which were committed in the very process. These observations provide deep insight into the nexi of economic society and thus at the same time into the societal interplay of forces altogether. Classical economics attempts to demonstrate that egotism does not separate economizing individuals but rather keeps them together, because everybody is so mingled with the collective that his egotism will drive him to spend his energies in such a way as to produce socially optimal results. Under any but the most primitive conditions everybody fares best if, instead of producing for himself in solitary manner, he participates in the division of labor of an exchange community. Since in such a community under appropriate conditions the total product will be much larger than could be the sum of the products of all individuals producing in economic isolation, the share to be allocated to an individual member must be much greater than could be his output when produced in isolation. The consequence is that egotism is socially deflected, with every producer laboring to meet a foreign demand and to obtain a revenue in the market which he then converts into the goods demanded by himself. But under the pressure of free competition all producers are compelled to raise their productive contribution to a maximum while having to content themselves with minimum profits. Thus under a regime of economic freedom all members of society are under such pressure to serve society as a whole that they cannot help contributing to its economic optimum. Shouldn't these observations concerning the teachings of economic freedom also be applicable to social freedom in general? Isn't it true that, like the economic forces, all other social forces as well are called upon to perform optimally if they are exposed to the struggle for existence and if the general public is permitted to decide upon whom to bestow the prize of victory? If that is so, there would be left for the state to do only that which cannot be accomplished by spontaneous cooperation among the citizens yet calls for the concentrated application of the united strength. But will not liberty perform its social function in public affairs as well? Will in the free state with universal suffrage elections not have to raise to the status of representatives and agents of the people those whom the majority

deems to be the best from among the populace? Aren't the representatives and agents of the people, realizing their dependence on the voters' favor, called upon to apply their best efforts to the general interest? And thus, like economic supply, haven't the political representatives also been harnessed for service to the masses? In this manner of thinking, according to the teachings of individualism, the economic optimum of liberty is joined by the political-social optimum as well.

As for the generations preceding the period of Enlightenment and of the Revolutions, the generations during the period of princely supremacy, the teachings of individual freedom would in vain have hoped for the applause by the masses, who were under the spell of princely and ecclesiastical authority. Science cannot dictate to life the moving ideas any more than it can dictate to nature the moving forces; it must draw out these ideas and forces through observation. But whereas observation of nature is ever confronted with the same interplay of forces and can identify a certain development only in retrospect, social observation in the case of all vigorous peoples finds itself directly confronted with the development which is kept in suspense by the law of the circulation of power. From one period to the next the social tasks to be performed change in distinct steps, and scientific explanation therefore has to identify from period to period a change in the moving ideas. Is it then surprising that social science is not able to perform its explanatory task with the lofty absence of bias of the natural scientist? Could it measure up to its task if it were completely detached from the new ideas which it has to proclaim? The social thinker would not have for the unfinished new things the keen eyes which he needs unless he were able with his inner eyes to share in experiencing these things. The great social thinker will always have something of the prophet in him in that, ahead of the others, he sees the dawn of a future whose arrival he will try to accelerate and whose splendor he will strive to augment.

Thus the scientific evangelists of social freedom have typically led the way. They didn't have to invent the idea of freedom; they discovered it in life when it was in the process of emerging, and in anticipatory fashion they then developed it to its finished state. During the period of Enlightenment and of the Revolutions scientific and economic tasks encountered new conditions; there were new great thoughts to be conceived and carried out which could not be conceived nor carried out in the absence of freedom. "Let do, let pass" was the slogan of the day, coined by one of the active entrepreneurs of the time. The idea of freedom hardly required proof as far as the aroused public opinion was concerned, the latter accepting it almost like an axiom. But then one had to cope with the resistance of the old powers and had to demolish the barrier of ideas which the latter had erected around them for their defense. The doctrine eagerly participated in the assault against the bastions of the old powers and discharged the critical portion of its task with flying colors' the refutation of the mercantile system by Adam Smith is a scientific feat of the first order. In its constructive task the doctrine didn't proceed with equal care. Here it could lighten its task, here it had its adherents as readers and listeners, and its teachings given the favor which liberty enjoyed in society — could be sure of the approval of the leading minds as well as of the masses. It was reserved for the

critics of the loxrowing social stage only to show up the defects which adhered to the doctrine of liberty.

At first it was largely proved true by success. The new territory which society entered into after the protective guild and intellectual barriers had fallen opened up in such vast dimensions as to exceed the boldest expectations, and not only overseas but in old Europe as well a new world opened. Even today its potential is still far from having been exhausted, although the present already encounters fairly substantial obstacles and advances at a more leisurely pace. What's visible of the new territory has already been occupied, by and large, and its more intensive use cannot succeed as rapidly as did the taking possession of it. By and by, accumulated experience has shown that "let do, let pass" is not enough in itself. The violence of the first eruption of freedom for the masses was already frightening. Later evidence suggested that the new territory did not remain free territory, but that, as in the preceding period of despotic rule, oppressive forces were gaining strength which gave to the few control over the many. Where democracies gained a foothold it was shown that not a few of these, in pitiable weakness, brought to naught the aspirations for freedom. Now freedom was seen in its true guise, and it was realized that the idealizing assumption on which the doctrine had based the system of freedom was not quite corroborated by the world of reality. One began to doubt and to criticize, and before one realized it the slogan of freedom was dropped by the extremist factions to the right and to the left, and dictatorship was proclaimed.

The first point of attack of the critics was the "individualism" of the doctrine of liberty, or as one put it more strongly still its "atomism." It was said to have only the single individual in its purview and thus not to give society its due, an accusation which, although made from so many quarters, certainly is not justified in such broad sweep. The doctrine of freedom also wants to give the state its due, it demands observance of the bounds set by law and morality. It is only within these bounds that it accords freedom of movement to the individual, although in doing so it believes to be able to show that the excesses of individual egotism as a rule are cut short by universal competition. It could be accused of having set the bounds of individual freedom of movement too generously, and if one examines closely the experiences made in those instances where the doctrine became pervasive in legislation and administration, one finds indeed that in these instances it has done great harm. But the ultimate reason for having failed to set the bounds correctly is not that one attempted to tear the individual loose from his social setting. Instead, it lies in the fact that one wasn't quite able to formulate the kind of relationship between individual and society which one demanded, simply because one still fell short of having a full-fledged sociology. The doctrine of individualism in its comments about the division of labor, team work and competition contributed many suggestive building blocks to the science of sociology, but how much more was still missing to complete the structure! Incidentally, the critics of individualism were not much more successful in this than were its exponents themselves, nay, if one considers everything carefully, one must say that they were even a great deal less successful. What was gained by pitting against the individualistic view of society the "organic" one? What insight is gained concerning the bounds

of freedom and constraint by viewing society as an organism which links individuals together like the limbs of the body? As was already shown in an earlier context, the organism lacks precisely that feature which matters most for an understanding of society: in society, the members enjoy a certain sphere of independence, whereas in an organism there is no independence of the parts whatsoever. The doctrine of freedom set too far out the bounds for the sphere of individual freedom of movement and thereby undoubtedly committed a blunder; organic sociology commits a graver blunder by neglecting this sphere altogether. If the notion of an organism were really an appropriate one, the members of society would be entirely deprived of freedom of movement.

The strongest statement made so far by critics of the doctrine of liberty is that it confounds the right to freedom with the fact of freedom. The weak members of society do not become actually free merely by being declared free in a legal sense. On the contrary, being declared legally free redounds to their harm if such declaration removes the barriers which so far had prevented the strong from abusing their strength to the detriment of the weak. During the period of liberal economic legislation countless experiences were collected about this: the weak among the debtors were turned over to usurious creditors, the weak among the proletariat were at the mercy of exploitative manufacturers, the weak among the savers fell prey to the schemes of promoters. The motherland of economic liberalism, England, was the first country which resolved to pass protective factory legislation, which was a great blessing, was generally imitated, and in the course of time was increasingly perfected. Certainly, much remains to be done yet in order to protect the masses from exploitation by the "strong" and to demolish the castles of the robber barons who on the public highways of commerce subject the passing multitude to their tolls. The modern robber baron does not openly flaunt his weapons, rather he uses various forms of disguise and knows how to protect his position by appeals to the name of freedom, with the submissive public standing in awe of this great word. One must not deny that at this point sociology hasn't quite met its scientific task yet. Certainly, there is no lack of courageous and eloquent critics of this pseudo freedom, but all the same there also still are the defenders and eulogists who allow themselves to be beguiled by outward appearances. One knows very well that the weak person must not determine the level of social aspirations and that society needs the strong person, but one does not know where between the two demands, to protect the weak and to allow room to the strong, to draw the mental line of demarcation.

In order to strike the happy medium between freedom and constraint one would need, of course, a well developed sociology) which neither the doctrine of individual freedom nor the organic theory quite offers. Nor does the widely held formula suffice which says that full freedom works only for a truly mature society, just as it is not suitable for every child but only for the matured man. This is an unassailable truth which, however, cannot offer the desired enlightenment as long as it is not known how to interpret social maturity. Neither the individualistic nor the organic doctrine tells us anything about what it means to be mature for social action, as neither of the two theories, of course, tells us anything about whereof the peculiar nature of social action consists. No engineer will want to make a judgment

understands how it runs. May the social thinker proceed differently, may he make a decision about the proportion of freedom and constraint before he is clear about how social action really takes place?

The theory of mass psychology was a great step forward in the understanding of social action because it showed us that action in the mass comes to pass differently from personal action. It is not a foregone conclusion that a multitude of intelligent men will act intelligently en masse, and Le Bon even thinks that it will not act intelligently. The theory of mass psychology, however, as we have explained elsewhere, by no means exhausts the topic of social action. It has enormously much to tell about the action of a leaderless or weakly led multitude, presenting many fertile ideas, but it precisely leaves that case out of consideration which is, of course, the normal one, namely, action on the part of a firmly led multitude. The ingenious men who present the theory of mass psychology have fixed their attention almost exclusively on the phenomena of the turbulent and pathological life of the masses which afflicts modern society, and they have observed its symptoms with the unfailing eye of the physician. But if the doctor is to be serviceable at the sick bed, doesn't he first have to be informed about the healthy body?

When at the beginning of this book we examined the basic form of social action, we assumed a healthy development, and the reader will remember that we believed to have identified as the basic form of social action the walking ahead of the leader and the following by the masses. By showing how the accumulation of power is based on successful social action, we were able to explain social action as determined by power, and in the process we incidentally traced even the so-called purely personal action to the participation of influences of power. We now have to undertake the decisive test of the correctness and accuracy of that description of ours by examining whether it can provide us with the suitable standard for the relationship between freedom and constraint in society.

2. Despotic and Free Leadership, Constrained and Free Following

By the success of his taking the lead, the leader gains power over the masses, and this power of his increases further if his success holds and if after the first understanding followers he is also able to win over the masses. Inevitable though it is that in successful social action the masses cling to the leader, this in itself does not necessitate by any means the unfree submission of the masses to the leader. Only in the case of despotic leadership are the masses deprived of their freedom, only here are they constrained to follow a leader who is master in his own right. But at all times, even those of most cruel harshness, there have been numerous cases of spontaneous following, and even in the cases of constrained following at the completion of the historical circulation of power the masses win their freedom by virtue of the fact that the selection and control of the leader upon them. The proud Roman populace was strong by yielding to the leader in free following, and every great people must do the same at all times. In the course of our discussion we so often had to touch on these matters that now it only

remains for us to summarize the upshot in a few words. Social achievements may be separated into special and collective undertakings. In the case of collective undertakings the general effect is at stake, and thus the constrained following by the masses is called for. In the case of special undertakings — to which the doctrine of individualism applies — success fundamentally concerns the acting individual alone, while there is no compelling interest on the part of the collective in the individual's undertaking the action and winning success. Nevertheless, even special undertakings are not purely a private matter, for outside the social context they either cannot be carried out at all or else can be accomplished only with negligible success. Since the beginnings of more substantial development they have, therefore, always been performed within the wider social groups and in cooperation with others. One wants to go with the others and seeks the leader, at least in order to have a standard worthy of imitation. Thus one is also under the influence of social powers, although the latter do not operate as external constraining powers of strict order and harsh sanction but exert only moral influence and leave free choice to the will, though, on the other hand, they can't be escaped easily. The multitude follows the general road fairly closely, and only the strong individual finds somewhat freer scope for very personal decisions. For all that, one still finds everywhere special undertakings wherever the decision to follow is up to the individual, for here society offers to the individual in the first place opportunities for successful action, and which of these are to materialize depends on his decision to follow. For the conceptual distinction between collective and special undertakings we must therefore in the final analysis depend on the fact that for the former following is constrained whereas for the latter it is free.

Even the doings of school children who have not yet matured to a will of their own are special undertakings although they occur in a common room, at a common hour, under the guidance and discipline of a common teacher in accordance with a general plan and — not to be forgotten — under the social force of competition and of comradely feelings. They are special undertakings because their success, after all, concerns each particular child for himself and because they ultimately depend to a crucial extent on his effort toward following. For comparison one only needs to realize with what means of extreme constraint military training operates, which for the sake of the necessary joint effect keeps every individual soldier in rank and file. Economic achievements are almost entirely the result of special undertakings, although they are accomplished through very strong social interaction, such as through imitation, rivalry, exchange and other transactions, trade and other associations, unions sticking together, as well as other social concatenations, and finally also the legal and ethical commands and prohibitions. They are special undertakings because their success still concerns the particular acting individual by himself and because success ultimately depends to a crucial extent on his effort toward following. They are all the more special undertakings where the individual rises to the independence of the anonymous or the publicly prominent leader and gives the masses a model to follow. Once religious tolerance has made its way, even the religious behavior, though subject to ever so strong social forces, is a special undertaking because it is accomplished by spontaneous following. It is a private matter, to use this term,

although this completely dissimulates the participating social forces.

Free leadership corresponds to free following. Although the leader of special undertakings may possess a maximum of personal authority, as does the teacher in school or the soul leader in life, his leadership is nevertheless mere leadership through success, not leadership in his own right, and if he is the true soul leader, he wouldn't have it any other way than doing without the following of those who are not attached to him from an innermost desire. The most common form of leadership in special undertakings is anonymous leadership by individuals who completely de-emphasize their personalities in society at large and whose achievements are finally compressed to anonymous powers which apparently are without subject, having their principal manifestation in the fact that the masses gradually become trained for nearly automatic compliance, which can hardly be viewed as following any more.

As already mentioned, all collective undertakings demand constrained following because otherwise the general effect could not be achieved. To be sure, one must not overlook that the following by the human will is in the most rigorous sense never constrained. Whatever may be the facts of the case concerning free will, man does not bow to the most oppressive kind of coercion with the mechanical precision of a machine, and when he obeys an order there is still room left for a personal touch, on which it depends with what effect the order is carried out.

As far as leadership is concerned, during the time when the masses still oppose collective undertakings, despotic leadership is called for. As the masses little by little turn to collective undertakings, despotic leadership in the course of change of historical circulation is gradually being replaced by cooperative-liberal leadership, where the masses select the leader or take a decisive part in his selection and, in addition, control his activities.

It is of particular importance to recognize that at the height of despotic leadership the leading stratum has control over the masses not only in respect of those tasks which in the nature of things are collective undertakings, but that it also forces its way into the sphere of special enterprises, divesting them of their self-determination in order to appropriate to itself, more or less, their success. It subjugates the worker as such, or at least it appropriates his means of production under any legal pretext or with actual power in order to enrich itself by the fruits of his labor. The freedom movement therefore had to have twin objectives: in the sphere of special undertakings it had to bring out the free following, to which end it had, above all, to guarantee personal freedom; and in the sphere of collective enterprises it had to bring out the free leadership.

To achieve this twofold goal required stern historical education. Historically, the masses through coercion had to be trained for participation in social collective undertakings which from the start were alien to them. They had to learn to commit themselves to following if they were to get rid of despotic coercion. Besides, in their special undertakings they had to be trained for active following, thus bringing forth from within the

forces supporting resistance against the abuses of despotic leadership and needed to gain through fighting liberal leadership. The despotic leader through historical education had to be transformed into a liberal leader, and as such he had to comprehend all true social objectives, dropping all those which would only serve his lust for power, his ambition, or perhaps even his decadent pleasure seeking. He had to learn to let all social forces operate as means to the end, not only those which he can high-handedly control. The liberal leader is able to perform the social leadership function in the highest sense; he does not compromise himself by renouncing his own despotic rights. Who is to judge the great soul leader? He is accountable to himself for where he draws the boundaries of human affairs, and in doing so, without being appointed or restricted, he always still remains a liberal leader because he positively aims at free following. In performing tasks involving external power it is particularly difficult to resist the temptations of power greed in its thousand manifestations and to assign to oneself the barriers not be surmounted. Napoleon didn't manage it; Alexander even vis-a-vis his friends allowed himself to be driven to criminal insolence; perhaps Julius Caesar came closer to observing the command of self-limitation than did any of the world's too powerful. Presumably the masses must have matured to a strong love of liberty to be able to counterbalance the will to power which the leading superman brings with him. Where leader and masses thus meet at high levels of strength, the highest leadership accomplishments and the highest accomplishments of the masses occur simultaneously, as can be seen, for example, in the history of Athens under Pericles.

It is erroneous to believe that the unbridled will to power exhausts the highest potentials of a personage; what makes more happy than it is the will to strength, which discards the all-too-human accompaniments of lust for power and ambition and is completely satisfied with letting flow into the channels of social success the energy which raises the personality to the highest pitch. He who abandons himself completely to the self-will of strength, which obeys its own inner law, enjoys the fullest personal happiness if it is given to him to find social approval as well for his accomplishments.

The modern heralds of freedom have committed the grave error of not recognizing that man is in need of the harsh school of history if he is to mature to freedom and that the rod of force could not be absent in historical education. They regarded the strength to freedom as the natural state of man and force as an evil historical spectre, which they believed to be able to banish merely by proclaiming the law of freedom. But their call to freedom had a definitive effect only where the leaders had gained the inner freedom necessary to lead the way without succumbing to the temptations of power and where the masses had gained the inner freedom to follow actively and with a searching mind. Only where historical education had called forth this strength for freedom was it possible to declare the right of freedom with full effectiveness, for in those cases external freedom was the self-evident expression of internal freedom. Where leaders and masses were only on the way to acquiring this strength, and especially where the process of educating the long oppressed lower strata of the population had just been completed, or even had to be started yet, it couldn't be helped that the success of external

liberation fell short of expectations and that the battle rang back and forth with a view to determining the measure of freedom which actual conditions justified. Especially where the declaration of freedom was prompted more by the example given by the advanced nations than by one's own strength, its hasty proclamation had to run into flat contradiction by facts, and despotic leadership in some form or other had to be reconstituted in order to complete the historical education of the peoples capable development and in the case of other peoples in order to establish permanently the legal system demanded by the circumstances.

At the present time economic undertakings have confronted leaders as well as masses with enlarged tasks which both catapulted a new ruling stratum into prominence and augmented the power and resistance of the masses. This explains the exacerbation of social conflicts which may be observed everywhere with cultured peoples. The historical education to internal freedom, which respect to the political tasks already appeared to have been almost completed, had to be started anew for the economic task; for the relevant things which had been learned here for the crafts and peasant ownership turned out to be insufficient for the huge dimensions of large-scale enterprises. Subsequently the political power relations also shifted on account of the rise of the big capitalists and of the worker proletariat, and consequently political education also had to be started anew. When the heralds of freedom devised their doctrines during the 18th century, they were not yet confronted with these conditions of bigness, and their designs of the law of freedom, which already were not enough for their time, had to fail completely in the social environment of new, colossal dimensions. In practice, the self-will of strength and the still more passionate will to power learned very quickly how to adapt to the new circumstances, and on the part of the leaders as well as the masses organs of freedom were shaped in battle in order to take advantage of the many opportunities and to counter the increased opposition offered on the other side. Theory so far has hardly done justice to the many formations. Socialist doctrine exaggerates the outrages of the despotic configurations, while the bourgeois doctrine exaggerates the danger posed by the masses, and both doctrines in their presentations use the term freedom, still working its magic, in too superficial sense.

We will now try to describe and evaluate the organs of freedom which have been developed, or are about to be developed, in modern mass life. In doing so it will be found that we will be able to give the idea of social maturity a more definite content than we have been able to do so far. Given the dimensions of modern life, leaders and masses achieve maturity for freedom only when they possess these specific organs of freedom. Each part develops them for itself as organs of its own power. The part which develops them ahead of the other poses for it the threat of superiority, but social health demands an equilibrium of these reciprocal developments.

3. The Free Leadership Organs and the Free Mass Organs

When the princes were about to make permanent the absolute rule which they had won they trained the army and the civil servant class to become reliable leadership organs of dominance. A

long as it was necessary to conscript vassals to conduct wars the prince was dependent on the great vassals. Whereas in the case of enlisted troops the condottiere could become a threat to him, in that of the standing army the soldiers were tied by compulsory military service, and the prince made sure to have the officers as his partisans by selecting them from among the circles with greatest loyalty to the state, their class interest coinciding with his power interest. As long as the patrimonial system was in force, the prince in matters of jurisdiction and administration had to give a say to the landowners and city governments, but the bureaucrats appointed by him had to obey his directives, and, as was true for the officer class, their class interest coincided with his power interest. The Protestant churches had in the prince their sovereign, and with the Catholic church he was eventually able to make an arrangement which safeguarded their mutual interests. What other social organizations may have made themselves felt were — all the way to the trading companies — subjected to state supervision. No liberal leadership organs or organs of mass resistance were tolerated which might be able to oppose the leadership organs of the state and be detrimental to their effectiveness.

The protagonists of the doctrine of freedom did not pay any particular attention to the phenomenon of leadership organs. They took it for granted that the army and the civil servants became organs of the free people's state. Religion was to be a private matter, and any other organization which might develop out of social interaction should be given free rein to the extent that they didn't obviously pose a threat to law and morality. It appeared to the doctrinaires to be a quite simple matter that where the prince was retained supreme organs of freedom would be placed by his side which would restrict his sovereignty, and that where he was removed supreme organs of freedom would be instituted which would exercise sovereignty in his place. By the way, as soon as these ideas were translated into practice there were ample opportunities to find out that there was an infinite number of possible solutions, in respect to which there was an endless tug-of-war between the parties and concerning which the political scientists of all countries in countless writings have not yet been able to arrive at a consensus. This did not prevent that in the end the doctrinaire democratic formula of universal suffrage took effect almost everywhere. That there was a need to cope with still other organs of freedom than those provided for in the constitution got scholarly notice only after the freedom organ of capital in daily life had developed into an oppressive organ of power against the mass of wage workers, whereupon the socialists, in typically doctrinaire extravagance, responded to the idealizing optimism of the doctrine of freedom with their idealizing pessimism and demanded the nationalization of capital along with all gainful productive activities, a demand made in the name of freedom of the masses, a demand which vastly surpasses the state absolutism of the princes. As is true for capital, those organs of freedom which had contributed most to the victory over the old dominating powers, namely, the party leaders and the press, in a great number of cases could not resist the temptation to administer in their own interest the power they had won, and they turned from leadership organs of freedom to leadership organs of self-aggrandizement. The masses on their part have used the new freedom for the purpose of creating organs of resistance and of

power struggle, the most obvious example of which are the labor unions.

It is not possible to obtain clarity of thinking about the social conditions of our time if one neglects to address oneself to these modern leadership organs and mass organs which have been a result of the freedom movement. In daily life they are the object of zealous endeavors and frequent discussion, and most of them have been frequently dealt with in scientific writings as well. But what is still missing is a general treatment examining their common features. We wish to start with this general view before turning to the particular forms. However, we had better also present this general view by focusing on a particular form which allows us to identify the common feature with special clarity. We refer to the capitalistic leadership organ, the business enterprise. However, at first we do not want to present its relationship to the labor union as a mass organ, but its simpler relationship to the mass of consumers. The economy being that segment of social action in which the variables can be most clearly measured and the forms are most distinctly manifested, sociology gathered its first fairly distinct theoretical insights from economics, and it therefore appears to be best to initiate the study of the freedom organs and mass organs by focusing on their economic configurations. In order to set forth the peculiar conditions of the present time as intelligibly as possible, we will be well advised to develop the story by starting with the preceding conditions and from which the present conditions typically differ. We therefore begin our discussion with a brief formulation of things as they existed in the social beginnings.

Economic tasks are first performed as special undertakings in the narrow circle of the family. With the transition to hunting, cattle raising, and very primitive agriculture, these undertakings are performed within the larger context of the horde and the extended family. As soon as the social task of establishing states and cultures called upon the warriors and priests to assume authoritarian leadership, the latter seized the land and obtained control over the social strata cultivating it, and the emerging crafts are then also plied by the unfree largely on behalf of the rulers for the purpose of satisfying their increased demand. With the further expansion of production, special economic undertakings are shouldered by larger circles forming a community of exchange, but for a long time still these activities remain secondary social undertakings, not sufficient to bestow social power; it takes long for growing wealth to support power. Within the exchange community the producer, even after he has become personally free, is more dependent on the consumer than vice versa. The consumer gives the order to produce, he is the buyer whose needs the producer has to meet. Only as the industrial arts are advanced still further does the producer become more independent and self-assured. As a member of the guild he now guards his right to produce (or not produce). Nevertheless, for the time being he does not yet become superior to the purchaser, for the latter, too, in the majority of cases is a member of the self-confident bourgeoisie, if not perhaps of the very ruling class, and plies his demand with careful regard to his self-interest. With gradual change there comes then the time of full-fledged production, and from now on the manufacturing entrepreneur in his social position leaves behind the Multitude of his customers. In economic undertakings, which now

have become social undertakings of a higher order, he has risen to the rank of a leader who is able to acquire social power. Of course, he must always take demand into his calculus without which he couldn't sell, but he now does this by guiding it into certain channels and looking ahead producing for the market. Little by little demand adjusts to the conditions of production. The good produced in the light of overall economic conditions becomes a success in the market, and in the end demand is transformed into following. Since the individual entrepreneur has to deal with a large number of buyers, he is able to increase his income through large-volume sales, thereby rising above the social average. Even when entrepreneurs jostle each other in competition, they are nevertheless united by their common class interest and are able to influence legislation and administration to their own benefit.

This was the state of affairs for which the classical theory that free competition is optimal was devised and on the whole is also correct. Entrepreneurs, as leaders of social undertakings which have attained importance, have risen to the higher strata of income and social power, yet without having become predominant. The social service rendered by the successful enterprise at this juncture is great. It has become a highly developed social organ, that is to say an entity combining numerous human and material productive elements, fitted to the social body as a living force. It has become a leadership organ which must be kept alive by mass following, but correctly perceived is also geared to such mass following. For all that, it is a wholly free leadership organ, for the entrepreneur has no leadership prerogative whatsoever, he does not exercise it by sovereign right. His leadership is merely one based on success, his following is not constrained in any manner, it is now as before free to examine and to choose.

The classical economists themselves already recognized that this becomes a different matter where the entrepreneur, by whatever right or as a matter of fact, dominates production and sales as a monopolist. They viewed the monopoly case as a matter of minor importance, however, as with intelligent laws it would constitute an exception. Since the classical theory was written a strange shift has occurred here, caused by the fact that the production of goods has become large scale. Under such circumstances, the well-established firm has a decisive edge over the new one which still has to mature; it finds it easier to expand than does the new one to survive in the first place. To be sure, the progress of technology, markets, and capital is so immense during times of peace that new opportunities for creative work open up all the time, and therefore the number of firms continues to grow. Nevertheless, this does not cancel the advantage enjoyed by the old firm, for — barring some adverse condition — it enjoys this advantage also with respect to new opportunities. It is most pronounced for the giant enterprises, whose number and size continually increase in the large national economies, especially if they produce for the world market. Under these circumstances, capitalistic power finds more and more opportunities for the establishment of an actual monopoly. In the giant enterprise the traditional theory of the division of labor seems to be turned upside-down, although internally it is practiced in a most subtle manner. Externally, on the other hand, the giant enterprise absorbs whatever efficient enterprises

it can lay its hands on. In a vertical sense, as it is now customarily put it now prepares for integrating completely under its wings production in its established line from the raw material to the finished product, including its marketing stages. In the process it amasses so much income that it is eventually also able to expand horizontally. In addition, entrepreneurs have learned to overcome competition in its most variegated forms through freely organizing among themselves and thereby to secure a monopoly. The profits of cartels and trusts and similar devices are so large that entrepreneurs are able to defy government regulation and injunctions. Those of their combinations which have been declared legally void prove, as a matter of fact, to be the most effective of all economic links. With this state of affairs the firm has ceased being a free leadership organ. It has become an authoritarian leadership organ or, if one should hesitate to use this term, a high-handed leadership organ, confronted with a constrained following. Though the monopolistic firm cannot legally impose its will on the demand, as the latter can possibly deny its following, either entirely or in part, by abstention, in those cases where it concerns a necessity it is actually constrained to follow.

We will not further discuss at this time the mass organs through which consumers strive to free themselves from the pressure exerted by the leadership organs of the entrepreneurs. Later on we will encounter mass organs of fiercer resistance which will enable us to make more distinct the general character of the mass organs.

The classical economists paid even less attention than they did to the trend toward predominance inherent in the leadership organs to another damaging trend of modern life, one which neglects the fundamental requisites of economizing and squanders the energies of entrepreneurs as well as of society as a whole. The classical writers still had too few occasions to observe the derailments of speculation and especially the rushes of promotional fever which the rise of capitalism has brought in its wake. When existing firms make phenomenal profits and along with the availability of funds the opportunities for capital investment also rise, it happens that the entrepreneurial spirit, in addition to many well-considered investments of a permanent character, also builds into vacant space. Promoters who act in good faith but without experience and who make common cause with greedy adventurers present to the public schemes which may be characterized by the wildest and most daring extravagance, and in doing so they still draw large crowds whose greed for profits has been abetted. The firms which are founded have the accustomed form of free leadership organs, but they lack the necessary base of upright strength. A few unscrupulous but lucky speculators use them to feather their own nest, but the firms themselves, after a flurry of apparent prosperity, collapse and the multitude of participants only loses. Such cases present incontrovertible evidence for the fact that these circles have not yet matured to the use of economic freedom. Precisely the same process occurs, as we will see, with the promotion fever of political freedom. The copies of the forms of the existing successful democracies while the strength is still lacking for bringing to life the necessary leadership organs and mass organs of freedom. One hasn't matured even know merely of what their true life consists. Crenshulous enthusiasts without experience and bold adventurers

without conscience are always ready to accept leadership calls, and the masses run avidly after them. Confusion and impotence follow; over-zealous critics now teach the populace that "freedom doesn't have a leg to stand on," and what's left is open or concealed dictatorship.

The national movement since the 19th century has provided ample food for the promotion fever of political freedom. It provided an introduction to political life for a great many people who were completely lacking in historical education for active following and for control of the leaders. In the first flush of the national idea they followed to a man the successful national leaders. During this period the large dimensions of national life elevated the great leader, as the large dimensions of modern economic life had done on their part. In the political life of an immature nation, however, the effect could not be as sustained as in economic life with its immense energies. The political life of an immature nation lacks the supportive power of freedom. To organize the leaders and masses of a nation of millions for the full use of freedom will take, if the effort succeeds at all, its due time. In a nation which prematurely claims to have come of age, the free leadership organs and the mass organs will be equally weak.

B. The Political Parties and the Classes

1. Representation of the People and Personal Franchise

In the free cities of the Middle Ages the city representation was composed of men who in the guilds had been elected as their heads. The cities were the places of business for the crafts, and the crafts were organized in the guilds which consequently were the natural constituent bodies for the election of the city representatives. The city representation, being composed of the heads of the guilds, went by its name for good reason, for in it men were joined who superintended the industrial affairs of the city. It was the true mirror and epitome of the social structure of the urban population according to its distribution by classes and income levels.

The same is true for the representations which the labor force of a people selects from its trade-union associations. They are composed of the delegates elected by the shops and the trade and city federations, which are the naturally grown electoral bodies for union management. The so-constituted administration of unions is the faithful mirror and epitome of the labor force according to its distribution by classes and income levels.

Following the idea of the so-called guild constitution, the populace should be represented according to the same pattern. This representation should consist of delegates to be elected from the various associations into which the populace is grouped. If the populace were as thoroughly and uniformly organized in guilds as the population of a medieval town — consisting mostly of trades people — was organized in guilds, then the guild associations would be the natural electoral bodies for the representation of the people, and this representation, composed of its delegates, would be the faithful mirror and epitome of the social structure of the populace. But in the modern state the

population has too mixed a composition and is too unevenly organized to meet in fact the prerequisites of the guild constitution. A large portion of the guild associations would first have to be constructed artificially for election purposes, and one would be devoid of an unambiguous standard for what number of mandates should be allotted to the various electoral bodies according to their weight in the social balance of power. In the calls to the first parliamentary chamber the idea of the guild constitution was now and then heeded to a certain degree. Many a politician also has recommended it for the second chamber, doing so with a sure eye for the unpleasant consequences yielded by the customary system of electing the representatives of the people, but in practice it has not so far been used. Only in rare cases is the franchise exercised through self-contained electoral bodies. As a general rule, it is a purely personal right of the individual voter which he enjoys without having to join a certain electoral body.

The art of election geometry for the demarcation of election districts, the gradation of property qualifications, and the formation of voter classes and "curias of interest" have provided diverse possibilities for implementing the personal franchise in such a way as to bring out in the process the existing power structure of the populace and permit the small number of people on top to assert themselves against the large number of state citizens. Before passage of the Reform Bill, the great landowners in England controlled in the election districts dependent on them, the rotten boroughs, such a large number of mandates that they were assured of a majority in the House of Commons. As long as the landed proprietors in England enjoyed superior social recognition this election system, however arbitrary and senseless it might appear to the observer, was an apt reflection of the power structure of the populace. At one time the situation was similar to the Prussian class franchise and the Austrian system of "curias of interest." The rise of the masses and the democratic movement have done away with all systems of privileged franchise which were intended to support the rule of the few over the many. If now the representation of the people is to bring out the true will of the people, is it not necessary then that it be selected through free popular election, and how else could this be accomplished than by giving the franchise to all male and female citizens of age of which the people consists? And that, just as they are counted as equals in the populace, they are endowed with equal rights in the exercise of their personal franchise as well? In this manner the personal franchise in the democracies has been shaped into the system of universal and equal suffrage.

But does this also really fulfill the idea of representation of the people? Each of the candidates winning the election is the representative of a certain number of individual voters who have cast their vote for him; none, taken by himself, is the representative of the populace. But if this is true, is it then with reason that the sum of all delegates is designated as representation of the people? That in the personal interpretation of the franchise the idea of representation of the people can be lost is shown clearly in the case of representation of minorities. In a nationally mixed state with the personal franchise the national minority is very effective in those cases where the national groups live compactly next to each other, because here

the minority obtains the number of election districts and of mandates corresponding to its headcount. If it constitutes 30 percent of the population it will, given an equitable demarcation of election districts, have available 30 percent of these and hence 30 percent of the mandates. Things are different where the national minority lives dispersed over the entire state. Assuming that in each election district it accounts for 30 percent of the population, it will be outvoted everywhere if the national groups vote as a closed body, and it therefore will not obtain any mandate. It remains unrepresented in the body of people's representatives, and this body can therefore not be viewed as a true mirror and epitome of the population structure. The universal personal suffrage thus does not provide assurance that the multifarious minorities which are found in every population are represented in that body. If this is to be accomplished, it is necessary to combine the minorities into units which can bring their influence to bear at the polls. In this manner one has seen fit to remodel the personal franchise into the proportional franchise, in which case each sum of voters who form an election group with a common list will be accorded representation in proportion to the size of the group, provided that the group achieve a certain minimum number, the so-called election number.

As do the minorities, the voter majority in the case of the system of electing from a list must of course also organize into a unit. It must set up its own list and file it in good time so its votes can be counted. The outward appearance of voting was much changed by this innovation, and the old voters, being still accustomed to the earlier and simpler procedure, first had to get used to the new one. At bottom, though, only the form has been changed, the substance has remained the same. All along, without a legal requirement of this kind, the majority and the minority had to act as organized bodies at elections. The voter would not have accomplished anything if he had interpreted his personal franchise to call for in the absence of any connections with other voters — casting his vote for that candidate who was personally agreeable to him; always voters have participated in elections in the context of ~~political~~ parties. They never thought of their personal franchise in any other way, nor did the legislator in devising the election rules. For all arrangements made in connection with the personal franchise it was always implied that the political parties were its implementing agents. The franchise was formulated in the law as a personal right to choose, but its exercise was thought of in terms of a party matter. The political parties are the natural electoral bodies in which in modern society the franchise is practiced.

Public opinion regards election day as the day of judgment when the sovereign people raises its leaders or repudiates them. He who has gained insight into the course of social decision-making knows that this is erroneous. As the army requires leadership in order to preserve its strength for victory, so the populace requires leaders in order to preserve its strength as a sovereign. The masses as such, without leader, aren't the people at all. Precisely because election day is a decisive day, the people on this day can least afford to do without leadership. The sovereign people cannot go to the polls without leaders. The old leaders on this day do their utmost to stand their ground, and if they keep away from the election this always proves that they no longer have a chance to stay in office. Those groups of

the populace who are not satisfied with the old leaders must have placed themselves under new ones if they want to assert themselves at the election. Election day is a crucial day and, if you will, a day of judgment, but it is not designed to settle things between the people and its leaders but between the parties, which are the bearers of the franchise. The victorious party forces its leaders upon the people by simultaneously raising its masses to a position of power. In the case of the losing parties, both leaders and masses have been rejected.

Thus the body representing the people is primarily an expression of the power of the parties. Where this body faithfully reflects the distribution of power within the populace, the representation of the parties is at the same time also the true representation of the people.

2. State Constitution and Party Constitution

The old unfree state attempted with every means at its disposal to fend off the political parties which grew up within the populace, because it detected in them the future powers which were to bring it to an end. Even the free people's state will use its means of coercion to suppress the extreme parties which it deems to pose a threat to it. Only when a state believes itself to have become fully consolidated will it give free play to all parties inasmuch as they do not themselves resort to coercive means. The election law itself does not refer to the parties at all; it regulates the personal franchise, and for the rest merely provides for the election procedure. The provision that the legally required lists of candidates must be backed by a certain minimum number of voters is the only one which reveals that the voter does not exercise his franchise in a purely personal way. How in the world should the law be concerned with the parties? The state does not direct the parties and doesn't have to do so. On the contrary, they are destined to direct it, and conceptually they are prior to it. The political parties are free power organs of the people, they perform their functions without a need for recognition by the state, and their urge for freedom is so strong that the state wouldn't be able to direct them at all once they have come into their own. Where the state attempts to restrict them it ceases being a free people's state.

The essence of democracy is the surrendering of the state to the political parties. In the power state of old a certain privileged stratum held the political rights, being leader in its own right, while the masses had no political rights. The privileged class was concretely differentiated — the families, the persons were distinctly defined. Within the privileged group there might have been party factions between which fights could break out leading to shifts in power constellations, but on the whole the trend was toward stabilization of power relationships. Especially the intra-dynastic rivalries increasingly cooled off until at last the idea of legitimacy gained so much strength that the person of the monarch was unmistakably determined. In a democracy, on the other hand, the persons called to power are continuously selected anew by the election outcome, and in the process even the strata providing the government may change. Instead of elevating to power certain persons, as in the old dynastic state, the democratic constitution is limited to regulating the method

according to which the persons representing the people and the persons constituting the government are selected in each case. The man in the street sees in this and enjoys the triumph of freedom, and he expects that the never-ending selection process will draw out of the populace the most promising forces. An adherent of the old political order is terrified by the perception that those who enjoy power today must be prepared to be ousted by others who have come up from below, and he can't believe that a government can be strong which is not stable but must adapt to the sways which originate in the movements of public opinion.

With this kind of an arrangement it is clear that the party constitution is part and parcel of the state constitution. By virtue of assigning power to the victorious party, the democratic state constitution is a directive to the party constitution. The state constitution offers the formal legal rule according to which the leaders of the state are to be selected. The party constitution endows this rule with its personal content because it is a living constitution which has to do with definite leadership persons and with historically conditioned states of the masses. When within the victorious party the relationship between leader and masses is loose, the government of the state can't help being weak; where it is tightly regulated, the state government can be strong. The party constitution is unwritten for the most part. The state constitution is for the most part written out carefully, but since it is so only with respect to the forms, irrespective of its possible comprehensiveness it calls for supplementation — in the essential matter of the persons to be selected — by the party constitution, which fills in its abstract formula.

Most of those who want to be informed about the given situation of a state reach for the constitution. One must of course know it if one cares to know the state, without any doubts, but precisely the most important things cannot be gathered from it. The experienced politician chooses a different path. He informs himself about the leadership persons, about the circumstances of the parties fighting for power, and about their prospects for coming to power. If the reader of this book expects to be informed along this line he will find himself disappointed. The author has not made it his task to introduce the reader straightway into practical politics. He is satisfied if he succeeds in shedding light on the essential structural features of the modern party constitution and its main types. If he has accomplished this he hopes to have contributed thereby a thing or two to the understanding of the political situation of the present time. How to elaborate for the individual states the general features of the outlined picture must be left to those who know from a close view the specific circumstances pertaining to leaders and masses.

3- The Organization of Party Leadership

Nowhere are the political parties thoroughly organized all the way down to the broad masses. By no means are they, as is sometimes true for the labor unions, designed to firmly include within their ranks all those on whom they count as comrades. They are not closed associations of leaders and masses, but with

respect to the masses are open-ended. Organized as a unit are the leaders with their staffs for direction from the top and at the local levels. To these must be added the communal representative bodies dominated by the party or the church organizations allied with them, to which are joined, moreover, a certain number of right-hand men in the political clubs. By and by, every intelligently managed party as it grows up takes hold of still other social organizations to the extent it finds these to be somehow useful for politics. A country whose parties are well organized has in all matters relating to clubs, societies, and other fraternal units red, black, yellow, and white organizations. Also important are credit organizations, and the bourgeoisie enjoyed a great advantage as long as it was alone in having access to these. But even so a not inconsiderable number of voters remain unaccounted for. There are many faithful supporters who do not belong to an organization, and incidentally some of the existing organizations are partly too loose to be able to control the voters. Party leadership finds in the press the most effective means by which to govern the minds. The number of fixed subscribers and faithful readers of the party press is relatively best suited to permit some conclusion concerning the scope of the parties. Certainly there is always left a very great number of voters whose attitudes change and who make up their mind only on election day.

So considered, we perceive the party as a semi-organized association for which in the main only the leadership is firmly established. According to its form, the power organ of the party is a leadership organ of exactly the same design as is the business enterprise. Like the latter, it depends on being sustained by the following of the masses. As the business enterprise conducts its leadership activities in such a way as to assure itself of the following by the customers, so the leadership organ of the party strives to behave in such a way that the masses flock to it and that especially on the crucial day of the election the masses adhere to the directives given to them on how to cast their votes.

The great significance of such a leadership organ cannot be questioned. Those groups of voters who haven't yet been able to secure leaders are forlorn at the election. They will abstain, or they will vote as fellow-travelers of the parties which stand closest to them, but in the process they remain disappointed because they have to serve causes which are alien to them while having to abandon interests of their own. Those parties which were the first to be organized have derived a great advantage from this because they were able to push through their special concerns in the guise of demands of the public opinion and they were able to secure a historically not unimportant position of power. At the beginnings of liberalism such a favorable situation benefited the educated bourgeois class which, to its surprise, later couldn't help noticing that the masses, who at first had gone along with it, gradually defected as soon as they had found their own leaders, until at last the intellectuals were limited almost entirely to their own narrow circle.

In the light of the described set-up of the party as a leadership organ, it appears as if the leadership has to get the upper hand because it alone is well organized. But must it not be said on the other side that the masses have to get the upper

hand because the leaders always have to adjust their behavior to them? The answer to this question cannot be given in the abstract it may be so, and then again it may not. We have for now to content ourselves with having become aware of the two possibilities and will be able to draw further conclusions only after having more fully captured the elements of the real world.

4. The Composition of the Party Masses, and the Classes in Particular

Within the meaning of the materialistic conception of history the political parties are a superstructure erected over the economic structure of the populace. If the social democratic programs were correct, this structure would be quite simple: the proletarians are confronted by the entire rest of the population as a single reactionary mass. Society is simply divided into the two classes of the haves and the have-nots, or, to put it more pointedly the ruling class and the class of the exploited or disinherited. Karl Marx himself didn't let it go at this simple dichotomy. In his writings on contemporary history we find very instructive explanations about how the class of the haves is subdivided according to its economic interests into individual groups which find their voice in the political parties. The differences between the individual groups indeed cut very deep: the peasant takes a very hostile attitude to the landed proprietor, and so does the medium-size and the small tradesman against the industrialist. One must range the peasant and the tradesman among the middle classes between large property holders and proletariat. It hasn't yet been very long since the peasants themselves belonged to the dominated and often exploited class. The independent craftsmen have mostly lost their golden ground, and at the lower levels, unless they have already been pressed down into the proletariat, they manage to make ends meet only laboriously and with suffering. It is out of the question for them to share the role of capitalists, rather do they themselves feel threatened by the latter. The educated middle classes, too, by their interests and their social function are clearly separated from the big capitalists. They do not "rule," for they lack the power resources for doing so, and even less do they exploit. What imprint they have on society they do by serving as intellectual leaders. The various groups into which the propertied class is divided are so vividly conscious of their differences that, when they are by themselves, they are hardly conscious of their solidarity. Is there alive among the nobles, the captains of industry, and the large capitalists, or even the high clergy, a sentiment which would unite them socially not only with the civil servants, officers, artists, scholars, lawyers, and physicians, but also with the small pensioners, the guild masters, and with the large and small farmers? In their external life style as well these groups are distinctly apart, and even the overwhelming power of female beauty only rarely is strong enough to overcome through marital union the separation existing between them. Only when the members of the propertied class are face to face with the proletarians do they recognize that they belong together, after all. The social foundations of their earnings and of their personal life are mainly the same. They all regard the same economic constitution of private property and the same family constitution as sacrosanct, and they identify themselves by the same historical view as members of a people. Almost

anything they consider as venerable is sensed with doubt, indifference and in the worst case even with hate by the proletariat. The chasm becomes deepest where in the proletariat the family's community of living loses its true meaning because the wife and mother must spend her day in the factory and the children, who as soon as possible are placed in the kindergarten and as soon as they are through elementary school must go to work, do not come to know the delightful feeling of having a home of their own. The personal estrangement between the propertied classes and the proletariat is still considerably deeper than that between the propertied groups themselves. Only the lowest strata of the former mix somewhat with the highest strata of the latter, whereas members of the remaining strata of the propertied class will hardly ever enter into a marital union with members of the proletariat. That other link, too, is almost nonexistent through which the talented sons of the lower strata of the propertied rise so frequently to the higher ranks. The wall of material and spiritual distress which hems in the proletariat is so high that it can only quite rarely be scaled by people with some special drive, given especially propitious circumstances. Even the living quarters of the two classes are for the most part separated from each other. The educated man scarcely knows the working-class districts, he doesn't like to go there, he avoids them because their sight tugs at his nerves and his conscience. It accuses him of insincerity, which is bad enough when he thinks of himself as a citizen among other citizens, and which is still a lot worse when in church he mechanically repeats the formula of charity.

The division of the political-economic parties normally corresponds to this division of the economic masses. For the most part each of the important economic groups has organized itself as a separate political party. At the same time, in spite of all the frictions and disputes which range back and forth between the parties of the propertied class, these parties nevertheless make common cause where the great interests are at stake which bind them together mutually against the proletariat. Today, when these interests are so much a matter of dispute, no line of separation between the multiple parties in the body representing the people is so clearly marked as the one between the side of the parties of property and the proletarian side. There is no need for an explicit agreement between the parties of the propertied class in order for them to close ranks against the proletariat because they are held together by anonymous powers working tacitly, being alive in the consciousness of each individual. What else would make the propertied class a unit than does the operation of such anonymous powers? The propertied class of a people lacks any kind of overall organization. Although the organizations it relates to are individual groups, the class consciousness is strong enough to impel the haves to united action when it matters. Similarly with the proletarians: as a class they are better organized than the groups of the propertied class, but their organization is incomplete, too. To a large extent the multitude of the common laborers is not thoroughly organized, but even they, when it matters, are united by class consciousness. Things are different only in the countryside, where peasant ways are alive as they have always been.

It is not the economic division of society alone which gives the political parties their support in the masses. When it makes such a claim, the materialistic conception of history is in error. Although it is too one-sidedly oriented to the economic interest, it is still true that at the present time this interest has come to play a more important role for the structure of society and of the political parties than was previously the case. Today the political parties nowhere are wholly patterned after the economic groups and social strata. There are parties everywhere having a different foundation while they may nevertheless be very prominent. In states with ethnic mixtures the separation of the national parties may be the dominant feature of the representative body of the people and be decisive for the fate of the state. Moreover, in addition to the national parties there are parties of the church, or there are parties of expellees from another country, regional parties and dynastic parties, and other parties with historic roots which reflect economic groupings and social strata - thus the national, or ecclesiastical, or regional feeling, or a historical precedent, may be decisive.

At any rate, the division of the population which serves as a base for the formation of parties is so pronounced and firmly grounded that the masses have a strong inherent tendency to split up into parties. Many of the groups bring to the formation of a political party their own ready-made organization, as do, for example, the denominational groups who are united in fixed ecclesiastical bodies, with leaders of great authority whom the masses are very willing to follow. The proletariat, too, is ready for political organization, thanks to the experience gained in its trade-union organization. Still other groups can only learn from practical politics how to get organized, and for this reason their party structure will be considerably looser. This variety in the degree of organization still adds to the motley of the social bases of party matters. The relationship between leadership and masses will differ widely from case to case, and here, too, a great many possibilities are open.

5. The Political Parties as Historical Formations

Which of the many possibilities in the design of party organization, opened up by the differences in the leadership-mass relationship, will be realized will ultimately be decided by the degree of historical education of the people and its groups. Mature peoples and mature classes within a people have learned through historical experience to bring the party as an organ of power to its highest effectiveness. A lack of political maturity will somehow always be evidenced by the half-baked character of the party organization. In culture states, too, the peoples and their various strata have received their historical education under the most variegated conditions, and even if their endowments were the same, for this reason alone their party organization would have to show differences in maturity. A factor of special importance must be the length of time which was granted to a people and a class for its political education. Old democracies will have achieved greater maturity in their party matters than young ones, and within the old democracies, in turn, those classes initiated early into the political life will be more mature than those initiated late.

In England the top strata in terms of property ownership and education have had a much longer period of training in party matters than is true anywhere else in the world, but precisely in England the great mass of voters won universal suffrage later than was the case in many states of the Continent. After the revolutions in the 17th century England became conservative. In apportioning the franchise it rigidly clung to the traditional standards, which had been instituted so as to favor the ruling nobility. Before the Reform Bill of 1832 was passed only 3 percent of its population enjoyed the franchise. Yet the franchise was so unevenly distributed that command over a majority of mandates was reserved to a minority of voters, which accounted for scarcely a third of the total number. In the voting reform one let it go at increasing the number of voters from 3 to 4 percent and removing the crassest injustices in the distribution of mandates. It took quite some time before Disraeli ventured the bold step of raising the number of voters to 9 percent of the population. Later Gladstone increased the number to one-sixth of the population, or about one-third of the adults. It wasn't until 1917 that universal suffrage was adopted, and 6 million new voters were admitted. Their inferior political education was shown clearly by the small voter participation rate: in the 1918 elections only 64 percent of the eligible voters cast their vote, as compared to 92 percent in 1910. Lloyd George voiced the view that only with the 1917 law had England become a democracy, but in doing so he probably underestimated the historical power which the idea of freedom has had in England. England of 1917 vintage surely must not be figured in with the new democracies. Rather we must view it as an old democracy, because for a long time it had been in possession of healthy freedom organs and, by making wise use of them, had become politically mature. The great mass of voters newly enfranchised in 1917 found very effective help for their political activities in the fact that the older parties already existed into whose mold they could fit themselves or which they could use as a model to imitate. In addition, the proletariat in England had had long prior training through its trade-union organization, and it had its time-tested leaders as well as a highly developed mass discipline. Nevertheless the introduction of universal suffrage severely upset England's political balance. Although its after-effects will be felt for a long time, the supportive freedom powers in England are strong enough to withstand the abrupt jolt caused by the new mass of voters.

In the United States the colonists, already before they had gained their political independence by fighting, found in the large measure of their self-government the opportunity for political education. The opportunity, still missing, for finding the most suitable persons for the top leadership was given to them by the War for Independence, and those persons, in turn, had the opportunity of gaining authority over the masses. When, from the middle of the 19th century on, the European immigrants, most of whom were devoid of any political training, poured in ever more plentifully, the American parties had become strong enough to take them into their fold and train them. They stepped into the ready-made party systems to which they adapted themselves with the kind of fervor which had driven the immigrants into their new home country.

The French people during the great Revolution had to make the leap to freedom almost without any preparation of its masses and its leaders alike. If somebody who has had no practice in skiing attempted to make a long-distance jump without falling on landing, he would fail in such an adventure, and the French nation likewise couldn't manage a "standing jump" in the ecstasy of the Revolution. After all, it did — following the formula of direct democracy — call upon the sovereign people for the decision-making process! Wherever in one of the many thousand French communes the sovereign people, or the small minority passing itself off for it, was talking, it demanded to be heard, and it was always at the discretion of any crowd to break into the parliament and to influence its deliberations. One had to learn first how to abjure the formula of direct democracy. Also, when the shift was made to the formula of indirect democracy one had to learn first — and this is true not only for France but for all young democracies — that here, too, the mere formula was not enough and that one first had to acquire the ability to develop properly and to use the party as an organ of power.

C. The Political Parties in the Old and in the Young Democracies

1. The Special Interest Parties in the Constitutional System of Government

Two states may have the same constitutional form to the letter, and yet in reality one will have the parliamentary and the other the constitutional system of government. The decision rests only in the political maturity of the population, which expresses itself in the design of the political parties. Matured to the parliamentary system of government is only that people which musters state parties. People which muster only special interest parties must content themselves with the constitutional system.

The state parties are a political superstructure of such large design as to reach across the boundary of the classes and of occupational configurations. The special interest parties are unable to rise to such a broad perspective, but are oriented to the individual classes and the economic or national or denominational or some other important occupational configurations. As a matter of principle, the state parties safeguard the totality of all occupational interests and beyond these always the general interest of the state as well. The special interest parties serve primarily the more narrow interests of their group and accept the other interests only to the extent they have to for the sake of their own interests. A people with state parties is a true state people; its representative body is truly representing the people; the parliament is ripe for organizing the state as a healthy republic which provides its own president and government, and in the monarchy it is mature enough to present to the prince the government which meets with the approval of the majority and which the prince has no choice but to install in office. A people consisting merely of special interest parties is by itself not a true state people as yet, but becomes such only by making itself available to the prince in joint following for the performance of the tasks of government. Its representative body is not really representing the people but is a mere

spokesman for special interests. The parliament is incapable of presenting the government to the prince, but must content itself with the lesser role of controlling and advising the princely government.

Before the decisive victory won by democracy through the upheaval, the constitutional system of government was the obvious one for the majority of states of the European continent. The republics of Switzerland and France with their longer political education had passed beyond it, while Russia and Turkey were just about to experiment with it. The constitutional system was the logical result of the transformation through which the princely state of the Continent had to adjust itself to the rise in the power of the people. The prince could no longer maintain his absolute power which, as a military and political leader, he had built up in the battles fought for the expansion of the continental states. He was forced to reckon with the powers which grew up as a result of the ever more prominent economic tasks of society. He couldn't expect to be able to handle the aspiring populace as easily as he had been able to manage the estates in the preceding period for the military power which he could use against the estates was no longer available to him vis-a-vis the populace now that public opinion also dominated the army. In many of the fights which the princes had to wage against the liberal revolution the army went openly to side with the populace. In others the prince succeeded in crushing the movement, but circumstances were still such that even after the military victory the princely omnipotence was forced to come to terms with the new powers in an accommodating peace. In its beginnings the liberal movement was so strong that at one time or another the monarchical form of government had to yield to the republican one or that the prince was forced to fall back to the line of the parliamentary system. The latter, for example, was the case in Austria when the liberal wave united into a state party almost the entire populace under the leadership of the educated middle classes. But these fluctuations were soon overcome. The general political sense was still too immature, and the state party formed in the first burst of enthusiasm irresistibly broke up into smaller factions of special interest, splitting the propertied class and to a certain extent also the proletarian one along such lines. The old middle-class party, which had led the movement was far too little consolidated to be able to absorb all the new economic factions which became prominent everywhere. Over and above that, in the nationally mixed countries there arose national and, in the denominationally mixed ones, denominational parties. The electorates, after all, simply were understanding and willing to follow only as far as their closest group interests were concerned and for each of the emerging interest groups the leadership organ was also available, eager to gather the prospective voters and mandates. The leaders from the time of the first general movement, still imbued with the great ideas of liberty of the first burst of enthusiasm, had to withdraw from political life or limit themselves to the range of interests of the groups closest to them. In the long run, the prince everywhere looked after his own interests, and thus it happened that, once the first turmoils were over, he again became master of the situation. It was left to him to conduct high politics, externally as well as internally, which basically were beyond the range of interests of the parties. The prince could feel assured of the consent of the populace if he took care that the parties

within the framework of their special interests were satisfied whenever practicable.

The large number of special interest parties into which Parliament split under these circumstances made it unavoidable that no single party could command a majority of the House. The interest parties focused so myopically on the wishes closest to them that they were also not easily able to form lasting unions. The parliamentary majority needed in order to approve by vote the state requirements or other state necessities had to be secured either through changing coalitions or even on an ad hoc basis. This called for a government which stood above the parties and which the prince had to select in his own right. He did this either by appointing politicians from the parties most agreeable to him or by creating civil service ministries. But that doesn't take care of the case yet! The special interest parties were not only incapable of governing, but in fact they were not even quite willing to assume the reins of government. The status quo freed them from the worries of government and permitted them to recover from time to time by the popularity of being in the opposition. It could happen that just about all the parties represented themselves to the voters as opposition parties, but in doing so they certainly had to be more forgiving VLS-1-VLS the government than was compatible with firm opposition. They could be bargained with. Circumstances were especially propitious for the government where the power tradition of administration and the weakness of the populace opened up an opportunity for them to win the election.

For the most part conditions were such that the constitutional system couldn't be considered as a transitional system for the short run or so, but had every chance to settle down for the duration. During the time when the parties were still in the process of development, one expected the newly rising parties to grow from one election to the next, but as soon as they were on the whole fully formed, one could hardly expect that a party in new elections would gain noticeably at the expense of other parties. Every national, every denominational, and probably also every economic party had its solid election districts, the number of wavering districts being relatively small. The national as well as the denominational settlements in the old Europe are now almost immovably demarcated from each other. It is true, though, that the mass of settlers in the economic groups shifts during the transition from the agrarian to the industrial state and with the expansion of industry as well as in the wake of the continuing pull of the cities. But even these shifts generally take place only slowly, and none of the groups making up the proletariat class could reasonably expect that in the near future these shifts alone would enable it to obtain an absolute majority in the representative body of the people. Even the growth of the industrial labor force does not proceed at such a rapid pace that the proletariat could hope to rise so quickly from a minority to a majority party in the House. For this to occur there had to be changes of the kind which happened during the revolution, changes in public opinion which unhinged the constitutional system.

As long as the constitutional system existed, the prince was in a deeper sense the representative of the people than were the parties, each of which only represented a single interest group

f of the populace. He had the historical power on his side, he alone could count on the willingness of the masses throughout the state to follow him, it was his task and the task of his government to construct from the components of special interest demands the resultant for the state as a whole and to stake out the great policy objectives. Where a judicious monarch ruled or a great statesman seconded the monarch as an adviser, the state interest was fully protected. During Bismarck's years of greatness the German people had a form of government which gave full vent to all of its abundant energies. At the outbreak of the World War nobody could doubt that the German people, which agreed with the government to see the war — to which it felt challenged — through at all costs, was a national power of no less cohesion than were the democracies of England or France.

2. The State Parties in the Parliamentary System of Government

The specific formal characteristic of the party of being a leadership organ under the basic requirements of the constitutional system subjects the party leaders to a condition of dependence on the masses, who are willing to follow only to the extent allowed by their own limited range of interests. But this very characteristic under the requirements of the parliamentary system places the leaders into a decidedly strong position vis-à-vis the masses. This is explained by the fact that the requirements under which the parliamentary system develops are such that, instead of more parties of special interest, full-fledged state parties are formed, and that via the state parties the leaders are faced with incomparably more demanding tasks and thus are accorded a great deal more weight than is true for the special interest parties.

We have already mentioned the prerequisites for the coming about of the parliamentary system. They comprise the greater political maturity of leadership and masses foreshadowed already in the character of the populace and furthered through historical education.

England, the prototype of the parliamentary system in Europe, thanks to its island position was isolated from the vortex of the continental wars whose embodiment were the standing armies through which the princely commander-in-chief on the Continent gained complete control over the levers of power. In England the princes never became so powerful as to be able to interrupt the tradition of the freedom of the estates. In the course of the revolutions the power relationship shifted still further in favor of the estates. The second revolution, the Glorious one, changed the kingdom by the grace of God into a kingdom by the grace of the people, but the exercise of power fell neither to the populace nor to the king. The populace still fell short of political maturity, and the House of Hanover, having been called to the throne from alien Germany, did not have the dynastic tradition. The actual exercise of power fell to the great Whig nobility which had directed the Glorious Revolution and had pushed through the protestant succession to the throne. England during the first decades following the accession to the throne of the Hanoverian kings in its actual constitution was a republic of the nobility rather than a monarchy. According to

Disraeli's judgment the king vis-a-vis the nobility was no better than had been true for the doge in Venice. As the Whigs faced the Tories the two great English state parties were being formed which vied for the favor of the majority in the country and for the government. The upward movement of the masses changed the aristocratic rule gradually from liberalism to democracy and the parties of the nobility had to adjust to the modern conditions. Their being able to do so earned them the reward of being able to maintain control over the leadership of the political parties. Traditions of long standing and new achievements were merged in a most intimate manner. Both of the great parties always were receptive enough to further educate the newly rising masses in the image of their own historical education. Both of the great parties, whatever new foci of interest they absorbed, have remained state parties.

Every state party must have the will to rule and must remain capable of governing. Thus there can't be many, but really only two, effective state parties for once there are more than two of them, the chances for one to gain the majority in the House, the prerequisite for ability to govern, are already too small. In order to gain the necessary number of mandates, each of the two state parties must strive to unite under its wings all the interest groups, if possible, and it must not exclude any that declare themselves for the state altogether. In the two great historical parties of the English Parliament, landed proprietors and big capitalists, the middle and lower classes and the agrarian interests, insofar as they were still able to hold their own against the big landowners, and finally until very recent times the workers as well, have always been represented, although the composition of the groups in the two parties differs. The difference between the two parties related more to the speed of development than to the choice of the interests to be nurtured. Each put in first place the great state interests of high politics, and each of course was a state party in the sense that the continued existence and power of the state were considered paramount. To this both parties agreed, and this is why they could take turns in heading the government without rupture of the leading state traditions being a necessary consequence. When somewhere in the Balkans the ruling party was pushed into the opposition, this, in times not very far back yet, might have had the consequence of making it willing at once to resort to conspiratorial activities and revolution and to oppose the dynasty to which it had still been submissively devoted a short time ago. In England, peace and order remained unaffected when the Whigs overturned the Tory government or the Tories overturned the Whig government. However passionate the political battles, especially the election battle, in the mind of every representative and every citizen the thought of a recourse to arms was simply ruled out, and everybody was always ready to put up with the outcome of the election. The majority of votes cast settled the issue. There was only one appeal from the poll in the House: to the poll of the voters.

A state party bent upon winning the majority of votes on election day has to conduct its political business within a broader scope than does the plain party of special interests. To do so, it is necessary that it meet the special interests of all the various groups halfway inasmuch as this can be done without clashing with the other participating groups, and this in turn is best accomplished by seeking out and effectively representing the

general interests on which all groups can agree. The state party is referred to the ways of high politics as previously intended by the far-sighted prince. It will recognize that all interests are solidly united in seeking to secure to the state the external respect commensurate with its power and in smoothing the path domestically so as to assure the unfolding of the most vital energies. The top leaders of such state parties must be the most high-minded politicians. It is not enough that they have the mentality of politicians a la the leaders of parties of special interest, mere party politicians — rather they must be statesmen as formerly were the great princes and their advisers. These top leaders need the kind of training which can be acquired only if politics is not pursued on a part-time basis, and again they must not pursue it merely for money-making purposes, but they must, financially secure, have spare time for persistent political work. Training of the kind they need can be acquired only by continuous practice, experience not acquired overnight but over a long period of time and which has been tested by historical success. For this one needs the tradition of a great party with an established history.

State parties of such a design and with such leadership, if they are successful in politics, may expect to win over as additions to the firm core of their ever faithful adherents the voters still vacillating between the parties, whose attitude is determined by the big sweeps of public opinion. If the party in power has suffered shipwreck with its policies, the opposition party whose criticisms were proved right will be able in the next election to defeat the old majority decisively and move into the new House by a wide margin. The old government then has to content itself with the position assigned to it by the leaders of the opposition. This does not by any means destroy its prestige for good. The day will come when it will be recalled to power, and when it then picks up the reins of power again, it does so not as a novice in the functions to be performed, which of course it has known from earlier times and in its opposition role is called upon to criticize constructively nor does it do so as a novice in enjoying public confidence. It takes up its office equipped with that historical power which is in line with the glorious traditions possessed by both of England's great parties. The new ministry enjoys the same full authority as did the preceding ministry and at an earlier time had been enjoyed by the princely government.

The ballot cast by the voters on the judgment day of the election by no means cancels the historical power of the party leaderships. The voters by casting their ballots by no means become the leaders' leaders, they continue in their role as the led multitude. Always during the period of the two-party system one of the existing party leaderships had to emerge victorious from the battle, for these leaderships alone are qualified, by historical selection and the willingness to follow of accustomed electorates, as candidates for government office; but on the other hand the size of the voter majority also weighs heavily. Thus leaders and masses always remain in their functions which under healthy conditions find their healthy balance. Under the conditions in which England found itself until the beginning of the 20th century the balance was so even that it could be said with equal right that England was an aristocratic monarchy as that it was a democratic monarchy.

Nor has the monarchy in England yet finished playing its historical role. Disraeli may be correct in saying that the first kings of the House of Hanover were nothing more than dogs in an aristocratic republic, but gradually the dynastic sentiment for which the English people have a historically conditioned predisposition, also turned to the regents of this House and the following House of Coburg. The peoples of the English colonies view the king as the personal representative of the unity of the realm, and the same is true for the English abroad and in the mother country. For the English psychology of power the idea of the historical glory of the realm is associated with the person of the king. Authorities on these matters believed that the colonies would break away from the empire as soon as the monarchical bond would cease to exist. The imperialistic notion of the world empire demands the prince on the throne. The appointment of ministers by the king is therefore not a mere formality. The leaders of the parliamentary majority would hardly command the full authority of government in the realm if they had merely been selected by the majority without having been confirmed by the king. Only the endorsement by the historical holder of the supreme power of the realm provides them with the full historical power which lifts them from the level of a party government to that of the imperial government. What Polybius says of the Roman state, namely, that it can be called equally well a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy, also applies to England. The perfect blending of the elements of state power bestows upon it its vitality, just as, according to Polybius, the "mixed constitution" gave to the old Rome its strength.

The English people matured to the democratic form of government as a result of the fact that it fully learned to perform the mass function of following. Certainly, in England, too, a large portion of the electorate is bound by tradition and interest to follow strictly the party line, yet there exists a considerable number of voters whose maturity has made critical followers out of them and who on the judgment day of the election decide the issue. As was shown in greater detail at an earlier place, this subjects the English party leaders to that effective control over the leaders which constitutes the crucial element for the self-determination of the people.

Most recently England's classic two-party system was broken by the rise of the Labor Party. This is an after-effect of the World War which, however much it is sensed as a disturbance, is quite mild compared with the shocks imparted to the historical state systems of the vanquished peoples. The World War-forced England to expand its enlisted army to the status of a militia, and the democratic sense was so strong that one couldn't help following up universal compulsory military service with universal suffrage. All of a sudden there were large numbers of new proletarian voters. As already mentioned, a large portion of these did not exercise their new right, but the number of those who did was nevertheless so great that there occurred a considerable shift in the composition of the parties. Until then the majority of the workers had joined one of the two middle-class parties, and an independent labor party which controlled only a few seats had existed for only a short time, to boot. It was natural that the new voters, above all, flocked to this party, which was subsequently also joined by most of the workers who had hitherto belonged to the middle-class parties. The severe

economic crisis which had befallen England as a result of the war and which was especially hard on its workers greatly stirred up class consciousness and contributed to labor's interest in a political organization of its own. However, not only proletarians have joined the new party; it is a party of labor not of laborers. It also attracted those truly democratic circles which were uncomfortable with the middle-class narrow-mindedness of the two state parties. The Labor Party includes among its leaders not few men with the finest education from among the propertied classes. It is therefore not permissible either to place the English Labor Party alongside the proletarian parties of the Continent. It is not a party of special proletarian interests, at least it is not yet today, although it does have a radical wing which so represents it. In its majority the English Labor Party is a state party, having taken the old state parties as an educational model, and this is true not only of its leaders but also of those segments of its masses who had already had the franchise before. Also many of the new voters had learned in their labor unions how to put free power organs to successful use. The Labor Party already once before had taken over the reins of government and, to judge from the manner in which it conducted foreign policy, it passed the test of statesmanship. The rise of the Labor Party did not throw England back to the stage of special-interest governments the country now having three state parties instead of the preceding two. To be sure, the maintenance of the parliamentary system has now become more difficult because the rivalry of majority and minority no longer yields the same clear signs. The political flair of the Englishman, however, certainly will find a way to so reconstitute the parliamentary apparatus as to make it suitable for the parliamentary system.

In Hungary the tradition of the privileges of the estates was maintained longer than elsewhere on the Continent. The Revolution of 1848 was still able to connect with it. When the settlement of 1867 made the Hapsburg monarchy dualistic and restored Hungary to freedom, the leadership of the parties fell to the nobility. In the process it benefited from the historical education of centuries. It proved its maturity for leadership in the formation of state parties which assured Hungary of superiority in its political battle with the Austrian half of the realm. Its leadership power was all the more conspicuous as the mass of voters was extremely immature in political matters. Through centuries the masses had been conditioned for submissive following. Apart from the Croats and the Transylvania Saxons, the non-Magyar peoples of Hungary were so devoted to the traditional Magyar rulers that the latter could almost completely count on the loyalty of the election districts. Certainly, the political horizon of the Hungarian party leaders was limited by their national interest, and they had no feeling for the importance of the unity of the realm. The Hungarian state parties were not also parties of the realm. Their strength as state parties put the unity of the realm in greater jeopardy, and more than all other parties they contributed to the loosening of the realm's coherence. Without the historical power of the crown and the personal authority of the joint monarch, Emperor Francis Josef, it would have been altogether impossible to keep together the parliamentary ministry of Hungary on one hand and the civil service ministries of Austria and Austria-Hungary on the other.

Through their English base population the United States received the heritage of the political education of the English people. Set up as a republic from the time of the Declaration of Independence, it depended on being able to create from the very beginning parties capable of governing. They were historically conditioned to form state parties in the manner of the two-party system. This state of affairs was not changed by the immigration over time of great multitudes of persons. The immigrants were willing by nature to yield to the American mass psychology, and the existing parties could count on their readiness to follow. The rapid rise of the masses did not improve their political position, but on the contrary, it strengthened the superiority of the leaders. They alone were experienced, in their hands was the political apparatus which true to the gigantic dimensions of American life, had itself to be gigantic. The new voters couldn't do anything better than to entrust themselves to one of the existing state parties.

In the conflicts of power which eventually erupted in the World War even the old democracies turned out not sufficiently solidified not to be overwhelmed by their national passions.

3. The Young Democracies After the Revolution

Germany, Austria, Hungary, and the new states which were formed by regions detached from them and from Russia all established themselves as democratic republics. Why are these young democracies weak and in part ruined to the point of impotence, whereas the old democracies in England and the United States are united and strong? The reason does not lie in one or another detail of their constitution — even if one of the young democracies followed closely the precepts of the constitution of one of the old democracies, it would nevertheless remain weak and rutty — it lies at bottom in the fact that in the young democracies leaders and masses through education have not become sufficiently mature to be able to set up true state parties. They did not manage to get beyond the form of special interest parties. But now their young polities are confronted, externally as well as internally, with the most difficult tasks such as the finished state parties in the old democracies do no longer have to solve. They are incessantly exposed to internal crises and not rarely to external ones as well. In times of such severe crises there is a need for leaders who, thanks to their outstanding personal authority or to the weight of their historical power, have enough stability to avoid being swept along by a vacillating public. Leadership personalities of this kind are not at hand in any of the young democracies, and the previously existing historical powers have been demolished by the revolution.

While the author of this book was lost in such thoughts he looked up Thucydides "History of the Peloponnesian War" and in it found a passage which presents everything there is to be said about the topic with such clarity that he believes he can do no better than to let Thucydides speak. The passage in question begins by telling how Pericles at the beginning of the war advised the Athenians to be circumspect about their fleet and for the rest to remain calm and then gave them the prediction that they would remain victorious if during the war they did not try to farther expand their domain and did not expose the city itself

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to any danger. According to Thucydides, the war was lost because the leaders coming after Pericles did not stick to his advice but undertook things which, if they turned out to be successful, surely brought honor and profit to the various leaders, but if they failed, had to ruin the state and the allies. Pericles had been — so Thucydides — of high repute and insight, incorruptible as none other, and able by his candor to keep the masses in check. "He was not guided by them, but rather he himself guided them, because he had not attained power through illicit means and therefore didn't have to tell the Athenians just what they wanted to hear, but took the liberty also to contradict them vehemently. . . . So in name there was democracy, but in fact the rule was in the hands of the foremost man. But those who came after him were men who held the same rank as between them and of whom each wanted to be first, and so, in order to please the populace, they condescended to entrust the reins of government to it."

In the young democracies at issue here nowhere has a Pericles stepped forth, but even if somewhere there should be a man of his stature, he would nowhere find the masses willing to follow as the Athenians had been vis-a-vis Pericles. The willingness to follow the great leader must have been historically instilled into the masses, the leadership position which becomes the platform from which the great man sweeps the populace with him must have been historically readied. The peoples of the young democracies had all been trained to follow the dynastically appointed leader, but the dynasties were uprooted by the gale of the revolution which had been provoked by the disastrous failure of the World War and the magnitude of the sacrifices rendered in vain. The dynasties of the Romanov and the Hapsburg-Lorraine had been granted half a millenium or more during which to take root in the minds of the masses, and the Hohenzollern, too, enjoyed a similar span of time in their Brandenburg-Prussian heartlands. It is true that as leaders of a united Germany they were active for a much shorter time, but they made their contribution during a period of enthusiastic receptivity of the masses. Their work was crowned by extraordinary successes which made a very deep impression on the minds. Their fall affected the minds as does the sudden tumble of a tree many centuries old under whose canopy of leaves one had felt sheltered from sun and rain. Where could a leadership person be found in whom the multitude was willing to lodge the same trust? This does not mean that again half a millenium has to pass before the willingness of the masses to follow has become equally general. The feat of unification by dynastic leaders is not entirely robbed of its effect, and a victorious leader a la Napoleon would again have been able to rally the masses around him by a series of lightning successes. The mediocre leaders on hand did not have available such a telling means of success. If they wanted to maintain themselves in their positions, they had to allow themselves to be directed by the ~~masses~~ instead of directing them. They could not dare to contradict them vehemently, as Pericles had done. What could be the upshot other than continued blunders, weakness, and impotence?

The unsuspecting democrat anticipated with confidence that as soon as the impediment, adverse to the populace, of the princes had been removed everything would be in the best way. He was surprised to see that the historically accumulated power of the princes, after it had been broken up by the tempest of war and revolution, couldn't simply be replaced overnight. One first

had to get an appreciation for the fact that even democracy with all the clarity of its forms, has its basic historical requirements, which cannot be made up for so quickly. One could elect a state president on whom the privilege and the honors of representation of the people would be conferred, but did this in itself make him the full-fledged representative of the majesty of the populace? What had been done in the name of the prince was considered valid throughout the populace. In the majesty of the prince the majesty of the populace also gleamed. It served to elicit a commitment to duty by army and civil servants, by populace and party, and even the basically reluctant proletarian had to acknowledge as a datum the prince's historical power. Even if the young republic succeeds in finding the man who meets all the prerequisites for the position of the president, then, if he has been drawn from the parties, he first is viewed by his own party as simply the familiar buddy and by the other parties — which means the majority of the populace, under the given circumstances — as the rival who is not to be trusted. If a government is put together by allowing a number of parties providing a majority in the House to combine, such a government by the mere fact that civil servants place themselves at its disposal and that it conducts the state affairs is not yet a state government, but remains what it is by virtue of its composition: a mere party government. Again the men conducting government affairs are viewed by the friends in their own party as buddies whose obligingness is counted upon, whereas by the others they are seen as rivals blindly addicted to the party. Even in their attitude toward the duties of their office they differ from the old governments. The honorable among them, who can always be found, will undoubtedly feel called upon by their conscience to administer their office in the social interest. But even these upright men may subsequently turn out not to have a trained eye for the general interest but to be fettered by their party attachment: one may be personally honorable and yet politically controversial. The others, sitting next to them, are guided ruthlessly by the party interest, and many also by their personal interest, which does not encounter resistances of the kind found within the scope of the former, firmly defined responsibilities, for which, of course they have not been trained.

For this to change, a great impetus must seize the nation, set in motion by one of those wondrous uplifts of the minds that arise from the reservoir of energy of strong peoples at the turning points of fate. Where this is the case, the traditional parties, beholden as they are to their nearest interests, are upset, and the nation turns toward its great goals under new leaders. Such a turn of events led to the rise of Fascism in Italy, leaving aside the question of whether or not it has used the right means. But in the absence of such an impetus, the law of inertia maintains the traditional parties of special interest. The proportional representation system, destined to assure to the minorities their just representation, by means of voting from lists has become a welcome instrument for party leaders to maintain themselves in their positions, and in effect it turns out to be a mutual insurance of mandates. Since during the brief period of the election campaigns the existing interest groups shift only little, each of the great parties may view the bulk of its mandates as secure, and the top leaders of the party at the head of the lists are absolutely assured of their mandate. But in return the leaders have to be loyally devoted to the

traditional interest of their party, they must not veer from their prescribed paths, and they must not rise to the level of state politics but must continue to pursue party politics in the traditional narrow manner. The great leadership tasks remain undone. The leaders go along in the trot of the masses, being guided by these instead of guiding them, as observed by Thucydides; they act to please them, they flatter them, and they support them in their shortsighted narrow-mindedness. Under these conditions, who is around to safeguard the general interest of the state, which never was more gravely threatened? What power is in sight that might replace the collapsed, historical powers of the old state? Here is the source of Fascism. The Fascist dictator appeals to the national consciousness in the fight against party stupidity. The proletarian dictatorship of councils has a different origin: it is narrow-mindedness of classes driven to excess. It turns against the democratic principle, it calls upon the proletariat against the nation. The proletarian leaders so long kept telling their buddies that they are the populace that they themselves can't get away from this doctrine and feel justified to control the people in the name of the people.

D. The Daily Press

1. The Press as Leadership Organ

When one talks about the press in short, he means the periodicals, and within this group virtually only the daily press. This is what one has in mind when designating the press as an organ of public opinion. All other versions of the press are, almost without exception, addressed to a limited readership, mostly to specialists, and even when, as is true for the great reviews, they deal with topics of the daily press, they do this for the few readers who are not only currently informed of the events of the time, but who also want to understand them in their larger context.

The press — we will use this short-hand expression for the daily press — was known for a long time as an organ of freedom, as the organ of freedom, and it still likes to be so referred to. It was the strongest weapon in the fight of the freedom parties, first the middle-class and later the proletarian ones, against the government. The government suppressed it as much as it could, and it is understandable why the demand for freedom of the press was included among the most urgent demands for freedom. How differently things are viewed today can be seen from Spengler's remark that freedom of the press, such as it is to be understood for our time, must be freedom from the press. Today the press is no longer a freedom organ in the fight against power, but it has itself become a power organ, reinforcing the power of the rulers and having won much power of its own. Indeed, it likes to refer to itself as a great power alongside the great world empires.

The reason for the magnitude of its power lies in the fact that it rallies the masses around itself. In its external structure it is a leadership organ in the very sense we have just shown for the parties. Every newspaper is a leadership organ which, pointing the way, expects the following by the masses. A

board of editors with the necessary assistants and facilities is set up. Subscribers and other buyers and readers as well as advertisers are wanted, and they form the masses whose following is expected. In the beginnings of journalism these "masses" were masses only in a theoretical sense, but not practically, because they were still very small. This is still true today for all those newspapers which stay alive only with difficulties as the editors are unable to win sufficient following, be it because they lack the necessary talent or material means, or because they stubbornly cling to views which are not the masses' cup of tea. But in our times of mass living the large press has gained a readership which as the founders of the press couldn't anticipate in their most extravagant hopes. Every large newspaper is planned for mass consumption and must therefore have rapport with the mass soul. Since each of the many groups making up the masses has a different disposition, the paper must declare its party allegiance or even lay its cards on the table of those without a party. But if this is so, isn't it then the subscribers, to take the position of Editor Aslaksen in Ibsen's "Enemy of the People," who rule the paper? Is it still appropriate, then to call the paper a leadership organ, as we have just done?

One may do so, indeed. The relationship to the masses in the case of newspapers is no different from what it is for all leaders who find for the masses the ways and means which permit them to reach their goals. Only the great soul leaders point to new goals, and even the greatest among them are given the definitive endorsement only by the weight of the joining masses. The press doesn't seek soul leadership, and even with respect to its ways and means it puts itself on a level which allows it to be readily understood by the public. Nevertheless, it performs a true and difficult leadership service which must earn its substantial leadership power. Even if the general direction which the public wants to follow is known, it is no cinch to navigate through the turmoil of current events. The leader performing this task is unlike the leader in wage negotiations who can be readily obtained for a small compensation and who is dropped after he has done his job; rather, the service rendered by the former is such that the public becomes as dependent on him as is the traveler in the desert on the bedouin chief who is to escort him.

2. The Readers of the Press

To a large extent it is the quality of the public which provides the press with its leadership power and along with the quality also the situation in which the public finds itself. This situation is by no means as favorable as that of the public in the theater or in the market. The theater public consists of theater experts and fanciers who deem themselves qualified to let the impressions received be followed immediately by their judgment and who in the process have the opportunity of expressing their approbation or displeasure most effectively. Also, the public using the market knows its wants and has the opportunity of telling its verdict to the seller right into his face. The newspaper public is worse off, for it lacks togetherness and does not stand face to face with the editor. Every reader is alone with himself. He must form his own judgment, and it is not easy

for someone to take it upon himself to argue with the paper over a remark he doesn't like; to send in a correction requires a courage which only few very determined people have. By the way, readers as a rule do not use such a critical eye at all. They critically read only the opposition papers which are taken up only with deepest mistrust, with the preconceived idea that everything they say is wrong. For all that, the majority of readers hardly get around to reading opposition papers but confine themselves to their own. But the latter in turn is read quite uncritically. It is seen by its reader as a well-meaning friend and counselor. He swears by everything it says, and he is willing to keep the kind of faith with it which the masses are so willing to bring to their leader. But this is by no means the worst that can be said about newspaper readers. One must admit that what the theory of mass psychology says to downgrade the masses applies to them by and large, and above all is this true for the statement that animal-like qualities come out while intellectual ones recede. It is distressing to realize how few the people are who can read a paper. Illiteracy statistics really should be amended to bring out the fact with how little understanding those whom the statistics list as being able to read make use of their knowhow. The paper which knows its readers makes things easy for them by cutting down on and categorizing the information content and beyond that by making it more conspicuous by headings and bold face and occasional summaries. All for naught! All these expedients are so many temptations for the ordinary reader. He is satisfied with reading the headings and what appears in heavy-faced type. That he be able to discern the news sources, or even only whether the news is offered as authentic or unconfirmed, one must not expect of him, nor that he correctly appraise or retain figures. The number of those who accurately absorb the essential content of a piece of information is very small, and the number of those who are able to reproduce it faithfully cannot be underestimated. A large portion of the untrustworthiness of which the press is accused must as a matter of fact be blamed on its readers. Even for the majority of the "educated" public for whom the leading papers write one can take only a modest level of understanding for granted. The multitudes who in the rush of modern developments become part of the public are too little prepared to find their way without gross misunderstandings — they are not yet ripe for the organ of the press. A majority of them lack the ability to perform the mass function of following with critical judgment.

3. The Press as a Business Enterprise

The men who felt a calling for the press couldn't help finding out very quickly that their place was on the side of the masses. Governments, too, couldn't help recognizing what immense assistance a press favorable to their views could offer them vis-a-vis the masses, but they had to recognize just as quickly that it was not their line to conduct a successful newspaper business. This takes a combination of attributes which are foreign to the civil servant as such. Moreover, the manager of a newspaper enterprise must be granted a measure of independence which government cannot yield to any of its employees. In the government plan which occupied Napoleon's attention at St. Helena, from where he expected to be recalled, Napoleon provided for an official press as an indispensable organ of the state, and it can't

be doubted that he would have had enough strength left to make the masses pliable through leadership of the press just as he was able to crush the enemy on the battlefield by cavalry attacks and sudden concentrations of his heavy artillery reserves. Today Fascism knows how to command the power of the press for its own purposes by either silencing opposition papers through official channels or keeping them at bay through using its partisans in the street. On top of that, Bolshevism utilizes the press with dictatorial severity for the education of the public; in addition, it doesn't fail to use the movie and stage theaters for the selfsame purpose, thereby attempting to complete the indoctrination of the populace which it begins in school in its own spirit. The old-style governments confined themselves to publishing official gazettes for public information purposes and for the rest to making do with a semi-official press by using the private press to the extent needed. Even the great political parties normally dispense with publishing their own party papers. It is more convenient for them to use private organs of publication whose editors belong to the party and are aware of the interest they have in keeping their columns open for the spokesmen of the party. Every great newspaper as a mass organ is a large-scale business enterprise which the party leaders cannot well cope with, and its editor must therefore be able to perform the tasks of a big entrepreneur in addition to his editorial responsibilities. The large newspaper, aside from its political section in which it follows the party line, must attend to a number of other sections which are no less important for its sales success. If managed well, it will find readers interested in these other subjects not only in the given political party camp in which the main stock of its subscribers are located, but it will look for and find them also among the many vacillating people who only on election day, if then, declare for a certain party, or among the unpolitical who are still fairly numerous, or among the businessmen who have to look all around themselves, or even in the rival camp or abroad. The party interest is too narrowly defined to permit the market-oriented editor, all party loyalty notwithstanding, to confine himself to its horizon. In this sense the great press developed quite predominantly as an independent press. On the other hand, the influence of the press has brought about a situation where owners of large capital seek to obtain control over the large newspapers, and in doing so, incidentally, they find it advisable to allow the experienced editor free rein insofar as this non-interference does not threaten their own specific practical interests. The strong editor will know how to make his personality prevail externally as well as within his enterprise. Generally, he will give his co-workers little freedom, conceding it only to the few strong personalities whose cooperation he values especially highly. All the others have to obey his command as the troops have to obey their leader, and sometimes they have to perform their nerve-racking job for a pittance.

The press has most perfectly prepared for doing business on a big scale. In its ingenious machines and highly functional equipment it has kept pace with modern technology, and in other respects, too, has lived up to its business responsibilities very well. Its news service is comprehensive and quick and from a global point of view magnificent. The discipline demanded of its co-workers with a view to meeting its deadlines is unsurpassable. It has discovered with excellent flair which lines of

thought meet with the interest of the public at large. It has long ceased being the mere dispenser of news serving to satisfy public curiosity. Its news service at the not too frequently scaled full height of its capacity has become nothing less than a research service — or is it not research service when a great American editor equips an expedition and picks its best suited leader to look up Livingstone in dark Africa? The feats of many war correspondents attain the full measure of male prowess. But there now has been added to the news service the extensive service as an organ of public opinion which covers not only the political area but also just about the whole area of social life. The great press nowadays sets the tone for critical reviews of productions of stage theater, music, fine arts, and literature. In its literary supplements it offers novels penned by the most widely read authors of the time. Besides it has the unique opportunity of attending to the special form of the short story in which — think of Maupassant — supreme mastery can prove its worth within the most narrow confines. In its feature supplement the press expatiates on all domains of social interest. In all these respects the contemporary press has become the most important aid for the social leaders, and on occasion it has itself taken on the leadership function. Is it not the press which gives directions for forming a world view to the educated public of our skeptical time which no longer attends the sermons? As a political aid it is indispensable for government and parties, both of which have to reckon with it, and occasionally it expands beyond their control. In its business section the press is an aid for the world of business on which every entrepreneur depends and whose influence on the public at large cannot be exaggerated, especially as far as the latter is involved in the stock market operations. There is no need to expound the contribution of the press in the field of advertising, particularly as an aid to business firms. The weighing of the nearly superabundant raw material of a modern newspaper and likewise the fixing of advertising and subscription rates demand most careful reflection in order that the requirements of mass circulation be met. The success of a well managed newspaper amply repays the editor for his labors: he receives a high income and has a great social impact.

If one looks at the daily press as a whole one finds millions of readers who obtain their intellectual nourishment, in part before they go about their daily work but also during the rest periods of their job. Not only is their news hunger appeased, but they also obtain from the press, which acts as an intermediary between them and the existing top leaders, the daily reading of the social and business barometer of opinion, the order of the day as it were, which they need to find their bearings in the chaos of events, or at least to keep themselves informed. The achievements of the movie industry, impressive as they are, still fall far short of those of the press. Perhaps the cinema is able to shock the viewers' nerves by its vivid graphic quality. As a means of war propaganda it has been used in a way which would have moved Dante to assign the slanderous originators to one of the worst habitats of the Inferno. But normally the movie theater is not visited before the evening

*There does not seem to exist such a word as "Bulgen" (p. 463) used by the author — (Tr.)

leisure hours whereas the press issues daily and hourly directives. In its own way it matches or exceeds even the most magnificent technical feats of our machine age. However one may assess its intrinsic worth, whether on balance it provides guidance or misguidance to the people, it is the most influential regulator of mass thinking. With amazing speed it creates concurring images in millions of brains. It is a brain machine of supreme capacity.

4. The Power of the Press and Its Abuse

It is clear from the start that the press wasn't capable of its technically and commercially supreme achievement without bringing a considerable dowry of talent to its broad tasks. Without extensive knowledge, without keen judgment, without mastery of form, and — one must not be kept from saying so by apparent examples to the contrary — also without strong moral impulses, the press could not have made its contribution. The history of the press at the time of its fight against state supremacy is filled with deeds of high verve and true valor. It would be a grave error to believe that these motives are no longer operative today. He who doesn't see the shining virtues in the work of the press must be treated only with distrust when he raises accusations against it. Its shortcomings — and it does have grave ones at that — are, above all, faults springing from its great power, yet it was not able to achieve such power except through the expenditure of great energy.

The press reveals the fullness of the power emanating from it on occasions when it takes a firm stand in a matter, as it does in conjunction with movements which carry the populace away completely. Thus during the World War the press of the Central Powers on one hand and that of the Entente on the other were united in backing the war effort, and in addition the governments, which usually hesitate to offend the press, in this case invoked martial law against it as well, subjecting it to most incisive censorship. For the outcome of modern international wars not only the spirit of the armies but equally the spirit of the population in the hinterland are decisive, and one can think of no instrument of war which could have had a greater impact on that population than did the press. It could trumpet forth and accompany with loud fanfares everywhere the achieved successes, and it could pass over in silence, or at least find excuses for, the failures, and it could raise again the depressed spirits by offsetting news or by promises. Every opposing voice had to be drowned out by the resonance which the general war enthusiasm found in the press. As long as there remained the slightest prospect for victory or for seeing the effort through the press was able to maintain, and did maintain, the determination for war. One of its most effective means was the branding of war crimes committed by the enemy. While the press on both sides amply availed itself of this tool, it may still be correct to say that on the side of the Entente the propaganda of slander was conducted much more extravagantly as well as skillfully. The then planted seeds of hate have penetrated deeply into the human hearts, and their effects will outlast the war by much. The press also had its large share in abetting the spirit of war and thus the war itself. Everywhere there was a chauvinistic press which became an organ of the anxieties and the zeal of the upset

parties. Everywhere there also was a counterpart press which was peace-loving and counseled accommodation. But the governments also had to take into account the mood of the warmongers who had found strong expression in the public opinion of the country, and perhaps one government or another even welcomed being able to rely on it. If the world press had previously been as united in arguing for peace as later it advocated war, the peace could never have been ruptured.

Although in ordinary circumstances the press, being internally divided, is not apt to be able to cast such a strong spell on the minds, its effect must still be considerable. The masses of each party swear by its press, and they take only little notice of other papers, at least as far as political matters are concerned. The doctrine of free competition has even less currency in the opinion market than in the goods market, for in its own camp the party press has a monopoly. The large newspapers — and only they matter for the public at large — are large-scale capitalist enterprises. To bring out a large new paper requires exceptional experience and the accumulation of a large staff of co-workers and of capital, but even then such a paper will not easily be able to cut the ground from under the feet of its rival which it confronts. The newspaper which has won its circle of readers is a historical power which cannot be got out of the way unless it contributes to digging its own grave by committing bad blunders, or unless it is hit by special misfortune. The liberal bourgeoisie for a long time benefited from the fact that, thanks to the advanced education of its partisans and to its ample capital, it first dominated the newspaper market. The lower middle class, the proletariat, — and the landed proprietors obtained their press only late, finding out that, equally applicable to their newspaper consumption as to their other consumption, they had the ready masses at their disposal. Those circles who have remained without their own press even today are thereby relegated far into the background in public life. As late as today the bourgeois press, although having lost all political influence on the readers affiliated with alien parties, in matters of business interest, criticism, literature, and general world view still wields a not inconsiderable influence in other camps. This is the last remnant of liberal splendor, which by the way shouldn't be given such a low rating.

The work of the press rests to a very large extent on the wire services of whose significance the public hardly has a correct view. In the nervous system of the news service the international wire offices belong among the most vital organs — one might view them as central organs. The wire service of the Associated Press in the United States of America provides some 900 newspapers with telegraphic news. Upton Sinclair, the eminent American author and journalist uses a felicitous term when referring to it as the canal system of public information. As a well structured canal system distributes its water, so the wire service distributes its news all across the country to every area of need. We will later have to return to the point that it is also able to bring its power to bear, and most strongly at that, when it denies its cooperation. The plans of reformers who propose to improve the press are therefore rightly and in the first place intended for the center of the international wire service. That reform is not so easy follows from the consideration that by its design this service is either an outright monopoly or

is in the nature of highly restrained competition, and those in control of it will do all they can to maintain their supremacy.

There has never been great power without abuse. Should the press be able to constitute an exception from this experience? Surely not, and we must therefore not be surprised if numberless accusations are raised against it. He who would want to form a correct judgment about it must be neither squeamish nor plaintive, for everywhere in public life things happen in a somewhat more ungentle manner than in private life, and the press is in the full public limelight. We will therefore not bother at all to dwell upon the evils of the gutter press and the outright yellow press — evil things, no doubt, but on the whole of no consequence, though perhaps unavoidable. There have always been highway robbers, so why not also on the highway of public communication? It is more worrisome that the outright yellow press unnoticeably passes into the sensational press and that the latter occupies much space in the lowland strata of journalism. If one imagines the figures of the newspaper people who are spokesmen in these strata, he is startled by the thought of whom the spirit of the masses supplicates for its daily bread. Worse still is the fact that we encounter abuse of power also in the highland strata of journalism. There is no use glossing over it, abuse is entrenched even there, and it has to be because there concentration of power leads into temptation. The articles of the choice critic of a great paper are read by tens of thousands whose applause matters to the victims of his critique. He is the artistic judge of fate not only for the capital city but for the whole country, and his objection can place in dispute the success of a masterpiece for quite a while. Nobody possesses the infallibility which would be necessary for the serious exercise of such office, but there must be quite many whose judgment does not withstand the temptations of personal favor or ill will. Although the camaraderie and cliquishness are only too often encountered in the critical or literary parts of a paper, it is also seen to it that their effect is limited. He who cannot return a favor will be forgotten in no time. The cliques of posterity do not bind a wreath for the dead buddy; he takes his fame with him into the grave. Lasting posthumous fame must have access to deeper sources than can be found in the shallow ground of the daily press. There is no end to the gratifications of vanity for which the press is abused. However, these are ridiculous rather than important. The worst things happen in the business section of a paper, especially when the latter is owned by a capitalist power using it with a view to putting the public in a favorable mood for its machinations and setting itself up as a judge of its own concerns.

The owners of large financing funds have the resources to make the press serve their own purpose on a grand scale. In the large combines the press must also be represented, and it must be so represented that the owners of finance capital can exercise their control toward all the political camps in which they have to safeguard their interests. To a modern gigantic enterprise the amount of money which must be raised to obtain that control carries no weight.

I

b. me News Service

No general verdict can be given to such accusations. It depends on the number and gravity of the cases of dereliction. Cited against these must be the entire weight of the performance of the press and of its sense of professional duty, without which such performance is not possible. It is clear from the start that the more mature nations and parties will have a press more mature in every respect and hence also in its sense of duty. It would not serve the purpose of our investigation if we were to dwell in detail on what would have to be said about this in accordance with the differences in time and place and circles of readers. We will let all of these accusations rest and confine ourselves to those evil effects which are said to be part and parcel of the character of the press. We only seek clarity about the extent to which the press in its grand design is suited to become the organ of public information affairs and of public opinion.

One must from the start give up the expectation that the press might be able to perform its service in the manner of a public office. This purpose is served solely by the releases of the official papers, which are as reliable as they are jejune wherever the government is not the party, but which lose this character as soon as the government itself has to be a party spokesman. One must proceed from the fact that the newspapers are organs of the party or at least are written in the spirit of the party. Considering the formation of public opinion this couldn't be any different, for what is called public opinion is nowadays as a rule merely the party line. The time is past when the press stood with one voice for the idea of freedom against the government. Today it is no longer the organ of public opinion but the organ for the party lines and thus the organ expressing the dissension of public opinion and at worst the general perplexity. With an eye to the news service one might of course imagine a different state of affairs. Could it not be arranged that all news of public significance were announced with the dependability of the official stock exchange list as published by the exchanges? To this end, however, one probably would have to equip the whole news service in all its branches with organs of the degree of dependability which put together the stock exchange quotations. This is hardly feasible, and for the time being, as usual, it will be necessary to entrust the news service to the zeal and the flair of the journalist. If one wished to surrender it to the f,most virtuous and wise of the population," one could be sure that all news, down to such simple facts as deaths, births, and weddings, would be published too late. Communications, if they are to be prompt, must not be entrusted to the kind of people who know all the things that must be borne in mind before the full truth, and nothing but the truth, can be ascertained in a given matter; rather, they must be taken care of by the more unhesitating minds who nimbly and resolutely grab what can be found out. The public is obligated to them even for the half-truths they seize, for without the aid of the press it would be at the mercy of the most absurd rumors. One gets a sample of this as soon as the press happens to be interrupted for a few days by a strike. On such occasions one becomes acquainted with the exaggerating force of rumor, of "fama," whose deformity the ancestors used to depict in such glaring colors. Incidentally, one must not overlook that the daily press may disseminate its

news only in proportion to the daily need. It must not begin to bother the public by too great accuracy and must not dwell upon a matter too long. The public is not at all interested in learning the full truth and nothing but the truth. As soon as it is sufficiently informed to satisfy its curiosity, it objects to additional information with boredom. The interest of the public sets the standard for the degree of accuracy which the press must observe. Regrettably, one must add that it is not easy to repair the inaccuracies once they have happened even if there is no lack of will to do so. Weeds once planted grow exuberantly, and one cannot keep up with them everywhere in order to eradicate them.

One must also add that only too often there is a lack of good intentions, for the press is and remains a party organ, after all, and its news are collected and written in the party spirit. A party paper cannot feel called upon to disseminate news which favors the interests of the adversary. It will assiduously disseminate only the kind which serve its own party. Besides, it must give out news of general interest which it must not keep from its public even if they are unwelcome. But where is the line between what one still has to say and what one may risk excluding from what is to be said? No doubt the party spirit will draw the line in such a way that it must appear to the reader demanding the full truth arbitrarily and unjustly drawn. Upton Sinclair has something to say about how rarely he, the socialist, succeeded in getting into the channel of the middle-class-oriented wire service of the Associated Press information which was detrimental to the capitalist regime. In most cases he had to give up the attempt. The "channel" was not opened up to him, an impenetrable "wall," as he puts it, barred the access. Doesn't such a denial of service amount to a denial of justice? He who considers the press to be an organ of the public news service will react so. The press as a party organ feels differently: it believes to perform an act of sovereign justice, and if one were to accuse it of meting out justice based on class bias, it may perhaps plead that as long as there is [REDACTED] wouldn't be justified at all to follow a different course. To be sure, it must not be concealed that there appear, along with the more excusable cases of class prejudice, also cases of star-chamber justice. Not infrequently the press reveals itself as a master of the style of clever concealment.

Less conspicuous than the outright refusal to reveal the facts, but much more pernicious in its effect, is bending the truth, of which the press following the party line becomes guilty. No party member has an unbiased view or is able to think impartially. The press as a party organ is least able to do so, for it must see with the eyes of the masses and think with the mind of the masses, which are always more impassioned than is the individual by himself. For the masses what is individual never counts, only what is general, only things with which everybody can go along, only what is strong, simple, and can be said and felt without reservations and qualifications. In every assembly the loudest orator wins through most easily, the one using the most drastic language, and the press cannot obtain the attention of its readers in any other way. The overwhelming majority of them do not read the newspaper like a precious book where every word is savored but they skim over it in great haste, quickly searching for the most spectacular only, and at bottom they accept only what obliges their prejudiced mind. After reading

the morning paper they do not want in their daily activities to have to bother with new ideas suggested to them, rather they seek confirmation and reinforcement for their conventional view. Just as is true for the party jargon, so in the press, too, all public affairs are governed by accepted beliefs which one must adhere to lest one abandon good form and run the risk of not being listened to any longer. When among themselves, those in the know talk quite differently, making fun of the ringing phrase which they keep trumpeting forth before the masses just as soon as they face them again. When one personally runs into the political adversary he is met with the accustomed good manners of human intercourse, but in public and in the press the political rival and the masses belonging to the opposition party find themselves, even more so than does the individual, deprived of the protection afforded by good manners. One may cast suspicion on him, nay, the party spirit demands that he be suspected of every possible rancor. Not only the opinion of the press but also its news service is colored by the party. Where the "channel" must be opened its water becomes muddied; the well is poisoned, although one does not always become really aware of it. One of the most widely circulated accusations against the press is that because of its daily distortions it is chiefly to blame for the heating up of passions. This accusation is hardly justified in full. As organ of the party the press is the echo of the party voices, with all other voices being drowned out by the noisy voices of passion, which indeed gains still greater effect by the aggravating resonance of the press.

A large portion of the newspaper columns does not serve the party interest but the general interests of the public. Here the press is free of factionalism, but even here it must placate the spirit of the people; here, too, it remains in the service of the mass soul. As spiritual leader of the masses the press does much, one may say extremely much, by all manner of instruction and education, but all the same it does not get out of the domain of the mass soul. It will teach the masses, but it will not improve and convert them. It doesn't even try this. The daily press stays within the horizon of everyday affairs and must stay there. What is not situated within this horizon must remain alien to it, and it must not burden the public with such matters, at least not on weekdays. Only on Sundays, and still more on certain extraordinary occasions, does the public have sufficient leisure for and interest in ideas aiming beyond the narrow bounds. On suitable occasions a large newspaper will open its columns to the nation's leading minds. These must welcome the opportunity to present what the hour calls for to a host of people and with such special effect to boot, that at the same time a general impression is being evoked which becomes a daily conversation piece with a more lasting echo than other utterances of the press are granted. Attentive readers clip the respective passages with a view to preserving them with care. However, this still doesn't help one to get over the fact that, all told, the general tenor of the press, which takes its cue from daily life, is dominant. The multitude amidst the variegated material of the paper does not spot the rare pearls offered to it from time to time. The regular subject matter of the paper can be worked through by the journalist only just to a degree compatible with the speed which is the supreme canon of the daily press. The issue must be completed within a deadline, and nothing must be absent that can still be communicated before it has elapsed.

Nothing is worse than to be bested in this by another paper. Speed is the foremost professional duty in the nerve-racking service of the journalist, and thoroughness has a place only to the extent that it is compatible with speed. What's lacking in terms of thoroughness must be compensated for by authoritative presentation. And as is well known we have mentioned this before — to the public itself thoroughness doesn't really matter a great deal. One might almost say that within a large area it isn't even concerned about truthfulness but only about the kind of mental satisfaction reaching from sensation-seeking to the sense of well-being caused by refined artistic enjoyment: one wants to be entertained, stimulated, flattered, and — to the extent necessary and attainable without too great an effort — also educated and advanced. From this the journalist derives his second professional duty, namely, to offer an interesting account. If it is impossible to attain full truthfulness, one must compensate for this by elegance of presentation.

In the rush of daily service the journalist of average talent must content himself with using the press jargon which the journalistic craft has worked out. Even the most competently managed and edited paper cannot stay completely aloof from it because it cannot carry out its far-flung task if, aside from the distinguished collaborators whom the far-sighted editor attracts, it doesn't use on its staff some lesser talents as well. Every issue of a large paper offers examples of the good and the inferior types with whom the press works. Side by side with the conscientious critic, who weighs every word, and the experienced professional, the man of routine and of the careless phrase writes. Aside from the language-corrupting and thought-abhorring jargon of the craft one finds the virtuoso who masters in superior fashion the so intractable instrument of public opinion, and in between from time to time a pure note rings through, clearly discernible amidst all the noise, without losing any of its truth and beauty.

6. The Impact of the Press

The formerly customary glorification of the press is as unfounded as the now customary rejection. Inasmuch as it is at all admissible to judge the press as a whole, behaving differently as it does at each of its stages and in each place, it must be said that the accusers of the daily press demand more from it than it is inherently capable of doing, much as it may try. It must currently relate the course of events to the masses of educated and uneducated and in agreement with the existing leaders must issue the slogans conducive to understanding those events. As a business enterprise it cannot help safeguarding its commercial interests and to pay heed to its sales. It will therefore seek to offer its best, yet it must nowhere exceed the mental capacity of its circle of readers, and least of all can it afford to fight against the basic views and passions prevalent in that circle. It only has to have a feel for the emergence of new general sentiments and must aim at going along in good time with future turns of events, yet it must steadfastly cling to the firm core of the party line and of the prevailing general view.

Nevertheless it is utterly wrong to believe that the domination of the daily press is only a fleeting dominion, unable to

prevail against the power of the status quo. The mountains of paper piled up by it daily collapse in no time, it is true, yet its dominion is still no mere paper reign as is that of the many paper constitutions of the present time. The mass impressions repeated daily by the press in its capacity as a brain machine, fleeting as they may be in particular, in toto contribute crucially to the state of mind of the modern masses. Notwithstanding all the instruction which it gives them the much the overmuch — it brings them daily severely blunts their desire for education, impairing the vigorous receptivity of the minds. A press which presents the much the overmuch in a hasty and superficial manner, to boot, depresses the love of truth of the masses.

Aside from these internal effects one must not overlook a drastic external effect. The press massages the masses who at the present time newly throng to the political entity, it is called upon to turn them into the same direction and bestow upon them a rudimentary discipline. It provides for the masses of voters and those who want to become voters the kind of service which the parliamentary floor leader provides for the representatives, and has to provide this service not only for political affairs proper but also for public affairs in general along a whole series of directions. It must be admitted that the press has rendered this service with unusual vigor. Guided by the scent of its interest, it recognized earlier and more fully than did most of the old historical leaders the peculiar character of the modern mass. It is indefatigable in rallying the masses, putting them in rank and file, and mentally uniformizing them. If the old historical leaders had been as adept as the press is adapting to the new ways, society would be much better off.

The rivalries of the political parties are severely aggravated by the interference of the press. The members of each of the existing political circles by the solidarity of their press obtain a clear awareness of their coherence, they gain rapport with each other, they become conscious of their numbers, they receive the catchwords and slogans by which they recognize each other and with which they confront their adversaries. The party-line-oriented news service of their home journals conveys the facts to them in such a way as to convince them fully of themselves being right and of their adversaries being wrong.

By organizing the masses the press, acting as an intermediary, helps to subordinate them to the existing leaderships; it represents the leaders vis-a-vis the masses. But in doing so the press also reduces the degree of superposition of the leaders, i.e., by acting on their behalf it deflects from them and appropriates for itself a not inconsiderable portion of their leadership power. It cannot avoid paying heed to the mass sentiments which it clearly reads from the sensitive barometer of sales, yet it is far from being the submissive servant of the masses. It has to meet them half-way in those cases where it is particularly sensitive to their interests. For the rest, if it uses some good sense it can feel assured of its following, for it is equipped to satisfy curiosity, that most typical attribute of the masses, and to interpret for them, in the manner of a modern-day oracle, the meaning of the public events which arouse their attention. By setting itself up as a mass organ it manages at the same time to obtain the following of the masses which it gathers, thereby

becoming elevated to a position of equality among the top social leaderships.

The press is of greatest service to the lower strata, which in its absence could not become aware of their own special needs and of the weight of their numbers. Therefore he who views the masses as the real champion of freedom will even today still elevate the press to a position of eminence, whereas he who sees in the masses the enemy of true freedom, the freedom of the liberated minds, will reject the press as by far the most oppressive organ of power. Both observers are wrong because each is able to see only one side of the given state of affairs. Genuine freedom can exist only when it is safeguarded by the coherence of leader and masses. The highest freedom must always reside in the leading minds, which have to be pathfinders for society. But since the masses have to legitimate the leader, they must also have the option of following, i.e., they must not be forced to follow the chosen leader in the manner determined by him. As the leader needs guiding strength, they need supportive strength, which is just as necessary for the well-being of society. It is the noble task of the press to serve the cause of popular liberty by advising the masses with respect to their supportive strength. Where the press is missing, the leader is less constrained in his decisions, being able to proceed more readily in accordance with his high-minded ideas. Where the press is well entrenched, he must pay more heed to the mass sentiments, and his work will be slower, though more solid, if the masses are soundly advised. Where immature masses are badly advised by an immature press, which is only too willing to do their bidding, progress and security are threatened to the same degree.

The observation that the press is said to bring about mass education will lead all those who believe that mass education is tantamount to the end of culture to condemn it without reservations. A misapprehension which can be easily corrected! Mass education always follows later. Culture can be disseminated among the masses only after it has reached its peaks, but it is quite wrong to believe that when it begins to gain in breadth its growth in height must have come to an end. It is true that, as a rule, some time will lapse until society has rallied its strength to ascend to new heights, but no nation would have been able to scale cultural peaks if it had not had within itself the strength to rise above its first attainments of cultural progress. The fact that the press helps to spread education among the masses in no way prevents the great minds of a nation from continuing to lead the way. Surely one would not want to believe, for example, that Christianity, having otherwise triumphed over all persecutions, would have been unable to rise above the levelling power of the press if the Romans had already had their press. Or is it thought that the spread of mass education would divert tensions inhabiting the popular soul that are conducive to new takeoffs? While not being itself able to bring about great social developments, the press will not stand in their way either. Great forces always awaken in the hidden recesses of great souls, and it will take time for them to emerge from the dark into broad daylight. But only then do they come into the purview of the daily press, and why should the latter oppose them as soon as they have come into their own? The great force which has succeeded is bound to have a good press as well.

To stand for freedom of the press under the given circumstances is unnecessary. It has power, and thus it is free. It is one of the great realities of modern life to which every other power in state and society must resign itself. He who is serious about "freedom from the press" must have the determination and the strength to plow more deeply than the press is able to do on the level of the masses on which the press has won its power. The great intellectual leader will overcome the power of the daily press.

E. The Economic Leadership Organs and Mass Organs

1. The Capitalistic Enterprise

The modern large-scale enterprise stands in the same relation to the large enterprise of earlier times as does the modern steamship to the rowing galley. The latter was powered by the human force of slaves or convicts, and the former also requires many hands to operate it, but the driving force comes from machines alongside which still other substantial capital goods have to do their job. The older version of large enterprises has achieved its stature, above all, by the large number of employee workers, while the modern version demands, in addition, a large amount of fixed and working capital. It is a capital-intensive enterprise. In addition it is characterized by a second element. Its types are in an unending process of development. As one strives continually to enlarge and improve the steamship and especially to refine its motive apparatus, so within the entire range of the large enterprise one harnesses the progressive technological know-how in order to employ more efficient capital goods to cope with the rising demand. Thus the modern large enterprise demands of its chief an ever alert, enterprising spirit. It must be a capital-intensive enterprise, geared to highest efficiency of the large capital put to work in it. From the point of view of the entrepreneur it is a capitalistic enterprise where concern with profitability, the highest personal rate of return obtained from the capital employed, overshadows concern with technical efficiency. Productivity increases which do not raise the profit rate are disregarded by the entrepreneur. Increases in profitability are striven after even when performance remains the same, let alone recedes. Nevertheless, performance remains the most important foundation of revenue.

Public opinion does not know how to appraise properly the share which the capitalistic enterprise has in the rise of economic productivity. It is customary to attribute the merits of economic progress to the discoveries and inventions of modern technical science without giving special thought to the entrepreneur. In reality, technical progress could never be realized without the great entrepreneur. By organizing his enterprise, he also acts as a discoverer and inventor. He resembles a social dowser in the scent he has for how to get hold of the varied complementary factors which the modern capitalistic enterprise has to combine and for the turns which supply and demand will take. In addition, the great entrepreneur must be a strong-willed man comparable to an economic Wallenstein who conjures up armies of salaried and wage employees and trains them for their jobs. It takes a strong, untiring effort to think through in every detail and to put into practice the entrepreneurial concept

which corresponds to a given state of technical knowledge and to a given market situation. The subsequent entrepreneurs who copy the new model don't have to be such dominating types any more as were the innovating first entrepreneurs. Yet the rapidly changing technical and market conditions of our time keep posing ever new tasks calling for the great entrepreneur, just as the quick changes of arms technique and political situation pose ever new tasks to the tactician and the strategist of our time. Setting up a modern gigantic enterprise presupposes a measure of entrepreneurial energy which itself borders on the gigantic.

As does a discoverer and inventor, as does a military leader, the great entrepreneur needs a free mind and an unfettered will in order to live up to the constantly changing requirements of the time. The doctrine of individualism expounded by the classical economists is tailored to fit the person of the modern entrepreneur as it became prominent in England and France beginning in the mid-18th century. When classical doctrine demanded freedom for the economy it fundamentally meant the freedom, the right of self-determination, of the entrepreneur. It did not know yet, nor could it know then, that with the further development of the capitalistic enterprise, with its growing tendency to monopolize, entrepreneurial self-determination had to entail constraints on numerous social strata.

The development whereby the free leadership organ of the enterprise becomes an organ of self-serving power was already pursued at an earlier place inasmuch as it concerns the relationship to consumer demand or, more generally, to the demand of the buyers of the goods and services supplied by the large-scale enterprise. This portrayal must now be completed with respect to the effect imparted by the capitalist enterprise on the weaker firms displaced by it and on the workers employed by itself. These two groups are hit much harder by its superior strength than are the buyers of its goods and services. The buyers always find the large-scale enterprise to be clearly advantageous because it produces at lower cost and they thus benefit from lower prices, not to mention that for the most part supplies reach the market in greater quantities, more quickly, and not infrequently in greater variety. Why else would demand turn to the large firm? By patronizing it, buyers confirm the superiority of its economic conduct. Causes for buyer dissatisfaction build up only when the capitalist enterprise, having gained superior strength puts regard for performance behind regard for revenue and raises its prices. Even if it doesn't go so far, one already becomes annoyed when learning that entrepreneurial profits increase without the public being any better off. One feels that the entrepreneur's gain is the buyers' loss, and one demands that even as a monopolist he set the price as low as he would have to do under effective competition. Salaried and wage employees of the firm also confirm by their following that the job opportunity provided by the entrepreneur is more advantageous than what they otherwise might find. Certainly, this is not proof positive that their job is really good or even befitting a human being. It may be that the men and women who followed the entrepreneur's call allowed themselves to be deceived by the figure of the money wage because they were unable to foresee the level of their necessary expenditures, let alone to appraise the loss of vital energy and happiness with which they were to be

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 brought by the work load to which they committed themselves and by the difficulty and insecurity of working conditions in their occupation. Perhaps they were also lured by the prospect of having their income supplemented by the earnings of wife and child, without being able to gauge the consequences arising therefrom for wife and child, for family life, and in the end for the husband and father himself. The predominance of the capitalist entrepreneur strikes particularly hard, without any compensating advantage, the weaker competitors crowded out of the market by him. They either find their income reduced or they lose their social position and are pressed down into a lower class where they cease being independent businessmen and must be content with finding a job as wage workers.

The groups injured by the capitalistic predominance in turn feel challenged to confront the capitalist leadership organ, the entrepreneurs, with their own mass organs in order to offer resistance and to afford as much relief as possible. It may be that, where they are too weak themselves, the state or the commune or some other polity takes it upon itself to perform the service of such a mass organ. The number of such mass organs has become quite considerable everywhere today. The impact of many of them is very significant, but none of them so far has surmounted the function assigned to the mass organ by the nature of things. Under the given circumstances of today none of them is quite able to replace and dislodge the leadership organ of the capitalist enterprise.

2. The Large-Scale Enterprise

The excellent men who founded the party of the Christian Socialists in England around the middle of the last century aimed at creating producer cooperatives of craftsmen which would free the latter from the exploitative domination by capitalists. The attempt failed. The capital had been raised to set up an association of tailors in London, but much as the London tailor journeymen suffered from the exploitation by the sweatshop operators, nobody among them could be found who would have had the courage to experiment with a cooperative. The failure of this well-prepared endeavor clearly proves that in the final analysis it is not due to a lack of capital if the producer cooperative does not succeed, for in this case the necessary funds had been raised, after all. The decisive circumstance is that the idea of the producer cooperative does not take the basic relationship between leader and masses sufficiently into account. It expects of the masses functions which simply can be performed only by the leader, while not according to the leader the position which he claims on the strength of his ability. Entrepreneurial thought and entrepreneurial will reside only in the mind of the leader, and the great mass of craftsmen and unskilled workers faced with the new entrepreneurial mode was in still more dire need of leadership than it would normally have been. The medium- and lower-grade master craftsmen were so trained in their accustomed shops that they could manage them as chiefs, but when the new situation called for the large-scale enterprise they were unable to merge their shops into a large-scale enterprise to be conducted on joint account. They waited until under the kick of the capitalist entrepreneur, to whom they now guided by their mass instinct to follow -- submitted as dependent workers, they lost

their independence. Governments and society as a whole, as well as men of science, accepted the social upheaval thus taking place in large segments of the craftsmen population as something final, as a necessary consequence of the unstoppable trend toward large-scale production which was not to be interfered with.

Whereas the cooperative strength did not suffice for the formation of large-scale enterprise associations, it was enough to bestow the advantages of joint management on the surviving medium- and small-scale shops of craftsmen, as also on rural enterprises, at least in certain specific lines such as buying and selling, storing, and credit extension.

In the case of consumers, cooperative strength was sufficient for the formation of consumer cooperatives. These associations are faced with a fixed demand as determined by the customary needs of the household in a given social stratum and by the number of households belonging to this stratum. The procurement of supplies also does not make any particular claims on entrepreneurial ability, especially if limited, as was true for the first consumer co-ops, to buying from the nearest-stage wholesalers and producers. In the classic case of the Rochdale pioneers there were at first seven worker families joining forces, and from among these it would be easy to find a person fully capable of conducting the small business transactions. Even when the consumer co-ops by and by considerably increased their membership, it was easy for them to find in the labor market trained personnel of the kind offering their services to the individual entrepreneur. It was then also possible to train people in one own's shop so as to be able to measure up to the demanding tasks of a more far-reaching business management which had recourse to the more distant sources of procurement and was commercial in a higher sense of the term. From the platform of the consumer co-op it was also possible to take the step to the producer co-op, which didn't succeed when undertaken separately. It doesn't require any special entrepreneurial ability to set up one's own bakeries to meet the fixed demand for bread which the consumer co-op has to satisfy and to establish one's own mills to meet the fixed demand for flour coming from one's own bakeries. In advancing further one came to expand operations from the provision of foodstuffs, the beginning stage, to meeting the members' demands for other necessities. Many consumer co-ops arranged for selling goods procured for the membership to non-members as well, but even then the fixed demand of the members remained the secure foundation of the operation. When after all this the business assumed the dimensions of a pronounced large-scale enterprise it nevertheless didn't turn into a capitalistic enterprise but remained a mass enterprise, an enterprise conducted in the interest of the mass of members and limited by their horizon, people who did not venture out on the high seas of the market with its changing demand, varying all the way from tempest to calm. Incidentally we may here register the interesting observation that with the rising demand placed on the managing personnel by the growing size of the business it might well happen that the task of managing came to be too much for a majority of the members. Under circumstances of such a vast scale as to require true entrepreneurial ability, this ability was likely to be coupled with entrepreneurial striving for power as well. The managerial employees were able to use their position, in which they felt they could not readily be replaced, to the end of increasing

their incomes to a figure which, in addition to their customary salary as officers, would yield them a certain entrepreneurial profit. As is well known, such producer cooperatives of workers were not infrequently transformed into proprietorships of their managers after having achieved prosperity, thanks to the business acumen of their leading member!

Still more far-flung, according to kind as well as size, is the area of economic undertakings by the state, the municipality, and other polities. It is not necessary for us to enumerate them separately. Many of them attain an extraordinary size. The unified operation of the railways of a great state vastly outstrips in territorial extent, capital, and number of employed persons any other business enterprise. But here, too, experience clearly shows that with respect to the tasks which these enterprises are able to shoulder they also encounter a certain limit beyond which they must leave the field to the capitalist enterprise. Of the purely economic state enterprises which arose during the period of Mercantilism, most have died on the vine because they were no longer able to keep abreast of the capitalist enterprises. Left are mainly those which, like the state forests, were seen to be in the public interest, thanks to their efficient administration. Added to these from time to time were those which, as is true for the railways, were seen to serve a public interest which private operation could not meet to the desired extent. But not every enterprise demanded by the public interest admits of operation by the government. A polity can successfully operate only those enterprises whose operation can be so governed by set rules that it can be performed, yea must be performed, as a civil service, because only the civil service creates the necessary loyalty to duties. In the formative years of the railways, when their different types had not yet been demarcated both technically and administratively, the private entrepreneur had to be called on the plan, and only after the rules had been found and the multitude of clerical and manual workers had been trained did the time come for the state to take over. Now one could hope that training in the shop would also develop the talents of those men inherently capable of serving as the top managers of the gigantic enterprise. Men who are to measure up to this task must have the qualities of great entrepreneurship, not only in technical and organizational respects but also as business managers. Of all the qualities of the capitalist entrepreneur there is only one they need not possess: that of a far-reaching imagination which seeks new combinations of capital and labor. Their attention may, and must, be devoted exclusively to the delimited mass enterprise, which they have to superintend in the interest of the polity.

The capitalist enterprise got started as the business of a single entrepreneur or of a small number of full partners. As the business grew to large dimensions it was impossible to stay within these confining enterprise forms; one had to turn to the multitude of capitalists and savers in order to woo them for active participation and financial contributions. Thus emerged the corporation, the "Rothschild of shares," which was needed by the economy because the private funds of even the most wealthy families were no longer sufficient to accommodate the business demands of the capitalist enterprise. The corporation embodies something of a mass enterprise, giving the multitude of owners of large and small money capital the opportunity to put it to work

in enterprises. This to a certain degree balances out the social upheaval which the large enterprise effected through the suppression of medium-size and small businesses. To be sure, it is not the same persons who are compensated, not the adversely affected master craftsmen, but rather persons from quite different circles and, aside from the middle and lower strata, also the upper and the top strata of the propertied class. But however large the multitude of shareholders may be whom the corporation enlists in this way, it thereby still does not become a full-fledged mass enterprise but remains fundamentally a capitalist enterprise, which solely in the interest of the mass of shareholders is subjected to certain governmental controls materially inhibiting its free movement. The mass of shareholders has nothing to do with the management of the enterprise. Even the share in the direction of the enterprise accorded to them by law through the stockholders' annual meeting is in fact hardly taken advantage of by them; the capacity for self-determination of the masses does not suffice for this. Only the principal stockholder rises above the mass of the other stockholders in this respect and, if he has sufficient business experience, can force through his entry into the circle of enterprise directors. The remaining stockholders are and remain a mass which as a rule doesn't get beyond the status of blind followers and rarely has the necessary understanding, more rarely yet the will, for following with scrutiny. It therefore does not contribute to entrepreneurial profits but is nevertheless exposed to the hazard of entrepreneurial losses if it permits itself to be deluded by reckless promoters. The entrepreneurial profit is from the start reserved to the founders of the corporation who take it out when the share issue price is computed, and in particular it falls to those investment banks which in promotions see an opportunity to carry on the "undertaking of undertakings," proceeding from one promotion to the next and basing their entrepreneurial profit on capital gains. The prospects of higher yields which emerge during the later life of a share-based enterprise are exploited less by the public than by stock exchange speculators, that peculiar species of capitalist entrepreneurs who buy and sell, or else sell and buy, with a view to profiting from the spread of market price fluctuations which in turn reflect the rise and fall of a corporation.

3- The Labor Union

The labor union is the most decided of all economic mass organs. It has to meet a much more important task for the worker than does the consumers' co-op for the consumers. The co-op is only designed to guarantee them a somewhat better use of their income, whereas the labor union is to guarantee to the workers their income first place. At the same time the workers' power of resistance as members of a union is by far greater than is that of weak competitors shoved aside by the large-scale enterprise. A large number of these competitors go down irrevocably but the workers are able to strengthen their organ of resistance, the union, so much as to hit the capitalists at their most sensitive spot.

The power which supports the union is the proletarian class feeling solidly uniting the workers. Under present-day economic circumstances the anonymous power of the proletarian class

reeling is most vehemently agitated. The financial status of the mass of wage workers in large enterprises who labor long and hard is precarious, with the lower strata living in poverty and the bottom ones in outright misery. Awareness of the often splendid and usually at least good economic situation of the entrepreneurs must have a provocative effect on the minds. Why shouldn't the proletarian put all his trust in the doctrine presented to him by his leaders to the effect that he, who creates all output while receiving only a meager portion thereof as wages, has been cheated out of the entire surplus value! The bitter indictment hurled by the Roman poet in his "vos, non vobis" is sensed again today by the millions who tell themselves that they are sacrificing their strength, not for themselves but for others whom they have to serve. Without the power of class feeling the proletariat could never have become organized in its labor union. Being congregated in the factory and in industrial districts facilitates the organizing task, but if the spur of class feeling were absent the workers of our time would no more have been able to offer organized resistance than in times past the slaves, who only in the most extreme cases rose up to fight. The workers were directed by their solidarity to organize their union in the only effective way, namely, by workers of all trades joining ranks on an economy-wide basis. Their solidarity committed them to the kind of obedience to the directives of their leaders which trade unionists prove as a rule and which only in exceptional cases is violated by wildcat strikes and similar breakdowns of discipline. The union joining in solidarity all skilled workers in the economy does not have to fear a strike breaker. Its decisions to strike at one fell swoop forestalls the entire following within the trade or industry so as to paralyze completely the entrepreneurial capital. It doesn't mean a thing to have a law depriving the collective agreement of legal force; the decision to strike is nevertheless effective since it is backed up by power. It is sustained by the solidarity of the work force. Hardly ever has an entrepreneur faced with a strike declaration appealed to a court to cancel the strike decision as not binding according to the law governing coalitions of workers. No court in the whole world would have enough power for that.

When a strike has been well planned, a plentiful strike fund has been accumulated, and the time for declaring the strike has been aptly chosen, the entrepreneurs are hit hard, and they will be inclined to yield if their self-interest permits this at all. The majority of strikes are waged during the prosperity phase of the cycle. During the downswing the experienced leader will counsel a strike decision only in an emergency when there is a need to fight wage reductions which the workers do not believe they are able to submit to. During good times there is the prospect of gaining higher wages from the increased productivity of the enterprise, and the entrepreneur will probably prefer sharing the increased yield with the workers to being deprived of any profit during the period of the strike. In this way, well-organized labor unions in the course of development of the large-scale enterprise have succeeded in increasing notably over time the meager wages which they had to be content with during the originally bad times for the labor market. The entrepreneur will offer strong resistance only if he is asked to pay the workers higher wages than justified according to the laws of imputation, taking into consideration the appropriate returns for the special entrepreneurial services, for interest on borrowed funds, and for

ground rent. When business profits leap ahead, the entrepreneur will eventually even be ready to go beyond the yield attributable to labor and to let the workers share to some extent in the entrepreneurial profits, adding such share to their wages. A remarkable fact! It may be viewed as a symptom of the fact that between employers and employees, much as they may be at odds with one another, there yet exists fundamentally a far-reaching community of interests. In today's combative mood the existence of this community is not publicly admitted, but it nevertheless is at work, if tacitly. The whole circle of people engaged by the enterprise, from the top managers to the lowliest workers, is bound together by their common stake in the success of the business, and in the struggle with the customers and the competitors it feels as a unit and as a companionship of fate.

The labor union has no chance, nor does it even try, to obtain the full "product of labor" as postulated by the theory of surplus value. This "full product of labor" is simply the enterprise's total output, and the workers could demand it only if they were able to perform all the entrepreneurial services and if, in addition to providing the services of capital, they could also fill in for entrepreneurs as managers. This they cannot do, and they know that when nowadays the leadership top of the pyramid is broken off the worker base is also put out of commission. The union leaders are smart enough to adjust to the given circumstances. They do not consider making the union into a leadership organ for the enterprise, but they manage it as a mass organ of opposition. Success has proved them right: the down-to-earth struggle for higher wages has been of greater benefit to the workers than has the feeble wishing of the socialists. During the years when the British large-scale enterprises flourished, the labor unions became conservative and gave up the socialist theory, to which they only later gave somewhat greater attention again. In the United States, where the unions are extraordinarily strong, socialistic ideas are less widespread than they are in Europe. That the great majority of German proletarians after the revolution were not interested in the Bolshevik experiment may be ultimately explained by the fact that their mind, steeled in the school of experience, didn't quite trust the socialist program enough to put it into practice. The Russians took a chance with the Bolshevik experiment because their ideologists were in command.

According to socialist doctrine, the entrepreneur is simply the organ of exploitation. He is seen as the man who takes the surplus value away from the workers as soon as the time comes for the distribution of the proceeds, whereas he doesn't take a possibly active part in the creation of value which precedes distribution. He is said to use his power as owner of the means of production for the sole purpose of withholding their use from the workers as long as is necessary to make them willing to consent to wage agreements which leave him the surplus value. This view would make sense if the tracks of value creation were so worn out that the whole process would run its course automatically without leadership, so that practically it would merely be a matter of distributing the ripened fruits for consumption. If this were the way matters stand, then distribution would have to be governed by the oft-quoted formula, "to each according to his reasonable needs," and business law would have to be set up as

consumption law. But as long as the process of value creation doesn't yet run of its own accord business law must be set up as acquisition law that is, it must be so instituted that it remunerates success in production by so distributing the proceeds that the employed persons are thereby given the incentive to conduct their activities and to make their investments according to the prospects for maximum return. Whatever party doctrine may tell the workers, their practical experience teaches them beyond doubt that the activities of the able entrepreneur and that the retained earnings enabling him to make the necessary investment expenditures play an essential part in the success of the enterprise. When a new entrepreneurial idea vigorously pursued creates new employment opportunities, the workers flock there in large numbers, and through their ready following they endorse the capitalist leader. As long as economic development proceeds in the tumultuous fashion as happened during that portion of the capitalist epoch so far experienced by the culture peoples new entrepreneurial ideas will continue to pop up, and the willingness to follow will continue to attest successful leadership. The workers, in turn, will not miss the opportunity to become organized in order to raise their wages to the possible maximum, and to this end will everywhere confront the capitalist leadership organ with the mass organ of the trade union so that entrepreneurial power has to reckon with worker power. As long as this is the state of things, the taunting proclamation of the Communist Manifesto that the entrepreneurs will dig their own graves and will train the proletariat as their heir will not come true. The trade unionist mass organ will remain an organ of opposition, and not only will not be able, but also will not want to oust the capitalist leadership organ from its position.

When we talk of opposition here, we certainly have to include the rise flowing from the strength of the organized proletariat by which it lifts itself up to the maximum height attainable within the employer-employee relationship. The process of superposition through which the capitalist power has pressed down into the proletariat large groups of independent craftsmen is followed as the proletariat rises, by a far-reaching social equalization. In the countries of strong economic development, such as England and the United States, this equalization has proceeded very far, the upper strata of the proletariat being in economically adequate circumstances there. In Germany, too, the economic betterment was not inconsiderable, but there it was still surpassed by the political rise in that the organized proletariat has become the strong champion of the democratic movement. Already before the revolution it gained respect as a political party, and during the revolution itself it took decisive action. Although the hiatus in the economic composition of society, opened up by the downfall of the independent craftsmen, still hasn't been closed, the position of political power gained by the proletariat is markedly superior to that reached by those craftsmen heretofore.

As long as the capitalist leadership organ and the trade-unionist mass organ confront each other ready for battle and continue to grapple with each other through strikes and lockouts, the state of equilibrium between the classes which social welfare demands has not been attained yet. It is like between the nations which outdo each other in armaments and treaties, meant to give protection from war but unexpectedly leading to war

itself. A full equalization between the classes would be reached only when the tension of class feeling had been overcome and the industrial worker not only through universal suffrage had been elevated politically to fellow-citizenship, but also through codetermination economically to propertied citizenship. The condition would have to be reattained which existed prior to capitalist superposition when the small crafts and trades brought to the mass of economically active persons the satisfying feeling of property ownership. That of course is also what the socialist idea is after, which would like to supersede the rule of the few by ownership by the many. Might one not conceive a constitution of the large-scale enterprise which would assure the many of their rights without jeopardizing the exercise of leadership with which, after all, only the few can be charged? A constitution of the large-scale enterprise which would transform the absolute monarchy of the entrepreneur into a constitutionally limited one, but with sufficient basic rights for the participating multitude? Such a constitution is, indeed, conceivable not only that, but it has already been put into practice in a handful of enterprises and has proved a success there. It starts from the idea of profit-sharing by the workers and also incorporates the idea of industrial partnership while carrying it much farther, and is crowned by placing an elite selected from among the workers alongside the entrepreneur, inasmuch as this does not cramp the freedom he needs in his decision-making. The private heir of the entrepreneur is not also heir to his leadership position, but the latter devolves upon a member of the elite.

A development along these lines is not preordained for the labor union. Even mere profit-sharing does not lie in its path for it threatens its solidarity, removing as it does the workers of a single enterprise from the association as a whole and tying them to that enterprise. For the labor union is a mass organ of opposition, shaped for the economic mass struggle. Once peace has been made between employers and employees the tension will disappear which now exists between leadership organ and mass organ, and then the time will be ripe for these two organs to unite and balance each other.

4. The Contribution of the Capitalist Enterprise to the Building of the National and the World Economy

Notwithstanding all the damage inflicted on the capitalist enterprise by the giant concern and by the labor union, it still enjoys a very large sphere of action and very great efficacy. Its sphere of action comprises not only the home country; it also finds its path to worldwide development. It attains its efficacy by exercising a leadership role in the utilization of the immense economic forces which are released by modern technology's fabulous progress. There is no social undertaking today which in its constructive results could be compared with the achievements on the economic front. Economic achievements constitute the social achievements of our times. This explains the dominating market position occupied by the capitalist enterprise. It eliminates by its superior bidding the medium- and small-scale shops, attracting buyers to its cheap, mass-produced goods. Just as it hereby secures its clientele by its call to work, it ensures the following by the masses whom in its extensive factory premises it provides with a vast arsenal of work tools. From a legal standpoint

it plies vis-a-vis its customers and workers merely the same private contractual power which is held by all the other parties in the market, yet in terms of its social effect it wields a kind of public power rivaling in many respects and even exceeding in some, that of the state. The power over its weaker competitors, whom it deprives of sales, is pernicious. The power it wields over the workers, whose services are in oversupply, where this power is not constrained by organs of mass resistance approaches the authority of a lord over his slaves. It wins over its customers by the mass suggestion of its supply of goods and services. It benefits from the fact that, as long as it avoids the worst excesses, its power is recognized by the law. It is a power by rights which is acquired and exercised in the customary legal forms and which must be accorded judicial protection. It breaks down only in the face of mass acts of resistance, such as the boycott and the strike, which are designed to stop by joint resolve the mass following by customers and workers. When followers stream towards it, as is usually the case, it is able to assert itself in directions where the armed power of the state fails completely. The most convincing evidence of this is its penetration into the far corners of the world from which foreign arms are barred during times of peace while this world eagerly receives the tender of the foreign businessman unless the border is closed by special governmental decree.

The constructive achievement of the capitalist enterprise is recognized even by its socialist critics. The accusation raised by Marx is aimed at the shocks caused by crises and social upheaval which are concomitants of the activities carried out by the capitalist enterprise. Its accomplishments as such, which through irresistible economic concentration move decentralized private economic decision-making closer to the centralized system of the future state, must be applauded by the socialist observer. As for us, we would like still to direct the reader's attention to certain effects which, though having for the most part escaped scientific observation, yet have their special significance. These effects are rooted in the "overcoming of distance" as made possible by the railroad, the steamship, the telegraph, the telephone, and lately also by aviation and radio communication. It is a feat largely accomplished by the capitalist enterprise, even though the state in considerable proportion was an active participant. Although it is not possible to talk of "overcoming distance" in an absolute sense, this being rather a case of extraordinary reduction of economic barriers hitherto presented by physical distance, the effects on the development of the national and the world economy are nevertheless exceedingly great. They tend in two directions: the localization of production units and the stratification of firms. In the national economy the process takes a course different from that in the world economy, where it encounters much stronger obstacles. This is why we must provide separate treatment for the national economy and the world economy.

In the national economy "overcoming distance" has provided the opportunity to bring the movable factors of production to the largest possible extent to the sites where nature has displaced the fixed factors. In every economy where a compact population is active, ideas spread without being arrested by local obstructions. Technical education in a given stratum is the same everywhere, and the same is true for the social character, as well as

for the energy and training of the masses. Therefore, the state citizen feels at home wherever he may choose to reside. This is why at the sites where nature has displaced its stores of wealth there will never be a shortage of entrepreneurs and workers who take advantage of the opportunity to earn a living. They will soon appear on the scene in the necessary numbers, and likewise the necessary capital goods will be brought there, while on the other hand the finished goods will be removed to the places where they are in demand. In the same way money capital flows to all the places where it finds remunerative use, and therefore enterprises can be located according to efficiency criteria. Of course the element of transport costs always remains a significant item in the economic calculus. Many a natural resource will therefore have to remain unexploited on account of high transportation costs, or at least will not be utilized to the extent that this would happen in a more favorable situation. But compared with the localization of enterprises which was necessary before the "overcoming of distance," it must be viewed as extraordinary progress that now one is confronted with localization on a truly economy-wide basis, whereas in earlier times only commodities which in an economic sense were especially transportable — i.e., those of especially high value relative to weight and bulk -- had an economy-wide market. All other products had as outlets only the limited markets of a particular region or town or even of only a village, and therefore localization of enterprises had to be geared to these geographically narrow districts. It was a deep-seated change when localization of production was transformed in accordance with modern technical production possibilities. England of the machine age shifted its economic center of gravity from its fertile agricultural regions to the coal districts, a process whose origins go all the way back to the time before the development of the English railway network, but which was immensely accelerated by the latter. In the process London as the economic capital did not lose weight, rather it gained still more with the growth of the country's total wealth, to which must be added the further enhancement bestowed on it by becoming at the same time the economic capital of the world. In the main, in the old culture nations today the process of economic localization has come pretty much to an end, and thus the general structure of the national economy is rather sharply defined. If the general structure of the old national economies were once more to change drastically, it would be necessary for large new shifts in the available resources of technology to occur, e.g. it would be necessary to increase greatly the potential use of water power, or progress in aviation would have to create entirely new conditions for "overcoming distance" if the old economies were once more to be extensively restructured. This statement is true, though, only to the extent that the worldwide interrelations of national economies are disregarded. Inasmuch as international economic reactions take place, national economic development may be significantly altered by the need to adjust to the international economic structure. The far-sighted businessman and politician therefore has every reason to observe attentively his home country's international economic relations.

In the world economy -- apart from the obstacles imposed by national governments on free economic intercourse increased transportation costs will have an additionally inhibiting effect. But also added in must be the historical forces which

f inhibit the migration of ideas, individuals, money capital, producer goods, and finished products. The peoples inhabiting the earth differ fundamentally in their economic endowment and their historical education. An economic method which in one country has long been established will never, or not in the foreseeable future, become indigenous in other countries. It will never be possible to train the population of certain countries to work in large industries, nor will it be possible to attract from afar the multitude of workers who would be able to exert their strength in the unaccustomed climate or to live in strange and unusual circumstances. Economically weak countries with a lack of legal security will find it impossible even to raise liquid funds. Once the means of transportation have been provided goods are more mobile, but completely mobile is only the spirit of daring of a certain group of profit-hungry individuals who are able to adapt to all circumstances which lead their imagination to expect great successes. Given these circumstances, it will not be possible to organize the localization of enterprises on the same scale of world-wide economic efficiency as is possible within a single national economy, nor will it be possible in anywhere near the same degree to exploit the natural resources as can be done within a nation. The more exotic the conditions abroad, the more paltry the investments that can be placed there and the number of workers who through immigration or training can be supplied for the exploitation of the resources. The plant installations in the old culture nations are of an incomparably greater capital intensity and are more efficiently utilized by qualified workers than is the case in the remainder of the world and than would be appropriate in the light of their natural resource endowment. Many precious natural resources are neglected because of their location beyond the range of entrepreneurial intentions. A single adventurous settler cannot succeed on his own. Only joint action by the many makes possible the spectacular successes, and it is therefore necessary to initiate large migrations of people if even the best virgin land is to yield good results. How long has it been since the European migration to the United States was substantial enough to fill the central and western parts of the country with people working the soil! How much fertile land, indeed, still remains untouched in Canada, ready to be subjected to the plow!

The development of the world economy is still in its beginnings, but there is no doubt that it will advance very rapidly if the world is granted peace. The acquisitiveness of entrepreneurs and masses of workers, directed to the realization of the many opportunities which still remain unexploited today, will not rest until the use of capital and labor has been brought into harmony with the geographic distribution of the world's mineral resources. The focal point of the world economy is likely to move — partly by gradual shifts and partly in rapid jumps — from Europe toward the new continents, and perhaps it will also tend toward the old Asia wherever the latter is able to accept economic modernization. For the time being Western Europe, followed even more closely by Central Europe, still takes distinctly first place in the acceleration of economic development. Not only have enterprises been made more capital-intensive, but they also operate in closer propinquity, and — of particular significance — they are designed for higher profitability. The country amply endowed with capital wherever possible gathers within its confines the most profitable enterprises, leaving the less

productive ones to weaker foreign countries, which may have to be content with shouldering the more laborious tasks and to get along on more meager incomes. England presents an instructive example of this. In its prime it kept for itself, in addition to the most remunerative industries, the business of international finance and of world shipping. In order to take full advantage of its manufacturing opportunities, England whenever possible amassed its workers in very lucrative industrial enterprises, and therefore neglected agriculture on its rich soil because it was a better deal to obtain the cheap products of the soil from abroad than to use the precious manpower in domestic agriculture. The conventional theory of the division of labor doesn't bring these conditions into clear focus. It only pays attention to the horizontal division according to branches of industry and other business occupations, without keeping an eye on the vertical stratification according to the degree of profitability. In the development of the world economy a law of international stratification of work applies which favors the capital-strong economies over the rest. They have the personal as well as material means to build up enterprises of highest profitability, and they take fullest advantage of the means at their disposal.

The capital-poor economies also must resign themselves to the fact that the best they have in mineral resources and other site advantages will be bought up and seized by the powers of international finance. Looking ahead, world capitalists acquire the localized sources of supply of the great primary commodities whenever there is a danger that foreign competitors will get control of them. As English and American financial powers today fight over the petroleum deposits of Mosul -- where it is only agreed to checkmate Turkey -- so big capitalists seek to secure for themselves in so many other places the strategic centers of the world economy.

The boundaries for the economic sphere of action of the capital-rich countries have been extended by the capitalist enterprises far beyond the political boundaries of their mother countries. Their adventurous spirit, fortified by the power of their economic resources, bursts open the bounds which political and armed power are unable to transgress. It would be informative to indicate on the world maps the spheres of economic power of the great nations as they reach across the state boundaries. For this purpose one would have to set up maps indicative of economic ownership the way this is done today with maps indicating the distribution of national settlements. Such maps would have to show not only all foreign possessions of lands, factories, trading and shipping companies, and other investments, but also the number and the economic position of native persons who are active abroad. They would also have to bring out the size of loans which make the capital-rich country a creditor and the capital-poor a debtor. To use the summary term which has become customary in the United States, one would have to be able to express the degree of economic concentration which the capital-rich country exerts throughout the world. In this way one would obtain a graphic picture of the international economic balance of power, where the strong, economically controlling countries would be clearly set off from the weak, economically controlled ones.

Organized labor in the weaker states makes common cause with entrepreneurs in the battle against the capital predominance of

foreign states. Here the community interests of capital and labor becomes plain. Henry George, who refuted with brilliant satire the customary arguments of bourgeois protective tariff policy, from the vantage point of proletarian interests opposed the free-trade doctrine most emphatically.

Among the capitalist powers the power of financial capital is the most effective. Apart from the fact that it is less exposed to attack by the proletariat, it is also superior to industrial capital in its ultimate effect. For the time being, it is true, it must give precedence to the latter in the development of production, for it is lacking the latter's creative power. Instead, at a later time, after industrial capital has performed its founding work, financial capital in a great many cases manages to obtain control over its enterprises. With the general trend toward doing things on a big scale, industrialists continue to need injections of funds, and only the strongest among them are able to draw for these on retained earnings, most of them depending on external finance. This is especially true during periods of crisis, when financial capital manages to benefit most from its liquidity. It is thereby placed in the same favorable position vis-a-vis big industry as is the usurious small capitalist vis-a-vis the indigent peasant. It can convert money capital into real capital at a point in time which is most propitious for money capital. It can acquire at lowest prices the naturally most durable works, or it can find it useful to bring the works, in some legally suitable form, under its economic control, thereby assuring it the bulk of the entrepreneurial profit. The business of large-scale promotions has fallen almost exclusively to the banks, which pursue it for the most part by buying up prosperous proprietorships and, after suitable expansion, converting them into corporations. In the process they pay themselves for their capital investment by issuing a suitable number of shares, and in addition to the promotion profit, which they secure through the high issue price, they continue drawing a profit from their effective control of the enterprise. By acting as intermediaries in the floating of public loans, financiers obtain far-reaching control over the governments of the weak states, and they extend such control from their purely profit-oriented interests to the preservation of their more general stakes in economic policy. Since economic policy finds its ultimate support in national political policy, financiers will also attempt to bring the latter under their control, and frequently enough with success. Even in its capital-rich home country, the political influence of finance capital grows to large proportions. For the government as well as the political parties economic policy-making is a task whose discharge makes them dependent on the self-serving advice of the owners of finance capital, and since economic and political policies cannot be separated their advisory influence will be felt in both. Even aside from this, finance capitalists have plenty of means to ingratiate themselves to the government and the parties, thereby also gaining influence on the formation of both. They are able, better than any other power, to make the press orchestra of their own country as well as the orchestra of the world press dependent on them and thereby to manage the public mood and opinion. People who have got around in the world are occasionally heard to offer the view that today the real rulers of the world are the great world bankers and that Mr. Morgan now is the mightiest man in the world. Though this judgment may

overshoot the mark and this name may have been picked quite arbitrarily, it certainly is still not erroneous to assume that owners of finance capital in the secrecy of government cabinets today exert a power comparable to that of the Jesuit orders over Catholic governments in times lying not very far back. In his role of financial father confessor the banker has access to government secrets and influence on crucial government decisions. If at some future time all archives should be opened up for the purpose of ascertaining World War guilt it will not do to pass up the bankers' archives. Isn't it conceivable that high finance had much to do with the declaration of war of the United States by utilizing, in addition to its other controlling influence, the power it exerted on public opinion through the press?

All along the economic interest has been one of the strongest motives in abetting war. This was true for the barbarian peoples and has remained true for the culture peoples. Strictly speaking, the only difference is that in earlier times of naive honesty one did not hesitate to acknowledge the economic objectives of war, whereas today one knows how to cover them up discreetly in front of the public. In turbulent times the merchant went on his expeditions in arms, as was still done until recently by the Arabic slave trader who went to Africa on his manhunt. The Phoenician towns were armed merchants' republics, Carthage came to the brink of world domination, the Greek republics as well as Venice and Genoa were armed, and the East India Company did more for the expansion of the British World Empire than any other organ of power in England. Still it would be incorrect to claim that the merchant as such is the founder of states. He merely assumed in certain cases the tasks of war. While one time or another he was successful in setting up states, in the majority of cases the task of state founding was performed independently from the merchant by warriors and priests, nobility and clergy. Upon these two leading estates, and among them primarily upon their secular and spiritual heads as leaders in the performance of contemporary social tasks, also devolved, along with all other successes, the contemporary economic assets. They shared in the possession of large landed estates and in the control of human labor.

During the capitalist era the process of power formation was peculiarly reversed. Now economic tasks became the constructive social accomplishment of the time. The capitalist entrepreneurs, above all the mighty owners of finance capital, as leaders in this movement not only acquired capital, the wealth of the times, but through it they also acquired social power in general. Now it was the capitalist entrepreneurs, and especially the mighty owners of finance capital, who were elevated through superposition to the towering heights of society. Today the great successes which assure the social leader of a mass following and make him ruler over the minds are won on the economic battlefields. Economic perspicacity devises the crucial war plans of the time. In the bold logic of their combinations they are not inferior to the strategies of a successful general, and the large human toll taken by the triumphant advance is as calmly accepted as the toll from a murderous war.

Most curious of all is that the rise of the capitalist enterprises is not confined to within the national boundaries. Across those boundaries they are building a worldwide economic

structure. Whereas the nations are not yet politically well enough organized to be able to agree on a world order, the capitalist entrepreneurs, after having completed the national economic structure according to the contemporary conditions, carry their conquests out into the wide world to achieve a victory without arms. National idealism accompanies them on their paths and is prepared to employ national power on their behalf if a foreign national power comes to pose a threat for them. The capitalist entrepreneur himself thinks he is acting in the national interest when he expands the sphere of control of his native country, and for the time being it is, indeed, so. But if one disregards the accompanying sentiments of the people and assesses the accomplishments of the capitalist leaders according to their lasting results, he recognizes that the national leadership organ is active as a world leadership organ by creating a supra-national, global work. This global work today is still in its infancy. While its outline is not sharp as yet, no attentive observer can miss the fact that it harbors a strong force, drawing new lines not only for the economic development of the world but, from its foundation for the political and general social development as well.

5. Modern Plutocracy

At their peak the great capitalists form a plutocracy which appears alongside the aristocracy by birth or penetrates it, or — where such an aristocracy does not exist — takes its place. Such plutocracies existed already in earlier times, but none of these could be as powerful as the contemporary plutocracy, for never before had the economic task been the constructive social task.

Plutocracy does not have a constitutional claim on participation in control. It is only weakly represented in the houses of the legislatures. It does not become an organized political party of its own, but exercises its influence on the existing political parties and through them, or also alongside them, on the governments, the offices, and sometimes also the dynasties. Through the press and through public opinion it also exercises it on the sovereign people. It enjoys its power without having to become conspicuous in the external arrangements of the state. It does not like it at all to stand out in this way, for as a shadow government it can wield more power than the official government. Without himself being a state functionary, the financial baron makes the representatives of the state dependent on him, so they act as he wants them to, as the Jesuits at the time when they held power educated the princes in their own way and managed to place their products into the decisive positions, or as Warwick, the last of the barons, was a king maker rather than being a king himself. Plutocracy exercises its power in the modern form of control, and in doing so one resorts to any means suitable to wielding power over the minds. The secret of the power of capital is its ability at all times to change into that shape which, depending on the situation at hand allows it to exert its strongest effect. It is because it immobilizes him that the plutocrat avoids public office. When he instigates revolutions, as foreign plutocrats, for example, have done often in certain Central American republics, he does not step forth himself as a dictator, but he directs his middlemen to act on his

behalf. He leaves to them the honors the worries, and the dangers of power, while himself defraying the expenditures necessary for the show of strength and collecting its golden fruits.

F. The Modern Dictatorships

1. The Classical Dictatorship and the Autocracy

When the Roman people had got into a dangerous plight, during times when the republic was strong it found the remedy in dictatorship. The Senate resolved: "Let the consuls take care lest the polity suffer any kind of injury," and thereupon the consuls named the dictator. The latter during his term of office enjoyed unlimited and absolute power, all citizens owed him unconditional obedience, he was master of life and death, and he was unaccountable. Of its own accord and sanctioned by law, the populace in its distress submitted to the most competent leader, who was released from all legal restraints which might have prevented him from eliciting a supreme effort from the populace. The person of the dictator, having been selected as the best from among the people, provided the guaranty for the absence of misuse of such a far-reaching power. Moreover, his term of office was set for the short span of a half-year, and given the strength of the public spirit it could be expected with certainty that on the appointed day the normal rule of law would be fully revived and that the dictator, like all the other Roman peasants, would return to his plow again.

The ordinary cause for a dictatorship was a grave war emergency. The half-year term reflected the length of the military campaign, which had to be completed during the warm season since during winter the arms were put to rest. In the case of war dictatorship the orientation to the commonweal is beyond the shadow of a doubt. It is a matter of a constitutionally provided, temporary and legally clearly defined suspension of the common law, undertaken for the sake of the common law. The extraordinary power of the dictator rests on the consent of a free people, intent on preserving freedom and order through him.

When the ground for dictatorship was internal unrest or civil war, it couldn't help veering the more from its pure form toward a mere party dictatorship, the deeper were the differences within the populace. Sulla's dictatorship was a pronounced party dictatorship. The terror of the proscriptions was one of its means, and its end was party rule. The constitution launched by Sulla was designed to strengthen the rule of the nobility. For the rest Sulla lived up to the original idea of dictatorship by resigning from his office as soon as he deemed his task completed.

Caesar, in addition to all the other offices he held, also had the Senate confer on him that of the dictator, and after expiration of the legal term he asked for a renewal of his charge. He thereby negated the idea of dictatorship in its very core. He escalated it from a temporary to a permanent extreme power; in the name of dictatorship he founded the Caesarean rule. He couldn't act otherwise if his rule was to meet its purpose. He had recognized that the old Roman city constitution did no longer satisfy the requirements of the world

! empire and that a new constitution had to safeguard the interests of the realm and had to include in its horizon, aside from the Roman citizens, the whole caboodle of subjugated people. The new constitution was in need of a supreme ruler because the subjugated peoples lacked any sort of strength and even the Roman strength for freedom was diminishing. Caesar felt that it was given to him to be this supreme ruler, and his nature irresistibly pushed him to assume the immense task of such a supreme ruler a task which had to be done and no one else could do. At the same time he could tell himself that he didn't deviate from the democratic way of thinking of his younger years by so acting, for he thereby would serve the interests of the populace which couldn't be served in any other way, and thus he could expect that the following of the masses would put the stamp of approval on his rule. In this respect he would fulfill the purpose of dictatorship, since he wanted to rule for the people's sake and through the people. His profound insight as a statesman told him that the most complete military victory would not be enough to give him undisputed rule. He had to fight for victory with arms in order to gain access to the rule which his rivals disputed, but in order to stay on top he had to be able to rely on the following by the masses. This was the way he had proceeded in Gaul. Through struggles lasting for years he had broken armed resistance there, yet at the same time through judicious accommodation placated the spirit of the populace so that no sooner had he brought that country to heel than he could safely leave it again and dare taking on his Roman rivals in the civil war. Along the same lines he intended to build up his dominion of the realm through victory by arms and to consolidate it for good by obtaining broad-based consent. To be sure, except for Caesar himself no other Roman ruler, not even Augustus, had all it takes to be an autocrat. Already among his immediate successors weak men, faced by the temptations of predominance, fell prey to Caesarean madness, and later, following Marcus Aurelius, when the traditions of the good times had completely vanished, the strong ones degenerated into mere military emperors.

2- Revolutionary Dictatorships and Law-and-Order Dictatorships

The danger of war always, and so also in the present, calls forth strictly exceptional forms of law which come more or less close to the Roman military dictatorship. To pursue its peculiarities in detail is of interest only to the jurist. On the other hand, the sociologically oriented politician must dwell on a consideration of those dictatorships which in the course of modern revolutions have assumed such distinct features. It is they which we will call modern dictatorships. They are clearly distinguished from the classical Roman dictatorship by having been constitutionally neither envisaged nor defined. At first glance they seem to be party dictatorships, like Sulla's, and many of them, like the latter, made frightful use of the means of terror against the opposing parties; yet they all envisage an aim higher than that of mere party dictatorship. They all are meant to promote the welfare of the whole populace, which is to be liberated by force from its autocratic rulers. The originators of the modern dictatorships intended them to be forms of coercion which should eventuate in higher forms of law. They are therefore at one with classical dictatorship in that the force to

which they lay claim is meant to hold good only for the state of emergency — except that instead of an external enemy it is an internal one which is to be got under control in the interest of the populace.

To the classical dictatorship, as well as to the modern one, belongs the exceptional person who justifies the emergency, the dictator who must not be cramped by the law, because otherwise he wouldn't be able to prove his peculiar strength on behalf of his people. The modern dictator must possess an even much stronger personality because he must be potentially able to affirm the dictatorship on his own volition, whereas for the Roman dictator dictatorship was ready-made and he was selected for his office by rights. On the other hand, when the modern dictator is overthrown, there is no need for the dictatorship as such to be eradicated at the same time. After the fall of Robespierre the revolutionary dictatorship continued in force because the opposition parties were still too weak to cope with it. It is true, though, that with Robespierre the dictatorship of the rule of terror had passed the culmination of terror and of the hold on human minds. Although its system could be upheld for some time yet, it was still only a matter of time before the strongman who was chosen to bring the reign of terror to an end had reached his full stature. That Robespierre was not formally proclaimed a dictator doesn't mean anything; he was dictator just the same. For modern dictatorship, of course, is not wedded to any particular form of law, and as little as the form of law is fixed, as little is its name. Napoleon called himself consul and then again emperor, craving to be the modern Caesar who established a permanent rule. But since the times were against him and toppled him from the throne, he was unable to assert himself as dictator, except temporarily. His rule was not one of permanence but a transitional one, and if we value clarity of terms we will have to designate it a dictatorship because it had that character of temporary emergency power which the Romans associated with dictatorship.

The modern dictatorships have been called into being by the fact that the stirred-up contemporary masses of people craved for freedom, but had not yet fully matured to the use of freedom. They pressed so impetuously for freedom that they were of no mind to follow those leaders who wanted to build the new law in peaceful transformation; they followed those who were bent on force and law. Inexperienced as they were in the use of freedom, they needed for their revolutionary outbursts, if these were to overcome all opposition, the firm hand of the dictator who would set the goals for them and maintain their united strength, and after the revolutionary excesses they again needed the firm hand of the dictator, who would provide law and order for them. The revolutionary or leftist dictatorships are followed by law-and-order dictatorships or dictatorships of the right. The former, as the latter, are transitional dictatorships leading to an improved state of law. The ones, as the others, in their time capture for themselves the mood of the masses, without which, notwithstanding all means of force at their disposal, they wouldn't be able to assert themselves for long. The constitutional changes at which the modern revolutions aim are geared to the constitution as a whole, and the same is true for the metamorphosis effected by the law-and-order dictatorships. In comparison, how modest look the changes to which the Gracchus

brothers were able to subject the Roman state of affairs! Even the slave uprising under Spartacus, from which a radical group of the German proletariat took its name after the upheaval, does by no means come close to the dimension of modern revolutions. It was an act of desperation by a multitude having no rights and which was not concerned with reshaping the state but only with escaping from the state. To master the far-flung tasks which the mass movements of the present time pose for modern dictatorships the half-year duration of classical dictatorships will not do. Their duration is determined by the unpredictable course of events.

3. Cromwell

The first of the great modern revolutions, the English one, elevated Oliver Cromwell to supreme power in the state; in him we confront the first modern dictator. He began his career as representative and general of the Parliament, which had to defend England's constitutional freedom against the power schemes of Charles I. The aura of the invincible strategist enabled him after the victory to move into the leadership position when the state was being reorganized. As a Puritan he belonged to the left wing of the constitutional party, and as a result he got into conflict with the majority. Since the Puritan army was at his disposal he was able to settle this conflict in his favor. England's liberal system was not strongly enough organized as yet to be able to cope with the self-assured army and its general. Nevertheless, Cromwell's dictatorship is by no means a military dictatorship in the usual sense. It was raised above this base type already by the puritanical earnest of the soldiers who felt committed by a religious duty, but foremost by Cromwell's magnificent personality who — anticipating future imperialism by two centuries — used his power to the end of making England's name famous in the world. That his personal stature was decisive in keeping him in command is revealed by the fact that his insignificant successor son lost the reins of power immediately. Still, the English populace felt Cromwell's dictatorship to be a minority dictatorship, and it joyfully welcomed as a liberator its recalled king. But the real liberator had nevertheless been Cromwell, without whose victory Charles I would have brought England's monarchy considerably closer to, if not having put it on a par with, the absolute monarchy of the Continent. His son, Charles II, after the Restoration had to content himself with plying his royal rule within the old constitutional limits. Cromwell's dictatorship preserved England's freedom.

Revolutionary Dictatorship and Caesarean Law-and-Order Dictatorship in France

Jacobinian dictatorship was and is seen by the general public as a reign of terror, having originated in the bloodlust of a few criminal fools and being raised to the top by the armed mob. This view is self-contradictory, for how could the strength of a handful of people suffice to overcome the determination of a population of 25 million? It happened that the movement which had seized the overwhelming majority of this body of 25 million irresistibly led to the Jacobinian reign of terror. The movement derived its impulse from the fact that the idea of popular

sovereignty had infiltrated into the masses and, as does every mass idea, filled the minds with inflamed passion. All at once one found himself transposed into a lawless state of emergency, for if one believed in popular sovereignty he could no longer acknowledge the old law resting on the sovereignty of the king. But the new law didn't become fully effective by the mere fact that its fundamental idea had been grasped, nor was it anywhere near sufficient to have completed the wording of the new constitution following heated deliberations. The new constitution first had to become familiar to the minds and prove itself through success. The most important thing was to find the right men who had to lead the populace on its new paths. To find these was far more difficult than had been supposed. One didn't know yet that the right men can come out of elections only if previously the right parties have been formed. The elections of the first years of the revolution were most heavily influenced by the parties of the agitated. In the convention were men who knew how to give fullest expression to the all-dominating idea of popular sovereignty, and among these impassioned men the most passionate again were heard above all. The masses, excited and enthused by the sentiment of freedom, saw the gravest threats to popular sovereignty from within and without and declared for the men who were determined to resort to extreme measures in order to save the precious achievements of the revolution. As long as the public mind remained in a state of agitation the convention could count on overwhelming assent to its merciless decrees of violence, and who knows whether in the absence of such ruthless procedure it would have been possible to eradicate the historically entrenched powers of the absolute monarchy and of feudalism? Undoubtedly the men of terror themselves believed that they had been called to safeguard the revolution and felt a deep commitment not to avoid any means of terror which might serve the sacred cause of the revolution. Great were the resistances which they had to overcome not only with the adherents of the old regime but also in those freedom-loving circles who were not inclined to join the tempestuous pace of the revolution. Nevertheless, the number of those daring to resist openly was small, as compared with those who supported the Jacobinian government or gave it full scope. While the convention dominated the minds by terror, it drew even greater strength from the fact that it was the supreme authority of the land. Even the Girondists, when they turned to the populace to oppose the convention, had to find out that almost nowhere did they find the expected following, whereas the "men of the mountain" received a throng of willing helpers. When Robespierre hazarded to pick his victims even from among the most resolute leaders of the "mountain," the latter — fearing for their lives — united with the "plain," managing to bring about a resolution of the convention directed against Robespierre. Again the convention proved its authority, the multitude sticking with it and Robespierre bound to be toppled. Only after the revolutionary cause could be considered as secure did the desire for order reassert itself in a notable way. But now it was revealed that the sovereign people were by no means ready to supply the leaders and the means called for by its desire for order. The Directorate had at its disposal the army trained during the revolutionary wars and thus was strong enough to escape the verdict of the voters which turned out against the Directorate. The dictatorship, which was to serve the cause of freedom, had found pleasure in the exercise of power and refused to end the state of emergency to which it owed

its power. The French populace needed a new mediator to shake off the revolutionary dictatorship which had rendered its transitional service. It needed a law-and-order dictator, whom it found in Napoleon.

The path on which Napoleon climbed to the summit of power was the same that had lifted all strong dynasties to the throne. The armies assembled by the successful leaders during the time of the founding of states were the first compact social bodies in the state, and free disposition over them made the general at the same time the state ruler. Napoleon was one of history's greatest victors in battle, and it couldn't be helped that he took by storm the minds of his people, who recognized in him the strongman who would restore the order shattered by the revolution. The directors themselves had partly submitted to his authority. The Council of Elders also bowed to him, and the protests by the loyal republicans of the Council of Five Hundred, which died away in the populace, were impotent against the bayonets of the grenadiers devoted to their general. Napoleon largely justified the expectations placed in him. Nature had endowed him with all the qualities of the great lawgiver and administrator, and he was about to do what the sovereign people had not been able to accomplish. The institutions he gave to the French people have endured because they matched the disposition of the populace. It became his undoing that he didn't want to be content with being a legal dictator, but wanted to be Caesar. He couldn't bring himself to giving the French, in addition to the institutions he set up, the constitutional rights which the national love of liberty demanded, nor could he resolve to bring the succession of his wars to an end. He claimed not to be in the position of the legitimate ruler to whom the populace is attached in accustomed loyalty, but that he had to bind it to him time and again by new armed successes, and he expected that his son only would be able to rule as emperor of peace. Perhaps this consideration would not have convinced him had he not been pushed by his natural disposition to relish the triumph of victory time and again. Whatever were his motives, it was a pernicious mistake for him to want to rule the freedom-loving French populace like Caesar. Apart from the small residues of republican Romans, the latter had been faced with a subject and submissive population, and it would be equally mistaken if he were to subjugate with arms a world of culture nations like Caesar, who was confronted with just one party of the Roman people and for the rest with a barbarian world. As have all modern dictatorships, Napoleon's Caesarean dictatorship of law and order met with a violent ending. He succumbed in battle with the external enemies, and the French people, too, led by its marshals defected from the beaten emperor.

It was still a long time before the French were far enough advanced to institute permanently the constitution of liberty for which they yearned. It was still necessary to stir up a series of revolutionary waves, though none was as tempestuous as the first, that of the great revolution, and none accompanied any longer by a pervasive revolutionary dictatorship. By and by the middle classes had so familiarized themselves with the use of liberty and had so chosen their leaders as to be able more and more to do without revolutionary excesses, finding ever more rapidly the path to a firm order. In contrast, the rise of the proletariat entailed violent movements, which had their strong

countereffects in the June battle of 1848 and in the fight with the Commune of 1871. The law-and-order dictatorship of Napoleon III, too, was in the main a reaction against the proletarian unrest. As such it met with the consent of the bourgeois and peasant masses, leaning for the rest on the Napoleonic tradition in the army. The dictatorship of Napoleon III was an imitation of the model created by his great predecessor, an imitation based on incomparably weaker resources. Napoleon III fell prey to the same mistake: he wanted to be a democratic Caesar in the face of the conflicting modern circumstances. The defeat at Sedan brought his career to an inglorious end, and now, at long last, the people's urge for freedom could be fulfilled and the republic instituted for good. The point had been reached where a guardian was no longer needed. What was still missing in the national education was completed by the powerful ebullition of national feeling prompted by the desire to restore the state to brilliance, wealth, and military power following the military catastrophe of the war with Germany. Boulanger's attempt to exploit the national mood for furthering his dictatorship failed miserably, being a foolish, inopportune caricature of the Napoleonic model. The national feeling had become so self-assured, the national order so firmly secured, that it was no longer feasible to summon the army against the nation. The army itself was imbued with the feeling of having to serve the nation as its tool.

5. The National Law-and-Order Dictatorship (Fascism and the Spanish Officers Dictatorship)

If Russia and the experiments in Hungary and in Munich are disregarded, the upheaval after the World War may be said to have taken place without intervention of dictatorships. The revolutionary intensity was not high enough for that. To be sure, emergency powers had to be invoked in order to effect the transition to the new order after the collapse of the legitimate governments, but the overwhelming majority everywhere met quickly on the new legal foundation. For all that, there were still groups who resisted in words and even in deeds, as exemplified by the Kapp putsch, not to mention the many people who resigned themselves to the new state of affairs only with inner reservations. Little by little the sentiments of the opposition became more united, and the desire for a regulating dictator became increasingly more fervent. But, strangely, the reaction against the democratic current did not openly come to the fore in the states directly involved in the upheaval, but in victorious Italy and neutral Spain. Mussolini and Primo de Rivera are law-and-order dictators of the most modern type. Their rule, in Italy as well as in Spain, had been prepared for by domestic law-and-order movements which were caused primarily by the rising threat to public safety emanating from the most radical groups of the proletariat. In Italy an added factor was that the national feeling had been vehemently provoked by the dissatisfaction with the results of the World War and the attitude of the allies. In Spain one had been aroused by certain separatist aspirations, but at bottom, here as there, it was the failure of democracy which pushed nationally oriented state citizens toward the right. In the young democracies of the Continent the state didn't count, but the party did. Instead of the powerful unity of the national interest one was faced with the inner strife of the parties which

pursued their narrow interests, within which the influential persons only too often pursued their personal interests. The Spanish patriot couldn't help noticing with concern that as a result of the malfunctioning parties government finances and public morale became ever more deeply disrupted and that one was unable to bring Morocco's dire condition, which drained away money and manpower, to a rational end. Among Italy's nationally minded youth and in the numerous chauvinistic circles of the country the new movement could count on thousands of combat-ready disciples. Everywhere Fascist organizations emerged, and within a short time a militarily organized militia numbering in the hundreds of thousands was at hand. In Mussolini Fascism had a leader of electrifying eloquence, eyes for the future, and determined energy. The king lent his support to the movement which acknowledged his authority, and the army gave its consent. In Spain the army with its officers was the backbone of the movement. The army had kept in perspective the state as an integral whole and Primo de Rivera, who took the lead, could feel assured of its following. Mussolini and Primo de Rivera, much as they rely on the military power resources, are nevertheless far from bent on a military dictatorship, let alone a Caesarean rule. They do not want to rise against the idea of democracy, but only against its abuses, and they want to be guided by public opinion, whose following they take as an endorsement. The goal they are striving after would be attained once the old party leadership had been eliminated and the masses had been united under strong national leadership.

The national dictator doesn't want to undertake anything against his people. He believes to act in its best interest when seeking to wrest it from the inadequate party leaders whom it must follow as long as no better leader is at hand. Impatient to show the public what a truly national leader is able to produce, and believing that there is danger ahead, he dares to breach the law, and with the help of a number of resolute followers he grabs the reins of power, expecting that success will turn the voters toward him who in the end will absolve him from his breach of law. It was thus in the case of the breach of constitution committed by Bismarck on the occasion of the military conflict, when the Prussian House of Representatives denied him the credit which he demanded for the implementation of his armament plans. It won't do to label Bismarck as an outright national dictator on account of this breach of the constitution since he acted only as a counselor of his king, but the advice given to the latter still amounted to an unconstitutional usurpation of power, and the attitude which prompted the advice was that of a national dictator.

Fascism has found an echo in all states where the young democracies affected by the inner strife and the narrow outlook of their parties proved incapable of forming conscientious and strong governments, as demanded by the national sentiment. When in such cases the call for the dictator, the strongman, is sounded, this must not be simply viewed as proof that one wishes no longer to have anything to do with democratic ways. One has got fed up with the profession of democracy; one wants instead democracy in action, the strong populace.

An approach to the idea of national legal dictatorship is embodied in the laws of the kind represented by the German

authorization laws of 1923, which for a certain time removed from parliamentary decision, and assigned to the executive, the resolution of certain complex and urgent governmental tasks. If Germany possessed a firmly established democracy with healthy parties fully aware of their political responsibility, such emergency laws would have been unnecessary.

Even in the old democracies one has become somewhat alarmed by the success of Fascism. There is no cause for this. A state like England, which possesses such strong liberal leaders and so firmly organized party masses, need not fear the usurpation of force in the course of its state affairs. The citizen of England or the United States of North America may observe the news about the Fascist turmoils with the contented feeling of a man who knows that his own household is in good shape. National dictatorship is a concern for nations which have not yet completed their democratic structure.

6. Dictatorship and Democracy

Whether the dictatorships in Italy and Spain really come up to the idea of modern dictatorship, we do not want to examine. In the way this idea conjoins authority and freedom it serves a principle which pervades the periods of history. Historically, the road to freedom from the very beginning has been paved by the use of force, for it so happens that the masses do not instinctively join together to form a national unit, which is the first step to national freedom. The kindred tribes which eventually coalesced to nations fought each other tooth and nail and would never have found each other if the lust for power of strong war-loads had not welded them together in the fire of battle. Even after this had been done, the leadership activity of dynasties was still needed in order to equip the peoples with the institutions of the centralized state. Force had to perform a lengthy historical task until the national forces had been trained far enough to permit dispensing with the use of force at long last. Where the old powers did not yield their place of their own accord, the establishment of democracies was carried through with the violence of revolutionary dictatorships, followed — where necessary — by law-and-order dictatorships. If later, after democracy is in the driver's seat, obstacles still turn up which prevent the national will from gaining strength, it is not surprising that one permits to happen what heretofore always happened in the face of obstacles to freedom and that strong leaders are permitted to proceed with the aid of force. Whereas in earlier times force was directed against the autocrat who barred the way to freedom it is in the end directed against the parties calling themselves democratic without being so in fact. Democracy is rule by the people, but these parties suffocate the popular government by party rule. The modern dictator must complete the task of education for national self-determination by enlightening the reluctant parties with some use of force about the duties they have vis-a-vis the nation. Undoubtedly the dictator resorting to force in a democracy assumes a much greater responsibility than was true when force was used during chaotic times, for in a democratic environment the populace believes to have landed in the safe haven of law, and a breach of law cannot help deeply upsetting the public conscience. Eventually, however, a vigorous people always commands the resources needed to

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help ireeasom win through. A robust people easts its lot by indicating the right leader through its own following. A people marshaling the strength for this cannot be subdued by force definitively. The power rallied around himself by a ruler may be a nuisance to rival leaders, it may block up the paths for their followers while compelling a certain following vis-a-vis the ruler, but it cannot permanently force an entire recalcitrant nation to follow. A vigorous nation will let the dictator have his way only as long as it feels that in doing so he is the servant of its interests. As soon as it loses this conviction it will, sooner or later, withhold its following from him, and a single false step, a single accident will then suffice to topple him. As soon as he has educated his people in the ways of national self-determination his dictatorship will come to an end, for then it will be said: "The lord has done his work, the lord must go." In the case of the freedom-imbuéd Romans the classical dictatorship was in all due legal form endowed with the increased power called for by the plight of the times, whereas with the freedom-seeking peoples of the present time modern dictatorship received this power through the use of revolutionary force. Eventually, however even a modern dictatorship proves that the arbitrary power wielded by it is at bottom supported by the populace and serves its interests. This holds only for vigorous peoples, to be sure. Weak peoples fall prey to military dictatorship or to some form or other of autocracy.

7. Bolshevism

Prior to the Bolshevik dictatorship all modern dictatorships had a bourgeois-democratic orientation, although one or another of them, and especially the Jacobinian version, had a distinctly proletarian streak. Their goal was freedom for the populace, which secured to the propertied middle class a large and probably decisive share of political and, beyond that, of social leadership. The equality postulate, which had also been incorporated in the battle cry of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions, has by and large remained an empty phrase. The proletarian revolution inverts the relationship, being oriented to equality in the interest of the masses. Taken seriously, the postulate of equality fundamentally revolutionizes state and society. In order to succeed with general equality, the state must draw within its orbit of power everything which would generate inequality if it were left to free personal decision-making. The state must become the master in the economic realm and thus, in addition to human labor, must especially dispose of the decisive power wielded by capital. It must also become master over all educational matters, lord of culture. All the leadership talent which heretofore enjoyed free range in economy and culture must be placed in government service and be equally subjected to certain norms as hitherto had already been true for the officer, the judge, the civil servant. Disregarding the church, which is a power apart, the entire social leadership function is nationalized and thus placed under a supreme leadership power, which is the only one left to exercise the right of independent decision-making. At the same time the idea of equality demands that all the leading state functionaries in income and standard of living be depressed to the level of the toiling masses. Altogether this represents an encroachment on the social constitution a more radical version of which cannot be imagined

at all. The walking ahead of the leaders and the associated following by the masses is the basic form of every social constitution. Although this basic form is not to be suspended for there is still demand for leadership service without which the masses couldn't progress — the leadership function is deprived of its momentum because, apart from the top leadership, it cannot be performed freely any longer. Doesn't the leader whose objective and path are determined from the start cease being a leader? And isn't his weight reduced considerably by the fact that as a person he is placed on the level of the masses?

The extent to which the Russian Bolsheviks have tried to apply the postulate of equality in state and society and have succeeded in this, only the testimony of close observers of the country can reveal. At any rate, they have succeeded in upsetting completely the stratum which heretofore had led in Russia. They not only removed the Tsar with his family and court, but they got rid of a considerable portion of civil servants, officers, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and landed proprietors who were killed in battle or executed, or ruined by privations, or had to flee the country; they placed the pliable remainder into their service. As with the Jacobians, with them, too, it is not the terror alone to which they owe such success, but the attitude of the masses also contributed decisively. The collapse clearly showed that the old historical leaderships had not internal power over the masses. The military defeat deprived them of all authority. The masses not only denied them their following, but turned openly against them, and the preponderance of the masses sealed their fate. Under these circumstances the Bolsheviks were the natural leaders of the masses. They both had the same enemies, and even those groups among the masses who inwardly had nothing in common with the Bolsheviks, such as the huge peasant group, found it to their advantage to submit to the Bolsheviks or at least to give them full scope. For did they have any other choice than to submit to the Bolshevik dictatorship or to give it full scope? Every people needs its leaders, especially under such confused circumstances as had spread across Russia after the upheaval. The Bolsheviks' leadership was the only compact leadership group at hand after the masses had shaken loose from their old historical leaders and were utterly incapable of recruiting new leadership from within their own ranks. How the relationship between the Bolshevik leaders and the Russian masses will develop once it may have been shown that the masses were unwilling to follow in the direction set by the Bolshevik leaders, only the future can tell.

If the Bolsheviks should undertake to realize fully the demand for equality, their rule could no longer be counted among the modern dictatorships which sprang up after the bourgeois revolutions. The purpose of their dictatorship was designed to lead through increased coercion to a state where a purified law is to hold without coercion. But a thoroughly conducted system of equality would be a state of permanent coercion, for it could not be maintained without binding through strict norms the freest of social drives, the leadership drive, the drive of the free spirit, and to subordinate it to a single supreme leadership force which in fullness of power would still have to exceed by far Caesarism and Tsarism. Perhaps it will be the accomplishment of Bolshevism through the excess of its dictatorial idea to redress the excess of the political and social inequalities of

historical tradition, and perhaps it will have to yield to other and freer types of leadership as soon as it has accomplished this task. If this came to be true, it would, like the modern dictatorships, have served the purpose of having led through greater force to a condition of exalted law.

A. The Crisis of Power at the Present Time

1. The Existing Power Conflicts

If it is true that with the World War a new era, the era of world history, opened up, then world history, as in their time the histories of peoples, has begun its work in the conflict of force. The World War was the first collective action of the states of the world which through the progress of the circular course of history were linked up with each other. In it the historical work of force attained an unprecedented climax. The largest number of culture peoples and of semi-civilized ones participated in it, though many only reluctantly under the pressure of the Entente and not through military engagements but only through the formal act of declaration of war, intended to deprive the Central Powers of certain advantages which the latter had been granted by the neutrality of these states. All the more deeply the principal nations had become engrossed in fighting. For them in the circular course of history the war between peoples had become a folk war in the old sense which it had been when war was not yet a concern of the supreme power of the state and of the professional army, but a war of all against all, when every able-bodied man and youth went out to do battle and the fate of the whole population hinged on the outcome of the war. When the circular course of the history of states began, the folk war had to give way to the war of professional armies because the distrustful thirst for power of the rulers of the state had disarmed the masses. Subsequently, however, after the rulers believed that they were secure on their thrones, the historical cycle was closed when through universal conscription the populace was again enlisted for war service. Giving way to the urge for the maximum possible, the large state wanted to perform its greatest feats on the battlefield, and so, instead of sending out the tens of thousands of warriors which formerly had constituted the folk armies, it sent out millions. These, rather than being armed with clubs and battle-axes or with bows, javelins, and swords, were lavishly equipped with the precision instruments of modern arms technique, being as well prepared for combat in the air and under water as for action on the ground. The battlefields of trench warfare criss-crossed the continent, and in addition the Entente was able to conduct an economic war alongside the military one. As previously one had blockaded and starved out a city, so one now directed the hunger blockade against realms and peoples. In all its dimensions, world war is the most stupendous among the acute conflicts of power which history has to relate.

The nations of the Entente, like the Central Powers, had not rashly decided on participation in the World War. As developed nations they were no longer in the position of the martial peoples in the earliest times who were so little absorbed by the works of peace that they could always be ready for war. The modern national war removed from the soil the majority of its cultivators. It took away from the factories and other plants not engaged in war production the majority of their workers. It disrupted communications, and with the first interruptions which it brought it already wrought economic catastrophe. No nation

could have wanted the war, and none did. Although for years already one had seen it come, it was, when it finally became a reality, a frightening surprise for all nations, and not one of them could explain it in any other way than by attributing it to the wickedness of the adversaries. But now that it had broken out one was all the more determined on both sides to carry it through to its victorious conclusion. When the toll in human lives and economic values grew apace, both sides got into the situation of the entrepreneur who gradually had to add so much to his stakes in a seemingly sure-win business transaction that he could no longer withdraw even after having realized that his undertaking was unsafe, even hazardous. The war outlays had subjected the national economies to such a large drain of material goods and had placed such a heavy burden on the public purse that one could expect reparation only from a full-fledged victory. One was confronted with the dilemma of being hammer or anvil, of either having the adversary wear the leaden chain of defeat or of having to wear it oneself. The arduous work could not be left half-done; it had to be brought to an end, a final end.

The war of extermination was the expression of intransigent bellicosity. At stake was not, as had already been the case for quite some time for the European wars, a piece of land here or a piece there, but, as had been true for the ancient tribal wars, who would be the stronger. Incidentally, the members of the Entente had granted to themselves and to the allies whose enlistment was still necessary at a later time so many claims for land and power that the military and political annihilation of the enemy, alleged to be the ultimate moral goal, had become an indispensable prerequisite for satisfying the material demands of the war participants. The complement to the military war of extermination was the war of calumny designed to annihilate the enemy morally. Given that in their personal disputes individuals already tend to interpret actions of the enemy motivated primarily by caution, weakness, or imprudence as evil intent, how much more must this be true for international wars, which are waged with no holds barred. The war of annihilation demanded the war of slander because man needs to believe in the infamy of the enemy in order to consider as permissible the use of extreme means against him. Standing one's ground demands that one proves to his own satisfaction the villainy of the enemy one seeks to destroy. When the World War as it advanced progressively degenerated the hearts of the combatants, the war of calumny was fed ever more ammunition. One didn't want to realize that the shadows of the World War, given its huge dimensions, had to be much denser than those of customary wars fought by professional armies. Each side readily appreciated it when its own fighting men were pushed ever deeper into the darkness of savagery by inexorable necessities, and it was bound to have excuses ready if it went beyond the call of duty. Yet neither side could understand it when the opponent also trespassed the bounds of what was necessary. If already the splinter in the eye of his neighbor offends man, shouldn't he be utterly annoyed by the beam in the eye of his enemy!

The starvation campaign waged by the Entente in connection with the war of arms was — however difficult this may be for a German to concede — the war of extermination carried to its logical perfection. In the modern people's war, in which all

able-bodied citizens are made into fighters and all persons of both sexes able to work are turned into military auxiliaries, the distinction between soldiers and citizens is no longer feasible in the way it could be made in the war of professional armies. Modern war resourcefully exploits every advantage which one side can gain over the other. How, then, could the nations of the Entente have abstained from exploiting the superiority conferred upon them by the wealth of their own economic resources and of the whole rest of the world to which they were tied by their command of the high seas? This superiority was their greatest military advantage; to it they owed their eventual victory.

The dreadful losses of lives and property caused by the war of extermination were not its worst consequence. They could have been made up in a brief span of years of peaceful prosperity if the World War had been followed by a state of moral recovery as had happened a century earlier after the Congress of Vienna following the Napoleonic Wars. But it didn't come to that; rather the acute conflict was condensed into a still more drastic chronic conflict of minds. The masses of citizens had not had a direct part in the war of professional armies, but now citizens had competed with other citizens, and the passion for fighting of millions could not so soon be calmed again. Added to the entrenched hate was a suspicion which could not be alleviated. Was it not to be expected that the malefactor whom to overpower had been so difficult would become active again at the first opportunity? In this mood the victors rendered their verdict, in which they made true in intensified form the well-known phrase of General Clausewitz that war is the continuation of politics by adopting a political course which was a further continuation of war. The war was over without there being a chance for peace. The victors didn't even consent to observing the usual form of the peace treaty. Its terms were imposed on the vanquished without engaging them in any negotiations. As in the pursuit of war, in the determination of the terms of peace one reverted to the old, crude ways of tribal war — it was a throwback to force such as had never happened before among culture peoples. The German nation was forced to submit to the Caudinian yoke of self-debasement, as the Romans had to do vis-a-vis the Samnites. It had to accept the capitis deminutio of accusing itself of war guilt and for the time being of getting wiped off the roll of culture nations. The disarming which it had to carry out struck it off the roll of sovereign nations, and the economic-finaneial burdens it had to take upon itself condemned it to a bondage for which there was no end in sight. Despite all that, the French distrust of Germany was still not about to be allayed. Poincare didn't tire of noting German lapses providing him with excuses for stiffening the sanctions. Under his management France got stuck in a policy which couldn't help aggravating the differences still further. The more onerous the sanctions, the more deeply the conflict had to sink into the minds. The French statesmen should have known from the experience of their own people how painful is the hurt caused by injuries to the national ego! The more violently Germany was pressed down, the more certainly one could expect that, as long as it still

*From a battle incident in 4 B.C., meaning deep humiliation, debasement. (Tr.)

preserved a glimmer of national pride, it would attempt again to throw off the leaden chain with which it was bound.

Of Germany's allies, Turkey and Bulgaria were weakened as much as possible, while Austria-Hungary was dissolved. Between Germany and Russia and the adjoining states down to the Balkan new states were set up or the friendly old states were patronized in order to establish a great system of military protection which would encircle Germany in the east and southeast and which was rounded out in the south by ceding to Italy the German South Tyrol to the Brenner pass. In the case of a number of the new state institutions one could plead that they were meant to further national self-determination which the Entente had hailed as one of its war aims, and indeed in a number of cases old national wrongs were righted. That respect for national self-determination was not the guiding light, however, is clearly shown by the fact that one had only to plead the argument of military protection as an excuse for subsequently creating new national injustices without hesitation. While one intensified the national feeling in the newly created states in a nationalistic manner, one most gravely injured the national feeling of the vanquished. All these newly created states are nationalistically oriented right from their cradle. They are bent on enjoying their young national life to the hilt, completely unmindful of national justice, and in particular they also want to live it to the full in economic terms. Creatures of power conflict, they aggravate the conflict of power.

The collapse ending the war aggravated via the ensuing upheaval the existing internal conflicts of power in the vanquished states. Most gravely so in Russia, a fact which once before we had occasion to comment in detail. In the other countries passable order was created, but nowhere do the new powers, which have arisen to take the place of the historical powers ruined by the war, possess that degree of dominion over the minds which is required for a strong government. Everywhere there is unrest, supporters of the old order beginning to rally for the fight here and there. The Fascist dictatorship has provided a model provoking imitation.

The upheaval also aggravated greatly the existing social conflict of power, with the Russian dictatorship of Soviets providing the pattern for the use of force.

The agitation of national and social passions has had an after-effect on the victorious nations ~~as well~~. The idea of national self-determination appealed to by the Entente was avidly accepted, especially by the peoples subject to English rule. The colored troops used in Europe who became witnesses here of the conflict and difficulties of their masters took home with them impressions which gave them much to ponder. "The whites are people like we, after all," the word now is in India. A threatening cloud of fury lies over Asia, and Egypt, too, demands national self-determination.

The tension which took hold of the world after the great war is most clearly manifested in the economic figures. The world has lost its economic equilibrium. During the war Europe was not fully able to maintain its dominating position in the international division of labor; the rest of the world in many respects

made itself independent from it. Moreover, the victor nations through the political reorganization and the economic burdens dictated to their adversaries have hurt themselves by weakening the markets needed for the sale of their own products. The heavy unemployment which as a result is haunting England means the paralysis of a large portion of its national wealth and constantly saddles it with losses and expenditures which match those caused by continued warfare.

Awareness of the ubiquitous economic tension more than anything else has contributed to put public opinion in a more peaceful mood again. Lately, gratifying progress has been achieved in this respect. The rapprochement in the matter of the German reparations debt is a meritorious accomplishment honoring the statesmen who mustered the courage for it. The meeting in Locarno evidences further progress. But how much is there still left to do if it is already considered a great achievement that the representatives of the victor nations sit around a table to engage in peaceful discourse with Germany's representatives! The more deep-seated evil, of which economic tension is merely a symptom, has not yet been touched upon at all, and none of the leading statesmen has so far found the courage to put his finger on the issue in which the tension of existing power conflicts originates.

The external power conflicts afflicting the souls have in the more sensitive minds awakened consciousness of the inner conflict between faith and knowledge and of moral instability. Many pious people see the World War as the consequence of, and punishment for, reckless acquisitiveness, being completely obsessed with the drive for worldly enrichment. Among Europe's educated the weak-hearted are certain that the existing power conflicts must lead to the ruin of the world of culture, while the strong-hearted defiantly prepare for a new fight. But how many of these may be confident that such fight will resolve the conflicts?

2. The Balance-Sheet of Social Forces Before and After the World War

The World War in its extravagance is the result of the existing enormous national tension. Any explanation which would reduce it to another origin is incorrect. In the era of nationalism no ruler would be strong enough by himself to induce the culture nations to fight each other if, abhorring any inclination to fight, they were receptive only for peaceful work. Therefore, it will not do at all to blame the outbreak of the World War on this dynast or that, this statesman or soldier or that this group of capitalists or that. Perhaps one may rightly accuse one or another of the participating rulers of having rashly or even malevolently ignited the match which set off the colossal explosion. But if one raises this accusation he surely takes it for granted that there already existed an inflammable mass! To illustrate this idea by a specific case, to raise against those rulers of Austria-Hungary who are responsible for the ultimatum served on Serbia the charge of having, by their exaggerated demands, forced Serbia to offer armed resistance, may perhaps be justified. But is it not true that the heated passion of the world was mainly responsible for the effect which the

ultimatum had? If the national passions of the world had not been stirred up, the attempt on the life of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife probably would not have been made, and if it still had been made, it would have remained the infamous crime of a few young people without any consequences for the peace of the world. Serbia of its own accord would probably have extradited or punished itself those of its citizens who participated in the assassination. Or, if it had not done so, a storm of indignation would have swept across the world, as was true 'earlier after the murder of King Alexander. The Austro-Hungarian government would not have had to press for their punishment, because all European governments would have made common cause with it, and governments on friendly terms with Serbia probably would even have beaten it to it. The ultimatum and the declaration of war would probably not have happened, or if they had still occurred, all of Europe would have intervened to make them undone and to offer to the monarchy due satisfaction without breach of the peace. A people with the moral and dynastic sentiment of the English would have granted to the monarchy the same extensive satisfaction it would have demanded for itself if it had been Serbia's neighbor and if the Prince and the Princess of Wales had been assassinated. But since Europe was split into two big camps watching with jealous nervousness lest any, however minor, shift occur in power relations at the expense of one party or another, one could not come to terms on how the crime was to be expiated and on the extent of amends to be made to Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary believed that if its honor as a big power were not to be damaged it must not accept the terrible blow perpetrated on it without the most severe punishment. Germany believed that it must not abandon its ally without its own prestige and power position being damaged. Russia, which for so long had let Serbia have its way, had tolerated or even supported its doings, could no longer back out, believing that it would suffer irreparable damage in its Balkan and world position if it ceased being Serbia's mighty protector. France had to go along with Russia if it didn't want to forego the pay-off for the great sacrifices which for so long it had taken upon itself for the sake of the treaty with Russia. Finally, England, which felt honor-bound not to abandon its allies, had to string along with France and Russia. The vessel of power alliances was brimful, and when it was pierced at the point of least resistance, all the venom of mutual distrust poured out over the world like from Pandora's box.

One will be more justified in attributing guilt for the World War to the prevailing system of militarism and capitalism than to any individual ruler, although one must keep in mind that in the era of nationalism it is not this dynast or that, this soldier, or that, but the nations themselves which had become the embodiment of militarism pushing toward war. Nor was it this or that armaments manufacturer, but the whole capital-intensive national economy, that supported the capitalism pushing toward war because it was extremely anxious to participate in the economic partition of the world — and here we must include in addition to the entrepreneurs, the industrial workers as well. The liberal bourgeoisie, as long as it was still in the opposition, had emphatically resisted the military system of the princes, viewing it as a system of unproductive expenditures weighing down productive workers with taxes and threatening them with the danger of external wars while internally reinforcing princely predominance. But when during the era of nationalism

the bourgeoisie was called upon to share in the management of the state its outlook changed, as does the horizon of a wanderer who climbs from the narrow valley to the mountain summit with its unrestricted view. Now the army became for it the tool for realizing the national idea. Embodied in it for the German patriot were the glorious memories of Gravelotte and Sedan, for the Italian patriot it was the weapon with which to liberate Italia irredenta, and for the French one it was the indispensable means of defense and perhaps of revenge. Little by little on the Continent the view gained ground which was held in its distinctive way by the citizen of England, for whom the superiority of the home fleet meant the protection of its economic domination of the world. The economic imperialism generated by the surplus labor power of the great culture nations demanded sufficient military protection in case the economic competitive struggle were to change abruptly into an armed struggle. The build-up of the armaments system, which was decided upon during the years before the outbreak of the World War, everywhere met with the approval of the people's representatives, although the government's proposals were not fully accepted everywhere. Only the socialist worker organizations remained in opposition. But, after the outbreak of the World War it was clearly shown that this opposition was not irreversible because the proletariat not only failed to resist the induction order but for the most part joined the national cause with full conviction.

Social movements of the depth and breadth of nationalism and imperialism must have their deep and widespread roots. Looking back upon the decades before the World War, we clearly see these roots before us. They lie in the abundance of the energies stored up by all nations. The large nations had experienced such a luxuriant growth and development, especially of their economic strength, that these energies burst forth across the national boundaries into the world and led the civilized world to a new age of discoveries during which the last hidden treasures of the continents were disclosed and thus migrations and settlements of such a size occurred as the age of a Cortez or a Pizarro had not known yet. The vast open spaces of North America and Siberia were as much their scene as was dark Africa, and the Middle Kingdom of China also had to open its gates to world commerce and, in addition to the Europeans, had to yield space to the Japanese as well. The work of building up the world economy was not confined to closing the gaps in the colonization of the earth, but at the same time the national economies were ever more closely tied together by the international division of labor which culminated in the international stratification of labor. But the state of affairs of the world economy which developed in this way was lacking in any kind of stable political order. One continued to adhere to the principle of national autarchy, which has been the natural political expression of a state of affairs where every nation in all important respects was on its own. One not only upheld this principle but made it even more dominant by building up the armaments to be held in readiness for an armed conflict and by expanding dynastic autarchy into national autarchy. For the purpose of regulating the thousands of relationships which span world commerce one made do with bilateral national treaties, which in matters of most general interest were broadened into global treaties, but with the principle of national self-determination always being jealously guarded. Was it not a discordant state of affairs to live in a world of the most

multifarious relationships without having any firm global association, and could such a state of affairs be maintained in the long run without collisions? Imagine a condition where the merchants of a number of nations are induced by surprising economic success to meet by the thousands and thousands on a world market which has no joint management to provide arrangements for the maintenance of order and where each market participant would be left alone to protect himself against attacks as well as possible with the help of his compatriots! As long as transactions take place to everybody's satisfaction, commerce may flow smoothly even in the absence of a common management, but it is a different matter once the greed for gain arouses envy and jealousy, especially daily if in the process all kinds of old resentments are stirred up again. Then one will get his weapons ready — system of armaments — and make agreements with friendly groups — system of treaties — and then, once the atmosphere has been heated by passions, it may suddenly happen that one finds himself engaged in fighting, for the outbreak of which each side blames the other. Transpose this string of events on the national and the world scale, and what you face is the World War. It burst out of the pressing fullness of world events for which the organizing constitution was still lacking.

The same pressing fullness of happenings in all economies had brought forth large enterprises, without previous creation of an organizing industrial relations constitution which would have pointed to an equitable arrangement between capital and labor. In the plant, in which hundreds or thousands were brought together, the entrepreneur continued to give his orders with the autarchic authority of a master craftsman intimately linked to his apprentices and journeymen whom he trained to become masters. On the other hand, the modern entrepreneur became the single owner who alienated the minds of hundreds and thousands whom he excluded from ownership. The same pressing fullness of happenings had elevated the modern democratic masses who wanted to, and had to, share in the exercise of governmental power while leaders and masses were still not mature enough to establish the necessary organs of freedom. The same pressing fullness of happenings had introduced women into public life to take their place alongside men, but in the process the time-honored domestic ethic was broken without a new ethical code providing an alternative form of security. The same pressing fullness of happenings had also made it feasible to be more permissible vis-a-vis the child who in the earlier constrained circumstances had to be kept under strict discipline, but there was no certainty about the rules which were to govern the sensible use of the newly won freedom. The same pressing fullness of happenings also tore apart the old unity of the cultural constitution in that the dominant strength of faith was broken by the ascending strength of knowledge.

Many of the educated of the old school who were accustomed to the clear ordering of things of earlier years could not feel at home in the atmosphere of unrest into which the pressing fullness of events had placed the culture nations during the years preceding the outbreak of the World War. They saw in this unrest the manifest sign of decay, of decadence. One could hear those intellectuals pronounce this judgment who had to run into the uncomfortable experience of seeing their social stratum displaced from its traditional leading position. Instead of recognizing that it was their own fault to withdraw into their little shell

amidst the fullness of life, they saw their isolation as proof of the disdain in which the modern world holds "man's highest strength." They didn't see what they could have seen so easily, namely, that all those who applied their education to the tasks of the time in the pressing fullness of events created for themselves leadership positions of high rank such as the good old time could not have offered them. What brought Lassalle to the top if not, as he took pride in saying of himself, that he was armed with all the education of the century by which he conquered the spot at the top of the proletariat? And how many men of the educated class, indeed, came to power before him and after him by making themselves available to the proletariat as leaders! In another direction, but with the same goal of substantial power, the great entrepreneurs put to use their knowledge of the world and of human beings. The esthete, too, who seeks to enjoy thoroughly all the refinements of the old forms of art in which he was trained, was not able to come to terms with the new world which had lost the eye for many of the old manifestations of life which previously had been the object of art and which was not yet able to find the artistic expression for the new manifestations of life. A feeling which is to find its artistic expression must be sure of itself, but in the pressing contemporary world there were still too many unfinished and unsettled things; for the time being the giant railroad station and the skyscraper were the figures which stimulated the artistic sense most peculiarly. That, on top of all that, the moralist of the old school had to be satisfied with contemporary affairs is understandable. The greater ease of living permitted a more comfortable relaxing. The larger dimensions of the present era could not be squeezed into the old tight framework and dissolved the old orders before new ones had been found. How could the inexperienced masses of voters, how could the multitude of proletarians, how could the women and children be expected to know the way to put their new freedoms to prudent use? Undoubtedly, the world had slipped into a moral crisis! Nevertheless, the stern moralist was wrong who spoke of moral decay. The decisive reason why the moral impulses didn't suffice for the new circumstances lay in the dimensions of these circumstances, which made new and larger demands. Between master craftsmen, journeymen, and apprentices the good old handicraft order had provided a firm discipline, but as between entrepreneurs and workers in the large and the giant enterprise the suitable order had not been found yet. However, this does not rule out that nevertheless a higher moral force might be at work. Wasn't the discipline which internally bound together the thousands of union members in spite of all the excesses induced by passion also a slice of moral self-education? And, to cite immediately the most telling example, did the discipline which governed the army of universal conscription not reveal a great moral force? Is the toll of millions who sacrificed their lives in the World War not proof for the contention that all the peoples participating in the war were imbued with unbroken ethical strength? It is completely absurd, as is usually done, to regard the World War as proof, pure and simple, of the moral degeneracy of the present time; above all the darkness of acts of savagery, of which it is full, there is the bright splendor of enthusiastic performance of their duty by millions of people. This infinite source of strength could have been put to infinite uses, this sense of duty could have been most fruitfully utilized, but our regret that things took a different turn must not diminish the admiring amazement over the abundance of the expended energies.

The perception that nations of highest culture went to the pinnacle of self-sacrifice may serve us as unmistakable proof that precisely their inner strength was not falling into decay.

The balance-sheet of social forces which was available to the world of culture before the war was one of exuberant fullness. When today we think back to those years when unbiased judges raised the accusation of decadence they seem to us to lie in the distant past, and they appear to us, as do the years of childhood to the old man, as years of pure bliss. Here we fall victim to that delusion which so often allows us to retain in our memory the good things while making us forget the bad. Although the balance-sheet of social forces was of exuberant fullness and there couldn't be any question of decay, the state of affairs was nevertheless extremely unsatisfactory, because the forces were in a state of mutual tension which brought about more pernicious results than even outright decay could have done. Human beings didn't know how to transform their abundant energies without loss into organizing social power and to concentrate them, and this is why the superabundance of energies gave rise to destructive power conflicts. In the dense traffic of railways the inattention of subordinate clerk is enough to cause a collision costing many human lives, yet the number of accidents is not all that great because the railway personnel is bound by strict rules and thoroughly trained. But for the great social tasks of the world there existed altogether hardly any rules and in any case no organizing constitution. For the service to the state at large and the general public the freedom organs called for by this service, if it was to be performed with successful vigor, were also deficient in many respects. At that, service in the giant economic enterprise was best provided for by far, for here the available forces were so abundant and the unifying interest in the success of the enterprise so imperatively demanded the subordination of the workers to the management of the strong, competitively selected entrepreneurs that the constructive work in the national and the world economy progressed rapidly. To be sure, the confrontation of the two sides pertaining to the industrial relations constitution in large enterprises was only put off. One of these days the power conflict between capital and labor will have to be settled, and who knows how highly charged it may yet become!

During its critical course the World War destroyed huge quantities of the available forces and enormously impaired the balance-sheet of these forces. Especially grave are the losses of the best men killed by the war. Precisely the vital ranks of key and subordinate leaders were terribly thinned out, and in those nations where these strata were thin to begin with — think of Russia, but Austria as well — the social equilibrium was very adversely affected. Nevertheless we may very confidently expect that, as far as the social forces are concerned, the rise which was under way before the World War will continue. The productivity of scientific techniques is still far from being exhausted. Certainly it, too, will reach its limit sometime in the future just as handicraft techniques reached their limit, but today it is still a long way from this eventuality. Every day brings something new, and why shouldn't perhaps a day in the very near future bring something amazingly new? Not for a long time will there be a shortage of manpower to continue on a large scale the dominant work of our time, the building up of the world

economy, and to gain from it rich material rewards which could be fruitfully used for the culture of society. And don't ever believe that material advancement is bound to lower the moral forces! The size of the material tasks always also assures the complementary growth of the moral forces. What keeps human beings from making up the losses of energy caused by the critical course of the World War is its chronic after-effect of hate and mistrust between the nations and are its radiations through which the domestic and social power conflicts and the existing moral crises have been aggravated. The transformation of social forces into organizing powers has taken place since the World War at the expense of still much larger frictions and losses than was true before; many valuable historical powers were destroyed whose functions have not yet been taken over by other powers. The widespread unemployment clearly proves that one does not know any more how to put to full use the smaller forces that remain. Since the World War, constitutions at home and abroad have been still more inadequately organized than they were before.

If the grave conflicts are to be settled, then the relationships between leaders and masses which, as we know, is the essential content of every constitution in the world of European peoples would have to be reorganized in accordance with the magnificently enhanced dimensions of modern life. Success would dictate how to reshape the insufficient old leadership powers or how to select new leadership powers. This would entail a most far-reaching transformation because existing leadership structures are inadequate in numerous areas of life, and even in the old democracies the historical leaderships are no longer firmly in the saddle. In the New World, wealth helps to blunt the sharp edges of conflicts. Japan occupies a special place. Here the deep ruts of a millennial tradition could not be affected by modern ideology. This youngest world empire has become Europeanized only in its external institutions while remaining Asiatic in the core of its historical culture. It gave itself a democratic constitution according to the European pattern, but the actual power, the pervasive dominion over the minds, rests with the Genro, this self-selection of the most experienced statesmen whose world success confirms them in their office.

The number of proposals which have been made to ameliorate conditions is well-nigh immeasurable. It is not our purpose to add to it still another new proposal, as we do not want to go beyond the scope set for an exposition of the principle of power. But it does fall within our domain all right to examine the proposals made by others with respect to whether they accord with the principle of power or run counter to it. To be sure, in the process we will nowhere go into details but limit ourselves to the most general aspects only. It is a matter of importance that the road to the settlement of existing power conflicts be correctly chosen. One must face the testiness which is found everywhere, and one must economize the existing energies. The leadership stock of Europe has been decimated, and its prestige with the masses has been weakened. What is left of this human

Council of state appointed by the Japanese emperor.
(Tr.)

capital must find, without vacillating search, the place where it can perform its service — walking ahead with success.

B. The Ways of Settlement of the Power Conflicts

1. The Path of Instruction

The proximate path which appears to be suited to the settlement of existing power conflicts is that of instruction. How far can this path lead us?

The eminent French physiologist, Charles Richet, who has also become known for his works in sociology and cultural history, in his little book translated into German under the title, "Man is Stupid," expresses the view that Linne had erred in designating man as "Homo sapiens," the correct name for him being "Homo stultus," because he is said to make of his reasoning power -- which places him above animals the kind of use which puts him below animals. He is said to use his acquired knowledge not to orient his actions accordingly; he is said to know what is good while doing what is bad; he is said to be liable yet to sink below the most primitive and crude living beings if he doesn't manage to raise his intelligence.

The lengthy description of human stupidities filling Richet's book reveals the warm sensation of a full heart and the rich experience of a serious historical scholar, but in his social psychology Richet in no respect rises above the view of the educated layman. This gives us occasion to -examine closely his book which presents to us the kind of view which contemporary educated people hold with respect to social action. One has to get over this view completely if he would want to discern clearly the paths which can lead to a settlement of the existing power conflicts.

The fundamental error consists in a gross overestimation of the share occupied in human actions by the performance of the intellect. Certainly any mistake concerning the prerequisites of such actions will lead a person astray, but merely having identified correctly the preconditions doesn't by itself give him any assurance at all that he is on the right path. It may happen — and how often isn't this true — that the strength is lacking to make the decision which the will has to arrive at conform to the inference drawn by the intellect. Richet provides a neat illustration of this by reference to himself. After having pronounced tobacco a poison as widespread and noxious as alcohol, he glibly confesses to being a heavy smoker himself. He alleges to have become addicted without having any excuse other than general insanity — not even the excuse offered by many other smokers who try to wiggle out by saying that tobacco is harmless, while he admittedly knows exactly that its enjoyment is unhealthy, nay, frankly speaking, extremely unhealthy. Didn't Richet with these words refute his own contention concerning human intelligence? If human reason should recognize all things harmful as clearly as Richet recognized the harmfulness of tobacco, this by itself would not suffice yet to induce human beings to make their acts conform to reason; it would still depend on whether they also have the willpower to do what is reasonable. Actions in the final analysis are rooted not in knowledge but in the will. In

order to act reasonably it is not enough to instruct oneself in what is most reasonable; the path of instruction by itself does not confer power over the will.

The social will, still more than the individual will, is deflected by the strength of passion from the path suggested by reason because social passion forces even those who wanted to keep away from it under the spell exerted on the minds by the going together of the many. Furthermore, the process of social decision-making is subject to the grave impediments which are occasioned by the apparatus of social decision-making. This is the point where the layman's view of social action always breaks down. The layman perceives the social act of volition as a carbon copy of the personal one, he views it as no less purposive than the latter. Nobody will deny that there will be special difficulties if thousands or tens of thousands are to march in step physically, but nobody cares to understand that there will be any difficulties if they must march in step mentally.

The inquiry into social decision-making which we undertook in the first part of this book gives us a different slant. We know that society doesn't act entirely purpose-oriented, but acts power-oriented. We know that always it acts purpose-oriented only to the extent that the powers which dominate it need to do so for the sake of success. The social purposes themselves are overwhelmingly power-oriented. They are present as historical realities, being maintained by historically entrenched powers as long as the latter don't crumble in response to major or minor failures or collapse, or in response to success change substantively or are displaced by new higher powers. The making of the decision is distributed among the leaders walking ahead and the masses following them. The leaderships to whom we owe the earliest formation of large social bodies were coercive leaderships. During the whole period of the founding of states the social will was determined by compulsion. Even after the great social bodies have finally been formed it rarely happens that the whole body is the joint representative of social action. Rather it consists of numerous smaller or larger decision-making bodies side by side, each according to its special interests being one-sidedly shaped by partial powers which intersect, rub, or complement each other. Society is built up in layers* which, following the law of circulation and in accordance with historical forces, rise on top of each other or balance each other out. During the phase of the cycle which elevates the democratic masses, the social decision-making process is particularly unsteady because the masses have free play while their freedom organs have not yet fully matured. If new stages of development are to be entered into, relapses into force frequently occur, and in the end it may even happen that the existing historical powers by obstinately clinging to power destroy the society which they are to serve.

If one examines individual cases of social stupidity, as described by Richet, one will almost always find that he accuses human reason so strongly because he attributes to it all the shortcomings which are associated with the process of decision-making. Society for him consists of nothing but Richets who, aside from the irrational smoking habit, have complete control over their will and whose aberrations therefore can be explained only by their own foolishness. Thus he says, for example, in the section entitled, "The Confusion of Languages: A Croaking of

Frogs," that the genius of a Zamenhoff has created Esperanto, whose grammar, he said, can be learned in no more than an hour and whose vocabulary can be almost mastered within a month, but — he adds — human stupidity does not permit through the dissemination of Esperanto to carry out a reform which would reshape the whole face of the earth. In saying so he overlooks the impediments to the act of volition stemming from the fact that within society each individual in his decisions is dependent on the decisions of "the others." The multitude of the educated would unhesitatingly learn Esperanto if they were sure that all "others" would also learn it, but how can they make sure of that, how could they dream that the wills of the millions on earth will start moving simultaneously? Instead of being annoyed that the final step to adoption of the world language has not been taken yet, Richet should be amazed that it was possible to take the many preceding steps which were necessary to bring humanity to the present degree of language communication.

In what Richet says about the frightening measure of social inequality, about the contrast between rich and poor, slaveholders and slaves, masters and servants, noble junkers and serfs, kings and subjects he judges by the warm feeling of his heart and from the cultural heights of the best men of our time. He fails to consider, however, that force had to do its historical task in order to unify the ~~reluctant wills~~ of the many in such a way as to lead to these cultural heights, and that it can't be easy to obliterate completely the marks of the historical action of force. The degrees of inequality which he deplores are necessities of the historical circulation of power, which had to pass through grievous battles of superposition before in its last stage it can end on a balancing note.

War, especially the World War, is seen by Richet as the most dreadful of all human stupidities. His description of the effects of the World War will shock every reader, yet Richet errs if he believes to have been able to deter humanity from the next world war by the forcefulness of his description. When the nations plunged into the World War they knew exactly what lay ahead of them. It was not stupidity that in spite of their foreknowledge they plunged into war, it was the helplessness of their frightened will. The experienced animal trainer knows that dogs tackle each other because they are afraid of one another, and he therefore keeps them together in a stable until they learn to get along with each other and lose their distrust. The nations, too, mistrusted each other, and historical experience gave them every reason for doing so. Their historical education furnished them no other means than that of combat in order to defend their national independence when the latter had been assailed, or when they believed that it was being assailed. Every nation knows that "the others," the adversaries, think alike, and therefore none has the courage for peace as each must be afraid that "the others" will all the more likely invade it if they see it defenseless before their eyes. Nations can't overcome the will for external war in any other way than they overcame the will for civil war, namely, by a historical education which sets up peace powers between them. To establish these peace powers even the most apt instruction will not do; it will be spoken to the wind when it turns to the immature will. The instruction of the intellect must be accompanied by the education of the will, which

takes place under the hard blows of historical failures and under the blessing of historical successes.

2. The Prospects for the Symbiosis of Power

The circulation of power begins with the work of brute force and ends in the peaceful coalescence of the balanced powers meeting each other. At what point of this movement has the present arrived with respect to the powers participating in the tasks of the time? The answer cannot be in doubt. The tension created by the power conflicts of the present time is so great that it would be presumptuous to expect it to fade away peacefully soon. Perhaps the conflict between faith and knowledge has passed its culmination. If this is so, should it perhaps not be merely because the strength of faith has declined? And what will happen if some time in the future faith will quicken again? Anyhow, the point has been reached where the two powers have learned to respect one another, and it may be hoped that this feeling will not be lost again, but that even a revived faith will acknowledge the power of knowledge and will not infringe upon its realm.

Can it be said as well with respect to the other existing power conflicts that they have reached that place of rest where each has learned to respect the other? Can this be said especially regarding national conflict? Shouldn't the national fatigue which befell many people after the furies of the World War be the first sign of national tolerance? Those who think so find a handy argument in recalling the outcome of the religious world war, the Thirty Years' War. An Austrian statesman with an outstanding scientific education in a recently held lecture expressed the view that the national conflict will end, as did the religious war, with the victory of tolerance. The idea is somewhat captivating, but on closer inspection it will be found that there is no definitive historical analogy between the two world wars, much as they may have in common. One must only get rid of the delusion of viewing things from a shortened historical perspective, which results when they are viewed from the distance of centuries and from the narrow horizon of German conditions. If it is asserted that the Thirty Years' War ended with the denominational peace, this holds true only for the German Empire, and even within the latter it is not true for the various territories; for the rest of the world it isn't true at all. Within the German territories, as well as in the world outside the German Empire, the idea of denominational intolerance first celebrated a full-fledged victory, and a year of spectacular intellectual development had to pass until during the period of Enlightenment the idea of inter-faith tolerance finally won through. At first all strong states enforced the principle of denominational unity with brutal energy, and they had to do so because, given the high degree of religious tension during the 17th century, no state without a united ecclesiastical front could offer a strong political front. The German territorial princes were a strong power, and therefore they stuck with unshakable firmness to the command that the religious denomination of the prince determine their subjects' denomination. All strong states outside Germany, in which since the time of the Reformation there had existed various churches, bestirred themselves with zeal to restore ecclesiastical unity. In France the same king who had taken up arms for the German Protestants lifted

the Edict of Nantes which had granted religious freedom to the Huguenots. In England the Catholics and Presbyterians were persecuted; in the Netherlands the Arminians were vehemently fought; in Switzerland the churches of Rome, Calvin, and Zwingli could not coexist in peace, and when tempers were at the boiling point, the Catholic Forest Cantons took up arms against Protestant Zurich and defeated the Reformer Zwingli, who died in battle. Within themselves the Swiss cantons were ecclesiastically united, hence the situation was the same as in Germany in that the strong political units here the principalities, there the cantons adhered to ecclesiastical unity; tolerance — here practiced by the Reich, there by the Confederation — was the obvious symptom of their weakness. Real denominational tolerance was ushered in only by the Enlightenment period, but even so it was not a matter of tolerance by the strong but of enervation of the weak. The victory of tolerance during the Enlightenment period was a consequence of the fact that the power of faith had lost its momentum under the impact of the rise of the power of knowledge. It no longer had the exclusive dominion over the minds as during the preceding centuries, and the unity of political consciousness was no longer threatened when the churches within the state were split. The dynastic feeling had become so embedded as to be strong enough to maintain the state even without the help of the church. By and large the church had fallen back upon tending to its spiritual tasks, only in certain borderline areas were there occasional animated conflicts. Then, during the 19th century, the national idea as a binding political power outgrew the dynastic concept. When the German Empire was reestablished, the denominational difference had so much receded and the national idea had become so strong as to unite all minds for the sake of the empire. In the struggle between State and Church by which Bismarck allowed himself to be carried away against the Catholics, he unjustly called their loyalty to the empire into question. During the World War the German Catholics equalled in devotion the Protestants in shedding their blood for the empire, and Germany's enemies hoped in vain that after the upheaval the Catholic South, West, and East of the empire would sever themselves from the Protestant North and Center.

If the alleged analogy between the course of the denominational and that of the national power conflict should really be valid, the lapse of still another century or so of greatest anxiety would have to be awaited before the national tension would have calmed down, and at the end of such a century the national idea in the state would have to recede as did the religious idea during the Enlightenment period. It certainly won't come to that. What other idea is in the offing that might have the supportive power to tie the nations together? The predominance of the church within the state was a transitional phenomenon, a symptom of the unfinished nature of the state apparatus, which to a large extent still had to be held together by force, whereas the church united the minds through its internal power. Therefore, it fell to the church to attend to a series of urgent tasks which lay outside its true jurisdiction but which the state was not yet able to meet. Could it be that the national idea in the state also has to perform a transitional function only? Does the nation as a political identity reach out beyond its essential domain? Has it perhaps met its calling if it confines itself to the cultural tasks of the nation? A historical expert of Kjellens perspicacity observed after Germany's defeat that it had

finished its political role in the world and that henceforth the German nation would have as its only destination to penetrate the world of the victors culturally, on the analogy of what the Greeks did in the Roman Empire. Which of the victor nations or of the other large or small nations would be content with such a fate? Which would be able to resolve to put aside the idea of the national state? The exceptional case of Switzerland does not disprove the general rule. If a world federation of states could be brought about only on condition that the individual states give up their national bonds, it would never come into existence. The national instinct strives to grow from the root to the crown of the state. The culture nation is an intermediate form on the way to the political nation. The cultural tasks of a nation are only a part of its overall task and the latter is of such a nature that it can't be separated from the political task. Even those nations which on account of historical impediments or the scattered nature of their settlements are prevented from growing to full political stature will not be able without great reluctance to resign themselves to being incorporated into a supranational political structure.

These words do not mean at all the absence of any hope that the overwrought nationalistic feeling will ever mellow to national tolerance. This hope must never be abandoned, for otherwise world peace would remain unattainable forever. The idea is only that national tolerance cannot be expected to be attained by the approach which has led to denominational tolerance, not by way of governmental abjuration of the national idea and the wane of the national feeling. Filled with the national idea, the states must meet each other peacefully, with confidence in their own strength they must trust and respect each other. For this hoped-for tolerance of full vigor the alleged analogy of the religious movement with its tolerance of decaying strength does not present a model. A much more difficult performance standard has been imposed on the social will. To be filled with strength and yet yielding requires the greatest maturity.

There is an analogy, extremely painful for the German nation, with respect to a point quite different from that alleged, as far as the course of the denominational and of the national conflict of power is concerned. The Westphalian Peace condemned the German Empire to weakness because it put its denominational split under foreign control. In the same way, the dictated peace following the World War is designed to condemn the German nation to weakness because it bars Germany from fulfilling the national idea, the prevailing idea of the time. Millions of Germans have been cut off from the community of the national state, and a large part of them has been forced within the power sphere of foreign national states. But whereas its religious disunion originated within the German populace itself, the national fragmentation is thrust upon it against its will and through violation of its original right of self-determination. The religious fragmentation rendered 17th century Germany externally weak without the country itself feeling that it had thereby been injured, while the national fragmentation now forced upon it is felt as a burning wound. This wound will not heal all by itself! While there is no lack of German citizens whose fatigued mind expects and wishes this to happen, it is seen to it that nationalism is aroused anew time and again, for the Germans who

were swallowed up by foreign national states are the victims there of a nationalistic striving for power which shoots for the maximum. It is a vain hope to expect justice for the national minorities from the free reign of nationalistic striving for power!

What has just been said for the German nation also applies to the other nations which were raped by the dictated peace. The number of Europeans existing as national minorities has been calculated at 30 million. Even though not all of them are under oppressive coercion, the national feeling of millions living in Europe has been gravely injured. The burning old sore is opened time and again by crude interventions. The temperature curve of national provocation is rising, and he who is honestly concerned about world peace must not stand aside and expect that things will automatically right themselves.

3. The Twilight of Arms Power

The terms of peace, however oppressive they were, didn't go far enough to satisfy the French chauvinist. He mistrusted even a diminished, disarmed, and impoverished Germany, now deprived of its allies. Germany's population was still half again as large as France's, and this ratio, given France's lower population growth rate, had to become worse from one year to the next. It is true that without arms and without capital the German people couldn't start a new war, but as long as it had not been deprived of its martial spirit, suspicious hate still couldn't help fearing that in the course of time Germany might accumulate arms and capital again, or that it might find allies who would provide it with arms and capital. Therefore, the French chauvinist proceeded ever further on his way to weaken Germany and to add to the system of military protection encircling the country.

Lately, French policy abandoned this approach. It was realized that one harmed himself by following it. The sensitive barometer of the stock exchange hinted at deepening depression, as the leading capital markets of the world withheld confidence from the franc. France exhausted itself by its armaments, and along with France those friendly states which had to encircle Germany in the east had to maintain their arms posture. Income was not sufficient to cover expenditures, and, besides, income in turn was jeopardized because a weakened Germany didn't manage to make the payments to which it had been condemned. A debilitated Germany failed not only in meeting payments on its debt, it also failed as a buyer, and the victors couldn't help realizing that in this way, too, they were harming themselves. England was still more afflicted than France, and even the real winner in the World War, the United States of America, was affected as well. If Germany was unable to buy, then England and the United States couldn't sell to Germany. The world on the largest scale put to the test the correctness of the old doctrine of the division of labor and learned to weigh the gravity of the error which had been committed when through the dictated peace the equilibrium of the worldwide community of labor had been destroyed.

These were the reasons which removed from France's chauvinist leaders the following by a majority of nationals. But with all this one had only arrived at the beginnings of a better

understanding. One hadn't got yet beyond the point of perceiving the external symptoms which one read off the official stock exchange list and the unemployment tables. One still had to gain the insight, not easily come by, that the whole system of the dictated peace was an aberration which barred the way to peace. The dictated peace had been built upon a system of national mutilations and oppressions and of military safeguards which these, in turn, necessitated an abysmal error! Between finished nations deserving of this name and we probably need not say a word about whether the German culture nation deserves it military safeguards are senseless because they aim at arms power, but arms power has nothing left to do between them anymore, and if it still tries to accomplish something, it, and along with it society, collapse into the twilight of the gods.

We on our part in the preceding investigations assigned ample historical space to the task of force. We assigned to it the task of opening up the path to historical development into larger dimensions. It has to unify the peoples, who develop their full potential strength only when united and yet are unable to join together of their own free will. It has to get the circulation of power started and to ever expand the framework of its movement. Even when it has led to higher stages of development we have assigned to it the task of clearing historical obstacles out of the way during temporary reverses. Yet the highest state of society must be able to exist without force; it must be secured by internal powers. To be sure, the world as a whole is not yet ripe for this ultimate state. In many parts of the world, also in large areas of Europe, and even in states priding themselves of their civilization, force has not yet completed its task, and hence even the state which has become fully ripe for peace must not yet for the time being divest itself of its means of force where it must protect itself against its bellicose neighbors. But matters are different between the fully matured culture nations themselves; as far as their interrelations are concerned, there is no task left for force. The law of highest success rules out the use of force between them. Between them the principle of power demands the cessation of the use of armed force forever, because such a fight between them would amount to annihilation.

Among barbarian peoples, too, war occasionally ended with annihilation. If we trace back the course of history to the ages of barbarism we see it covered with ruins. But where during those ages war accomplished its task of unification without exhausting the strength of the populace, renewed strength and enhanced vitality burst into bloom, and the losses of life and property were soon made up again. Just as, according to legend, in certain valleys after a disastrous epidemic one young man and one girl who were spared founded a new generation of energetic people, so after the devastations of war it happened time and again that the survivors whom the sword of the enemy had spared renewed their people in undiminished vigor, thanks to the natural wealth of the land which they colonized; the forest always supplied the timber for the reconstruction of the destroyed cottages, and the herd always replenished itself quickly, and every summer brought forth new crops. Even where culture peoples and barbarians met in battle, the war might speed up the cycle of development, nay, this very encounter has been particularly favorable to it. The superior strength of the Romans united in

one realm the tribes of the European west all the way over to England, with an after-effect on civilization and culture lasting until the present time. The subjugation of a culture people by vigorous barbarian conquerors produced new ethnic groups of a superior type, the very advanced civilizations of Asia having originated in this way. The European culture peoples of the present acquired their specific character when the twig of antique culture was grafted unto the wilding of barbarian vitality.

The World War victory was as complete as it could be, and yet it didn't bring the world of culture one jot closer to the goal of unity. On the contrary, it brought victors and vanquished to an extreme confrontation of hate and mistrust. Nations react with utmost sensitivity to encroachments of armed might. Louis XIV was able to seize the pieces of German Alsace allotted to him by the verdicts of his "chambers of reunion" without having to fear resistance, given the weakness afflicting the emperor and the realm. When Frederick the Great grabbed a piece of Austrian Silesia, Maria Theresia in her pride as a ruler offered him resistance to the best of her ability, and he had to defend his acquisition in the Seven-Year War. The peoples of Austria followed their duchess faithfully in the wars she waged over Silesia, yet it was only their duchess's cause, not their own, for which they fought. The French nation felt the loss of Alsace and especially of the Metz region, which it had to cede in the Frankfurt Peace, as a very personal loss. Internal powers tie a nation together into a unit down to its very depth. It is a compact, inner aggregate of power; its national boundaries are viewed as its natural boundaries; and if a strip of its national land is taken away from it, this alienation is felt like the loss of a limb which belongs to its body. To renounce its recovery would be tantamount to renouncing national independence and dignity. National idealism is primed to give its best in the just fight which must be waged for the undiminished retention of the national stock. This is why those wars turn so horrible in which the idealism of nations, all of whom believe in their just cause, collides. How is such a war to end? The "decisive battle" which used to end dynastic wars is not decisive in a national war, for nations fight to the exhaustion of their strength. The enemy must be worn out to a degree which approximates extermination. The World War with all its shudders still falls short of giving us the complete picture of a war of exhaustion, for the economic superiority of the Entente brought it to a close before it had progressed to complete military exhaustion. The next world war, if one is to follow, will be started only when the masses on both sides have been lined up in a near-equilibrium, and this is why the determination to annihilate will then have to be carried through to the end.

What gives to the task of force its historical meaning? It is rooted in the fact that by the forced superposition of peoples the circulation of power in the world is brought closer to its objective. Complete nations do not tolerate any superposition, they already have reached the end of the cycle. Between them there is no room for any relationship other than that of mutual respect and equality in a free community of nations. Any attempt which one of them might undertake to elevate itself above the others to world rule will be resisted by these others to the point of exhaustion of their strength. Napoleon made this

attempt but in the process even his genius failed him. There is no force on this earth strong enough to tear apart or to crush a living nation; the more violent the encroachment the more sustained the energy of resistance. And could, for that matter, the victorious nation become happy about its victory? Through the extermination of the other culture nations it would have deprived itself of the necessary complements to its own personality, and it would have fully consumed its own material and moral capital without which it could not maintain its ethnic identity and its culture. It would have to pay for its victory by its own ruin.

4. The League of Nations

As Austria, Russia, and Prussia, the leading states of the Continent, after the overthrow of Napoleon joined in the Holy Alliance in order to secure peace for Europe, so the victorious states of the Entente after the World War founded the League of Nations in order to safeguard world peace against new shocks. In the case of the Holy Alliance its name already suggested the great significance attributed to its task by its sponsors. The name of the League is more modest, but its sponsors were no less convinced of the sanctity of their cause. Just as did the Holy Alliance, they claimed, after all, the authority to intervene as regulators in the affairs of states which didn't belong to it as members whenever they thought such action to be justified in the interest of world peace. As victorious England, bent on protecting its independence, had kept away from the Holy Alliance, so the United States has declined to forego its decision-making freedom by joining the League. On the other hand, the Holy Alliance permitted defeated France, against whom the organization was originally intended, to join. Likewise the League has left open the right to accede under certain preconditions to the vanquished Central Powers, which at first were excluded, and it appears that Germany is now just about to seek admission and to be admitted. Russia was not invited to join, but for the rest League membership from the start was left open to all nations of the world, and the preponderant majority have joined. It is almost a complete world federation.

The Holy Alliance deserves to be remembered more favorably than public opinion in the succeeding liberal era has done. One is agreed to condemn it as representative of a narrow-minded police mentality. Though there was enough reason for doing so, one should not have overlooked what it accomplished in the matter of European peace. The work of peace of the Congress of Vienna for which it pleaded was a true work of peace. After the undignified bickerings and petty jealousies which had imbued the Congress, it eventually still succeeded in drawing the state boundaries between the nations rather well in accordance with the thinking of the times, and, indeed, these boundaries by and large remained almost unchanged until the outbreak of the World War. The wars during the immediately preceding century were for the most part, as far as Europe is concerned, internal wars or grew out of internal wars. The political changes occurring in Europe

this will be shortened to "the League".

(Tr.)

for the most part served the domestic national confrontation, a demanded by later developments, which the Congress of Vienna hadn't been able to foresee. Will it also be possible to say after a century of the League's peace work that this work was stable and enduring because it was conceived in accordance with the spirit of the times?

If the League is destined, as originally intended by its sponsors, to give stability and durability to the peace dictated by its victors, one certainly cannot say such a thing. A federation which is to preserve the peace as it was dictated by the victors of the World War is not a federation of peace but one of force, because this peace is not a peace but something ordained by force which militates against the thinking of the times. The thinking governing the times with respect to international relations was announced with apt words in some of its essentials in the war manifestos of the Entente and finally in Wilson's Declaration of the Fourteen Points, which constitutes a historic document of the time. Victors and vanquished came together in this declaration, and the German people, putting its trust in it, laid down the arms. However, the peace dictate didn't adhere to the solemnly rendered declaration. It denied to the defeated the original national right of self-determination, although to the best of their insights and conscience they had to tell themselves that in the era of nationalism this original right must not and cannot be wrested from any nation. What could be the fundamental reason for France's mistrust of Germany other than the awareness that the latter would not submit to this forced peace in the long run!

In its deeds the League rose not inconsiderably above the spirit in which it originated. In a series of important cases it acted as a genuine organ of world peace. To judge from these samples, the world possesses in it the basic foundations of the constitution which it needs. The League has moral power which proved sufficient to keep smaller nations about to disturb the peace in check, and in its statutes it also provided for the material power resources which enable it to deter from war even the stronger nations, or, if they still broke the peace, to calm them again through military action. The League, however, proved itself not only as a worldwide police organ, but it has acted as a ready organ of assistance with a view to freeing nation and populace of afflictions — or reducing them — inasmuch as these became a threat to the world. If at some future time Germany should become a member of the League's Council, national minorities will also have the agent whom according to the League's statutes they need in order to express their concerns. To be sure, in those cases where the interest of the big victor nations or of their close allies was at stake, the League failed. The decision it rendered concerning Upper Silesia was felt to be a gross injustice not only by Germany but also by many impartial men outside Germany. What is still much worse, conflicts which immediately concerned the interest of the League's powerful members could not be brought before it in the first place if the danger of the League's falling apart was to be avoided. What will happen if conflicts affecting their vital interests break out between the powerful members of the League? The League may be able to enforce judgment by execution on the little peace-breakers, but will it not have to give full scope to the big ones? The fact that the big powers still maintain their

tribulations or war, to be left alone. Millions of such friends of peace taken together carry no weight on the scale of history. They are destined to languish completely in strength and to fall prey to the next despot who arises from within or presses in from without. They are either invaded by their more resolute neighbors, or else they will be visited by the still worse civilian tumults and horrors. It still won't do even if such friends of peace form an association or a federation, however glorious a name they may give to their collective and however shrewdly elaborated may be the statutes which they want to obey in order to avoid war. Such endeavors are surely praiseworthy, but they remain within the realm of wishful thinking and are unable to force the brazen gates of real life. A power of peace to be operative would have to wield compelling power over the hearts, it would have to live up to an ideal which enthuses the leaders while elevating the masses. It would have to fill leaders and masses with a moral fortitude matching soldierly valor, and it would have to arouse in them an unlimited sense of duty. It would be a match for the powers of war only if it assumes the latter's boldness, sense of obedience, and chivalry as an order of peace taking over from the orders of knighthood of the Crusades the double duty of care, especially of the soul, on one hand, and on the other of combat, which as moral combat would have to set requirements no less stringent; as an order of peace taking over from the freemason order the impetuous striving for light and, be it said irrespective of all danger of misunderstanding, from the Jesuit order the increased rigor of discipline, the deep understanding of world and mankind, the conviction of the sacredness of its own cause, and the unbending and compelling will to power.

No less strong would have to be the power of peace which would have to fight the battle for peace within the nations and would have to resolve the existing power conflicts through the unifying national spirit. The classes within the nation are more prone to attacking each other than are the nations. None of the nations which were embroiled in the World War wanted to attack, all were dragged into the war against their wish. However, the proletarian class in its programs has openly flung down the gauntlet, and the extreme political parties do so everywhere. On many an occasion hostilities would have commenced long ago if the parties had been so well armed as is true for the nations. As soon as the masses commanded weapons as did the Paris Communists in 1871 or the proletarian masses in Russia and in many other places after the upheaval, civil war flared up. How many tasks, indeed, there would be for a national Order of Peace within the nation to occupy male and female teachers, monitors, and nurses in the many places where misery is to be alleviated, conflicts* are to be settled, and social education is to be advanced!

The persons joining ranks in order to wage the fight for peace should not organize themselves as parties alongside the other parties but would have to keep aloof from the parties, with whose more limited purposes they would have nothing to do because they strive for fundamental renewal. Just as the spirit of the monks of Clugny pervaded the entire hierarchy of the church, these persons would have to fill all the social strata of the nation with their unifying national spirit. Within these strata there would likely be formed the leaders and masses for the

modern freedom organs which must give stability and meaning to the democratic movement.

Everywhere among the mature nations endeavors are afoot in various guises which are aimed at external peace, the goal deserving of the highest priority. In Morel who died too early, the English nation had a hero in the fight for peace. It would especially devolve upon the disarmed German nation to shape through national reformation the power of peace being victorious over external coercion.

6. The Youth Movement

For the contemporary political calculus the Youth Movement is of not the slightest importance, and no statesman has to take it into account in any way. But in a faithful accounting of the social forces it must be allowed for. Although the magnitude of the present-day value at which it would have to be entered into the balance sheet is wholly uncertain, it must not be neglected in a listing of existing values. The tiny spark of light emanating from it is hardly visible in the profound darkness in which the present is immersed, but it may nevertheless be destined, already in the near future when present-day youths have become active men, to illuminate the world as a shining light.

The Youth Movement has its origin in the old culture nations of Europe. From its national origins it has become integrated into a European movement, radiating from here out into all civilizable nations and races of the other continents. If everything may be included which goes by its name, it comprises today already millions of members. The observer who is serious about the matter must exclude from this figure all those who take pleasure in the mere outward appearances of the movement and from whom the genuine youth associations turn away with disdain. As one of the genuine representatives describes these phonies, they are "groups of dissatisfied, neurasthenic people who have found each other from weakness and unfitness rather than from a sense of strength, who are not able to stand on their own feet and who lack the wisdom of keeping quiet." Or they are groups which, as the same severe critic points out, were captured by circles belonging to the withering world, by the churches or the old political parties. Both kinds of groups are met with bitter enmity by the genuine federations and orders.

How big the genuine core is cannot be determined by an outside observer. In Germany a large part of the academic youth does not belong to it, being still prejudiced by the historical traditions which call the young man to the use of arms and the waging of war and for which the moral fortitude required by the fight for peace counts for nothing. We may assume that outside Germany, too, the number of young men who form the core of the movement is small. Could it be any different? Always it is only the few, whether young or old, whose mind and will are really in motion, but these few are chosen to be the leaders of the masses. The catchword issued by the genuine core of the youth movement is "~~independence~~" and "service" -- the appropriate catchword for the emerging leader whose task it is to serve the masses by walking ahead or them with self-reliance. The true youth movement is a leadership school, called upon to train the

small number of those who will, as leaders, give the law to the large number.

It is not easy for the outside observer to find his way through the flowing fog of symbolic words and acts to the real bottom of the movement. But one must not be misled by such muddy manifestations of energy; a movement which begins with utter clarity will in its next stage already have become dull. As the engineer derives from the rushing mountain stream the big driving energies, so the moral energies needed by society can be derived only from those movements which rush things in their zealous striving.

What can be discerned as driving impulses under the cloaking symbols is sound. One wants to get out from the conflicts of power in which present-day mankind consumes itself. One no longer knows the divisive national hate, one probably also has got over the divisive class consciousness, nor does one unsteadily vacillate any longer between faith and knowledge. Abhorring all dogmatism, one is religious in the deepest sense, desiring to profess, as the leader of one of the English federations puts it, the great nameless god of all of humanity — who "is adored in a thousand and one different religions, idols, icons, images, and symbols, and is also the sign of the agnostics.1" One has rejected any kind of civilian or military fight and has resolved "to wield the invisible weapon of nonviolence." For a movement of such depth it is a matter of course that one unites in the compactness of orders.

Perhaps one may summarize the substance of this genuine youth movement by saying that it strives to awaken the deepest, the most hidden, the original force of the human entity.

None of the great human movements has so far succeeded in achieving its goal fully. Might the youth movement succeed? Rather than seeking an answer to the question, we will be content to state that the goal which it is after is the same which the principle of power is after which leads from external to internal power. It gives one a good feeling to be able to say that the best among our youth have the will to become internally strong.

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